



NATO Photo

The opening ceremonies of NATO's 50<sup>th</sup> Anniversary Summit in Washington, April 1999.

## LIVING IN A RENOVATED NATO

**A**t the Washington Summit in April 1999, where it celebrated its 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary even as it was embroiled in an undeclared war against Serbia, NATO approved its second “New” Strategic Concept of the post-Cold War era. This new Strategic Concept emphasizes the risks to Euro-Atlantic stability from the ‘spillover’ of conflicts from regions on the periphery of the Alliance.<sup>1</sup> Stressing the common values of member states, it defines “crisis management” and “crisis response operations” as core missions of the Alliance. In contrast to the Cold War period, member state military capabilities are now to be maintained for two purposes: collective defence in accordance with Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, and crisis response operations. The new Strategic Concept is indeed remarkable for the emphasis placed on non-Article 5 operations, this term appearing no fewer than nine times in the text.

NATO's engagement in the Balkans is by far the most visible evidence of the prominence of non-Article 5 operations. Neither SFOR in Bosnia nor KFOR in Kosovo can be characterized as collective defence

operations. No member state was attacked. Instead, NATO's Balkan adventures represent the operational reflection of an Alliance that has adopted a wider role in maintaining regional stability and, significantly, a role which calls for the projection of military force outside the territory of member states. The rationale for NATO's actions did not flow from Article 5, but from Article 4. A value-based humanitarian impulse was a significant motivating factor, as decision-makers and publics alike were moved by scenes of suffering and reports of atrocities. Incidents such as the mortar bomb that fell in a Sarajevo market or the massacre at Racak served to drive policy in the direction of increased Alliance involvement. However, it was the convergence of values and interests that drove Alliance engagement, as member states sought to prevent the conflicts in the Balkans from spilling over into a wider regional war. This explains why NATO intervened in Bosnia and Kosovo while refusing to intervene in Algeria or Albania.

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NATO's engagement in Bosnia and Kosovo reveals both the extent of the Alliance's transformation and the depth of the challenges facing non-Article 5 operations. In Bosnia, NATO's role was initially subordinate to the UN, acting in support of United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions only with the authorization of UN authorities. NATO involvement increased incrementally.<sup>2</sup> From humble beginnings monitoring and then enforcing the UN arms embargo under Operation "Maritime Monitor" (16 July 1992) and Operation "Sharp Guard" (15 June 1993), NATO found itself monitoring and then enforcing a UN-mandated no-fly zone over Bosnia under Operation "Sky Monitor" (10 September 1992) and Operation "Deny Flight" (12 April 1993). It was during Operation "Deny Flight" that NATO fired its first shots in anger, as F-16 fighters shot down four Serbian aircraft on 28 February 1994. On 10-11 April 1994, after an acrimonious internal debate that had been raging since the fall

changing military fortunes on the ground that paved the way for Dayton and the signing of the General Framework Agreement on 15 December 1995.

On 5 December 1995, the UN Security Council authorized the establishment of a NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR), thereby 'contracting out' to the Alliance. Planning for a ground force had been underway at NATO since 1993 under instructions from the North Atlantic Council (NAC).<sup>3</sup> The NAC approved the IFOR plan on 16 December, and IFOR took over from UNPROFOR on 20 December 1995. By February 1996 some 58,000 troops from member and non-member states were deployed in Bosnia. The objective of IFOR under the General Agreement was to create a secure environment for the restoration of normalcy in Bosnia, and the mission tasks assigned to IFOR reflected this. In effect, NATO became engaged in peacekeeping and peace-

building in Bosnia, monitoring the withdrawal of military forces, establishing the Inter-Entity Boundary line and the attendant Zone of Separation, and establishing links with local military and civilian authorities and international organizations. Other tasks included assisting with humanitarian and reconstruction efforts, the prevention of violence against civilians or the obstruction of free movement, and the apprehension of Persons Indicted for War Crimes.

