Canadian Military Journal [Vol. 23, No. 4, Fall 2023]
Navy

Adam Lajeunesse, PhD is an Associate Professor and Chair of the Public Policy and Governance Program at St. Francis Xavier University in Canada. He works on questions of Arctic sovereignty and security policy and has written extensively on Canadian Armed Forces and allied Arctic operations, maritime security, Canadian-American cooperation in the North, information operations, and Canadian Arctic history^{Footnote *}.

Return to footnote ^* referrer The author would like to thank the anonymous reviewers as well as Dr. Tim Choi and members of the Naval Association of Canada for their insightful input in this article.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine marks an important historical turning point, reframing the global security dynamic and changing the way Western nations perceive their world and defence obligations. The shift in Canadian foreign and security policy has been somewhat predictable: grand statements of purpose, coupled with parsimony and hesitation. Addressing the House of Commons in March 2022, Finance Minister Chrystia Freeland delivered what the CBC described as a wartime speech. “Putin and his henchmen are war criminals,” declared the Minister. “The world’s democracies — including our own — can be safe only once the Russian tyrant and his armies are entirely vanquished. The world’s dictators should never mistake our civility for pacifism. We know that freedom does not come for free, and that peace is guaranteed only by our readiness to fight for it.”^{Footnote 1} Yet, nearly two years into the conflict, the cost of rebuilding the Canadian Armed Forces has led to second thoughts, with the Department of National Defence now contributing to government-wide budget cuts.

The contemporary security situation requires a more robust Royal Canadian Navy — which has seen its responsibilities expand to include longer and more frequent forward deployments, taxing the fleet’s limited number of ageing hulls. Yet, there is very little relief expected in the near term. The Canadian Surface Combatant program — which will provide the Navy with its next generation surface warships — is not scheduled to deliver the first vessel until the early 2030s.^{Footnote 2} The Navy’s submarine replacement project is in the exploratory stages and is at least a decade and a half from replacement boats, if they are built at all. Add onto this complex and lengthy delivery schedule a government seeking to limit defence spending wherever possible and creative approaches to enhancing RCN capability on a budget appear desirable. In this light, it is worth exploring an old debate over the role of the Arctic and Offshore Patrol Ships (AOPS).^{Footnote 3} Namely, can the country get more value from these platforms by enhancing their combat power and expanding their capabilities?

These vessels were certainly never intended to be warships and are not designed for combat; however, as NATO finds itself facing an openly expansionist Russia, alongside a more aggressive China, a broader understanding of the AOPS’ mission is probably in order. This notion was first explored in depth by Rob Huebert in a 2015 article in the Canadian Naval Review. There, Huebert asked whether the AOPS “as currently configured” really provided Canada with the “necessary security in the Arctic.” Given their limited combat capability, Huebert asked, could the ships be better outfitted to hedge against potential security crises that might emerge over the next 25 to 40 years? His answer was that such “enhancements” — including a larger gun and modular weapons systems — were both possible and necessary to provide a “more robust combat capability.”^{Footnote 4} In making that suggestion, Huebert was responding to Whitney Lackenbauer, who had penned an article in the previous edition of the Naval Review, arguing that such militarization was wasteful and inappropriate, given the low probability of military conflict in the Arctic. Instead, Lackenbauer suggested that the existing constabulary philosophy remained appropriate, writing: “Canada’s whole-of-government approach, designed to anticipate, prepare for and respond to non-combat security and safety scenarios, should not be hijacked by a retreat to Cold War thinking.”^{Footnote 5} Yet, with NATO now potentially facing a new Cold War, Huebert’s warnings seemed precinct and a reconsideration of the AOPS’ role may be in order.

The AOPS were conceived and designed as constabulary vessels with a whole-of-government support mission.^{Footnote 6} Never intended to be combatants, the ships are armed with a small, BAE Mk 38 25mm gun, enough for patrol duties focused on civilian traffic though hardly sufficient for higher-intensity conflict with a state adversary. This concept of employment made sense and stemmed not from any naivety on the RCN’s part with respect to the dangers lurking in the global geopolitical system, but from a sensible appreciation of the regional threat environment and the RCN’s priorities and requirements. In the Arctic, Canadian defence policy has consistently accepted a security environment defined by low-intensity safety and security threats, requiring light armaments for constabulary duties only. This was always sensible policy and, even considering the current war in Ukraine, that assessment probably remains an accurate perception of the threats that the RCN will encounter in the North. Recent assertions that conflict with Russia might spill over into the Canadian Arctic, in a way that leads to combat operations, are almost certainly exaggerations.^{Footnote 7} As one Canadian Army officer quipped about the Arctic in the 1940s: “there’s nowhere to go and nothing to do once you get there.”^{Footnote 8} Simply put, there is still nothing of military strategic value in the North American Arctic that might tempt a Russian incursion, or lead to naval combat along the Northwest Passage.

