

FIGHTING FOR CANADA: SEVEN BATTLES, 1758-1945

edited by Donald Graves

Toronto: Robin Brass Studio. 446 pages, \$44.95 (hardcover), \$25.95 (paperback).

Reviewed by Lieutenant-Colonel Michael Cessford

What a delight this book is! I must confess, I felt much like a gourmand surveying a groaning table as I considered the mouthwatering, historical delicacies spread before me. Where to begin? The defence of *Nouvelle-France*? Armoured combat in Normandy? The Canadian infantryman's war in the Dutch polders, the South African veldt or the Niagara farmlands? In any event, I started where best — at the beginning.

This work studies seven battles that span the period 1758 to 1945. Some, like Ticonderoga and Queenston Heights, loom large in Canadian history, others are of significance perhaps only to those who see names such as South Africa 1900; France and Flanders, 1915 to 1918; Le Mesnil-Patry; and Kapelsche Veer emblazoned on their regimental battle honours. For good reason, the Canadian debacle at Ridgeway was judged unworthy of a battle honour, but nonetheless provides an instructive lesson on the threats that attended (or precipitated) the birth of Canada. But there is more — much more.

Grave's introduction is an excellent primer on the nature of the tactical fight — "the real business of war." His introduction also places equal importance on the simple fact that Canada was shaped and formed, to a very large part, in the crucible of war. As much as we would wish, Canadians cannot shirk our history — it exists in tangible form as our border with the United States, the role we currently play in the world, and the institutions of our nation.


The transitions (*Interludes*) between the chapters are equally good, providing remarkably succinct historical overviews of the periods between these battles. Important in and of themselves, they serve to properly situate the battles within their historical and operational context. This is fundamental background to any tactical analysis and, again, Graves has presented a polished product. In addition, the annexes provide useful details on the strengths and weapons of the forces engaged, honours and awards granted, and the military

lineage of the units that took part in the fighting. The maps (for a much-appreciated change) are numerous, comprehensive and relevant. Finally, the drawings, paintings and photographs are excellent and well captioned — although I personally believe the unidentified individual pictured on page 233 to be a very senior Imperial staff officer.

Despite the remarkable standard of this supporting work, the essence of the book is its description of the seven tactical engagements. Each is of high quality although, if forced to choose, I might rank Ticonderoga and the Kapelsche Veer just a touch above the rest in detail and description. In doing so, I suspect that these choices reflect my lack of familiarity with these two battles — that in gaining an understanding of these actions, I formed an unwarranted bias towards them. In any case, let me be clear — each chapter provides detailed and scholarly analysis of the battle in question. In many cases, the historical record is corrected as authors make good use of a wide variety of primary and secondary sources. In other cases, the authors are breaking new ground, examining in detail minor tactical engagements that have long been ignored and forgotten.

The editor makes no apology (nor should he) for what has not been included. The North-West Rebellion receives only passing mention in the appropriate *Interlude*, while the study ends five years before the Korean War and the start of the Cold War. From a purely personal perspective, I would have enjoyed, among others, an examination of the capture of Batoche or a study of one of the battles fought by the Canadians in Italy during the period 1943 to 1945. However, one can hardly quibble with the editor's choices. Together they span a period of almost two hundred years, giving the reader a sense of the rich tapestry that is the military history of Canada.

There are stark dangers in reviewing the work of friends and colleagues, however, I need not have wor-



ried. This is military history as it should be written: sound in reasoning, precise in detail and placed firmly within the relevant political, military and social contexts. It incorporates the testimony of both private and general, and does not shirk, where necessary, from passing judgement or according praise. It causes one to

think, and think again, on the military history of our nation — and I can think of no higher praise.

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PATTON AT BAY: THE LORRAINE CAMPAIGN, SEPTEMBER TO DECEMBER, 1944

by John Nelson Rickard

Westport, CT: Praeger. 1999. 299 pages, US \$45.00.

Reviewed by Brereton Greenhous


George Patton was undoubtedly the best American general of the Second World War — a veritable wizard of high tempo attack which demands a thorough understanding and mastery of logistics. Logistical understanding and expertise is an aspect of Patton all too often ignored by students focussed on his operational and tactical skills.

Was he a great general? How does one assess generalship? One measure must surely see the candidate's performance in adversity, but Patton never had to fight in what could be described fairly as adversity. True, in North Africa he had to recover the momentum lost by his predecessor, but the enemy's logistical and operational difficulties were such that victory was inevitable. Sicily was another walkover. Perhaps the closest he ever came to meeting adversity was during the Lorraine campaign in the fall of 1944, following hard on his dramatic break-out from the Normandy bridgehead and that triumphant sweep across north-central France.

Reaching Lorraine, his predicament came not so much from the German generals opposing him as from his own superiors, Bradley and Eisenhower. Bradley was a cautious man who feared Patton's *élan*, while Eisenhower was — perhaps rightly, given his position as Supreme Commander — a totally political animal. The latter's diplomatic adherence to a 'broad front' strategy, and the former's failure to back his subordinate to the limit, deprived Patton of the resources that might well have carried him across the Rhine and deep into Germany in one unending rush. Instead, he was condemned to fight a series of set-piece battles in which his less-than-usual superiority of men and material was countered by terrain

that favoured the defence and vitiated his penchant for speed and manoeuvre.