Kosovo represented a very different challenge for the Alliance. Unlike Bosnia, Kosovo was a province of a sovereign state, and NATO acted without the expressed authorization of the UN Security Council. NATO threatened Belgrade with air strikes in October 1998, which led to a temporary halt to the

campaign of ethnic cleansing underway in the province following an ill-fated Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) offensive earlier in the year. Efforts by US envoy Christopher Hill to broker a peace settlement in late 1998 failed as the Serbian campaign against the KLA intensified in January 1999. On 15 January, 45 ethnic Albanians were massacred outside Racak, and on 19 January 1999, 24 more Albanians were killed in a police raid. NATO again threatened the use of air strikes, and the Milosovic



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US President Clinton addressing the Washington Summit at which NATO's "New" Strategic Concept was approved.

of 1993, NATO began conducting air strikes to protect the UN 'safe area' of Gorazde, beginning an aerial campaign that would widen to other areas of Bosnia and would continue well into 1995. By late 1994, there was a growing sense that the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) could not contain the conflict in Bosnia. There was growing frustration with the cumbersome UN-NATO 'dual-key' authorization procedure for air strikes. As if to underscore the reactive nature of conflict management efforts in Bosnia, it was

government agreed to attend peace talks in Rambouillet, France. The Serbian delegation refused to sign the accords, which essentially amounted to an ultimatum, and on 24 March 1999, NATO initiated a bombing campaign against the Republic of Yugoslavia.

In the early stages of the air campaign against Serbia, NATO was criticized for mounting a military action against a sovereign state without the express authority of the UNSC. By launching the air attacks against Serbia, NATO effectively severed itself from the requirement of obtaining 'right authority' from the UN, despite Article 7 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Protestations of violations of international law notwithstanding, support for the NATO bombing campaign remained moderately strong, with only a few exceptions.<sup>4</sup> The imperative of action overrode concerns related to the uncertain legalities of right authority and noninterference.<sup>5</sup> NATO members were concerned about the potential for the spillover of the conflict into the wider Balkans, they were dismayed by the humanitarian crisis perpetrated by the Serbian government in Kosovo, and they had lost patience with Milosevic. The UNSC would never have provided a mandate supportive of NATO military action, so it was bypassed, in part because of the humanitarian impulse and concerns for the moral and legal consequences of inaction, and in part because of the concern that the credibility of the Alliance was at stake.

As the bombing campaign wore on, criticism shifted to the execution of NATO's campaign strategy. As the initial bombing campaign failed to bring Milosevic to the bargaining table and the ethnic cleansing campaign in Kosovo intensified, the absence of a consensus on a ground force option created the image of an Alliance that had miscalculated and was caught between an embarrassing retreat or a costly ground war for which it was poorly prepared.<sup>6</sup> Nevertheless, Alliance resolve held even as rumblings of discontent were expressed by some member states, and it was the Milosevic government which backed down in the face of increased damage from the air campaign and a looming threat of a ground invasion.<sup>7</sup> After 78 days, on 10 June 1999, the air campaign was suspended. Two days later the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) began deploying into Kosovo. In subsequent months, KFOR grappled with the challenges



Bosnia: the first of NATO's non-Article 5 Operations. Shown here is an SFOR helicopter landing zone at Banja Luka.

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of providing security in a region characterized by the return of refugees and Albanian reprisals against the remaining Kosovar Serbs.

## THE CHALLENGES OF NON-ARTICLE FIVE OPERATIONS

Together, NATO's restructuring and its activities in the Balkans demonstrate the increased divergence between the Article 5 foundations of the Alliance and the actual political and military activity that has of late consumed the attentions of member states. Developments beyond NATO's formal area of responsibility (the territory of member states) has become the top security concern for most NATO members.<sup>8</sup> In the last decade, most of NATO's business has been 'out-of-area'. On the surface, Bosnia and Kosovo have the appearance of being qualified Alliance victories. Certainly NATO has proven its preeminence in the security architecture of Europe, and the mechanisms developed to facilitate the political formulation and operational execution of non-Article 5 operations have proven effective. However, NATO's activities in the Balkans have also revealed the extent of the challenges facing the Alliance as it undertakes non-Article 5 operations.

