



A 3 PPCLI Bison passing through a Bosnian village while on patrol, 7 September 2000.

CREATING COMPLIANCE: SOME LESSONS IN INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN A PEACE SUPPORT OPERATION

by Major Shane Schreiber

The Ronald Haycock Lecture in War Studies recognizes the long-term contributions of Professor Haycock to the War Studies Programme, the flagship of the Graduate Studies and Research Division at Royal Military College.

In the aftermath of the tragedy of 11 September, war and the use of violence in the pursuit of political goals seems to have taken a turn that was all but unthinkable just a few short months ago.¹ Nevertheless, as the United States and its allies prosecute the new War on Terrorism, it may prove instructive to look at lessons learned in other agonizing, ‘post-modern’ conflicts since the collapse of the simpler bi-polar world order of the mid to late 20th century. It is my contention that, although dissimilar in many ways, lessons learned from the efforts at the resolution of the recent Balkan wars can provide some valuable insight into the conduct of the war against the Taliban and al Qaeda. Moreover, while the battle continues to rage in Afghanistan, I have no doubt that, like Bosnia, it will be a challenging peace support operation (PSO) once the guns have fallen silent.

It is beyond the scope of this paper to examine the Balkan Wars of the late 20th century in general, or even the Bosnian War in particular. The real focus of this lecture will be on the specific lessons learned in ‘creating compliance’; or, to paraphrase Clausewitz (because no War Studies lecture could ever be complete without a statement from ‘The Dead German General’), lessons learned in “compel[ing] our enemy to do our will.”² More specifically, this paper will review the lessons learned from my tour as a military commander in Bosnia attempting to implement the full measures of the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords. For a generation of officers in the Canadian Army (and perhaps the Canadian Forces as a whole), Bosnia and the various PSOs in the Balkans have been the defining experiences of their professional lives. Peace support operations often call for a wide variety of international organizations to work together in order to resolve complex problems, such as the inability or unwillingness of local governments to abide by recognized treaties or agreements. In enforcing the will of the international community (IC) in a

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The Canadian Area of Operations in SFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina until September 2001, when Canada took over a part of the Czech AOR.

Canadian Light Infantry (3PPCLI) Battle Group. The task of my company was to oversee compliance with the military aspects of the Dayton Accords in the southern four *opstinas* (municipalities) of the Hercegovina canton (usually called Canton 10): Livno, Tomislavgrad, Kupres and Glamoč.³ This was a relatively new area of operations (AO) to Canadians, with 'B' Company, 1 Royal 22nd Regiment having taken over from a Belgian/Luxembourg Battle Group only a month earlier. Before the civil war, Canton 10 was a divided entity. The three northern *opstinas* — Drvar, Bos Grahovo and Glamoč — were dominated by an ethnic Serb majority, while the *opstinas* of Livno and Tomislavgrad had a majority of ethnic Croats. Kupres was and remains a hinterland, with a split population of all three ethnic groups spread out in small pockets. Bosnian Croats, who make up almost 80 percent of the population, now dominate the southern four *opstinas*. Historically, Tomislavgrad and Livno have been considered to be the 'heart' of Croatia; the first Croatian King, Tomislav, was born in Tomislavgrad and ruled the earliest 'Kingdom of Croats' from his capitol in Livno in the 10th century AD. During the civil war, Drvar, Bos Grahovo, Kupres and Glamoč were occupied by Serbian forces, which were subsequently pushed out by Bosnian Croat Forces (HVO) during the Operation "Storm" offensives of autumn 1995.

