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Chief of Land Staff (CLS) Lieutenant-General Peter Devlin and CWO Giovanni Moretti, Army Sgt-Major visits The National Support Element (NSE) during Battle Inoculation Stand during exercise REFLEXE RAPIDE at Canadian Forces Base Wainwright, AB, 5 September 2010.

Deciphering the Roles of Chief Petty Officers/ Chief Warrant Officers within Command Teams

by **Necole Belanger**

Chief Warrant Officer (CWO) Necole Belanger, MMM, CD, is currently the Command CWO for the Canadian Forces Intelligence Command (CFINTCOM). She joined the Canadian Armed Forces in 1987 as a Military Police Officer and since transitioning to senior appointments in 2013 has held such jobs as the Strategic Joint Staff CWO, the Strategic Response Team CWO for Operation HONOUR, the 16 Wing CWO, and the Canadian Defence Academy CWO. She is currently the Command Chief Warrant Officer for the Canadian Forces Intelligence Command. CWO Belanger holds a bachelor's degree with first class distinction from the Royal Military College and a two-year diploma in Law and Security Administration from Loyalist College of Applied Arts and Technology. She has also authored several articles on leadership, including *The Accidental Strategic CWO*, *Inclusive Leadership: If We Build It Will They Come*, and *Being a Member of the Profession of Arms: A RCAF CWO's Perspective*.

According to *Beyond Transformation: the Chief Petty Officer, First Class/Chief Warrant Officer (CPO1/CWO) Strategic Employment Model (SEM)*, a command team construct is generally defined as "... a distinguishable set of two or more people who entered, dynamically, interdependently and adaptively toward a common and valued goal/objective/mission, who have been assigned specific roles or functions to perform and who have a limited life-span of membership."¹ *Beyond Transformation* goes on to define this construct as "the combination of a Commander and CPO1/CWO" with their individual skill sets being merged together to form the final level of leadership, either at the tactical, operational, or strategic level.² While it is recognized that other command teams exist at lower levels, I will focus solely on the senior appointed Chief Petty Officer/Chief Warrant Officer (CPO1/CWO).



Then Lieutenant-General Wayne Eyre, Commander of the Canadian Army, speaks to participants of the Canadian Armed Forces Small Arms Concentration at the Connaught Ranges and Primary Training Centre in Ottawa, Ontario, 21 September 2019.

This article challenges the assumption that CPO1/CWOs are ready to fulfill command team roles beyond the tactical level immediately upon appointment. I think we have a gap and a missed opportunity to enhance the effectiveness of the command team, particularly for those CPO1/CWOs in key institutional appointments where they may feel out of their element because of the dichotomy that exists between military chain of command that most are familiar with and unity of command and the system of government at the strategic or institutional level. This paper is designed to highlight the complexities associated with each senior appointed level of leadership within the CPO1/CWO Corps and could be a beneficial tool for those currently serving as senior CPO1/CWOs. It will also serve as a good foundation of study for future senior CPO1/CWOs. It will compare and contrast the different roles and complementary strengths of the officers and non-commissioned members (NCMs) who come together to form these teams and I hope that by building on the points of view presented that you can increase the effectiveness of your leadership team relationship.

An Interesting Dynamic

While acknowledging the importance of any command team’s ultimate leader with authority – the Commander – we need to expand our focus beyond this unitary position so

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that roles and responsibilities of appointed Commanders and CPO1/CWOs remain clear.³ Commanders’ roles are easily defined by their accountabilities, responsibilities, and authorities (ARAs) and clearly laid out in law. For CPO1/CWOs it isn’t that simple. CPO1/CWOs have no authority by themselves; they derive their authority from their Commander and exercise it in the Commander’s name. This does not mean CPO1/CWOs lack authority or are powerless; they are definitely not. CPO1/CWOs rely on their personal power within the organization to undertake activities on their Commander’s behalf. Personal power is described in leadership doctrine as a source of influence a person has over his followers and is based on strength of character, confidence, and competence that individuals acquire in the course of their development.⁴ It is the reliance on this personal power and the authority the CPO1/CWO derives from their individual Commanders that makes for an interesting relationship. This dynamic does not exist anywhere else in government or even in big business, which could explain why CPO1/CWO roles have remained elusive and difficult to codify.

Most CPO1/CWOs have heard their roles portrayed as “buttons and bows” or the “3Ds” (dress, deportment, and discipline), co-stewards of the profession of arms, guardians of the NCM corps, and, as the advisor and confidant to the Commander.

