

by Colonel Michael Ward with Lieutenant-Colonel Ed Gallagher,
Major Doug Delaney, and Major Hugh Ferguson



Canadian Forces Photo by: Cpl. Ken Allan

TASK FORCE KOSOVO: ADAPTING OPERATIONS TO A CHANGING SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

Within days of arrival at the air and sea ports of Thessalonika, Greece, on 9 June 1999, the units of Task Force Kosovo were engaged in a race against time to link up with 4th (UK) Armoured Brigade to participate in the entry into Kosovo. NATO's Operation "Joint Guardian" had begun. With no notice, on 5 June Yugoslav president Slobodan Milosevic bowed to demands from the international community for a cease-fire and withdrawal of Serb troops from this ravaged province. A scant week later, 25,000 troops of General Sir Michael Jackson's Kosovo Force (KFOR) were advancing northward to end the brutal oppression of Kosovar Albanians which for months had riveted people around the globe. Supported by National Command and Support elements based in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FRYOM), the Lord Strathcona's Horse Reconnaissance Squadron, the Kosovo Rotary Wing Aviation Unit (KRWAU) and 15 Composite Engineer Squadron played major roles in the entry operation. By late summer, the 1st Battalion, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry (PPCLI) Battle Group joined Task Force Kosovo to round out the Canadian commitment to peace and stability operations in this region of the Balkans.

Canada's contribution to peace and stability operations in Kosovo has been a measure both of a traditional approach to peace support and of adaption to new and changing factors in the global security environment.

From deployment into Kosovo in June 1999 until the recent first rotation of Canadian troops, Operation "Kinetic" posed a variety of unique challenges. Under the auspices of the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) and its partner, the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), the Canadian contingent deployed in both traditional and non-traditional roles — to provide security against Yugoslav (Serb) conventional forces, establish law and order and assist in the delivery of humanitarian aid. This article will explore important impressions, lessons learned about our participation in this operation, and future challenges facing KFOR and UNMIK.

FORCE PREPARATIONS

Command and Control

All Task Force Kosovo units remained under Canadian 'command' throughout the deployment. The reconnaissance, helicopters and infantry were, however, detached under 'operational control' of HQ Multi-

Colonel Michael Ward commanded Task Force Kosovo from March to December 1999. He is Director of Land Strategic Concepts, focused on future Army development, at Fort Frontenac, Kingston. Lieutenant-Colonel Gallagher was the Legal Advisor to the Commander of Task Force Kosovo. Major Delaney was Battle Group CIMIC Officer in Kosovo. Major Ferguson was the Task Force G2 and commanded the National Intelligence Cell in Kosovo.

National Brigade (Centre), the largest of KFOR's five brigades in Kosovo. This Brigade was led by the UK's 4th Armoured Brigade until August 1999, when it was replaced by the 19th Mechanized Brigade. The engineers, National Support Element (NSE) and National Command Element (NCE) were kept under national command to provide distinctive Canadian sustainment support along with command and intelligence links.

Organization

Operation "Kinetic" was designed to provide an information operations capability to a coalition formation. The inclusion of Coyotes and Griffon helicopters equipped with a Forward-Looking Infra Red (FLIR) camera offered a capability not typically found at brigade level, and therefore an opportunity to test new concepts. The organization to support this capability was sufficiently robust and flexible to support reinforcements in the event of changes to the mission. However, some capabilities were missing. Intelligence

Training

Without doubt, 1 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group (1 CMBG) was well prepared to generate the majority of the troops for the mission as a result of their comprehensive collective training plan. This permitted freedom to deploy units with only minimal mission-specific training. The retention of this level of operational capability is expensive, but it is essential to ensure readiness for short or no-notice deployments. This is our core capability, and funding must be dedicated to ensure that our troops and units maintain this edge.

Regular-Reserve Mix

Reserve augmentation was not planned for the initial deployment. This was an on-call contingency mission without predictable deployment timelines, so only a few Reservists already on Class B service were included. These individuals were well trained and experienced in the jobs they held within the Contingent. The future direction of the Total Army is clear, and Regulars and Reserves will be integrated, but Reserve employment on missions such as this must be carefully thought-out and managed. A balance of general training and individual capability is required, especially in high-profile or special assignments, and rank equivalency cannot be automatic. For example, on one occasion a Reserve officer was deployed to an intelligence operations position in the headquarters of Multinational Brigade (Centre). The job required specialized knowledge and experience of intelligence processes, and allowed rare autonomy to conduct real-world operations — a golden opportunity. Unfortunately, the individual nominated was relatively inexperienced and did not meet the requirements. This resulted in losing a highly advantageous job, losing influence in the planning and execution of operations, reducing our access to information within the HQ, and almost wasted a callout for a willing, albeit unqualified individual. On reassignment, the officer was placed in a position in a Canadian unit where his employment was more in keeping with his training, where procedures were more familiar, and where his professional development could be managed.