Politically, Canton 10 was dominated by the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) party of Bosnia-Herzegovina, a right wing nationalist group that maintained strong links with its sister party in Croatia proper. During the war, the HDZ had been the political force behind the military forces of both Croatia proper (*Hrvatski Vojna*, or the 'HV') and the Bosnian Croats (HVO). Not surprisingly, HDZ party members held the vast majority of the cantonal and *opstina* government positions; all four mayors, and virtually the entire cantonal cabinet, were HDZ members. Moreover, the nature of cantonal politics was essentially feudal, with pre-eminent groups of families or friends dominating both the economic and political apparatus of their *opstina*. The HDZ itself, although not monolithic, was nevertheless a fairly closely co-ordinated political body whose main goal was to see the southern four *opstinas* of Canton 10 become part of Croatia, or at least part of a separate and independent Bosnian Croatian entity within the Federation. Those who did not support the HDZ were marginalized, and were often the victims of intimidation or exploitation by HDZ members, who were also part of organized crime syndicates. The ruthlessness of the HDZ's methods did not mean, however, that it was unpopular; on the contrary, the effectiveness of the HDZ in protecting its interests and organizing the defence of Livno and Tomislavgrad during the war had engendered a deep loyalty to HDZ among the local populace. By comparison, the Federal government in Sarajevo seemed far away and almost wholly impotent and irrelevant, unable to provide for or protect the citi-

'non-compliant' area in Bosnia, it was found that both formal and informal mechanisms have been of significant utility in co-ordinating the IC's joint efforts. The effectiveness of a united front approach has political, moral and psychological advantages that often work synergistically in order to drive intransigent regimes towards compliance and co-operation.

While deployed to Tomislavgrad, Bosnia for Operation "Palladium" Roto 6 (February to September 2000), the author worked closely with most of the principal IC agencies involved with the implementation of the Dayton Accords in the challenging environment of a non-compliant canton (province). However, through close co-operation and co-ordination of efforts, the IC was able to make a number of very significant inroads into creating compliance, and engendering an environment conducive to the full implementation of the Dayton Accords. The purpose of this lecture, therefore, is to outline and examine a number of the practical means used to ensure that the IC effort was as effective as possible. Further, it will look at a few specific cases of how the military force (in this case the NATO Stabilization Force) (SFOR) was able to assist other members of the IC in the fulfilment of their mandates.

I was deployed to Bosnia as Officer Commanding 'A' Company (Parachute), 3rd Battalion Princess Patricia's

zens of Canton 10. Although the local ‘Entity Armed Forces’ were also Bosnian Croat (1 Guards Brigade and 2nd Guards Division HVO), they were for the most part compliant and co-operative with SFOR. Thus, the greatest challenge to implementing the Dayton Accords in Canton 10 was at the political level, owing to the continuing intransigence and passive (if not active) obstructionism of the hard-line HDZ party apparatus.

As non-compliance with the terms of the Dayton Accords in Canton 10 was primarily in the political and legal realms, so the lead therefore had to be taken by those IC agencies whose mandates dealt with the political and economic reform of Bosnia, such as the Office of the High Representative (OHR), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and the United Nations Missions in Bosnia (UNMIBH), which included the International Police Task Force (IPTF), the Judicial Supervision and Advisory Program (JSAP) and UN Civil Affairs (UNCA). As the SFOR mandate precluded any real leadership role in these circumstances, it was considered that SFOR could best fulfil its role by serving as the aegis under which the other IC actors could carry out their work without fear of intimidation or reprisals. But, as will be seen, ‘A’ Company and SFOR in general also played a critical co-ordination function in Canton 10, especially during the most challenging times.

Canton 10 was an interesting study in the dynamics of small entity power politics. Some members of the IC referred to it as the “Wild West” or “Little Sicily,” highlighting its seemingly lawless nature. Corruption was rampant, and accepted as a legitimate way of doing business. Given the local political environment and the ruthless nature of the controlling elements, the ingrained sense of North American fair play was very much out of touch with extant reality. In the face of a disjointed, uncoordinated IC effort, hard-line cantonal officials often acted with impunity to subvert or obstruct implementation of the Dayton Accords. Given their support from hard-line elements within Croatia, as well as their relatively strong popular support and control over the local media outlets, the HDZ often treated the IC agencies as a necessary nuisance, to be tolerated but not taken seriously. Many local officials made no genuine effort to co-operate. Clearly, HDZ hard-liners had failed to be swayed by the doctrine of ‘soft power’, and would need to be convinced of the IC’s political will through concrete and decisive action. The dictum *facta non verba* needed to be applied to create an improved climate for the implementation of Dayton.