While these terms largely express some of what we have traditionally done, there remains a lack of consistent understanding as to the potential to enhance the command team through a more fulsome spectrum of how CPO1/CWOs can, could, and should be leveraged from within our own ranks as well as at the officer level. For the most part, our roles do not change significantly; what changes is the organizational influence we exert, and the manner in which we choose to exercise these functions varies depending on the positional level we are filling and the “value-added” we can bring to the command team through our unique perspectives and experiences. Our scope of engagement at each level should focus on leading the institution and align with our Commander’s ARAs. Developing CPO1/CWOs who are competent at all three levels of leadership and able to not only lead people, but lead the institution, is imperative and it becomes even more vital at the strategic level. Complicating this fact is that attributes that make a CPO1/CWO a highly effective tactical leader do not always translate across the other levels of leadership, and in fact, in some cases, may actually inhibit their thinking or acting and being effective at the operational and strategic levels.


“While approaches will reflect individual personalities, and methods may differ to complement their commander, strategic level CPO1/CWOs fill many roles, but I consider three mutually supporting ones to be essential: as connectors, they help link the grassroots with the strategic, ensuring implications, issues, and ideas are aligned and understood up, down, and across the chain; as advisors, they provide critical perspectives and act as sounding boards for many, especially for

complex decisions; and, as communicators, they reinforce commanders’ intent while providing a conduit up for voices in the field. Critical for success in all at this level are organizational understanding, wide networks, and well developed interpersonal skills, along with a solid appreciation of institutional issues.”

– Acting Chief of Defence Staff
Lieutenant-General Wayne Eyre

Former Canadian Forces Chief Warrant Officer (CFCWO) Kevin West, in his 2010 Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) Journal article “The Role of the Chief Warrant Officer within Operational Art,” touched on the fact that “without clear definitions of roles..., a grey area will continue to exist between the [officer and NCM] corps”⁵ at levels beyond the tactical sphere. It is imperative that the institution guard against its dilution by establishing stringent criteria by which the establishment of one strategic occupation called the “CPO1/CWO Corps” will be created. The single most important criterion within the SEM Guidance Document was to ensure CPO1/CWOs were paired with Commanders to form command teams.⁶

To clarify the lack of understanding regarding the roles of the senior-most CPO1/CWO within the different levels of employment the CAF moved toward competency-based human resource (HR) practices. “In recent years the CAF has taken steps to modernize this career management system. One of these initiatives has been the development of leader profiles (LP) for executive level positions.”⁷ However, even these do not quite



DND photo

CWO Crystal Kramer, Military Police Command Team at Tactical Level (Tactical Leadership Team).

capture all the nuances of the command team concept and tend to be more applicable to individuals in leadership roles. Thus, we find ourselves in a quandary: when the roles are too explicit they limit a Commander's ability to make appropriate use of their CPO1/CWO and develop a cohesive team that fits their requirements; too generic or broad, they provide no real clarification or defined arcs, and consequently a discrepancy is evoked.⁸

“As a CPO1/CWO, progressing from the tactical, operational and to strategic levels will impose an increased demand in the abilities and commitment of the Chief Corps. Our role as chiefs is to “Set the Example” of unique values and behaviours that are intended to deliver operational professionalism and leadership proficiency. What we do will always be about our people, regardless of the level.”

CPO1 Gilles Grégoire
Canadian Armed Forces Chief
Warrant Officer

CPO1 Grégoire is adamant in carrying on with the work of former CAFCWOs. He recognizes this discrepancy and wants to ensure that that CPO1/CWOs possess enhanced skill-sets and the necessary cognitive knowledge to take on the responsibilities demanded of them within each of the three senior appointment levels: Post Tactical Leadership Team – Entry (PTLT – E), Post Tactical Leadership Team – Master (PTLT – M), and Strategic Leadership Team (SLT). Having occupied every leadership level within the CAF, CPO1 Grégoire knows better than most that when CPO1/CWOs cross the threshold from leading people to leading the institu-

tion their roles and responsibilities must shift from the technical competencies they developed in their trades to broader leadership competencies, critical thinking, strategic planning, complex problem solving and effective communications. Along with shouldering greater responsibilities, the institution requires advice and input from CPO1/CWOs because of the unique position they occupy within the framework of the CAF. Senior CPO1/CWOs are expected to “provide knowledgeable input, grounded in critical thinking, supported by ethical reasoning, contextualized in practical experience and professionalism.”⁹ In order to address this discrepancy the *CPO1/CWO Preferred Path* was created. This model is based on the acquisition of sequential professional military education (PME) knowledge since sequencing of instruction is one of the most important issues in the application of learning theory.¹⁰