First, non-Article 5 operations may serve to threaten Alliance cohesion, both in the short and long term. Member states that once viewed collective defence efforts as essential may be inclined to regard non-Article 5 operations as discretionary. During crisis response contingencies, the range of divergence between those members interpreting a NATO response

as necessary, and those members interpreting a response as discretionary, is likely to be far more corrosive than any of the differences encountered in managing the challenges of collective defence. During the Cold War, even countries physically distant from the threat could expect their security interests to be compromised in a general European war. Crisis response contingencies do not, however, inspire the same level of commitment, particularly for those countries far from the flames of conflict. As Joseph Lepgold has suggested, over the long term NATO will face a serious collective action problem, caused by increased incentives to 'free ride' and contribute less to the collective good. Non-Article 5 operations will not be well considered because the territorial integrity of member states is not threatened.<sup>9</sup> For those member states closer to the conflict, local interests and sensibilities that flow from regional histo-

Second, non-Article 5 operations carry the risk of entanglement in interminable conflict-management contingencies in which some member states may have little or no interest. Such entanglements may begin with relatively small deployments and escalate into major operations and long-term commitments. In Bosnia, for example, NATO involvement began with a modest role subordinate to the UN, and yet a few short years later the Alliance had almost 60,000 soldiers in the country. Member states may become increasingly wary and weary of such efforts, leading to free riding and burden-sharing debates and recriminations, especially across the Atlantic. Furthermore, the fear of entanglement may prevent or delay a collective decision to engage in a crisis response operation, thus damaging the capacity of the Alliance to react in a timely fashion to regional crises. A failure to intervene early may require a more

costly and dangerous intervention at a later date, as was the case in Bosnia. The fear of entanglement may also compromise the ability of the Alliance to achieve consensus on operational policy, driving the collective decisions of NATO down to the level of the lowest common denominator. This is what happened in Kosovo; the inability to achieve consensus on more robust air and ground options led to the adoption of the only option that could be agreed to by the North Atlantic Council – a limited air campaign against Serbia. When this failed to achieve the desired results quickly, no consensus could be reached on a ground force operation, which weakened the weight of NATO's political pressure on Milosovic. The problems of achieving consensus in an Alliance rife with such cohesion challenges will make NATO vul-

nerable to efforts by adversaries to drive political wedges between members. It may also call into question Alliance cohesion on other matters of far more importance.<sup>10</sup>

Third, another challenge attending non-Article 5 operations is the danger of placing strains on the capacities of member states to support large contingents in the field. In an era when defence budgets have contracted, and support for increased defence spending has a limited constituency, asking member states to deploy and maintain large forces abroad is not a popular proposition. Open-ended commitments can serve to drain the



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Kosovo: NATO's second non-Article 5 Operation. Depicted here is Sergeant David Wilson of the 1st Battalion, Royal Canadian Regiment, briefing a Norwegian officer prior to the Canadian withdrawal from Kosovo.

ries may lead to opposition to NATO activities, such as the denial or obstruction of NATO access to facilities or bases. During the air campaign against Serbia, Greece, Italy and Hungary were less than fully supportive of the NATO effort. In fact, the Greek public was overwhelmingly opposed to the bombing because of concerns over regional stability and the bombing of a people who share their Orthodox faith. Italian concerns were driven by the threat of large numbers of refugees landing on their shores. Hungary was concerned about a backlash against the Hungarian population in Vojvodina. These are the kind of intractable cohesion problems NATO will inevitably confront in non-Article 5 operations.