Upon ‘A’ Company’s arrival in theatre, the IC had only recently started to address the problems existing in

the southern four *opstinas* of Canton 10. Given the stranglehold with which the HDZ held the political and economic life of the canton, some IC agencies had declared it a nut too tough to crack, and had simply avoided interest in the area, preferring instead to focus on the ethnic hotspot of Drvar. The death of Croatian President and HDZ leader Franjo Tudjman, and the subsequent victory of moderate elements in the Croatian elections of January 2000, reinvigorated interest in the future of Canton 10. At that point, the relationship between the IC and the local authorities could best be described as dysfunctional. The IC agencies had essentially stopped speaking to the increasingly intransigent local officials, who were claiming to desire an open dialogue, but were in reality only paying lip service to implementing the peace agreement in the hopes of frustrating and forestalling the IC. Coincident with ‘A’ Company’s arrival, the OHR office in Mostar had decided that “decisive action” was required in order to deal with the “critical situation in Canton 10”.⁴ Simultaneously, in individual meetings with the IC Field Representatives in Canton 10 during the first week of March 2000, it was decided to hold an Interagency



Patrolling on foot through the streets of Bosnian towns provides the soldiers with an intimate knowledge of their area of responsibility, and gives local residents a degree of confidence that their security is being looked after.

Co-ordination Meeting hosted by SFOR at our camp in Tomislavgrad to try to find a solution to the impasse.

Ironically, another catalyst for the improvement in IC co-ordination was a fairly high profile IPTF/SFOR operation to search a large warehouse located in Glamoc for suspected misappropriated humanitarian aid. The warehouse, part of the “Glama” potato factory under the directorship of two powerful local HDZ politicians, was found to contain almost DM3 million worth of missing humanitarian aid. When SFOR unilaterally released flyers explaining its role in what came to be known as “the Glama Affair”, it raised the ire of not only the local officials, but also of the other members of the IC who had not been consulted on the press release. Therefore, the

Glama Affair highlighted two heretofore-unaddressed realities in Canton 10. The first was the corruption on a fairly grand scale of some of the local politicians. Second, it exposed the weakness in overall IC co-ordi-

the head of OHR Mostar, Judge Finn Lyngham, and usually involved not just the IC agencies listed above, but also senior representatives from the United States State Department and the European Commission (EC). The representatives in attendance were most often the heads of the regional offices of the IC agencies (the rough equivalent of a Commanding Officer) based in Mostar or Banja Luka. The senior SFOR representative was usually the Battle Group Commander, although on occasion the Battle Group Senior Liaison Officer (SLO) or I sat in for him. In any case, the SLO (in his capacity as Battle Group Political Advisor) and I were included as regular attendees, if only to improve and maintain our situational awareness and understanding of the policy we would have to implement. As a result of these meetings, a strategy was outlined and agreed to by all members of the IC, which was subsequently discussed and blessed by the heads of the various IC organizations in Sarajevo. In reality, this policy development process took considerable time, effort and negotiation on everyone's part, and the outline strategy was not agreed to until late March 2000 after four such meetings. The original Canton 10 Action Plan included the following ten points:

- Removal from government office of selected obstructionist authorities.
- A media plan to accompany all removals.
- Follow up on removals by IC engagement of an empowered and vetted deputy.
- Continued pressure for reform of the judiciary.
- Financially empowering the 'have not' Northern *opstinas* (Drvar, Bos Grahovo, Glamoc, Kupres) through finance reform.
- The downsizing and relocation of HVO elements from Drvar.
- Development of a coordinated and wide-reaching media campaign.
- Establishment of a permanent OHR Office in Livno (prior to April 2000, all OHR contact was conducted from their head office in Mostar).⁵