The author designed the current *CPO1/CWO Preferred Path* (Figure 1) to augment the experiences CPO1/CWOs bring to the table and better prepare them for the complexities of leading the institution and advising Commanders at the strategic level. The intent of this conceptual model was not to force NCMs into obtaining diplomas and degrees but rather to lay out a more deliberate path and sequence of developing expertise and gaining experience. Past practices often separated or emphasized one over the other. While experience can, it does not always provide all the necessary skills needed for the next appointment while education alone only provides knowledge, not necessarily understanding or application. There is no clear answer as to which is the most appropriate or successful because there is not a “one size fits all”

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


Figure 1: The CPO1/CWO Preferred Path

solution. Every CPO1/CWO is different. What is most important is the ability to learn and practically apply the knowledge coupled with an open-minded attitude toward new ideas and concepts, which is exactly how the *Preferred Path* is set up. It addresses a systemic gap and offers a better way to develop CPO1/CWOs. The CAF needs us to be productive at every level and adaptive to the learning curve that exists at each level. You won't always be invited to have a seat at the table, so when you do have that opportunity, you must make it count and not only bring your ideas but opinions and advice. Adding value and enhancing effectiveness comes from a combination of expertise, experience, and education.

The Three Environments and the Three Leadership Levels

There is little doubt that the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN), the Canadian Army (CA) and the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) employ their CPO1/CWOs differently. For example, the RCN employs the Command Team Triad (Commander, the Executive Officer (XO) and the Coxswain), while the CA leadership team is composed of the Commanding Officer (CO) and the Regimental Sergeant Major (RSM). The RCAF employs a CO with a Squadron Warrant Officer (SWO). At Headquarters level, there may also be the insertion of staff positions like the Chief of Staff (COS) or Deputy Commanding Officer (DCO) that bring an additional dynamic to the command team. Regardless of the environmental uniform the CPO1/CWO wears, one thing is certain – for any of these relationships to work the CPO1/CWO must play a complementary role to their Commander and they must excel at the people part of leadership: connecting, communicating, motivating, etc. while also being prepared to advise and lead the institution.

At the PTLT-E level, it is usually the CPO1/CWO who has the greater experience and technical expertise as well as an understanding of NCMs and thus their advice is of particular value to the Commander. The CPO1/CWO is relied upon heavily by the Commander to ensure the sailors, soldiers, and aviators are trained and developed and motivated and well cared for so that the organization is an effective fighting force. A PTLT-E CPO1/CWO almost always takes a “hands on” approach. Their focus is mostly on leading people and the manner in which leadership is exercised at this level can best be described as “down and in,” but there exists some operational influences. In this type of relationship, the Commander and the CPO1/CWO are almost always together in order to contribute to mission success. For the most part, CPO1/CWOs excel at this level of leadership and accordingly their roles should not change.¹¹

At the PTLT-M level, it becomes the officer who may possess greater experience, stemming in part from their professional development (PD) that includes not only their occupational requirements but also leadership, strategic planning, critical think-

ing, and execution of operation as well as extensive experiential opportunities through exercise, employment, and deployment. Courses such as the Joint Command and Staff Program (JCSP) and the National Security Program (NSP) groom these future leaders for leadership of the institution. However, the experiential advice of the CPO1/CWO is still of vital importance and brings a distinct and unique viewpoint because CPO1/CWOs view problems from a different perspective than officers.¹² At this level you must be creative, a visionary, and extremely confident in your abilities to provide the proper advice that assists your Commander in taking risks. Furthermore, your scope of responsibilities is greater than at the PTLT-E level and you must consider a wider range of potential outcomes. You start to shift from “doer” to “delegator” and learn to lean on and trust subordinates. As a member of this team, the CPO1/CWO should be venturing out on their own on occasion to communicate the Commander's intent and to engage audiences within their organization. It is at this level that we start to see a shift from leading people to leading the institution, which the Deputy Director Academics at the Canadian Forces College, Dr. Alan Okros, describes as occasionally addressing “inter-related domains across, ‘up and out,’ including into societal and political arenas in which the profession of arms must function.”¹³ In a nutshell, operational leadership is about mission implementation and getting things done.