Preparation of Stores and Equipment

Because of the contingent nature of the mission, no funds were released to support pre-positioning or packing of mission stores until late April 1999.



Canadian Forces Photo by: Sgt David Smahall

support was minimal, consisting initially of only one warrant officer. This was a critical shortcoming during the entry into Kosovo, and we were largely 'in the dark' until a fully equipped national intelligence cell was deployed in mid-July. No contingent deployed on operations should be without this capability. As well, we would have benefitted by deploying an electronic warfare capability. The attachment of a TRILS/AERIES detachment would have rounded out our information gathering capability, and would have provided very useful support to our units and to the Allied headquarters.

Although this was a prudent fiscal precaution, it did not take account of how time consuming a process this is. When the order to deploy was given, there was a mad rush to deliver supplies and pack sea containers in time for the ship loading in Montreal. Consequently we lost control of critical stores and equipment, which in turn degraded early operational capability. This is wrong. We need to devote sufficient funds up front and accept the risk that not all contingency operations will actually be ordered. This will reduce the potential for failure when troops must be deployed on short notice.

Deployment

Understandably, strategic deployment posed the greatest challenge to mission success. The advance party's deployment was disrupted from the beginning, and remained so until after the accelerated arrival of the main body. Delivery of advance party equipment by AN 124 *Antonov* and C 130 transport aircraft was a near catastrophe. From the first chaulk, breakdowns interrupted the flow, and equipment was delivered out-of-sequence or not at all. In retrospect, this was the least professional aspect of the operation and threatened failure at a very early stage. Given Canada's remoteness from possible operational theatres, the Canadian Forces must have better and more-reliable strategic deployment capability. The accelerated initiative to procure strategic air and sea-lift recognize that this is an essential joint operations capability. The air-lift of the main body went more smoothly.

Aircraft brought in personnel to conduct hasty reception, staging, onward movement and integration, and units were deployed to operations just in time. The ship carrying vehicles and supplies arrived at the same time. Despite clear direction, however, loading had not been done in accordance with operational requirements. Consequently the Coyotes were last off, even though they were the most urgently needed capability for early entry into Kosovo. Nevertheless, we made it in time. The appropriate analy-

sis had been done, opportunities exploited and risk taken to ensure that we were ready to link-up and join the advance into Kosovo with 4th Brigade. The later deployment of the 1 PPCLI Battle Group went relatively better because of our experience the first time around.


OPERATIONS

In general, Canadian troops performed admirably, and were highly sought after. They were inherently objective and impartial, completely reliable, innovative, flexible and adaptable, and thus were able to work with any nation. Our investment in the development of doctrine over the past five years paid off handsomely. Our information operations doctrine, operations planning procedures and intelligence preparation of the battlefield enabled the execution of operations with better-equipped Allies, and in fact we were ahead of many of them in terms of emerging intelligence, surveillance,

target acquisition and reconnaissance concepts. Being a junior coalition partner, however, our detached units were limited in their ability to apply and validate some recently-fielded doctrinal concepts and procedures — a missed opportunity. Although Canadians are frequently modest and critical of our own capabilities, I came away from Kosovo convinced that we have the ability, training and doctrine to take a leading role in coalition operations, and should do so when we can. The plan to assume command of SFOR's Multi-National Division (South West) in Bosnia in October 2000 is an overdue initiative which

will affirm our ability to prosecute operations and permit us to maintain essential formation-command skills.

The Strathcona Recce Squadron moved into Kosovo with 4th (UK) Brigade on D-Day, 12 June 1999. By D+1 they were in the thick of withdrawing Yugoslav Army forces, counting battalions and ensuring their compliance with the Military Technical Agreement (MTA). By 20 June they were established in Pristina, supporting dis-



mounted operations with 1st Battalion, The Parachute Regiment (the 'Paras'), and maintaining surveillance throughout the Brigade Area of Operational Responsibility (AOR). The Recce Squadron was the 'spotlight' unit in KFOR throughout the tour. With advanced doctrine, a second-to-none surveillance capability and sound tactical skills, they were in high demand.