This plan was later modified to include two more points:

- The support of Displaced Persons (DP) returns and reconstruction.
- The engagement of talks between authorities in Croatia and Bosnia to regulate Canton 10's foreign support.⁶

With the Principals' Meeting having outlined and gained consensus on the overall strategy for Canton 10, it then fell to the various agencies to carry out their specific tasks. This requirement led to the development of a second set of formal meetings. In order to keep abreast of the continuing developments within each organization, the 'Field Officers' who actually lived and worked in Canton 10 decided to meet on a fortnightly basis in an Interagency Co-ordination Meeting (ICM) hosted by SFOR at our camp in Tomislavgrad, and chaired by the OHR representative from Livno, Mr. Jesus Gil. This conference was kept as an open forum for frank discussion about the impact and problems the various IC agencies were having, both in implementing their own part of the strategy and with the way others were carrying



DND Photo by: Sgt David Snashall, IVD 00-514

On Guard, Bosnia.

nation, especially in the area of media operations. For better or worse, SFOR had demonstrated that if the other actors were unwilling to play, then it would go it alone, perhaps to the detriment of the IC as a whole. The fallout from the Glama Affair both underlined the need for greater IC co-ordination and galvanized the will of the other IC agencies to co-operate or face being left out.

COORDINATION MECHANISMS

The first step in resolving the problem was to create some form of regular co-ordination conferences so as to open a formal dialogue and achieve better co-operation between the IC agencies in Canton 10, including SFOR, OHR, UNMIBH, OSCE and UNHCR. What eventually came about were two sets of meetings. The first, called the 'Principals Meeting', was established on a bi-weekly basis for the senior members of the IC agencies to develop and agree on a joint strategy for creating compliance in Canton 10. This gathering was chaired by

out their mandate. In effect, it was a clearinghouse for issues that concerned most or all of the IC actors. Although the discussion was often heated, all participants understood that resolving the issues we had with one another's actions behind closed doors was the only way to de-conflict our activities and create a united front. Moreover, it offered the opportunity to uncover likely areas of friction, as well as make our own chains of command aware of these areas, so that we could be proactive in finding solutions. In short, the IMC was an excellent forum, not just for co-ordinating the IC effort within Canton 10, but also for helping the participants develop and maintain a high level of situational awareness and responsiveness.

The third formal co-ordination mechanism was the weekly Interagency Coordination Conference held in Livno, and chaired by UNHCR. It included the non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that were working in the Canton, as well as the municipal returns officers from each *opstina* responsible for registering and supporting the return of DPs to their area. This meeting was attended by the Battle Group Liaison Officer (LO) from Tomislavgrad. Its focus was primarily on humanitarian and DP issues. As DP returns and reconstruction became more important tasks in the accomplishment of the IC mission, this meeting took on greater significance, and helped to add to the co-ordinated effort throughout Canton 10. In practice, it was similar to the 'Returns and Reconstruction Task Forces' that have been established under the chair of the OHR in other cantons throughout Bosnia.

Of course, there were also a number of informal mechanisms used to maintain and improve co-operation between the various IC entities working in Canton 10. The most common and effective of these was face-to-face individual meetings on a regular (if unscheduled) basis. As most of the IC field offices were located in the same neighborhood in Livno (the cantonal capital), it was simple for a platoon commander or myself to stop by at least once a week (and usually more often) to touch base with our IC allies. It also helped to set the agenda for upcoming Principals' Meetings or the ICM, and to resolve problems either between the IC or with the local authorities in a timely and united fashion. More important, as time went on and our interaction with the other ICs increased, the spirit of co-operation and mutual trust improved. This was reinforced by the exchange of information and assistance. For

example, SFOR assisted UNHCR in determining an accurate figure for projected returns to Canton 10 by approaching the mayors and municipal housing authorities, as well as by using our own sources within SFOR to come up with a more accurate projection than was previously provided.

