



Photo courtesy of Canadian Arms Control Verification Team

Soviet aircraft cut up in compliance with the CFE Treaty.

TRIALS, TRIUMPHS AND TRIBULATIONS: THE SAGA OF ARMS CONTROL

by Louis A. Delvoie

In the second half of the 20th century, arms control emerged as an important component in the security policies of most Western states. Together with defence and deterrence, it came to be viewed as a major instrument for achieving security, stability and peace. Broadly speaking, the main purposes of arms control policy were the achievement of improved security at the lowest possible levels of forces, and the enhancement of strategic stability through the control, limitation or elimination of forces, weapons or weapons systems which represented an inherent threat to that stability. Arms control agreements could of course serve other useful purposes outside the field of security policy. On the one hand, by permitting reductions in defence expenditures, they could make possible the diversion of financial resources to the social sectors of national economies. On the other hand, by eliminating certain weapons systems which caused unnecessary suffering or had indiscriminate effects (e.g., napalm or anti-personnel landmines), they could serve a clear humanitarian purpose.

The history of efforts to control armaments and forces for security or other purposes is long and tortuous. Failures are numerous, successes few. That is what makes the record of achievement of the period 1987 to 1992 so remarkable, and the more recent period of tribulations and setbacks not entirely surprising. The

challenges and opportunities facing arms controllers in the future are politically daunting, but do suggest new avenues to be explored in the cause of international security and stability.

A LONG PROLOGUE

It is something of a truism to state that humanity's capacity for inventing, producing, deploying and using weapons has always far outstripped its efforts to limit or control them. Examples of such endeavours are rare and difficult to identify at any time before the nineteenth century. The earliest recorded disarmament agreement probably dates back to the 6th century BC and involved a league of states in the Yangtse Valley of what is now China, but little is known about it, its duration or the extent to which it was observed. In the Mediterranean world of the early Middle Ages, some attempts were made to control or ban the use of 'Greek Fire' because of its sheer destructiveness, particularly in naval warfare engaging wooden ships, but those attempts were in vain and this much feared instrument of war eventually evolved into the modern flame thrower. In the Europe of the later Middle Ages, the Papacy decreed a ban on the use of the crossbow in wars among

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Christians, because this weapon proved both militarily and socially destabilizing by challenging the primacy of the mounted knightly class on the battlefield. However,

The horrendous death toll and destructiveness of the First World War gave rise to new endeavours to limit armaments and to avoid armed conflicts. Some were essentially declaratory or hortatory. Thus, the Covenant of the League of Nations called upon all member states to reduce their armed forces to the greatest extent possible consistent with national security. So too did the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, through which 65 states renounced war as an instrument of national policy. The Geneva Protocol of 1925 represented an important first step towards prohibiting the use of chemical weapons, but it suffered from the absence of effective implementation mechanisms and from the fact that many states did not accept to be bound by its provisions. The most concrete of the measures of this period, and in many ways the ancestor of contemporary arms control agreements, was the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922, under which the major naval powers agreed to limit their fleets according to a proportional formula stipulating quantities, sizes and types of ships. The Washington Treaty collapsed in 1934 when Japan notified its intentions to withdraw from its obligations under the treaty; its weaknesses as an instrument for promoting strategic stability had, however, already become evident by this time, since some of its signatories had already embarked on a competition to build warships of a type not specifically designated in the treaty.

In the aftermath of the Second World War, the debate over arms control and disarmament quickly got caught up in the politics of the Cold War. While there was no dearth of new proposals, many were geared to enshrine the superiorities of one side over the other in specific areas or types of weapons; some were put forward for propaganda purposes in the knowledge that they were totally unacceptable to the other side. Typical of the propagandistic or utopian proposals of the period were the various plans put forward for "General and Complete Disarmament" which gave rise to endless negotiations and debates, but to no results. It was not until the late 1950s that the major powers turned their attention to more serious, albeit far more modest, endeavours and a series of useful agreements were signed: the treaty prohibiting all military activities in Antarctica in 1959; the treaty prohibiting the testing of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water in 1963; the treaty prohibiting the deployment of weapons in outer space in 1967; the treaty declaring Latin America a nuclear weapons free zone in 1967; and the treaty banning the emplacement of nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction on the seabed and ocean floor in 1971. But these agreements were not only very limited in their aims, the most important of them, the nuclear test ban treaty, was largely ineffective. On the one hand, in military terms it did little to inhibit the development and multiplication of nuclear weapons since signatories could continue to carry out underground tests. On the other hand, it did not prove particularly useful as a measure to protect the atmospheric environment, since two of the declared nuclear weapons states, China and France, refused to sign it and continued to carry out tests in the atmosphere.



