**THE LEADMARK CHRONICLES**

Canada’s Navy, to its credit, has become a most prolific publisher since the end of the Cold War. Early offerings, such as *The Maritime Command Vision* (1993) and *The Naval Vision* (1994), examined the “current state of long-range planning” while focusing on the capital plan — much of which subsequently encountered mind-numbing delays (e.g., Sea King replacement), or quietly disappeared (e.g., the Canadian Sovereignty and Surveillance Enforcement Vessels, a Seabed Operations Vessel, and a revitalized fleet of coastal patrol aircraft). More ambitious in scope was *Adjusting Course: A Naval Strategy for Canada*. Published in 1997, it projected the future strategic environment and charted “a way ahead for the next two decades”, but was faulted by some observers for falling “somewhat short of the mark” in explaining the rationale for the fleet.

*Adjusting Course*, however, is a mere lightweight alongside the freshly-minted *Leadmark: The Navy’s Strategy for 2020*. A weighty tome, *Leadmark* seeks to provide “a critical link” to the capability-based planning framework promulgated in 1999 by the CF/DND *Strategy 2020*, while focusing on “the principles of naval strategy essential for a medium power such as Canada”. It identifies “the maritime challenges of the 21st century security environment, establishes a conceptual framework for the navy’s strategy to address them, and points to the capabilities required to implement the strategy.”

Although “not a shopping list” — no doubt to the frustration of those seeking detailed analyses of, for example, the ALSC (Afloat Logistics and Sealift Capability) and CADRE (Command and Control Area Air Defence Replacement) initiatives — *Leadmark* offers “nothing less than a medium global force projection navy” that will serve Canada as a multi-purpose, combat-capable, rapidly deployable and interoperable force capable of joint and combined operations worldwide. As a vital corollary, *Leadmark* also seeks to provide “the rationale (the why) for capabilities (the what) required to fulfil the roles and functions projected for the navy of 2020 and beyond.” The “implementation of this strategy” (i.e., the how) will be addressed in a follow-on operational-level document.

*Leadmark* offers much of merit, but it is clear that its architects faced some formidable challenges. The links to *Strategy 2020* and to *Strategic Capability Planning for the Canadian Forces* (VCDS, 2000), for example, were intellectually and bureaucratically essential, but those documents, while useful in their own right, did not exactly provide the clearest of rationales for Canada’s defence establishment or an effective lead-in for *Leadmark*. The continuing absence of the type of comprehensive national security strategy championed by Professor R.B. Byers constituted a further constraint.

*Leadmark* contains a useful analysis of the future security environment, provides a solid (if not necessarily affordable) inventory of Canadian naval roles, functions and “competency components” (ranging from force generation and C4ISR to organic air, force defence and sealift), identifies naval truisms which Canadians too easily ignore, and makes a helpful, if brief, Canadian contribution to the inexact science of naval typology. It also explores the important, but frustratingly little-studied, question of whether Canadian integration into US and NATO naval formations strengthens or undermines Canadian sovereignty.

Some vacillation is evident in *Leadmark*’s analysis of public opinion. At one juncture it notes, with considerable understatement, that “some Canadians are unaware of their navy, and do not understand where ‘naval’ fits into a ‘national’ strategy”, but at other points appears remarkably sanguine about the willingness of Canadians to support, and presumably to pay for, the type of military required for “engaged internationalism”. In a somewhat similar vein, *Leadmark* correctly notes that the Canadian government has in the past decade made “full use of its medium global force projection navy”, but that is no guarantee of financial largesse when recapitalization comes due.

Perhaps the ultimate litmus test for a document such as *Leadmark*, as Peter Haydon has reminded us, is whether it accomplishes what Samuel Huntington defined as establishing a service’s legitimacy in the public eye by answering the question, “What function do you perform which obligates society to assume responsibility for your maintenance?” More to the point, does it answer the question, “Why does Canada need a navy?”

*Leadmark*’s vision of a medium global force projection navy is unlikely to sway those of the all-conscriptary mindset, or those who posit that a significantly smaller but still combat-capable navy could credibly support Canada’s international aspirations. The degree to which *Leadmark* garners the support of its natural constituency (i.e., those who recognized the need for a successor to *Adjusting Course*, who expected much — perhaps too much? — from the new document, and who are ideologically predisposed to the type of navy envisaged by *Leadmark*) remains to be seen. Some frustrated would-be admirers have drawn unflattering comparisons with the Royal Navy’s elegantly straightforward *British Maritime Doctrine* while lamenting *Leadmark*’s imperfect grasp of classical maritime strategy and incomplete attempt to weave historical experience into contemporary analysis. Some sections of *Leadmark*, to be sure, make constructive and thought-provoking efforts to explain why Canada needs a navy, but others fall short or smother potentially useful arguments under the deadweight of excess verbiage.

*Leadmark* provides answers, but too few, suggest its critics, are clear, cogent and compelling.

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