The AOPS’ light armament and constabulary design was also a result of the Navy’s limited resources. Combat systems were minimal not because the RCN was unconcerned by the hard security threats on the horizon but because it needed to concentrate its resources to meet those threats. Adding vertical launch systems, a large-calibre gun, and integrated fire control radars would have been an expensive luxury for a ship whose heavy ice-strengthening, civilian construction standards, and limited speed would always keep it from being a capable warship. Instead, the design philosophy was to keep the vessels as inexpensive and focused as possible to husband resources for the Canadian Surface Combatants. These next generation frigates are the purpose-built warships that will provide the Navy with an uncompromised combat capability. Adding combat systems to the AOPS could have reduced funding for the CSC program, ironically reducing the RCN’s potential combat power over the longer term. Yet, those ships are behind schedule, with a decade to go before delivery. The Russian threat to Canada and NATO exists today.

Despite his general prescience, Huebert’s focus on the AOPS as potential Arctic warships remains misguided. Indeed, a very common problem with discussions of the AOPS’ capabilities is that they are rarely considered outside of their Arctic employment and are too often boxed into that regional framework. While the AOPS will probably never be more than constabulary ships in the North, they are still large, capable platforms well suited to global operations in the offshore environment. In this often-overlooked global role they can do more. To return to Huebert’s original assessment, the RCN could invest a modest amount to turn the AOPS into vessels with capabilities more in line with comparable allied Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPV).^{Footnote 9} Rather than Arctic-focused combatants, the AOPS should be seen as adaptable OPVs capable of defending the sea lines of communication and performing a wider variety of defence tasks — while also possessing an Arctic capability.

In an extended great power contest with Russia, the AOPS’ most effective contribution will still be as support and patrol ships. As their designers intended, they can provide the RCN with a cheap alternative for domestic security operations. In this, they can relieve RCN frigates of patrol duty, coastal surveillance, fisheries enforcement, and other constabulary functions, allowing those ships to forward deploy on higher-risk missions. With ample storage and workspace, as well as a 20-tonne crane, the AOPS also represent a valuable platform for defence research and systems deployment, laying fixed SOSUS arrays and distributing sonar buoys — much as the country’s Auxiliary Oiler Replenishment Vessels (AORs) did in the 1970s and 1980s.

In the event of outright war, Canada and its allies will need to sweep the seas of enemy flagged merchant vessels, both to deny them to the adversary and to prevent those ships from conducting surveillance or other hybrid warfare tasks. While not armed for high-end combat, the AOPS’ 25mm gun will enable the ships to comfortably monitor or interdict Russian “civilian” vessels functioning as Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) collection assets. During the Cold War, the Soviet Navy deployed these Auxiliary General, Intelligence vessels (AGIs) on a regular basis, to the point that they became a common feature in North American waters. As is the case with China today, Soviet fishing vessels were also deployed as hybrid state assets, causing the RCN serious concern throughout the Cold War, and particularly during the Cuban missile crisis. The Russian Navy has not relied as heavily on such assets, but they do still appear, and may grow in number as geopolitical tensions rise.^{Footnote 10} Surveillance of such vessels would be an important and time-consuming task, and the AOPS will offer the RCN a more cost-efficient solution than a frigate.^{Footnote 11} During a conflict, the RCN would also require an armed presence to interdict such hybrid threats: not only ELINT vessels, but also unarmed trawlers and hybrid warfare vessels tasked with laying mines or severing crucial trans-Atlantic cables.^{Footnote 12}

Interdicting hybrid threats and patrolling the offshore in periods of heightened tension or war may require more than the ship’s current light armament. In wartime, an AOPS might also encounter hostile surface raiders on the high seas. Huebert recommended modular weapons, like the StanFlex system employed on Danish patrol ships. Integrated modular design is, however, no longer possible with the AOPS program being as far along as it is, and the RCN is not about to undertake hull redesigns on existing ships. The key to realistically adding capability is selecting weapons and sensors that don’t require major modification to the hull, such as cutting into the deck or running new wires.^{Footnote 13} This could include containerized systems, which promise a more limited combat capability but can be more easily “plugged into” the ship.