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At the SLT level problems are not controlled by tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). More often than not, problems are “wicked” in nature and are rarely as straightforward as dilemmas faced at the tactical level. CPO1/CWOs must possess a broader institutional and political understanding so that they do not make snap decisions that can make a problem worse. They must focus on framing the problem before attempting to solve it. This is a difficult feat to master since CPO1/CWOs are accustomed to reacting immediately and are used to feeling that they have all the answers. At the strategic level the Command CPO1/CWOs set the tone for the entire NCM Corps, and along with their institutional level Commanders, they affect the entire culture of the CAF. They set direction vice drive execu-

tion. They must be outstanding examples and be models of ethical, professional, and technical competence. Effective Command CPO1/CWOs are combined team builders who must understand the joint, interagency, and multinational environment. They must be “deft influencers and organizers, with a keen appreciation for the mechanics of power and the social environment in which they operate.”¹⁴ As such, almost every “task requires more coordination, takes longer, has a wider impact, and produces longer-term effects”¹⁵ than operational or tactical decision-making. A strategic CPO1/CWO remains focused on the “down and in” while simultaneously operating in the “up and out” framework, which helps shape broader organizational systems and processes. In other words, strategic leadership for CPO1/CWOs is about helping to position the organization to be competitive in the long run. It isn't so much about individual environments as it is about the CAF as a whole. More often than not a strategic level CPO1/CWO will

DND photo by Corporal Lynette Ai Dang



Commander Mark O'Donohue, the Commanding Officer of HMCS *Calgary*, Cdr Meghan Coates, the Executive Officer of HMCS *Calgary* and Chief Petty Officer First Class Mark Chambers, the Coxswain of HMCS *Calgary*, stand on the ship's forecandle in Jakarta, Indonesia during Operation PROJECTION, 2 July 2021.

engage with military and civilian stakeholders outside of their command structure, independently of their Commander, although the CPO1/CWO's priorities will always line up directly with those of their Commander's. Additionally, these CPO1/CWOs spend

less one-on-one time with troops and thus use the privilege of speaking to a wide variety of audiences to communicate the commander's intent. We call this a privilege because the Commander must entrust their CPO1/CWO with this role.

Senior Appointed CPO1/CWO Command Teams

Contributing Regiment	RCN	CA	RCAF	PAN CAF	NATO	Deployed Ops	Res F
Level 0 – Institutional	–	–	–	1	–	–	–
Level 1 – Strategic Strategic Leadership Team – (SLT)	1	1	1	5	–	–	–
Level 2 – Operational Post-Tactical Leadership Team – Master (PTLT-M)	2	5	2	–	–	–	3
Level 3 – Tactical Post Tactical Leadership Team – Entry (PTLT-E)	6	11	13	27	6	5	18

Author: CWO Belanger

Table 1: Senior Appointed CPO1/CWO Command Teams [Data furnished by the CPO1/CWO Corps CWO, CWO Jenny Godin].

NOTE: Specific Level 3 - PTLT-E positions are undergoing assessment to determine whether they will migrate to a Level 2 – PTLT-M. Presently, these positions are accounted for under PTLT-E.

The Challenges of Navigating from the Tactical to the Operational and Strategic Level

Preparing CPO1/CWO to assume leadership roles at the three different levels can be extremely challenging. First and foremost, employment opportunities beyond the tactical level for CPO1/CWOs are still limited in scope. Second, is our own inability to articulate a clear understanding of our roles at these different levels. Last and perhaps most important, is that some are still holding on to the pervasive attitude that Commanders and CPO1/CWOs should only be paired together at the tactical level.

As an institution, we need to provide additional exposure for our NCMs into more complex positions to equip them with the knowledge they will require at the operational and strategic level. As a corps, we must not only want to step outside our comfort zone and embrace different leadership roles but be prepared and encouraged to do so. For instance, as the chief disciplinarian of a unit, an individual must shift his or her focus to different tasks at the operational level, such as spending more time focusing on external matters, and playing a new social role in the organization. A common mistake made by tactical level leaders is to continue to lead at the next level without changing their leadership style. “Focusing on your strengths is required, but improving your weaknesses has the potential for the greatest gains... Leaving your comfort zone involves risk, however, and when you are already doing well

the temptation to stick with the status quo can be overwhelming, leading to stagnation.”¹⁶ Even if CPO1/CWOs have the ability to adapt to a new role, they still have to deal with the legacy of the roles that they previously played in the organization. For example, if the CPO1/CWO has earned the reputation as a “hard-edged disciplinarian” people within the organization may hold deep-seated attitudes that make it extremely difficult for that person to undertake a major role shift.¹⁷ Finally, the biggest hurdle is winning over the hearts and minds of those who believe we have no advisory role to play at the operational or strategic level.