Alliance of political will, monetary resources and military assets. At the height of these operations, NATO had 80,000 personnel deployed in Bosnia and Kosovo with little sense of when these deployments might end. The Alliance will, of course, maintain forces in these regions for an indeterminate period because they are seen as a precondition for long-term peacebuilding. But what if the peacebuilding agenda fails? There is evidence that peacebuilding has serious conceptual and operational shortcomings. At the conceptual level, the core premise of peacebuilding is that the presence of external actors can assist war-torn countries in the development of democratic institutions and civil society, and that the creation of market economies will prevent recidivism into violence. Put simply, peacebuilding is “pacification through political and economic liberalization.”<sup>11</sup> Operationally, the challenges facing peacebuilding efforts are significant, from deep divisions in war-torn societies to the existence of ‘spoilers’ who have an interest in continuing the conflict.<sup>12</sup> If NATO finds itself supporting a peacebuilding agenda that is not succeeding, is it facing a lengthy commitment similar to that of the UN in Cyprus?

A fourth challenge presented by non-Article 5 operations comes in the form of the increasing gap in relative military capacities among Alliance member states. In particular, there is a widening gulf between the military-technical capacities of the US, and its European allies and Canada. As the US pursues the high-tech promise of the ‘Revolution in Military Affairs’ (RMA), it is leaving its Alliance partners far behind, to the point that effective interoperability between US forces and those of its allies is now in question. This gap exists across the operational spectrum, from small unit force protection and communications security, to precision-guided bombing, night-fighting capabilities, and reconnaissance and surveillance assets.<sup>13</sup> General Klaus Naumann, former chairman of NATO’s Military Committee warned that the US and its allies “will not even be able to fight on the same battlefield” in the near future.<sup>14</sup> This has stark implications for multilateral crisis response operations – if allies cannot fight together, they cannot act together. If the Alliance is to be utilized as an instrument of crisis response, it must retain the capa-

bility, interoperability and consensus on combat strategies and doctrines that are the basis of multilateral operations. In addition, the increasing depend-



The restoration of order and stability is the ultimate objective of NATO’s Stabilization Force in Bosnia. Here, members of the 1st Regiment, Royal Canadian Horse Artillery, ‘show the flag’ in Velika Kladusa to prevent partisan violence during the recent elections in Bosnia.

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ence of Europe on American capacities will exacerbate burden-sharing debates and threatens to divide what is already a ‘tiered’ Alliance even further.

Fifth, while NATO’s area of responsibility remains clear (the territory of member states), NATO is facing a new out-of-area problem in terms of defining its area of interest – the geographic region or space of direct material concern to the Alliance. NATO grappled with this question during the enlargement debate, and it will again, for future enlargement decisions and future non-Article 5 operations will confront NATO with the same problem. Friction is likely to develop between members who call for Alliance involvement in resolving a certain international problem, and others who will argue that it is outside NATO’s area of interest. This was the case in the recent debate over whether NATO should adopt a global role.<sup>15</sup> Achieving consensus within the Alliance on this issue is likely to be impossible beyond short-term tactical agreements over new members or crisis contingencies considered on a case-by-case basis. Any attempt to establish a defined area of interest could call to mind the division of Europe into spheres of influence, and the reestablishment of dividing lines in Europe.

## CANADA AND THE NEW NATO

The transformation of NATO has, to paraphrase David Haglund, created the Alliance of Canada’s dreams.<sup>16</sup> Having rebuilt itself as an organization with

a political and value-based orientation to maintain peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area, NATO may be the best it can be in terms of Canadian interests. As operations in Bosnia and Kosovo illustrate, NATO is the preeminent security organization in the Western world, and has developed an elaborate array of outreach programs to Central and Eastern Europe (and to a lesser extent in the Mediterranean) in an effort to extend stability over a wider area. This serves a fundamental Canadian interest in a peaceful and stable European space. NATO remains a key diplomatic forum for Canada, as most of its closest allies are members. Membership in NATO secures Canada's access to this forum with attendant expectations of having a voice and input in political and security deliberations. As a multilateral forum, NATO offers Canada the opportunity to act in concert with other countries to promote common agendas and to constrain the behaviour of other partners, most notably the US. Finally, NATO is at the center of a wide range of activities which include interoperability training and exercises, initiatives dealing with the environment, the promotion of democracy, democratic control of armed forces, and arms control. In short, NATO is the core of an expansive agenda of political and security consultations across Europe, an agenda that is certainly consistent with Canadian interests. As it has in the past, NATO today serves Canada's interests very well.

