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Primary Reserve and Regular Forces artillery soldiers from the 4th Canadian Division on Exercise STALWART GUARDIAN board a Boeing CH-147 Chinook helicopter as part of the mortar insertion exercise at Garrison Petawawa, 19 August 2015.

Serving the Nation's Interests: Creating an Integrated and Agile Canadian Reserve Force

by Shawn D. Bindon and Howard G. Coombs

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This policy enables the Reserve Force to achieve a fulltime capability through part-time service... The Reserve Force will receive new operational roles and will become further integrated into the total force. The Canadian Armed Forces will also create a more agile model that supports the transition between full- and part-time service that meets the needs of the member and the institution.

– Canada, Department of National Defence, *Strong, Secure, Engaged* (June 2017)¹

This succinct aspirational statement from Canada's 2017 defence policy *Strong, Secure, Engaged* (SSE) lays out the future vision for Canada's Reserve Force – an integrated and agile Reserve Force able to effectively and efficiently contrib-

ute to national security. This operational capability has three main components: (1) the service of part-time Reservists will produce full-time capability, (2) Reservists will be a cohesive and contributive part of the total force, and (3) sizable numbers of Reservists will be trained, readied, and equipped to take part in domestic or international operations, in many cases in areas where they may be the sole capability contributor. These elements, grouped in the defence policy under the unifying theme of “A New Vision for the Reserve Force,” will enable a Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) Reserve that contributes significantly to successful operational outputs. Canada's most recent defence policy directs enhanced integration between the Reserve and Regular forces to achieve this goal. Reserve *integration* is defined as achieving “full-time capability through part-time service.”²

Strong, Secure, Engaged lays out the actions that must be taken to enable this admirable goal of fundamental and (perhaps once in a lifetime) change. These measures include increasing numbers of Reservists, streamlining Reserve recruiting, capability, and force development leading to assigned roles that give full-time outcomes through part-time commitment, such as cyber operations, and enhancing existing Reserve contributions, like logistics, intelligence, and information operations. Also directed is the use of Reserve Forces in international capacity building operations, increasingly in a leading role. Along with enhanced use of Reserve Forces are accompanying policy initiatives like flexible terms of service, allowing seamless movement between Reserve and Regular service, plus alignment of pay and benefits between the two components. This is particularly significant in situations where the Reserve conditions of service are like that of a Regular. Additionally, there are ongoing changes to annuitant employment regulations to allow former Regulars who are in receipt of a pension greater flexibility for Reserve employment. Other incentives to Reserve service include full-time summer employment for the first four years of a Reservist's service and efforts to harmonize job protection legislation across Canada.


These endeavours have advanced at various rates since 2017, but despite the diligence, small successes, and the evident goodwill demonstrated by those involved in this work the path forward is not without debate. These conflicting views are in part due to varying understandings of integration. “A New Vision for the Reserve Force” sees a fully integrated CAF, bearing both a renewed operating environment and a cultural dynamic that looks to the Reserve Force as being able to mount, contribute, and, in limited cases, lead operations. What does this integration really mean? At times, there appears to be friction from differing perspectives of integrated organizations, some advocates promoting the diversity of complementary capabilities and others promoting some form of homogeneity as the best fashion in which to

leverage strengths of a varied group. Along with that is the method by which ideas of integration mesh with operational environments, domestic and international, as well as represent themselves in force generation, pre-deployment, deployment, employment, re-deployment and transition to future operations? These questions still require examination and introspection. From this, most important and reinforced from previous Canadian attempts in organizing the Reserves, is the need to clarify the challenges to Reserve/Regular cooperation that must be addressed to move forward in achieving the integration goals of *Strong, Secure, Engaged*.

“SSE lays out the actions that must be taken to enable this admirable goal of fundamental and (perhaps once in a lifetime) change.”