This will only be achieved if we as individuals and as a Corps focus on personal and professional growth and if we can articulate unequivocally exactly how we add value and complement our Commanders.

“Commanders benefit greatly from the unique perspectives, experience and advice as well as a “challenge function” that CPO1/CWOs can provide as command team partners. This must not only be developed but encouraged before senior NCMs are assigned to institutional level command team roles so that they are confident and ready to make the most of the opportunity to guide, advise, influence, communicate, and implement the Commander’s vision and decisions.”

RAAdm (Ret’d) Jennifer Bennett

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Then Defence Champion for Women, Rear-Admiral Jennifer Bennett, addresses the audience during an event for International Women's Day, held at the Perley-Rideau Veteran's Health Centre, 6 March 2018, in Ottawa.

Command Teams Working Together for a Common Vision Can Be an Incredible Thing

It has been said that it is lonely at the top, but it shouldn't be because leaders are more effective when they are supported by a team. Leadership of a unit, a formation, or a command is simply too big for any one person. Renowned leadership author John C. Maxwell points out in his bestselling book *Leadership Gold*, "why be on the fringes of your strength zone when you have a chance to be right in the centre by discovering your uniqueness and then disciplining yourself to develop it."¹⁸ Strong command teams require the development of a partnership based on trust, a common vision and open communication. There must also be an understanding of the strengths that each brings to the partnership as well as areas where one can complement or strengthen the other. Bringing the Commander and CPO1/CWO together "results in a team in which the whole is greater than the sum of the parts."¹⁹

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"Command team leadership is vital to the success of the RCAF at all levels. I have been spoiled during my career with exceptionally gifted and intuitive RCAF CWO Partners who have purposefully advanced organizational goals and objectives, demonstrated impeccable role modeling, while remaining tuned to the disposition and vibe of all personnel."

LGen Al Meinzinger
RCAF Commander

The first thing a CPO1/CWO needs to do when being appointed to a command team, regardless of the level, is meet with their Commander and establish a good relationship; the second is to vie for that person's support. It is here that the Commander will lay out the division of labour or set the ground rules that you will be expected to play by. A common

vision and close communication enable decisive and formidable cooperative action. You will know when you have achieved this state of complementarity because your Commander will provide you with a "free runway"²⁰ to do what you need to do to advance



DND photo by LS Erica Seymour/RP26-2019-0038-024

RCAF Commander, Lieutenant-General Al Meinzinger (left) and RCAF CWO, CWO Denis Gaudreault speak with the troops during their visit to Operation REASSURANCE-Air Task Force-Romania, 15 December 2019 at the Mihail Kogălniceanu Airbase.



DND photo by Corporal Brian Lindgren

Commander of Joint Task Force – IMPACT / Task Force – Central (JTF-I/JTF-C), Brigadier-General Michael Wright, with the assistance of A/JTF-I/TF-C Chief Warrant Officer, CWO Richard Coltart, say goodbye to ROTO 3 members who served during Operation IMPACT, Joint Task Force – IMPACT / Task Force – Central, at Camp Canada, Ali Al Salem Air Base, Kuwait, 16 February 2021.

the mission on their behalf. It is simply not enough that you and your Commander understand your relationship; subordinate Commanders and NCMs must also understand it. In the end, a Commander's support will be pivotal to your leadership success; not only because Commanders are the most powerful person in that organization, but because they deal with the big picture on a daily basis. Therefore, it is imperative that you possess a common vision and close communication which will enable decisive and formidable cooperative action and increase effectiveness.

Communication, mutual respect, common vision, and trust are also paramount. The most effective command teams have not only a strong connection and rapport but possess open, effective, and ongoing communication. Two-way feedback is a huge part of the communication cycle. Do not be afraid to communicate candidly and frequently with your Commander. These officers would not ask for your advice if they didn't want to hear the ground truth. This is their way of inviting you to push back before the decision is made. "This is never disloyalty; however, questioning the decision afterward is not good teamwork."²¹ You are essentially the eyes and ears of the Commander and your discussions are on behalf of the personnel within your unit, on your wing, within your formation, or at the command level. You are perfectly placed within the institution to obtain the pulse of the organization you serve.