US Space Command

A test launch of a US Minuteman III inter-continental ballistic missile, the number of which are limited by US-Soviet/Russian agreements.

this ban was only sporadically observed in its time and did nothing to inhibit the evolution of infantry weapons in the longer term.

The 19th century saw a few more conscious and systematic attempts at arms control, but with fairly mixed results. Among the more successful was the Rush-Bagot agreement of 1817 which banned the stationing of warships, other than patrol boats, on the Great Lakes between the United States and Canada. Although not always strictly observed in the years immediately following its conclusion, the Rush-Bagot agreement remains in force until this day and by extension, became the foundation of one of the most enduring features of relations between Canada and the United States — the longest demilitarized and undefended border in the world. More ambitious in scope was the initiative of Czar Nicholas II in calling together the Hague Conference of 1899 (and its successor in 1907), with a view to limiting the production and deployment of armaments by the European powers. The Hague Conferences ended in failure, however, because there did not exist sufficient recognition of mutual self-interest in the enterprise, let alone a minimum of mutual trust.

LAYING THE FOUNDATIONS

It was not until the late 1960s that some real headway began to be made in the field of nuclear arms control. The first landmark was the signature of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968. Aimed at curbing the horizontal spread of nuclear weapons to countries that did not then possess them, the NPT suffered from a number of weaknesses as an arms control instrument: its verification mechanisms were inadequate and its enforcement mechanisms virtually non-existent; the obligations which it established for nuclear-weapons-states to control vertical proliferation were non-binding; France and China, which already had the capacity to produce them, did not adhere to the Treaty. Nonetheless, the NPT proved to be a highly useful instrument for limiting nuclear proliferation and the inherent instability and dangers to which unchecked proliferation would have given rise. At a very practical level, the NPT set a series of benchmarks to regulate the trade in nuclear technology and equipment which have been broadly observed by the industrialized countries and have at the very least slowed down the proliferation of nuclear weapons. However, the NPT progressively became a powerful symbol and political statement of the will of the overwhelming majority of the international community to see proliferation halted in the interests of humanity. This element of political and moral suasion has played an incalculable, but nonetheless real role in conditioning the conduct of nations in the years since the Treaty was originally signed. The adherence of an ever increasing number of countries to the NPT (including France and China in 1992) is no doubt in part due to this.

The first really significant attempt to control the vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons occurred in 1969 with the launch of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) between the United States and the Soviet Union. These talks resulted in 1972 in what are usually known as the SALT I agreements. The most useful and enduring of these was the treaty limiting the testing and deployment of antiballistic missile (ABM) systems. This treaty in effect avoided the launch of an arms race between the superpowers in the domain of strategic defence systems, but did not inhibit the expenditure of enormous amounts of money on research programmes such as President Reagan's Strategic Defence Initiative of a decade later. The quantitative ceilings imposed by the SALT I agreements on certain types of offensive strategic systems were also useful in promoting stability and predictability, although in most instances they were high. Their great shortcoming, however, was that they did little if anything to prevent the qualitative development of offensive strategic systems through the introduction of new technologies. The second series of SALT negotiations, which lasted from 1972 to 1979, sought to address this issue, but the SALT II agreement which emanated from these negotiations was never finally ratified even though many of its provisions were observed informally for several years by both the USA and the USSR.

The early 1970s also saw the beginning of important negotiations dealing with conventional armed forces in Europe: the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction talks (MBFR).

The CSCE was a multi-faceted conference which dealt with political, legal, economic, social and cultural issues, as well as security questions. In the sphere of security, it devoted much of its attention to the elaborations of politically binding confidence building measures to be agreed to by the thirty-five participating countries (the United States, Canada and all the states of Europe, except Albania). The purpose of the measures was to break down traditional barriers of secrecy and to foster more openness and transparency in military matters in the interests of stability, predictability and the avoidance of conflict through miscalculation or misapprehension. By the time it concluded in 1975, the CSCE had reached agreement on measures calling for the prior notification to all parties of major military manoeuvres and movements, and providing for the exchange of observers at major military exercises. These confidence



Artist's interpretation of the launching of a SS-NX-23 ballistic missile from a Soviet Delta IV submarine in the Barents Sea.

building measures were further elaborated, and new ones developed, at follow-on meetings of the CSCE, especially the Stockholm Conference of 1984.