Time Flies Like an Arrow; Fruit Flies Like a Banana

The need for Reserve/Regular integration has underpinned the Militia and Reserve legacy in Canada. Historian George Stanley wrote in his well-known *Canada's Soldiers 1604–1954*: “The story of Canada's defence forces is as old as the history of Canada itself.”³ Stanley points out the early French colonists mustered when required to defend against possible attack. He also notes the inability of the French Regulars to adapt readily to the fighting conditions of New France or seemingly work in conjunction with the colonial Militia resulting in sub-optimal



outcomes.⁴ In doing so, Stanley provides the earliest Canadian examples of the need for an effective combination of full- and part-time military forces. With the ebb and flow of time concepts of cooperation evolved with changing force structures. From the seventeenth until the late twentieth century the Militia⁵ provided the largest component of the Canada's defence forces, with the professional army providing support. If there was a need for mobilization the Militia could provide formed units, and as well contribute significantly to internal defence and security. At the same time, both the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) and the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) maintained Reserves from their early twentieth century inception, but they were much smaller entities than the Militia and from inception were meant to augment the full-time component of their respective services.⁶

However, in 1963 this perspective changed. The liberal government of Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson introduced a significantly reduced defence budget that would decrease the Militia from 51,000 to 30,000 effectives. Even the already small Naval and Air Reserve Forces did not escape significant cuts. As a result of these financial constraints, the RCN Reserve was decreased from 4,000 to 2,700 and the RCAF Reserve even more affected with a lessening of strength from 2,200 to 800. These financial directives were actualized for the Militia by the 1964 Suttie Commission, chaired by Brigadier Earl R. Suttie, Royal Canadian Artillery. The report of the commission realized the reduction of the Militia to the targeted figure of 30,000. This diminishment took on a life of its own and by 1972 the effective strength of the Militia had plummeted to 12,865. This restructuring, which eliminated 114 armories, effectively ended the belief that the Militia could provide any collective level of force generation for war and instead focused its raison d'être on individual augmentation to Regular units. At the same time, the Naval and Air Reserve had separate restructuring committees whose recommendations reinforced the goals of the defence budget. The Naval Reserve reorganization was achieved through eliminating, or "paying off," auxiliary ships, closing and consolidating support infrastructure, and reducing or eliminating Naval divisions. At the same time, the Air Reserve became a six-squadron organization, with associated wing headquarters, all located at existing bases in order to take advantage of remaining infrastructure.⁷


In addition to a desire to rationalize defence expenditures were two major considerations that caused a diminution of Militia and Reserve capacity. First, the demands of the Cold War necessitated "forces in being" that could be deployed quickly. It was observed that Reserve Forces had lower training standards, resulting from less time to acquire skills. They were not always equipped similarly to the full-time military, and would require time to mobilize, equip, train, and deploy. As a result, their ability to contribute to no notice defence and security operations was believed questionable. Second, due to constantly changing elements of the strategic security environment, created by rapidly evolving technology,

proxy warfare, and changing governmental defence priorities, mainly budget driven, there was a consistent lack of coherent and enduring Canadian defence strategy linked to national goals and aspirations. The combination of these factors made the Reserves an opportune target for reductions and amalgamations. Former Defence Minister Paul Hellyer, in his memoir *Damn the Torpedoes*, alludes to these sentiments when describing the "painful" impact of defence cutbacks:

"the need to clarify the challenges to Reserve/ Regular cooperation that must be addressed to move forward in achieving the integration goals of Strong, Secure, Engaged."

None was more so than the reduction in the reserves: but we had to save a few million here and a million or two there. None of us downgraded the reserves..., but we did have doubts about their cost-effectiveness. Many units were far below strength, and too many reservists were overfed World War II veterans whose age and physical condition would have

made it difficult for them to shape up in an emergency. Faced with the task of setting priorities, the Chiefs of Staff decided to conserve as much money as possible for the 'forces in being'. It was a judgement call with which I fully concurred.⁸



Hellyer's recollections include descriptions of acrimony displayed by Militia supporters and affected communities toward the Pearson government regarding the elimination of units and armories.⁹