Canada has been broadly supportive of NATO's engagement in non-Article 5 operations in Bosnia and in Kosovo. This was consistent with Canada's enthusiastic support of more robust peacekeeping efforts, and of the need to strike a balance between state sovereignty and humanitarian intervention. In a convocation address at Stanford University in September 1991, Brian Mulroney supported the necessity of "...re-thinking the limits of national sovereignty" in the world of sub-state and transnational problems.<sup>17</sup> The surge in UN peacekeeping became a Canadian peacekeeping surge, which led to a dramatic increase in the commitments and operational activity of the Canadian Forces. Canada joined all but one of the fourteen new peacekeeping operations established between 1988 and 1993.<sup>18</sup> However, peacekeeping under UN auspices was tarnished by negative experiences or outright failure in Somalia, Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. In the case of the former Yugoslavia, Canada was among the first countries to commit to the UN force in Croatia in February 1992 and to UNPROFOR in Bosnia in March of 1992. The UN, however, proved to be highly unsuited to the demands of conflict management in the Bosnian civil war.

When NATO was assigned responsibility for the enforcement of the General Framework Agreement in

Bosnia, Canada made a largely seamless transition between UN and NATO operations, transferring its UNPROFOR contingent to IFOR in December of 1995. In one sense, Canada's military deployment in Bosnia under NATO auspices did not represent a vast shift in Canadian policy, for NATO has always been a pillar of Canadian overseas engagement. Furthermore, Canada could at least console itself with the UNSC mandate authorizing IFOR. However, Canada has recently played the role of NATO ally much more than that of UN peacekeeper, a fact that has caused some consternation among UN supporters in Canada. Indeed, the vast majority of Canada's overseas forces are in NATO-led operations rather than in UN missions. Canadian officials have recently expressed their frustration with the UN; so, despite the deployment of small contingents to UN missions in East Timor and Eritrea, the return of Canada to the role of staunch Euro-Atlantic ally would seem to be more than a passing fancy.<sup>19</sup>

In Kosovo, Canada was confronted with two moral dilemmas. The first pitted the legalities of NATO intervention against the humanitarian impulse, a dilemma decided in favour of NATO and humanitarian intervention over a clearly paralyzed and ineffectual UN. The second pitted the imperatives of human security against the consequences of a delayed or deferred response, a dilemma decided in favour of the need for a response, even if it meant inflicting casualties on innocent Serbian civilians. In the early stages of the war, Canada was among those countries most committed to the air effort against Serbia. As the war progressed, the government's enthusiasm waned, but never to the point where NATO's basic strategy was challenged.<sup>20</sup> Canada's participation in Alliance operations against Serbia and subsequently inside Kosovo was justified largely on humanitarian grounds. However, Canada's traditional pro-NATO interests were also engaged, in particular the desire to preserve stability in the Euro-Atlantic area and to prevent the spillover of the conflict into a wider Balkan war. Canada was also intent on supporting the Alliance for its own sake, given the value of the organization for wider Canadian interests.