While the CSCE was essentially a political process, it was paralleled by the activities of an East-West arms

control forum known as the MBFR negotiations, which brought together 15 NATO countries and seven countries of the Warsaw Treaty Organization. The primary aim of the negotiations was enhanced security at lower levels of forces in an area of Central Europe which was

THE INF TREATY

In the late 1970s, the Soviet Union deployed in Europe and Asia a new generation of intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF), principally in the form of the SS-20 missile. The countries of Western Europe, which were among the targets of these new weapons, sought to have this development countered by NATO and turned the issue into a test of the USA's commitment to the defence of Europe. In 1979, NATO adopted what came to be known as the "double track" decision: either to have the SS-20s removed from Europe through a process of East-West arms control negotiations or to have them neutralized in terms of military advantage through the deployment of American Pershing II and land-based cruise missiles in Western Europe, if the negotiations failed to produce the desired result by the end of 1983. The INF negotiations between the USA and the USSR began in 1981 but were broken off late in 1983 by the USSR as a result of a generalized downturn in East-West relations and of the decision by NATO to proceed with the deployment of land-based cruise missiles. The INF negotiations were eventually resumed within a different framework in 1985 and led to the conclusion of a treaty in 1987.

The INF treaty was remarkable in three important respects. First, not only did it call for asymmetrical reductions, it provided for the actual dismantling and destruction of a whole category of weapon systems. Second, it stipulated a series of mechanisms for intrusive on-site verification whose acceptance by the Soviet Union represented a revolutionary break-through in Soviet policy and thinking since it ran counter to that country's long tradition of extreme secrecy in everything to do with military security. Third, the treaty was concluded at a time when relations between the USA and the USSR, between East and West, were

still adversarial; that is, before some of the main issues or symptoms of the Cold War had been resolved or had disappeared. In this last respect, the INF treaty demonstrated that the resolution of all important political and security problems is not a prerequisite to the implementation of meaningful arms control arrangements between adversarial parties, but that they can be based on no more than carefully negotiated texts, the recognition of mutual self-interest, effective verification mechanisms and a minimum of mutual confidence.

THE CFE TREATY

The member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and of the Warsaw Treaty Organization were engaged in conventional arms control negotiations in Vienna for over seventeen years before finally reaching an agreement. The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), which emerged from these negotiations and which was signed at a CSCE summit meeting in Paris in November 1990, is a highly complex document whose provisions cover an area extending from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains. The Treaty established Europe-wide and regional limitations

characterized by one of the largest concentrations and confrontations of conventional forces in the world. The negotiations lasted for over 15 years (1973 to 1989) without achieving any concrete result due to the inability of the two Alliances to reach agreement on what forces should be included in the reductions plan and, more importantly, on what would constitute an appropriate and more secure 'balance' in Central Europe. Although essentially flawed in concept, often bogged down in technical trivia and subject to all of the vicissitudes of the Cold War, the MBFR negotiations did help to elucidate problems and permit the achievement of common understandings on many technical issues. In that sense at least, they did serve a useful purpose in providing a point of departure for the subsequent and successful Conventional Forces in Europe negotiations (CFE).

But while the negotiations and agreements of this period represented varying degrees of progress in the field of arms control, one essential fact must be borne in mind: none of them resulted in the demobilization of a single soldier or the elimination of a single piece of offensive military equipment. That was to be the achievement of the major agreements concluded between 1987 and 1992.



Drawing of a Soviet SS-20 mobile intermediate-range ballistic missile, which were withdrawn from Europe under terms of the 1987 Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty.

Soviet Military Power 1985

on the numbers of certain categories of armaments which could be deployed: battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery pieces, combat aircraft and purpose-built combat helicopters. The imposition of these ceilings required NATO countries to reduce by over 13,000 pieces of equipment and the Warsaw Pact countries by more than 36,000 pieces of equipment. The Treaty stipulated how these reductions were to be effected and set out procedures for the destruction of equipment, and for the conversion of limited numbers to non-military purposes. The Treaty and its protocols also laid out in elaborate detail procedures for the exchange of information among signatories on the structure, location and holdings of their land and air forces, as well as a comprehensive system of verification and on-site inspection. The CFE Treaty certainly broke new ground, not only in terms of its arms reductions provisions, but also by opening up to exchange and verification information which had previously been jealously guarded by all participants in the name of national security.