To quote from Carlo D'Este's foreword, this study 'admirably fills a void in the history of one of World War II's least-known campaigns,' skillfully tracing the way in which Patton struggled through Lorraine and giving us many a subtle insight along the route. He won in the end, of course, as he was bound to do, but there was little in the victory to enhance his reputation. Despite the Ultra decrypts available to him — or perhaps because of them, as Rickard points out — he seriously underestimated the German ability to recuperate after the catastrophe they had endured in Normandy. And his massive ego often got in his way. Rickard cites Harold Deutsch, "In a sense he [Patton] was his own intelligence analyst. His staff would furnish him with the 'when, where, why, and what' of things and he would take it from there."



The ability to make accurate judgements from such information as is available to him is another mark of generalship, but in Lorraine, Patton clearly got it wrong, not once but several times. He also failed to sack Manton Eddy, the XII Corps commander, although many of his problems stemmed from Eddy's excessive caution. Patton's carefully cultivated image was that of a quite ruthless leader who would unhesitatingly sack subordinates who failed to measure up, and Rickard rightly observes that, "his failure to get XII Corps moving and his apparent passive acceptance of Eddy's reasons seem out of character." Could it have been that Patton's nerve was weakening in near-adversity?

Book Reviews

Perhaps Lorraine was only a hiccup. When the Germans launched their Ardennes offensive towards the end of December, Patton again performed an operational and logistical miracle, shifting his axis of advance ninety degrees to the north in five hectic days, moving 20,000 tons of supplies across the grain of the country in miserable winter weather, and pushing six divisions into the German flank. But on that occasion, adversity lay heavily on Courtney Hodges, not George Patton.

Was he a great general? Not on the evidence marshalled here. He was, overall, certainly a better general

than his British rival and fellow egotist, Bernard Montgomery who had met adversity briefly and well as a divisional commander in May 1940, but was overly concerned with balance and apparently had no concept of high tempo. But neither was he a Bill Slim, who demonstrated a mastery of every aspect of generalship and could also 'meet with Triumph and Disaster and treat those two impostors just the same.'

The publisher Praeger did well to appoint Colonel Jack English as adviser for their 'Series in War Studies.' This is another worthy addition to an excellent series.

THE NORTH ATLANTIC TRIANGLE REVISITED: CANADIAN GRAND STRATEGY AT CENTURY'S END

by David G. Haglund

Toronto: Irwin Publishing and CIAA. 2000. 113 pages, \$21.00.

Reviewed by Dr. Stéphane Roussel


Atlanticism has been given short shrift in Canada over the last decade, and nothing seems to have been able to curb the decline of Canada's oldest relationship with the outside world. It was indeed high time for someone to put forth a systematic defence of the Atlantic Alliance, and this challenge has been taken up by David Haglund.

Those familiar with Haglund's works will recognize his methodology — systematic examination from both historical and theoretical perspectives. The topic considered here is the tendency towards the regionalization of Canadian foreign and defence policy, most notably the refocusing of that policy on the Asia-Pacific region and Latin America to the detriment of the Euro-Atlantic area. Haglund sets out to show that, for Canada, "Europe still matters", and he does this by means of the concepts of 'grand strategy' and 'national interest'. This latter encompasses defence and the promotion of material interests (security and prosperity), as well as upholding certain values (democracy, human rights, etc.). On the theoretical level, Haglund's thinking is located at the crossroads of realist and constructivist approaches.

It is, however, the historical dimension that dominates Haglund's argument. He sees the 'North Atlantic Triangle' metaphor as the first manifestation of a Canadian grand strategy. This metaphor, which emerged

gradually after 1870, generated four principles. The first two are of a defensive nature: the 'bookkeeper' principle, preventing Canada's interests from being sacrificed on the altar of Anglo-American relations, and 'counter-balance', leaning toward one or the other of these partners so as to contain the excesses of the other. The third and fourth principles are linked to the promotion of Canadian interests, especially those relating to values; they involve strengthening Canada's diplomatic status and using the power of the United States for Canada's own benefit. The first two of these principles no longer have any applicability, but the latter two remain highly relevant, particularly in the present context.

Haglund demonstrates that, contrary to popular belief, it is just as much in Canada's economic or socio-political interests to preserve its ties with Europe as it is to forge new ones in the Asia-Pacific region or in Latin America. Moreover, the Euro-Atlantic region is, without a doubt, the only one where Canada can hope to bring into play the two principles aimed at the promotion of its interests. As a result of post-Cold War transformation and reform, NATO has become the very institution about which Canadian leaders have always dreamed: a cooperative security organization that emphasizes the political over the military dimension, a community of states united by common values and, finally, one that includes Canada's main coalition partners. Who could ask for more?