Looking to the future, NATO's non-Article 5 missions have created a set of operational common denominators for member states, the most important of which is the requirement for rapidly deployable formed units, particularly ground force combat units. Such units and formations must be capable of a high level of interoperability with the forces of other allies, which presupposes an acceptable level of training and exercises with multi-national formations. Interoperability, particularly with new members and potential non-member partners in Combined Joint Task Forces, will, of course, always

present problems, but they can be reduced by Partnership for Peace exercises. The shrinking size of members' armed forces, and thus the forces available to NATO, presents challenges to the ability of NATO to respond to major emergencies. In addition, the logistics challenge of operating in 'out-of-area' regions will severely strain available air- and sealift resources. Notwithstanding the difficulties, it is the contribution and maintenance of expeditionary forces by member nations that is the key to NATO's ability to conduct both Article 5 and non-Article 5 missions and tasks. Such forces are required both for peacekeeping and for CJTF missions in the unlikely event of a threat to the perimeter of NATO itself; such rapid reaction formations are the very core of NATO's new military structure. For Canada, the additional dimension of extended geographic separation must be included, as any Canadian commitment to European security will by definition require expeditionary capabilities.

The importance of formed units (as opposed to individuals or sub-components of units) as contributions to non-Article 5 operations in NATO (or in any other coalition, for that matter) cannot be too highly stressed. Formed units are required to address the initial military situation in any contingency operation, whether it be actual conflict or a more benign peacekeeping operation. Formed units are also required to establish and maintain a stable environment in which civilian or humanitarian aspects of the mission can function effectively. As a result, formed units (particularly ground force units) are the most valuable contributions a member state can make to a contingency and to a standing alliance. Not only are they required for military and political success, they are also indicators of the commitment of member states to a given contingency and to shared defence arrangements. The contribution of formed ground force units indicates acceptance of a level of risk and cost (both human and material) that cannot be matched by the deployment of air or naval formations, or the deployment of 'niche role' contributions. As Defence Minister Art Eggleton recently stated: "The proof really comes at a time when Canada is asked to provide its troops, such as we have in Kosovo. We have been able to deliver when we have been asked to deliver."<sup>21</sup>

If a changing NATO places a premium on the operational need for rapidly deployable formed units and formations, and if such formations (particularly ground force formations) are the most consequential from both military and political standpoints, the implications for Canada are rather stark. Canada's expeditionary capability for land force units is dangerously thin, a consequence of successive cuts to

defence spending which have seen budgets decline by 23 percent (30 percent after inflation), from \$12 billion in 1994 to \$9.4 billion in 1999. This has fueled arguments that Canada cannot fulfill the obligations specified in its own *Defence White Paper*.<sup>22</sup> The number of combat arms units in the Canadian Army has been shrinking, and few of the remaining units have their full complement of personnel. In 1992, the former Chief of the Defence Staff, John De Chastelain, warned that the Canadian Army was at the limit of its expeditionary capacity for formed units. Although Canada has since reduced its overseas commitments (i.e., Europe, Cyprus and Kosovo), the Canadian Forces – especially the Army – continues to have a large proportion of its troops deployed abroad, and questions have been raised about the military's capacity to sustain them, given current funding realities.<sup>23</sup> Recent increases to the budget of the Department of National Defence are welcome, but will not alleviate the worst consequences of years of budget cuts.

NATO continues to serve Canadian interests, so Canada has a stake in an effective, healthy Alliance. In order to contribute to Alliance solidarity in the face of the several cohesion challenges it faces, Canada should take steps to ensure it is capable of providing meaningful contributions of formed units to non-Article 5 operations mounted by the Alliance. 'Niche' contributions and peacebuilding capabilities may be valuable, but the most important requirement in these missions is for military forces on the ground. Ground forces are the defining contributions in terms of political input to the diplomatic process. These forces also lay the groundwork for future peacebuilding efforts. In light of this, one recommendation seems inescapable: a priority for the government of Canada, the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces must be the expansion of Canada's expeditionary capability for formed units, particularly ground force units. What Canada must not do is further any 'free rider' momentum that might gain ground within the Alliance. Embarrassing reports that Canada has been unable to meet the force goals assigned to it by NATO are not encouraging.<sup>24</sup> Canada's contributions to Bosnia and Kosovo have, however, been encouraging, and this is the direction that Canada should pursue – a renewed commitment to building the military capacities required by such operations. In this way, Canada will contribute positively to a new NATO that requires the commitment of its member states as never before if it is to survive the challenges of non-Article 5 missions.