The White Paper, *Defence in the 70s*, reinforced the viewpoints articulated in the reductions of 1963–1964 by stating the Reserves existed to support the Regular Force through augmentation and reinforcement, as well as potentially providing a mobilization base. They could assist with internal security contingencies and had some specialized tasks to address existing defence gaps. The Naval Reserve maintained a control of shipping organization that could be expanded if needed during a crisis, the Militia had trained personnel for civil emergencies, and the Air Reserve possessed some light air transportation capability. In 1973 the idea of a single force was advocated to not only use reserves as “back up support” for the Regular Force but as an integral part of the forces in being. The initiatives that commenced at that time were like that advocated by the 2017 policy *Strong, Secure, Engaged* with changes to pay and benefits, along with expanded reserve roles. However, the primary difference between then and now is that the focus was upon developing individuals and small groups with specialties that could supplement the Regular Force. This was augmentation of organizations not the integration of capability envisioned today.¹⁰ These changes continued with minor refinements until the 1980s.

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In 1987, the White Paper *Challenge and Commitments* aimed to revitalize Canada's military, including the Reserve Force. Naval Reserve involvement with the Maritime Coastal Defence Vessel (MCDV) dates from this time. Also, the Air Reserve experienced greater responsibilities within, in what was then, Air Command.¹¹

However, it was the Militia that experienced the greatest change. Canada, like many countries in NATO, moved to a total force structure for the Land Forces. This meant, in some instances, that Regulars, as well as full- and part-time Reservists would serve in the same units. The Land Forces were also reorganized into four Land Force Areas: Western, Central, Quebec, and Atlantic.¹²

However, following the break-up of the Soviet Union and disintegration of the Warsaw Pact a new defence policy was created. The 1994 White Paper was shaped by a desire to reap the “peace dividend” resulting from the end of the Cold War. Reductions to the Reserves were again announced and a Special Commission to Examine the Restructuring of the Reserves was formed to look at the Primary and Supplementary Reserves. The reorganization of the Army Reserve from Districts to Canadian Brigade Groups was initiated during this time.

There were several Reserve reviews throughout this period from that of the Office of the Auditor General (OAG) in 1992 to the Special Commission on the Restructuring of the Reserves in 1995. The focus of the Special Commission's scrutiny was the part-time



Members of HMCS *Halifax* make their approach during a Naval Boarding Party exercise aboard HMCS *Halifax* with NATO ally FGS *Spessart*, a German Tanker during Operation REASSURANCE, 3 March 2021.



DND photo by Sergeant Daren Kraus/AR2010-0177-28

Master-Corporal Keven Gelinas, Royal 22^e Regiment provides security at the landing zone during Operation ATHENA, 9 July 2010.

soldiers of the Land Force Militia who were not perceived as meeting total force requirements. The other Reserve elements were seen to be achieving the objectives of the 1994 White Paper.¹³

Following from ministerial directed change initiatives of the late 1990s, the report *In Service of the Nation: Canada's Citizen Soldiers for the 21st Century*, was released in 2000. It was known as the Fraser Report, named after its chair, the Honorable John A. Fraser. In general, the Fraser Report noted issues with low training standards, burdensome administration, problems with recruiting processes, the lack of integration of the Reserves with the mobilization process, review of terms of service to bring in skilled applicants from the civilian economy who could fill specialized roles (like psychological operations or civil-military affairs), the need for reliable funding that is protected, and a requirement for an increase to the strength of the Reserves. Its recommendations resulted in a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) directed project, the Land Force Reserve Restructure (LFRR). The observations of the Fraser Report were reinforced by the release of the Department of National Defence's *Shaping the Future of Canadian Defence: A Strategy for 2020*, that called for modernization of the Reserves. In addition to the Fraser Report and LFRR there were other Defence programs started at that time designed to grow the Reserves and provide better administrative structures to support them. Of note, in the context of today, was the International Policy Statement (IPS) released in 2005, which reinforced the necessity to increase the size of the Reserves. The IPS articulated the need for a mix of civilian and military specialist skills in the Reserves to react to domestic emergencies and augment Regular Force units with similar capabilities. A need to strengthen the Canadian Rangers for Arctic security and sovereignty was highlighted. Unfortunately, these goals were never fully realized.¹⁴