The CFE Treaty was buttressed by two other documents signed at the same Paris Summit. The first was an agreement among all 35 member nations of the CSCE to endorse a new and enhanced package of Confidence and Security Building Measures, adding to those already put in place by the Stockholm Conference in 1986. The second was the somewhat clumsily labelled "Joint Declaration of Twenty Two States" in which the countries of NATO and the Warsaw Pact solemnly declared that they were no longer adversaries, renounced the threat or use of force in their mutual relations, and undertook never to use their weapons, except in self-defence or otherwise in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. This declaration, in many ways comparable to a classical non-aggression pact, symbolized the end of the Cold War in military terms, especially when set against the background of the revolutions in Central Europe and the virtual collapse of the Warsaw Pact as a military alliance.

But the CFE Treaty was not alone in bringing about conventional force reductions. The end of the Cold War and of the East-West military confrontation, the economic recession in Western Europe and North America, and the economic upheavals in Central and Eastern Europe all led a large number of governments to effect unilateral reductions additional to those agreed in the CFE Treaty. Between 1990 and 1993, the United States, Russia, Germany, Canada, Poland, Britain, Hungary, the Netherlands, Belgium and others announced plans to reduce their defence budgets and the size of their armed

forces unilaterally. The size of the proposed manpower cuts varied from ten to thirty percent of existing military personnel, and cumulatively represented the largest unilateral military demobilization since the end of the Second World War.

THE START TREATIES

In terms of global security, the most important arms control endeavours were those aimed at achieving greater strategic stability through the imposition of limitations and reductions on the ever evolving strategic nuclear systems of the USA and the USSR. The SALT talks of the 1970s made some useful headway in this direction, but still left both of the then superpowers with enormous arsenals of land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and strategic bombers equipped with over 12,000 nuclear warheads in the case of the USA, and over 10,000 in the case of the USSR. The nature and variety of the delivery systems, combined with the sheer number of nuclear warheads, were conducive to



Graveyard of the hulls of Soviet tanks destroyed in conformity with provisions of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. The men in the photo are US and Canadian inspectors sent to verify the destruction.

strategic instability in that they gave rise to suspicions that, under certain extreme circumstances, one or other party might be tempted to launch a pre-emptive first strike in the hope of being able to eliminate or incapacitate all or nearly all of the nuclear retaliatory capabilities of the other. Given the size and destructive power of the arsenals involved, this was an issue of concern not only to the superpowers and their allies, but to the international community in its entirety.

The Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) between the USA and the USSR started in Geneva in 1981 and, with interruptions, were to go on for over a

decade. The first START treaty was concluded in mid-1991 and the second in late 1992. Taken together, they provided for dramatic reductions in the strategic nuclear forces of both countries, reductions so sweeping that they vastly exceeded what even the most enthusiastic arms controllers had thought possible only a few years earlier. Two of the provisions of these highly complex treaties were of key importance. The first called for the elimination by the year 2003 of all heavy ICBMs and of all ICBMs equipped with multiple, independently targeted re-entry vehicles (MIRVs); in other words, getting rid of the systems which would have formed the basis of any pre-emptive first strike scenario. The second called for a 70 percent reduction in the number of nuclear warheads attributed to strategic systems by the year 2003. The treaties, of course, also include stipulations for the reductions of other delivery systems, as well as elaborate provisions for the verifi-

THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

The INF, CFE and START treaties all had one thing in common — they were the product of East-West negotiations, whether between the USA and the USSR or between the member states of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The fifth of the major arms control agreements concluded between 1987 and 1992, the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), was different in character in that it was negotiated at the United Nations Conference on Disarmament, was open to signature and ratification by all member states of the UN, and was universal in application.

Whereas the Geneva Protocol of 1925 had created some legal and moral inhibitions pertaining to the actual use of chemical weapons, its shortcomings had long been recognized; it had done nothing to prevent

certain states from developing, producing and stockpiling chemical weapons, and little to stop others from actually using them. The need for a more effective instrument was evident, but the difficulties inherent in achieving a consensus on the purpose and form of a CW negotiation proved insurmountable until 1984. There then ensued eight years of laborious negotiations within the UN Conference on Disarmament in Geneva before agreement was finally reached on the text of a Chemical Weapons Convention in September 1992. Unlike the Geneva Protocol, which dealt only with the use of chemical weapons, the CWC prohibited the development, production, stockpiling, retention and use of these weapons and their precursors. It contained provisions for international observation of the destruction of existing CW stockpiles, for monitoring certain chemical industries and for limited challenge inspections of civilian and military installations at short notice. The Convention also provided for the establishment of an Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, to be located in the Hague and be responsible for verifying compliance with the convention. Although many countries would have preferred to see an international instrument with even more rigorous inspection provisions, there was general agreement that the CWC was the best text that could be achieved at the time and that it represented a giant step forward

towards the total elimination of the weapon of mass destruction which had been most widely used in the twentieth century. In that sense, it was difficult to overestimate its importance or the achievement which its successful negotiation represented.