## NOTES

1. "The Alliance's Strategic Concept," NATO Press Release, NAC-S(99)65, 24 April 1999.
2. For a detailed discussion of NATO involvement in the former Yugoslavia see Dick A. Leurdijk, *The United Nations and NATO in the Former Yugoslavia, 1991-1996: Limits to Diplomacy and Force* (Nijmegen: Netherlands Atlantic Commission, 1996).
3. See Kay, *NATO and the Future of European Security*, p. 77.
4. See "Support for Bombing," *The Globe and Mail*, 23 April 1999, p. A8.
5. For a discussion of the legal debates surrounding NATO action see Adam Roberts, "NATO's 'Humanitarian War' over Kosovo," *Survival*, Vol. 4, No. 3, (Autumn 1999), pp. 102-123.
6. See Michael Mandelbaum, "A Perfect Failure: NATO's War Against Yugoslavia," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 78, No. 5 (September/October 1999), pp. 2-8.
7. See William Drozdiak, "Yugoslav Troops Devastated by Attack: B-52 Raid Leaves Forces 'Pulverized' ", *Washington Post*, 9 June 1999, p. 19, and Roberts, p. 188.
8. See Ronald D. Asmus, "Double Enlargement: Redefining the Atlantic Partnership After the Cold War," in David C. Gompert and Stephen Larrabee, eds., *America in Europe: A Partnership for a New Era* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 35.
9. Joseph Leggold, "NATO's Post-Cold War Collective Action Problem," *International Security*, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Summer 1998), pp. 78-106.
10. See Peter W. Rodman, "The Fallout from Kosovo," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 78, No. 4, (July/August 1999), pp. 45-51.
11. Roland Paris, "Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism," *International Security*, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Fall 1997), p. 56.
12. See for example Stephen John Steadman, "Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes," *International Security*, Vol. 22, No.2 (Fall 1997), pp. 5-53.
13. Elinor Sloan, "DCI: Responding to the US-led Revolution in Military Affairs," *NATO Review* Vol. 48, No. 1 (Spring/Summer 2000), pp. 4-7.
14. Quoted in William Drozdiak, "Air War Exposed Arms Gap Within NATO," *Washington Post*, 28 June 1999, p. A1.
15. See for example Karl-Heinz Kamp, "A Global Role for NATO?," *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 22, No. 1 (Winter 1999), pp. 7-11.
16. Haglund, "The NATO of its dreams: Canada and the cooperative security alliance," pp. 464-482.
17. See Notes for an address by Prime Minister Brian Mulroney on the occasion of the centennial anniversary convocation, Stanford University, 29 September 1991.
18. The operation Canada did not join was the UN Angola Verification mission (UNAVM I). However, Canada did participate in the follow-on mission, UNAVM II.
19. See Paul Knox, "UN Politicking slows vital work: Axworthy," *Globe and Mail*, 24 September 1999, p. A11.
20. See Jeff Sallot, "Canada's Tone Turning Dovish," *Globe and Mail*, 20 May 1999, p. A16.
21. Jeff Sallot and Murray Campbell, "NATO gets first-hand view of Canada's defence woes," *Globe and Mail*, 22 September 1999, p. A1.
22. Stewart Bell, "Cash-strapped army can't meet objectives set by Ottawa in '94 in 1994 paper," *National Post*, 19 October 1999.
23. Jeff Sallot, "Baril fears troop burnout," *Globe and Mail*, 28 May 1999, p. A1, A.4.
24. David Pugliese, "Canada falls short on NATO assignments," *Ottawa Citizen*, 21 September 1999.