The *CDS Planning Guidance – Future of CF Reserves* promulgated in 2007 continued the trend towards creating “relevant and responsive” Reserve Forces. Simultaneously, Canadian participation in the NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan prompted a need for Reserves that could contribute to this ongoing international operation, support domestic operations, connect Canada's military to civilian communities and assist in the maintenance of sovereignty, especially in the North. Reviews from this time re-affirmed the requirement for a common recruiting system and similar training standards and called for a review of human resource and pay systems, as well as terms of service, to align them between Regular and Reserve Forces.¹⁵

Following on from this, was the *Report on Transformation*, or the *Leslie Report*, named after its chair, Lieutenant-General Andrew Leslie, released in 2011. The *Leslie Report* called for a return of full-time Reserve positions from headquarters and other locations to the part-time units and formations of the Reserve Forces to increase field force capacity. About the same time, the Vice Chief of Defence Staff's (VCDS) *Primary Reserve Employment Capability Study* (PRECS) Report of 2011, provided baseline figures for the Reserve Forces in the context of the ongoing transformation and other review efforts. The review included numbers for full- and part-time Reservists. PRECS also identified the need for Defence Administrative Orders and Directives (DAODs) pertaining to the Reserves, a requirement for a strategic concept for the Reserve Forces and need to ensure correct and guaranteed funding levels.¹⁶ Following that, several directives from both the CDS and VCDS provided guidance for initiatives aimed at creating a capable and responsive part-time Reserve that could support domestic and international operations.¹⁷



A Canadian soldier assigned to the Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team (OMLT) on sentry duty at a strongpoint operated jointly by Canadian and Afghan soldiers.

One of these initiatives was the 2015 Canadian Army initiative *Strengthening the Army Reserve* (StAR). StAR reinforced three main areas: growth, capability, and funding. First, growth included repatriation of recruiting responsibility to Reserve units, leadership initiatives and Regular Force personnel support. Second, capability included a rationalization of tasks, equipment and infrastructure. Last, funding was a promise to establish funding models to support these initiatives.¹⁸ These enhancements were not a moment too soon as the 2016 Office of the Auditor General Report reviewing the Canadian Army Reserve portrayed a force in disarray. These changes are ongoing and were incorporated in the 2017 *Strong, Secure, Engaged*.¹⁹

For Want of a Nail

In retrospect, apart from the most recent StAR initiative these efforts were not able to establish a cooperative, more integrated Reserve/Regular Force. The issues contributing to this lack of success were manifold and ranged from a lack of strategic clarity in the visualization and implementation of these initiatives through ambitious expectations of the abilities of Reserve Forces to meet the demands that were place upon

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them. Resultantly, Regular perspectives of Reservists that are cynical as to actual capability have arisen over the decades.

These views can be generally stated as members of Reserve Forces are sometimes regarded as civilians in uniform, lacking commitment, expertise, and legitimacy. At the same time Reservists sometimes see Regulars as unimaginative and unable to interact with the civilian population, as well as being willing to use Reservists and their service when needed but ready to disregard them when that necessity has passed. Or even worse use the Reserves as a source of funding, equipment, and people to the detriment of the long-term viability of Reserve units.²⁰ These perceptions, rooted in historical experience, real and imagined, impede harmonization of our efforts towards the integration envisioned in our most recent defence policy. Even the large Reserve contribution to international deployments to the Balkans and Afghanistan, as well as sudden domestic operations, like ice storms, floods, firefighting, and other crises which have demonstrated the capacity of the Reserve Forces over the last 30 years, have not eliminated these deeply entrenched sentiments. A senior Army Reservist, Brigadier-General (Retired) James Camsell, when reflecting on his service as a Lieutenant-Colonel, in

Afghanistan in 2008 with the Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team (OMLT) in Kandahar opined:

I was in training in New Mexico and I volunteered to become an infantryman [with the OMLT], nobody knew I was a reservist, most people did not know I was a reservist. So I remember I was having a coffee with some RCR dudes and they started talking about cartoons. So they call reservists cartoons in the RCR, because you're only there on Saturdays type thing. So I listened to this, and they didn't know who I was and I said 'hey, you realize that I'm a reservist and half this section is reserve?'