The Kosovo Rotary Wing Aviation Unit disembarked in Thessalonika on 10 June, and was flying missions into Kosovo within five days. In the early days the unit's helicopters were split between three forward operating bases and flying at maximum tempo. The unit quickly adapted to a form of ground support operations not practised since the Kiowa was retired, and showed commendable innovation in supporting units like the Paras in the conduct of 'law and order' operations in Pristina's urban landscape. This was a spirited and capable unit that was ready and willing to perform any service requested.

On 27 May, 15 Engineer Support Squadron arrived to construct camps, but was re-rolled less than a week later to assist 4th Brigade's engineer regiment during the entry into Kosovo between 13 and 20 June. Versatile and highly skilled, they made a notable contribution in this phase, performing the whole range of combat engineer tasks. When they reverted to national command later in June they were instrumental in re-building a headquarters for KFOR, establishing our tactical camps and gradually creating the Weather Haven relocatable camps that provided a much higher standard of life support. For force entry or theatre-opening operations, this composite engineer capability is essential.

The National Support Element established support services at the same time as the main body arrived on the ground. Although the entry into Kosovo was not expected to take place so soon, they 'hit the ground running' and provided vital combat support in the first days and weeks, including establishing a forward Logistic Support Group in Kosovo to provide hour-to-hour support to the units. Because of the problem of supply 'visibility', they were literally tearing apart sea containers in search of needed spares and repair parts and rushing them to units in Kosovo. This extremely heavy tempo was maintained for over two months until a more steady state was reached in mid August.

The 1 PPCLI Battle Group began to arrive in early July to assume control of the Drenica area of operations from British units that were hard pressed in the Pristina area, and by mid-August were complete and in firm control of their area. They developed an excellent reputation among the ethnic factions and the other Allies for their objectivity and insistence on strict adherence to the terms of the various agreements, as well as for their

commitment to guarantee the security of the inhabitants of the Drenica Valley. They earned the respect of all parties (some very grudgingly) for the professional manner in which they conducted operations. The Leopard tanks in the Battle Group added a highly positive force-protection capability and were a tangible expression of commitment to peace and stability operations. The tanks provided a 'lethality overmatch' that both impressed and helped to subdue local factions.

The National Command Element staff provided the essential link between the strategic/operational level and the tactical level in the field. They were busy, effective and dedicated to building this mission toward the original three year mandate. Flexible and persevering, they acted, reacted and maintained focus to ensure that the main effort activities and projects were fully supported. Neither highly-ranked or manned, the staffs represented the broad capability we in the Canadian Forces possess by virtue of our system of education, training and operational expertise. That is a very good and effective standard!

Interoperability

While most national contingents within KFOR shared similar doctrine, we were hamstrung by the absence of a common communications architecture. Although all contingents brought their best equipment, the breadth of the coalition and the lack of resources meant that there was no secure communications means that could link all nations in the coalition. This limited the degree to which we could stay abreast of developments in the whole of KFOR and conform to the Commander's intent and concept. In 21st Century coalition operations, 'seamless' communications are essential, but, of course, this capability does not yet exist. Much work needs to be done to build this essential component of interoperability.

Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC)

The establishment of the 1 PPCLI AOR in mid-August was a key step in harmonizing the work of military forces with Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). Because UNMIK was unable to coordinate the efforts of the many aid organizations, the Battle Group took the lead. Its CIMIC section assessed emergency needs and established liaison with some thirty different NGOs and international aid agencies. By means of extensive patrolling, the Battle Group gathered information and set priorities for tasks to be accomplished by NGOs. Weekly conferences coordinated food aid, shelter delivery, water supply and medical services, thus ensuring adequate coverage and avoiding duplication of effort.