Book Reviews

This brief review cannot do justice to the richness of the argumentation put forth in the book. Haglund's defence of Atlanticism is neither an impassioned pleading nor a dry scholarly discourse, but instead is like an impressionist painting in which the arguments are applied with quick, deft strokes. He does not press his arguments on the reader, he invokes them gracefully. This approach can succeed only if the writer has complete command of the subject matter, but that is clearly the case. Such a writing style also allows the author to avoid repeating what he has already written elsewhere. Haglund occasionally refers to ideas that he developed in one of his many articles (on the metaphor of the North Atlantic Triangle, on grand strategy, or on Canada's 'dream NATO'). In fact, he brings together in a tidy package many of his ideas that have ripened over time, and he arranges them in a coherent whole, forming a panoramic picture, a large tableau, that superbly synthesizes many years of thought on the theme of support for the Atlantic Alliance.

Of course, there is another side to the coin. Haglund puts forth so many ideas with such economy of detail, that there some passages that will inevitably raise eyebrows. For example (and the following is the subject of an old argument between Haglund and the author), he states that, contrary to predictions that can be inferred from constructivist theory, the common values of the western democracies were not sufficient reason to create an alliance in the early 1920s (pp. 42-43). I do not share this interpretation of constructivist hypotheses. It might be more accurate to say that *when* democracies decide to form an alliance, they demonstrate greater collective will and the alliances are therefore more solid. The last part of the book, which deals with the continued existence of NATO and the policy of coalition, tends to support this argument. Haglund also suggests that the process of NATO enlargement may help reduce the sense of marginalization that Canadians all too often feel today, "Expansion of the alliance ... has the effect of making Canada ... less marginal — because [it is] less

marginal to its newest members and to non-allies who are participants in the new Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council" (p. 95). It is hard to see how the fact of being *relatively* less marginal will solve the Canadian problem. Canada will still be the only small non-European state in the Alliance.

Supporters of Canada's Asiatic or hemispheric options could no doubt make counterarguments in favour of 'their' regions, and it is hoped that they will do so. But 'concerned Atlanticists' (of whom I am one) will ask themselves after reading this book whether or not it has put their minds at ease. The answer is "yes, but not entirely." Haglund certainly attains the goal he set for himself, clearly demonstrating that "Europe still matters", and this is a considerable feat under the circumstances. But he neglects what is happening on the other side of the fence; why would the European partners, caught up in their own introspection, continue to concern themselves about Canada? Moreover, he dismisses the European Union a bit too lightly, stating that "The EU remains today what the European Community was yesterday, a minor player in defence policy" (p. 101). That may be true at this time. But the persistent uncertainty that surrounds this question might be enough to prevent Canadian Atlanticists from sleeping soundly.

If the value-laden (normative) or future-looking dimensions of this book do not entirely convince the reader, the explanatory dimension — the logical reasoning woven throughout the work — cannot fail to win him/her over. Haglund surveys over a century of transatlantic relations, elegantly highlighting elements of continuity in how Canadians have perceived these links and what they have sought to find in them. Those who appreciate insightful perspectives, and who search for firm points of reference in an otherwise confused evolutionary sequence, will be delighted with this book.

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MORALITY AND CONTEMPORARY WARFARE

by James Turner Johnson,

New Haven: Yale University Press. US \$25.00 (hard cover).

Reviewed by Major (ret'd) The Reverend E. Arthur Gans

James Turner Johnson is a professor of religion and a member of the graduate program in political science at Rutgers University in New Jersey. He is also arguably one of the premier exponents of the 'just war theory' writing in North America

today. His latest book, *Morality and Contemporary Warfare*, deals specifically with the forms of warfare that have engaged the international community since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the effective end of the Cold War.

Book Reviews

Johnson divides the period following the Second World War into four major theoretical periods in just war theory. First, there was the immediate aftermath of the war and the emphasis upon the only just use of force being that of defence. Then, the development of the bi-polar Cold War balance of terror, followed by the generalized rejection of any use of force engendered by reactions to the Vietnam War. Finally, the contemporary period in which 'humanitarian interventions' are being increasingly required. The first three of these periods place an emphasis upon a single area of classic just war theory, namely, defensive reaction. What is new in more recent discussions is the return of right intention as grounds for just war. As Augustine, the father of Western just war theory says:

True religion looks upon peaceful those wars that are waged not for motives of aggrandizement or cruelty, but with the objective of securing peace, of punishing evil-doers, and of uplifting the good.

This is quite different from the more commonly heard approach in recent years which condemns all use of force as illicit other than that which is purely defensive.

One could say that the rest of the book follows from this discussion focus in the first chapter — but that

would be too limiting. Johnson considers in detail a substantial number of concepts that are important to the conduct of modern warfare, including the treatment of noncombatants, targeting, the role of ethnicity and religion in warfare, and finally, the matter of war crimes and reconciliation. Of particular interest to members of the Western community would be his analysis of the Islamic concept of *jihad* and, for me at any rate, how closely the Islamic rules of warfare parallel those of the western and international humanitarian forms.

I would strongly urge every professional member of the military to read this work. It will provide you with a complete discussion of the just war theory which is the moral basis of your profession. It will also provide you with enough background in the legal and theological bases of that theory to be able to speak positively about the justified use of force in modern statecraft. For anyone interested in military professional ethics, this is a 'must have' volume.

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