BGen Camsell also recounts several incidents in Kandahar in which reservists were not perceived as being professionally competent, despite stellar performance, or receiving lesser treatment than the Regulars they served alongside, all of which he attributes to the fact that they were Reservists.²¹ While one would hope that these perspectives do not reflect current thought, but with the passage of time the acknowledgement of the Reserve Force contributions during the last decades will diminish and these negative attitudes may re-assert themselves to act as barriers to Reserve/Regular integration.

Articulating the New Vision for Canada's Reserve Force²²

To institutionalize the ideas contained in Canada's *Strong, Secure, Engaged*, one must confront all biases. Understanding what Canada's Reserve Force is, and is not, becomes crucially important. The Primary Reserve consists of (1) Naval – around 4,000 personnel in 24 cities; (2) Army – about 19,000 reservists distributed in 185 units across 86 cities; (3) Air Force – approximately 2,000 reservists spread nationally in RCAF total force establishments; (4) Military Personnel Command, which includes Canadian Forces Health Services Reserve – 16 units across Canada and the one Canadian Field Hospital in Ottawa – and the National Defence Headquarters Primary Reserve List (PRL) – the latter with roughly 1,500 members; (5) Special Operations Command personnel; and (6) Judge Advocate General Reserve – almost 60 legal officers. Each element is responsible to a service command and can conduct or augment various operations with varying degrees of notice depending on whether it is domestic or international. Along with the ability to respond to these demands, the Reserve Force provides the CAF connection to Canadian communities and emphasizes citizenship through



DND photo by Corporal Shilo Adamson/IS2010-3012-02

A Canadian Ranger rides on a Light Over Snow Vehicle while at a bivouac on Oopik Island, near Canadian Forces Station Alert during Operation NUNALIVUT.

service to country.²³ Then, the Canadian Rangers (a sub-component of the Reserve Force who form part of the Canadian Army) give the only continuous CAF presence in many remote and Arctic communities, and can provide surveillance, community support, search and rescue and patrol support. Additionally, a Supplementary Reserve currently consists of about 6,700 inactive or retired members of the CAF, Regular or Reserve, who are willing and could be available for service until age 60. There is a five-year limit on retention due to “skill fade.” Finally, the Cadet Organizations Administration and Training Service (COATS) consists of officers and non-commissioned members who conduct training, supervise, and administer the Canadian Cadet or Junior Canadian Ranger movement.²⁴ Terms of service for each of these sub-components vary. Although the *National Defence Act* contains provisions to employ any or all these sub-components on operations, it is the Primary Reserve that is the source of personnel for deployments, although the Canadian Rangers are increasingly used in support of CAF operations in their local areas.²⁵

Reservists are distributed in hundreds of communities across Canada. Most of these individuals hold civilian employment or attend an educational institution. Because of this demographic, part-time Reservist availability for military service depends upon many elements, like defence policy; federal, provincial, and territorial legislation; plus socio-economic aspects, like the help and support of their family, their community, and their employer.²⁶ Of note, except when voluntarily participating in operations designated by the CDS, Reservists are not subject to the unlimited liability of their Regular counterparts. Nevertheless, over the course of their service, Reservists will be asked to commit to deployments at home and abroad, as well as undergo substantial professional education and training. Absences from home for these obligations are significant, often using vacation leave from work at the expense of family time. Military administration, training, and education are, then, only a few of the aspects of the support required for effective Reserve Forces. If Reservists cannot access military support and community backing – which includes their civilian employer and family – to mitigate the demands produced by their reserve commitment, the force generation of Reserves to create full-time operational capacity for operations will not be successful. That is why Canada’s 2017 defence policy stresses that integration is underpinned by the need to “...allow Reservists to balance a vibrant civilian life and occupation with meaningful, part-time military service while enhancing the overall Canadian Armed Forces effectiveness.”²⁷

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Consequently, what does integration really mean in the context of *Strong, Secure, Engaged*? What does it not mean? Integration is not solely about augmentation, or increasing the numbers, of Reservists in Regular organizations. That has already been attempted. Integration instead is a whole of defence approach to how Reserve capability is generated and employed to achieve integrated effects. Integration is the creation of the total defence force that should incorporate all elements of organizational development including doctrine, structures, training, education, materiel, equipment, management, leadership, and command, as well as infrastructure.