Cooperation between Canadian agencies accelerated with the conduct of emergency relief operations. This was enhanced by an excellent working relationship between CIDA and the Battle Group. CIDA financed several NGOs operating in the Canadian AOR. To safeguard the local population and the distribution of humanitarian aid, it financed de-mining efforts in the AOR by the International Demining Alliance Canada (IDAC). IDAC's de-mining was closely coordinated by the Battle Group Engineer Cell, which set priorities based on operational and humanitarian imperatives. CIDA also financed the provision of emergency shelters by the Centre Canadien d'Etude et Cooperation Internationale (CECI) in and around Glogovac. Moreover, as the most pressing requirements were identified by the Battle Group, CIDA funded whichever NGOs and IOs could respond. When safe well water was threatened by contamination, for instance, CIDA financed a Red Cross well-cleaning project in the municipality. CIDA has also agreed in principle to fund an OXFAM project to repair the water system in the town of Glogovac and plans to restore a health clinic. The interdependence of military forces, government (i.e., CIDA) and humanitarian organizations was clearly beneficial, and our collaboration in addressing the human security concerns of the indigenous population facilitated development projects.

This military/CIDA/NGO partnership paid huge dividends. With a CIDA grant of \$750,000, the Battle Group refurbished three schools, conducted extensive road repairs and delivered teaching aids and stoves to over twenty different schools. Having a source of funding contributed to tactical freedom of action, enhanced operational effectiveness and allowed the Battle Group to pursue important national policy objectives. The local population welcomed these efforts, and this helped establish and maintain a stable operational environment.

Full Spectrum Inter-Agency Operations

Canadians are active everywhere across Kosovo — in police, the OSCE, the UN and several NGOs — but nowhere is there a functioning, nationally-directed focus to their activities. The value of these separate efforts is not disputed, but, on the whole, Canada receives no collective credit for their achievements. As far as boosting Canada's profile within the KFOR coalition, UNMIK or even the North Atlantic Council is concerned, they are barely visible. This is because they have been fragmented and scattered, detracting from the sort of critical mass which could bring influence at the tables of the policy-makers. Unfortunately, many of these efforts, at least in terms of contributing to policy influence, have been squandered. Whatever level of Canadian inter-agency cooperation that has occurred in

Kosovo has been accomplished after the fact instead of by design. Until the Battle Group CIMIC Cell began collaborating with CIDA, there was no coordination between our troops and Canadian NGOs. Much time and influence was lost as the various players established contact, determined requirements, set priorities and tackled the tasks at hand. Had we established a central coordinating agency for the *entire* Canadian contribution, many of these capabilities could have been integrated before deployment. Administrative and logistic



economies could also have been realized. As we saw in Kosovo, the benefits of this type of national collaboration are obvious.

In the future, Canada should project a full spectrum inter-agency capability to these operations: credible military force, police forces, civil administrators, technical experts (e.g., engineers, communications experts), humanitarian organizations and CIDA. Canadians could thus control full-spectrum human security intervention in an entire sector. This would boost our national profile, proving that we can be front runners in the planning and conduct of peace support operations. Then, perhaps, Canadians would receive the sort of credit and policy influence we justly deserve. This should be an explicit objective when Canadians command MND(SW) in Bosnia later this year.

Rules of Engagement

Tactically, the lessons of many years in Croatia and Bosnia were borne out. Canadian Rules of Engagement (ROE) were flexible and broadly-enough drafted, and our soldiers sufficiently well trained to adapt smoothly from the combat operations phase to stabilization tasks. The ROE were permissive in focus, rather than restrictive, with the result that Canadians had among the most robust ROE in KFOR. Over the course of the tour dozens of situations arose in which Serbs and former Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) members engaged in acts of non-compliance, including unauthorized carriage of weapons or wearing of uniforms. Our soldiers understood well the limits of their powers, and the steps necessary to maintain control over situations so as to enforce compliance. Not once was a Canadian soldier put at risk by a failure of an on-scene commander to act decisively and in accordance with the ROE.

Force Rationalization

We watched the development of NATO's Force Rationalization process with great interest. Although Kosovo was an interesting mission, the need for conventional military forces there will gradually diminish in favour of police-type security forces. Regardless of how much is left to do in Kosovo in the near term, it is a step in the right direction (operationally and economically) for Canada to concentrate its efforts in one region. Those of our troops who have already served a couple of tours in Bosnia will not welcome this option. To encourage troops to volunteer to return repeatedly, we must ensure that the right incentives exist to make it attractive. Whether that is in terms of compensation, leave benefits or improvement in conditions in the theatre, such as walking-out policies and expanded rest and recreation facilities, needs to be determined.