Several navies are already experimenting with this option. The Russian Navy’s AOPS equivalent — the 6,800-ton ice-strengthened Ivan Papanin-class — is reportedly being equipped with the mobile Kalibr-K cruise missile system. This system is not fully integrated, but is instead deployed in three standard containers, which include a vertical launcher, fire control system, combat control, navigation and communications equipment, as well as the necessary power supply.^{Footnote 14} Western navies are working with similar containerized systems. In 2019, Rear Admiral Paul Halton (Royal Navy), outlined a British study to “enhance the lethality” of the Royal Navy’s River-class offshore patrol ships, with containerized weapons systems, requiring no significant renovations to the ship.^{Footnote 15} The US Navy (USN) is likewise looking at similar capabilities to support its broader program of “distributed lethality,” which includes adding combat capabilities to ships previously considered non-combatants. The Marine Corps is experimenting with Naval Strike Missiles aboard amphibious warfare ships, while the USN’s “Ghost Fleet Overlord” program recently test-fired an SM-6 Standard Missile from a modular launch cell onboard the unmanned surface vessel USV Ranger.^{Footnote 16} That system comes in a container sized box with four standard Mk 41 cells.^{Footnote 17}

The most popular surface warfare weapon being deployed in this manner is the Naval Strike Missile, which is now one of the standard anti-shipping weapons in the US Navy. This, and similar weapons, carries its own guidance system based on GPS, inertial navigation, and passive electro-optical/infrared sensors to independently acquire targets, or receive targeting information from outside sources, permitting deployment on vessels like the AOPS.^{Footnote 18} Indeed, the extended range of modern antiship missiles means that most would never be fired at a target within radar range of the ship itself. These are not necessarily one-size-fits all additions. The height of a Mk 41 VLS, for instance, may make it an awkward fit, while a high-end weapon like the SM6 would require a new fire control system, representing a major addition. Still, the move towards containerization offers clear opportunities if the right systems can be adapted to the AOPS’ space and layout.

Instead of relying on onboard radars, such over the horizon strike systems could also be supported by the ships’ helicopter or embarked drones. A variety of UAVs are already being tested by Western navies for precisely this purpose.^{Footnote 19} Drones are also regularly proving their utility as spotting assets in combat across Ukraine. The most dramatic of these may have been the April 2022 sinking of the cruiser Moskva by two Ukrainian Neptune missiles, supposedly with drone support.^{Footnote 20} While the RCN’s drone program remains in its infancy, some experiments have at least begun,^{Footnote 21} while a sense of necessity could cut through bureaucracy to allow the Navy to quickly acquire more mature technologies from its allies.

Systems such as these offer a potential offensive punch against an adversary’s hybrid surface ships, though they would never transform the AOPS into front-line warships. Because the vessels are built to commercial standards, they will always be less resilient in combat, making survivability and damage control a serious issue. There are also no defensive weapons aboard an AOPS capable of fending off missile attacks from enemy warships — or even strikes from Russian ELINT or hybrid vessels, which may themselves be carrying containerized anti-shipping missiles.

Given this persistent weakness, the AOPS would never be deployable into warzones. They would, however, be able to manage the hybrid security/defence tasks in the North Atlantic and the North American littorals, where hostile combatants are unlikely to materialize. In support of that mission-set, a defensive system such as the American SeaRAM could also be installed with minimal additions of new sensors and combat management systems. This kind of point-defence missile system is designed to work against the type of limited missile attack from hybrid vessels that an AOPS may experience in the relatively uncontested waters of the North Atlantic or Pacific.

Adding an anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capability to the AOPS is another consideration which may arise in extreme situations. Dating back to 1939, the RCN’s focus has been on ASW, with the postwar Navy born from its escort duties convoying vessels across the North Atlantic. Today, the fleet’s Halifax-class frigates are optimized for that same task. A renewed cold war — or its sudden escalation into combat — would once again see the Navy stretched to guard those same sea lines of communication. Slow and noisy, the AOPS are not built for such tasks.^{Footnote 22} The ship has a top speed of 17 knots and poor maneuverability in the open ocean compared to most warships, limited by a hull form designed to operate in ice.^{Footnote 23} In every respect, the AOPS make poor submarine hunters or convoy escorts. Still, necessity tends to push aside questions of optimization; the corvettes used by the RCN to fight the Battle of the Atlantic were hardly ideal platforms.

As an ASW platform, the ships’ main asset is its ample deck space, from which it can launch a CH-148 Cyclone helicopter. A versatile and highly capable ASW aircraft, the Cyclone can carry two lightweight torpedoes, passive and active sonobuoys, as well as a powerful low-frequency tethered active sonar — a system that has successfully tracked Victoria-class submarines during wargames.^{Footnote 24} While that capability is a significant strength, it is far from optimized for combat. While AOPS were designed to land a heavy aircraft like the Cyclone, it was assumed that standard operations would employ only a light helicopter for ice-reconnaissance. That, and the pressing need to keep costs low, meant that the ships were built for, but not with, the Recovery, Assist, Secure and Traverse system (RAST) or Helicopter Hauldown and Rapid Securing Device (HHRSD) systems needed to handle large aircraft in anything greater than sea state three.^{Footnote 25} The ships also carry only enough aviation fuel for 71 hours of flight operations.^{Footnote 26} Turning this ASW capability into something usable in a crisis would be possible, but would require some upgrades.