SFOR also decided to increase its presence at IC sponsored social functions, such as farewell dinners or office 'meet and greets'. This increased contact at the social level had the effect of deepening the personal and professional bonds between the IC players. For SFOR, it also improved the way we were perceived by our IC compatriots. In the words of one OSCE representative, "I expected to find [from SFOR] just a bunch of cold 'uniforms'... but my biggest surprise in Bosnia has been the humanity with which your soldiers approach their job."⁷ Obviously, this increase in mutual respect worked in the other direction, and the entire IC community in Canton 10 came to have its own unique sense of identity, purpose and cohesion.

Another informal method of co-ordination was the adoption of unofficial affiliations between certain IC agencies and members of 'A' Company. For example, my observation detachment worked closely with the IPTF throughout the area. As the IPTF Station Head became comfortable with my Observation Detachment Commander, he became the unofficial liaison officer (LO) to the IPTF, passing sensitive and confidential information between IPTF Headquarters in Livno and SFOR elements in Glamoc or Tomislavgrad on a daily basis. Another example was the relationship established between the CIMIC Liaison Officer and the head of UNHCR Livno. By personalizing the channels of communication, an excellent rapport was developed and maintained. This allowed all involved to improve their situational awareness and ability to respond to any 'threat', either internal or external to the IC's robust implementation plan for Canton 10.

Another informal means of improving the co-operation between IC agencies was to offer SFOR's assistance in a wide variety of matters. Support of this nature ranged from the provision of close personal protection for IPTF officers, to provision of secure meeting facilities, to organizing a simple luncheon. I was determined that the IC should understand that SFOR saw more than just the maintenance of a secure and stable environment as its mandate; we were, to put it colloquially, 'the

Mechanism	Attendees	Results
Principals' Meeting	Regional Heads of IC Orgs (CO equivalent)	-Overarching strategy and consensus at highest levels
Interagency Coordination Meeting (ICM)	Directors of Field Offices (OC equivalent)	-Coordination and implementation of strategy -Consensus at local level for implementation -Situational Awareness
Interagency Coordination Conference (ICC)	NGOs and loc auth	-Focus on humanitarian and DP issues

Figure 1.1 Formal Co-ordination Mechanisms in Canton 10

grease' that made IC interaction more effective. In short, we would try to do everything within our resources to advance the IC's cause, so long as it did not compromise our ability to carry out our primary mission. Furthermore, I saw our role, in conjunction with the OHR, as the linchpin in the IC efforts to create conformity in Canton 10. Often, this meant 'leading from the rear', but our willingness to assist made it all the more clear to our IC allies that SFOR was making a staunch commitment to the success of the Canton 10 Action Plan.

The end result of the formal and informal mechanisms was the creation of both a unified strategy and the development of a real team atmosphere within the IC community in Canton 10. With the objective clearly defined, and the channels of communication opened at as many levels as possible, we were now prepared to manufacture compliance in Canton 10.

CASE STUDIES

It is now my intent to examine a few examples of how IC co-operation functioned, given the 'real world' test.

IPTF Snap Inspections – 21 March 2000

In mid-March 2000, IPTF requested SFOR assistance in the conduct of snap inspections of local police stations in Kupres, Glamoc and Tomislavgrad. An earlier inspection conducted by IPTF, with assistance from the 1 R22^{CR} Battle Group, had uncovered large quantities of electronic eavesdropping equipment that was subsequently seized by SFOR. It was now suspected that other LP stations were not in compliance, and in fact may have been improperly storing unauthorized weapons. The IPTF Station Commander and I drew up a joint plan for the searches, and approval was sought and received from our respective headquarters. The conduct of the surprise searches was quite simple. The IPTF had asked for SFOR's presence only to ensure the security of IPTF personnel should the local police object (IPTF officers do not carry weapons), and to assist in entering locked rooms that the local police could not or would not open. SFOR's presence, however, was also shaped to send a symbolic message both to the local police and the non-compliant cantonal Minister of the Interior (under whose command the police fell). The message was simple: the IC had both the will and the means to enforce compliance. In the end, the local police proved to be co-operative, and only a few unauthorized weapons were confiscated with no real incidents.