FORCE SUSTAINMENT

Quality of Life

Attention to Quality of Life issues had a very positive effect on morale, and played a strong role in supporting the soldier's ability to perform his mission. By the time of my handover of command, we had received Internet and Canadian radio, and satellite television was being installed. While the mission performance clearly remains the first priority, this programme is doing much to improve conditions in austere theatres.

Troop Burnout

The unique nature of the Kosovo operation allowed troops to maintain interest and focus. Burnout is,

however, a cumulative phenomenon. Over 35 percent of my troops had three or more tours, and need rest and longer down-time between missions, courses, field training and summer training augmentation. In constrained times too much is being demanded of fewer people. The result is an increasing number unfit for deployment: we experienced increased administrative, compassionate and medical repatriations, personal breakdown and retirements. This is a strategic issue. We must balance this against our national enthusiasm to commit troops to every mission.

Post Traumatic Stress Disorder

The tour in Kosovo was not as stressful as others in the Balkans have been. Some soldiers were exposed to mass graves and atrocities, but most were not. We had a very good peer counsellor network in place, reinforced by padres and a military psychologist who conducted counselling and 'defusing' as required. Individuals that could not be handled in-theatre were ultimately repatriated on advice from medical and psychiatric specialists. Only two such cases arose, neither of which were attributable to problems encountered in Kosovo. Post-tour stresses were addressed in collective re-integration counselling sessions for all ranks. These were designed to prepare people to recognize reunion stress and other symptoms of PTSD that typically affect members on completion of their tours.

Alcohol Policy and Consumption

Despite the fact that operations in this region have always involved a degree of pressure, if not necessity, to consume alcohol, during the deployment we conscientiously promoted the philosophy that operations and alcohol don't mix. This allowed personnel to consume alcohol when off-duty in controlled unit canteens, and this policy was followed by all but a few. All violations were investigated and dealt with through either disciplinary or administrative means. In my view this reinforced the operational philosophy and made it clear that abuse would not be tolerated. Although we always expected violations, we also knew that we had in place a proper command climate, a zero tolerance attitude and a disciplinary process that focused on the guilty. In short, a reasonable and responsible balance, and I think we had it right.

National Support Base

National support capability was stretched to the limit during the deployment surge, and could not meet the demands of a short-notice mission when all other overseas commitments were also competing for support. Management of the deployment was thus disrupted, and critical items of equipment and supplies did

not make it to the operational theatre according to plan. For example, sea containers were packed without itemized lists of contents, which created havoc and delay in-theatre that was overcome only by tremendous additional effort on the part of the National Support Element. This is an area that in future could be improved through domestic contractor support.

In-Theatre Contractor Support

Operation “Kinetic” was a dynamic and unpredictable operation in an insecure and immature environment, and we needed complete control over sustainment assets to avoid disruption to the operational tempo or unit effectiveness. During the initial stages of the tour there were no contractors on whom we could rely completely to deliver first and second line mission-critical sustainment. Beyond second line support there was some scope, but only on a case-by-case basis. The most capable, flexible and reliable capability still resides in our uniformed service support units. Their capability cannot be replicated, and they are therefore the best option for initial entry forces. While Alternative Service Delivery is an attractive option instead of maintaining an expensive uniformed capability, it is, however, more appropriate for operations that have reached a steady state.

Camp Construction

During the operation, Weatherhaven re-locatable camps were procured to ‘bed down’ the Contingent in austere, ‘green-field’ conditions in both Kosovo and Macedonia. This offered a major improvement to the living conditions of deployed forces, and was promised for the first contingent. We expected to achieve the standard in the first few months, so camp stores, generators and heaters that would have allowed us to run the camps efficiently were not brought. Continuing delays in delivery, and miscalculations about power requirements kept us applying band-aid solutions to life support issues. This became acute as winter approached in October, and the problem was not resolved by the time of handover to the next Contingent in December. In Macedonia we were still living with tactical generators and jerry-rigged field lighting and heat. The camp at Donja Koretica in Kosovo was approaching the desired standard, but would not be complete until February 2000. With so much else going on, the concept proved to be an operational command distraction and too labour-intensive. As the operation ends and camps are dismantled, this capability must be retained and pre-positioned as operational stock for future contingency missions.