Clearing anti-personnel mines in Croatia.

cation, inspection and monitoring of the dismantling of missiles, silos and warheads. Once ratified and fully implemented, the START agreements would represent a major contribution to the objective of creating a more secure world.

PARTIAL SUCCESSES AND MAJOR SETBACKS

The period 1995-2000 has seen a few qualified steps forward and some major steps backward in efforts to control the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons and to reduce existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons.

In 1995, a review conference resulted in the permanent reconduction of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The NPT thus became a permanent feature of the landscape in terms of both arms control and international law. But although this process was endorsed by an overwhelming majority of the member states of the United Nations, three countries known to have nuclear weapons capabilities — Israel, India and Pakistan — continued to refuse to adhere to the NPT.

After decades of desultory discussions and three years of intense negotiations, the UN Conference on Disarmament achieved a near consensus on the text of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1996. If and when implemented, this treaty would ban all forms of testing, including the underground testing of nuclear weapons, the only form of nuclear testing not covered by the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963. The text of the CTBT as it emerged from the Conference on Disarmament was approved by an overwhelming majority of states in the UN General Assembly, and opened for signature on September 24, 1996. The CTBT is, however, a heavily mortgaged instrument. The price paid for achieving widespread agreement on the text was a stipulation that the treaty would not enter into force until it had been ratified by all 44 countries possessing nuclear reactors. Among these latter is India which steadfastly opposes the treaty in its present form and refuses to sign it. The result is that since 1996 the CTBT has been in a sort of legal limbo. While its very existence, and the international support given it, means that the CTBT stands as a political norm against future nuclear testing, it so far enjoys no status as a legal instrument and no country is legally bound to refrain from underground nuclear testing.

The international nuclear non-proliferation regime was dealt a serious blow in May 1998 when both India and Pakistan conducted underground nuclear weapons tests. These tests did not constitute any violation of international obligations, since neither country had adhered to either the NPT or the CTBT. They did, however, severely undermine the credibility and provisions of the NPT which was founded on the assumption that there were only five nuclear weapons states — the USA, Russia, China, France and Britain. There now exists a major disjunction between the provisions of the NPT and the reality created by the emergence of two additional declared nuclear weapons states. Furthermore, in addition to making their own traditionally adversarial relationship more dangerous to international peace and security than ever before, India and Pakistan also set a lamentable example for other countries which may now or in the future be led to contemplate the nuclear weapons option, e.g., countries in the Middle East and Far East.

Nuclear arms control suffered a further setback in late 1999 when the United States Senate refused to rati-

fy the CTBT despite the solid support given the treaty by the Clinton administration and by all of the major allies of the United States, including France, Germany, Britain, Japan and Canada. Opponents of the treaty argued that it would prevent the United States from maintaining and modernising its nuclear arsenal, that it was not verifiable and could be easily circumvented, and that it would not prevent 'rogue countries' or terrorist groups from acquiring nuclear weapons. When the vote on the treaty eventually took place, however, it became evident that it was not based on the merits of the treaty, but on partisan political considerations; virtually all Republicans voted against while virtually all Democrats voted in favour. Despite the Clinton administration's declared intention to abide by the provisions of the unratified treaty and to refrain from testing, there is no doubt that the Senate vote greatly weakened the position of the United States in its diplomatic efforts to convince other countries to adhere to the CTBT, most notably India and Pakistan. More generally, the Senate vote further undermined the legal status of the CTBT as an arms control instrument.

Of equal importance has been the steady refusal so far of the Russian parliament, the Duma, to ratify the START II agreement concluded between the USA and Russia at the end of 1992. Here again it is a case of a parliamentary assembly refusing to accede to the wishes of its government. Some members of the Duma are reluctant to see Russia further reduce its nuclear arsenal, for they regard that arsenal as the last remaining underpinning of Russia's claim to great power status in international affairs. For many members of the Duma, holding up the ratification of the START II treaty is a means of expressing their concerns about, and opposition to, certain Western initiatives of recent years, including:

- the eastward enlargement of NATO to incorporate Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, thus bringing NATO closer to the frontiers of Russia;
- NATO's aerial bombardments of Russia's traditional allies, the Serbs, in the course of the civil wars in Bosnia and Kosovo; and
- Western criticism of Russia's military operations in Chechnya.