Simplistically put, the “we” and “them” perspective that seems to be at times present in conscious and unconscious bias needs to be eliminated. Rather than disparate elements Reserves should be viewed as one joint component for which planning occurs in parallel with their Regular counterparts. Although force generation and employment models may be different the idea of creating integrated effects remains unchanged. For example, there should be no “Regular Force equipment and Reserve Force equipment” or “Regular Force infrastructure and Reserve Force infrastructure” but simply CAF equipment and CAF infrastructure with usage integrated into holistic CAF needs.

Critical in all of this is that true integration will occur when the only difference across the Department of National Defence is terms of service, or employment. Importantly this means a unified one CAF perspective on compensation, benefits, and administration and their associated policies – remuneration, access to services/benefits, application of the *National Defence Act* and Queen’s Regulation and Orders, on top of other applicable policies, directives or instructions. Significantly, this has proved the most difficult challenge to resolve, and is the most important. Major-General (Retired) Herb Petras, a former Chief of Reserves, indicated that this change, particularly unified terms of service, which has been advocated since the early 2007, is the most crucial and difficult to affect.²⁸

Perhaps the main barrier to effective integration is managing the process by which change will be affected. Efforts cannot be simply focused on adjustments to the CAF structure by adding people and money. Structural additions or streamlining have failed to create integration in the past. Confronting the ingrained historical legacy of previous attempts to optimize the usage of Reserves and the biases that have evolved from them is the first step. Following from that, visualizing the integrated effects required from Reserve/Regular alignment and the terms of service is needed along with the policy framework required to support it, and from

that flowing into the structural organization needed to produce integrated activities. Changing our primary focus from tailoring our organizations to creating effective policy first is the only way to avoid the pitfalls of the past. Frankly put, without supporting and effective terms of service, aligned administration, compensation, and benefits, one cannot move beyond re-imagining organizations and roles all within similar or the same constraints as the last 60 years. Otherwise despite much effort we might as well be “moving the deck chairs on the Titanic” and this will be another fruitless round of Reserve/Regular engagement.

Conclusion

We have a significant and perhaps fleeting opportunity to integrate the CAF and we need to seize this moment. This is truly a once in a generation opportunity.

It is apparent, in the myriad of shifts regarding full- and part-time military force cooperation and integration that have taken place in Canada | move from ideas of individual or collective augmentation to

since 1960s unification, there was and is a perception of “many paths to the same destination.” However, the numerous and constant adjustments to organizations and roles have had an adverse impact on the elements of the Canadian Armed Forces Reserve. Also, and importantly in the context of defence management, these continual course changes have not permitted any meaningful progress towards a mutually reinforcing concept of Reserve/Regular cooperation. While consensus exists about the need for Reservists and Regulars to serve together with common vision and mutually accepted outcomes, the “how” that is to be attained diverges in detail and methodology depending on whom is engaged. Clarity on this aspect of the integration goal directed by *Strong, Secure, Engaged* needs to be attained.

One should start with the acknowledgement that Reserve (and Regular) Forces are different from popular conceptualizations and ingrained beliefs. Perspectives need to

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DND photo SU2008-0208-05

Major-General Herb Petras, Chief of Reserves and Cadets during his Change of Appointment Ceremony at the National Defence Headquarters, 20 May 2008.

creating successful integrated effects through complementary skills. Along with that is the imperative to facilitate balance amongst the Reserve triad of military service – family – employer through an effective policy framework. This is the starting point to any real and lasting efficacy.