Trust is built on honesty and dependability. You must deliver what you say you will, which in turn will lead to you influencing up and down the chain of command. Trust builds over

time through mutual respect, a shared vision, and common experiences. Communication builds trust by keeping others informed. A CPO1/CWO can foster trust by articulating the Commander's intent and guidance, with specific focus on the "why." Sustaining trust depends on meeting expectations, thus you must be extremely careful not to communicate conflicting direction when you communicate via the "CPO1/CWO net."

The CPO1/CWO's Role in a Non-Complementary Team

While the CPO1/CWO Corps does an excellent job at trying to match CPO1/CWOs with a specific organization as well as with the appropriate Commander, sometimes compatibility is difficult, if not impossible to achieve. As stated earlier, compatibility and a strong partnership begins and ends with trust. A good indication of a lack of trust is if your responsibilities haven't evolved past the tactical level. For example, at the strategic level, your Commander will only entrust you with decisions concerning NCMs; they do not ask for your advice or your input is considered as an afterthought; you are rarely at the table; and, you are likely required to seek approval on everything you do with close scrutiny and micromanagement. No matter how challenging the relationship may be, it is vital that both partners find a way to balance perspectives and inputs to make the relationship work. You cannot leave the nurturing and tending of this relationship to chance. There is one appointed Commander and the CPO1/CWO's job is to support this officer up to the point where support becomes unethical;

until that point, however, the CPO1/CWO must directly address the lack of a productive relationship.

“CPO1/CWOs need to adapt their style of leadership to the level at which they are operating to compliment that of their command team partners. They must also be comfortable in uncomfortable situations.”

CWO (Ret'd) Denis Gaudreault
Former RCAF CWO

If you are unsure of your Commander's goals, objectives, and desired outcomes, it is imperative to set up a one-on-one meeting as early as possible to gain a better understanding of how they work and how you can best provide support. “With opportunities come risks. Don't be afraid to take them. It is in moments of risk that the greatest leaders are born.”²² You may have to take the lead to inform your Commander about what you bring to the table that can enhance the effectiveness of the team and the organization, how best to use your expertise and experience, and how your inputs and perspectives will help him or her to lead the organization. If you have done all this and you feel you are still being underutilized and do not have a “free runway” to operate you will need to carve out a niche for yourself, being careful not to expand into areas where you have limited knowledge and no authority. If you overstep the authorities the Commander has provided to you the command team will collapse and the relationship will no longer be productive in any form. The only ones who suffer when this happens are the subordinates, both subordinate officers to the Commander, and subordinate NCMs to the CPO1/CWO.

“If you overstep the authorities the Commander has provided to you the command team will collapse and the relationship will no longer be productive in any form.”

Conclusion

The strategic vision of the Commander includes a wider institutional view of where the organization is going, while CPO1/CWOs bring their experience and understanding of the work that goes into making every decision happen and implementing the vision or mission. Through their own careers, CPO1/CWOs have likely seen the issues and have an understanding about how subordinates do their work and how to get the job done effectively and efficiently. “The effect of these two functions working together to solve problems is a force multiplier in any organization. What it does is take the best of both the need to see the big picture with fresh eyes and marries it up with understanding the details and the ‘how’ from the ground up.”²³ CPO1/CWOs can serve as force multipliers if they direct their efforts to those things that their Commanders need them to focus on. CPO1/CWOs must remember that it isn't about them; it is their role as part of a team. You are there because you bring technical competency, professionalism, maturity, experience, and most importantly, a distinctive perspective and voice to the table. Your ability to network and the significant personal power you possess will augment your Commander's understanding of the institution and the big picture and their ability to achieve the mission. One of your many roles, regardless of whether you are exercising direct leadership at the tactical, operational, or strategic level, is to bring the perspective of the NCMs and your understanding of how things get done. Your voice is essential and adds value to one of the most crucial team concepts in the CAF and the occasion will be lost if you don't take advantage of the opportunity to fulfill your role.



NOTES

- 1 Chief of Defence Staff, *Beyond Transformation: The CPO1/CWO Strategic Employment Model* (Ottawa: Chief of Force Development, 2021), Section 2.4.
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- 20 *Ibid.*
- 21 Maxwell. *Leadership Gold*.
- 22 *Ibid.*
- 23 <http://www.leaderschool.ca/blogs--podcast/the-command-team-concept>