Outside the embarked helicopter, an AOPS’ onboard ASW capabilities are non-existent. That too could evolve with additional bolt-on or containerized systems. That possibility was at least hinted at by HMCS Harry DeWolf during Operation Nanook 2021. While operating in the Northwest Passage, the ship hosted a Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC) team, which tested a Towed Reelable Active-Passive Sonar (TRAPS), a compact, low-cost, active and passive, variable depth ASW sonar.^{Footnote 27} The ship still lacks (and will continue to lack) an organic torpedo capability, or the ability to defeat — or evade — an incoming torpedo. As such the AOPS will never be sub-hunters, and engaging a hostile submarine would be a last resort. They may, however, be able to provide another layer of detection to the broader allied operating picture — from a distance.

In monitoring the underwater environment, AOPS could leverage new advances in autonomous underwater vehicles (AUV), launched from the ships’ 20-ton crane. These systems are evolving rapidly, with many designed as extended sonar systems, tying information back into a mothership. Canadian designed AUVs have already demonstrated ranges in excess of 2,000 km,^{Footnote 28} and an AOPS could serve as a hub for a distributed network of AUV and surface ‘wave gliders,’ recovering these assets and transmitting data to other platforms, like Canadian or allied submarines. NATO navies have been testing this concept for years and a system of this type was put on display during the 2020 Dynamic Manta exercise in the Mediterranean. There, NATO’s Centre for Maritime Research and Experimentation employed AUV and surface sensor systems in a mock hunting exercise to locate ‘Russian’ submarines in coordination with Canadian and allied surface ships. The communications and command challenges of using extended range AUV remain considerable, given that such drones must surface in order to make contact and receive instructions. As such, this remains a longer-term possibility, contingent on new research and development, though a promising one.

While not designed for fitted weapons systems or drones, AOPS are flexible ships. Each has room for up to six sea containers, with tiered deck space that would allow for the deployment of these systems without encroaching on the ship’s helicopter flight deck. Built to accommodate containerized laboratories and hydrographic equipment, the ships have all the connection points for power that could readily accommodate the new additions without invasive renovations or electrical work. Many of these new weapon systems or sensors would need to be adapted but integration would be facilitated by the versatile nature of the ships themselves.

Enhancing the AOPS’ surface warfare and ASW capabilities would also require additional training and a larger crew, since each new system requires dedicated operators. Luckily, the AOPS are large vessels with space to support other government partners and scientific personnel. In a crisis, or on missions requiring additional capabilities, these add-on teams could be supported with relative ease. Assembling these teams would be more difficult given the RCN’s current personnel shortages. Indeed, the human resources component may prove more challenging than the technical adaptations — though that is a separate subject entirely.

Finally, managing containerized systems requires a sophisticated Command Management System (CMS), and, in this, the AOPS are somewhat overbuilt to requirements. The ships are fitted with the CMS 330, a lighter version of the same system used by the Halifax-class frigates. This system collects information through radars and sensors, converts that data into actionable intelligence and directs ships’ systems to engage and respond to threats. Tying the physical combat systems into this would require major adjustments, but not a fundamental redesign.^{Footnote 29}

The use of the AOPS for kinetic operations, or even security duties against state adversaries, was never a consideration during their design or build. Adaptability in rapidly changing circumstances is necessary, however, and the Navy has proven that flexibility in the past. The Kingston-class (MCDV) patrol ships, for instance, have certainly evolved well beyond their original design. They are now globally deployable, with MCDVs being sent south on Operation Caribbe, to Europe on Operation Reassurance, and Africa on Operation Projection — tasks that were not envisioned when the ships were launched.

Augmenting the AOPS to include improved defensive and interdiction capabilities would not fundamentally alter their role. These are patrol ships, ill-suited to combat operations; however, renewed great power threats to Canada demand that we broaden our understanding of those patrol duties. While the AOPS will never be frontline warships, a more robust capability would expand their purpose to encompass a wider swath of the security spectrum, from pure constabulary safety and security operations to the defence of North American waters from hybrid threats and — in an extreme crisis — even engaging hostile vessels and tracking submarines. The ships will always be constabulary patrol vessels, but strategic upgrades can help them to carry out that role in a more contested environment, with what one might call “constabulary+” capabilities.

Adapting existing ships also fits into the government’s newfound need to reduce spending and find efficiencies. While containerized systems and upgrades are expensive, they would likely deliver far more capability faster, and at a lower price, than new hulls. While the AOPS were never designed for such duties, and certainly not optimized for dealing with state opponents, a degree of flexibility is clearly required as Canada and its allies adjust to an increasingly dangerous security environment. The AOPS can play a role in meeting that new challenge, and that might require thinking outside the traditional Arctic box.