Environmental Issues

Since the UN mission in Croatia, our troops have been very concerned about exposure to toxic substances and environmental hazards. This mission was no exception. We actively investigated environmental concerns, ensuring that all camp locations were swept and hazards removed or marked off. Some concerns were identified, including possible airborne asbestos



Canadian Forces Photo by: Col J. Bradley

fibres at the Marshal Tito Barracks in Pristina and emissions from coal-fired power plants near Pristina. Extensive testing was conducted both by the Contingent and our Allies to determine the extent of any possible exposure. Results have been negative so far, but some results are still to come. All activities were documented in case long-term health problems arise as a result of the operation.

KOSOVO ASSESSMENT

UNMIK and KFOR

Widely criticized in the initial months for its slow deployment in Kosovo, UNMIK is gradually expanding its base and influence. Its mandate includes the development of social services, the creation of a Kosovo Transitional Council, facilitating local and regional elections and, finally, transferring executive authority to elected political leaders. Although progress was initially threatened by lack of funding, UNMIK now has multi-year commitments of over \$(US)1 Billion. Although it is too early to judge the outcome, UNMIK has achieved some initial success.

UNMIK still has considerable challenges ahead. Local elections have already slipped to October 2000, and regional elections are unlikely to occur until some time in 2001. At this time governance is shared with the Kosovo Transitional Council, a representative body of leaders from the various Kosovo ethnic communities,

but political manoeuvring, ethnic animosity and mutual distrust among its members have hamstrung its effectiveness as a governing body. Attempts to form an executive council have been equally frustrated, and show no signs of improvement. The proliferation of parallel, provisional and shadow governmental organizations is another major obstacle to UNMIK's creation of an effective interim administration. Sorting through this political and ethnically-charged morass to find common ground and consensus will continue to be one of UNMIK's most daunting tasks.

KFOR has successfully established basic security in the province, and is supporting UNMIK and other organizations in their activities to re-establish civil society. So far, however, the UN has been unable to take over the policing role from KFOR. With only 1800 UN police out of the planned 5000, they are unlikely to be effective. KFOR therefore continues to provide police-type services. In addition to maintaining a secure environment, KFOR is helping transform the KLA and train the new Kosovo Protection Corps, a civil operations agency created to provide emergency humanitarian aid and essential public services. Despite the effort, the partnership is suffering under the weight of UNMIK bureaucracy and a lack of coordination between principal agencies such as the UN, the OSCE, the European Union, and a plethora of NGOs, each of which has its own different agenda.

Criminal Activity

Criminal activity in Kosovo is simply all-pervasive. Many within the former KLA have long been involved in illegal activity, and are likely to continue to pursue these interests. Inter-gang turf conflicts are resulting in a growing number of ethnic Albanian casualties. Attempts to control crime will no doubt increase local hostility toward KFOR and UNMIK. Ironically, this is one area where we have seen evidence of Serb-Albanian cooperation.

The Strategic Perspective

Looking dispassionately at the situation in Kosovo, it is evident that the Kosovar Albanians have the strate-

gic upper hand, politically, economically and militarily. The provisional government of Hashim Thaci is expanding its influence throughout the province. Albanian criminal activity is flourishing despite UN and KFOR policing efforts, and intimidation and ethnically-motivated violence against non-Albanians continues on all fronts. The Kosova Serbs, on the other hand, are on the strategic defensive, withdrawing into *de facto* enclaves, struggling to survive and defend themselves with or without support from Belgrade or KFOR. Increasingly, KFOR is thus finding itself interposed between two factions that thoroughly hate each other. KFOR and the international community are reacting to events and, in the eyes of some, are in danger of losing the strategic initiative.

CONCLUSION

The observations raised have been aimed at emphasizing those things that went well, recognizing progress that has been made, and focusing attention on areas where improved capability or practice are needed. We live in an imperfect world and are schooled professionally to plan for the unexpected. Although we routinely dealt with shortfalls, deficiencies and changes to plan, this was, to a certain extent, to be anticipated. That the deployment worked and eventually met the conditions for success is a tribute to the talent, training, initiative and unity of purpose of all the people involved in this operation, in Kosovo, in Macedonia and here at home. We can be enormously proud of the fine troops and units who succeeded in such a just cause. Short of warfare, this operation was the best of professional and operational challenges, and tested the mettle of every member of the Contingent.

All things considered, this was a very successful operation. In concert with our Allies, we deployed to a distant part of the globe, entered a foreign country and brought peace and stability. This action brought repression to a halt, and set in train the conditions for the development of a civil society based on the rule of law, democratic process and freedom. Although much still remains to be done, these are nevertheless great accomplishments.