These phenomena not only go a long way towards explaining the current stalemate over the START II treaty, but also many of the difficulties which Western countries have experienced with Russia in adapting the treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) to contemporary realities.

Outside the realms of nuclear weapons and security policy, there was one exceptional arms control achievement in the period 1995-2000. That was the conclusion of an agreement to ban the manufacture and use of anti-personnel land mines, weapons which had achieved notoriety because of the widespread devastation and human suffering they had produced among civilian populations in countries such as Afghanistan, Angola and Cambodia. Initially taken up as a humanitarian cause by the International Committee of the Red Cross, the campaign to ban these mines progressively garnered the

support of non-governmental organizations around the world. In its later stages, the campaign was joined and eventually led by governments, such as those of Canada, Norway and Belgium. The culmination of those efforts was the treaty concluded in Ottawa in late 1997. While the treaty represented a remarkable diplomatic accomplishment, and is of great political and symbolic value, it remains an incomplete or flawed arms control instrument in that it has not been signed by any of the world's major military powers, including the United States, Russia, China and India. In that sense, the campaign to ban anti-personnel mines remains a work in progress.

THE CHALLENGES AHEAD

The most immediate challenge facing the nuclear arms control community is to salvage existing agreements which are 'in trouble', most notably the NPT, the CTBT and the START II agreement. If the latter can finally be ratified by the Russian Duma, the governments of both the USA and Russia have made it clear that the road would then be open to embark on the final negotiation of the third START treaty, which would see a further significant reduction of nuclear warheads on both sides.

Closely associated with checking the spread of nuclear weapons are the problems of controlling the production and deployment of delivery systems and eliminating other weapons of mass destruction. The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) represents an encouraging start in relation to delivery systems, but it is one which will require expansion and strengthening through the exercise of political will and self-discipline on the part of the governments and industries of producing countries if it is to achieve its objective. The Convention on Biological and Toxic Weapons and the Chemical Weapons Convention represent sound foundations from which to look forward to the elimination of these weapons of mass destruction from military arsenals. These Conventions will, however, have to be universally adhered to and their implementation rigorously verified by international inspection teams if the total elimination of these weapons is to occur. This is another area in which much work remains to be done.

In the realm of conventional forces and armaments, there are several regions of the world where the CFE treaty might serve as a useful precedent for the mutually agreed reduction of deployed forces in the interests not only of enhanced security and stability, but also in

order to permit the diversion of scarce resources from military spending to economic and social development. Regions which suggest themselves for this approach are ones in which pairs of countries deploy large forces in opposition to each other, e.g., Russia and China, India and Pakistan, Israel and Syria, Iran and Iraq, and North and South Korea. The European model could not and should not be transposed in its entirety to all or any of these regions; institutions, mechanisms and modalities would have to be developed to suit individual circumstances. But the central objectives of the European treaty — improved security at lower levels of forces — and the central elements of that treaty — mutually agreed and balanced reductions in major armaments, buttressed by rigorous verification and confidence building measures — could certainly be pursued with equal advantage in the Far East, South Asia and the Middle East. Diplomatically and technically, if not politically, the negotiation of such conventional arms control agreements should prove easier than the conclusion of the CFE treaty, since in each instance they would involve only two countries, whereas the European treaty involved 15 NATO and seven WPO countries. The missing ingredients at this stage would seem to be largely political will and a minimum degree of mutual confidence.

The challenges facing arms controllers in the twenty-first century are daunting, politically, diplomatically and technologically. They are, however, worth taking up. While arms control negotiations should never be allowed to carry most of the burden of any international relationship, as they did in East-West relations in the 1970s and early 1980s, and while they can never be a substitute for the normalization of political and economic relations, the successes achieved in arms control between 1987 and 1992 show that they can play a significant role in the construction of a more secure world. Continued perseverance in the search for solutions to security problems through the negotiation of strategically sound and verifiable arms control agreements should remain a priority interest of governments and citizens alike in the years ahead.

Note

This is a much revised and updated version of an article which first appeared in 1993 in the journal of the Islamabad Institute of Strategic Studies, *Strategic Perspectives*.