In the final analysis, integration is currently viewed in a variety of ways by the different members of the defence team.²⁹ It can be argued that in most cases, integration is perceived as pertaining to building Reserve/Regular organizations, as well as a concentration on individual augmentation, not towards creating collective capabilities and their management to producing integrated effects. While integration needs to be about producing and employing amalgamated capability, the current focus is upon force structure. We need to shift this

“While integration needs to be about producing and employing amalgamated capability, the current focus is upon force structure. We need to shift this perspective to create a unified vision of Canadian Armed Forces integration that optimizes the contributions of all its members both full- and part-time to achieve unified Reserve/Regular effects in the international and domestic security environments.”

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Acknowledgment

We would like to express our gratitude for the advice and input of Colonel Patrick Kelly, MSM, CD, Deputy Chief of Staff Operations Military Personnel Command and Colonel James McKay, CD, PhD, Assistant Chief of Staff Support 4th Canadian Division, and former Honorary Colonel John Selkirk, CD, Brockville Rifles. As always, all remaining errors are ours alone.



A reservist from 38 Brigade Group's Influence Activities Company conducts patrols and executes key leader engagements during Exercise MAPLE RESOLVE 19, 11 May 2019.

DND photo W707-2019-0013-005 by Private Jordyn Anderson

NOTES

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- 9 Hellyer, *Damn the Torpedoes*, pp. 102–105.
- 10 Canada, Government of Canada, Department of National Defence, *White Paper on Defence* (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1971), 45–46; Canada, Government of Canada, Department of National Defence, *Defence 1973* (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1974), pp. 59–65; and Canada, Government of Canada, Department of National Defence, *Defence 1979* (Hull: Canadian Government Publishing Centre, 1980), p. 28.
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- 20 These ideas arise from research presented during the *Total Defence Force Online Workshop*, 06/07 May 2021.
- 21 Brigadier-General (Retired) James Camsell, OMM, MSM, CD, interview by Officer-Cadet Dennis Emerson, St. John's, Newfoundland, 20 February 2021.
- 22 See *A New Vision for the Reserve Force* in Canada, Department of National Defence, *Strong, Secure, Engaged: Canada's Defence Policy* (June 2017), pp. 67–70; retrieved at <http://dgpapp.forces.gc.ca/en/canada-defence-policy/docs/canada-defence-policy-report.pdf>.
- 23 Significantly, 97% of Canadians live within a 45-minute drive of a Reserve Force unit. *A New Vision for the Reserve Force* in Canada, Department of National Defence, *Strong, Secure, Engaged: Canada's Defence Policy* (June 2017), p. 67.; retrieved at <http://dgpapp.forces.gc.ca/en/canada-defence-policy/docs/canada-defence-policy-report.pdf>.
- 24 For the purposes of this examination of Canada's Reserve Forces and contributions to national security, COATs will not be considered. See Canada, Government of Canada, Office of the National Defence and Canadian Armed Forces Ombudsman, *The Reserve Force* (Date modified: 2020-11-25); retrieved at <https://www.canada.ca/en/ombudsman-national-defence-forces/education-information/caf-members/career/reserves/reservists.html>.
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- 26 Canadian Armed Forces 101 (Date modified: 2021-03-11); retrieved at <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/reports-publications/transition-materials/defence-101/2020/03/defence-101/caf-101.html>; and Enclosure to NATO, North Atlantic Military Committee, Secretary General, *Military Decision on MC 441/2 NATO Framework Policy on Reserves* (19 January 2012), paras 3 and 4.
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- 29 “The Defence Team is composed of military personnel in the Canadian Armed Forces and civilian personnel in the Department of National Defence who work together to carry out the defence mandate.” Lise Arseneau and Amy Cameron, *The Composition of the Defence Team*, in Irina Goldenberg, Angela R. Febraro and Waylon H. Dean, eds., *The Defence Team: Military and Civilian Partnership in the Canadian Armed Forces and the Department of National Defence* (Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2015), p. 69.