The most significant lesson learned from SFOR's perspective was the need to begin planning for such joint operations as early as possible in order to give both agencies time to conduct proper battle procedure and get permission from their higher commanders. As well, a co-ordinated media line had to be agreed to in advance and adhered to, as a proactive 'advertising campaign' was crucial to ensure that the local populace understood the reasons behind the IPTF's actions and SFOR's presence. The operation as a whole also clearly

pointed to the powerful symbolic value of SFOR, or any military presence, at the scene of an operation. Commanders must be aware of this, and be prepared for both the heightened interest and ramifications of the military's inclusion in such joint operations.⁸

Municipal Elections – April 2000

The OSCE-led Bosnian municipal elections held on 8 April 2000 were the next important challenge for the IC in Canton 10. The OSCE invited other agencies to attend its briefings and press conferences. Joint planning was conducted by OSCE with all the other IC actors throughout Bosnia, although it was clear that OSCE was the lead agency for the elections. 'A' Company was tasked to provide back-up communications for OSCE during the election period, and provide mine and situational awareness training for OSCE election monitors and staff. IPTF were to work in conjunction with and supervise the conduct of local police to ensure security on election day, with SFOR prepared to step in as a last resort. OSCE relied heavily on local organizers to run the elections under minimal supervision, with the result that co-ordination between individual polling stations and OSCE representatives was often haphazard, and IC monitors were frustrated in their attempts to have polling irregularities addressed in a timely fashion. In fact, given our widespread presence and communications ability, 'A' Company personnel found it necessary to act as intermediaries between the OSCE elections office and accredited international observers due to a lack of OSCE field supervisors. Nevertheless, owing in great part to the close co-operation between the OSCE, SFOR and the other IC organizations, the elections went relatively smoothly and were declared a success. The primary lesson learned by 'A' Company was that, despite the close co-ordination prior to the election, SFOR nevertheless had to be prepared to step in and 'fill the gap' left by either an IC agency or by a local organization. Without the close co-operation prior to and during the elections, we could not have done this in as timely or effective a manner.⁹

Removal of Officials – May-June 2000

The elections of April reconfirmed the HDZ's political supremacy throughout the southern four *opstinas* of Canton 10, and returned to power many of the same officials who had obstructed the implementation of the Dayton Accords in the past. As a result, the IC felt that it had no recourse but to remove from office those non-compliant individuals who were proving to be the most obstructionist, in keeping with the Canton 10 Action Plan. While the OHR prepared the Letters of Removal and acted as lead agency, they also put forward all names slated for removal at the Principals' Meeting for consideration and input from all. In this manner, consensus was created within the IC. This united front was made manifest to both the 'removee', his replacement and the general public by having the delivery of the letter accompanied by representatives from all the major IC agencies, symbolizing the unity and resolve of the IC in this matter. Once the official

had been removed, and his replacement approved by the IC, a meeting was arranged, again with all the IC agencies represented, to make sure the same message on the IC's will and cohesion was sent to the incoming official. A joint press conference was also conducted, again to demonstrate to the public as a whole the coordinated resolve of the IC, and to underline the reasons for the removal. The primary lesson learned from the removals is that, despite the fact that the option to remove political authorities was predominantly an OHR prerogative, by sharing their power in the decision-making process with the other Principals, they generated a very powerful and symbolic consensus. The message left by means of these removals was indelible: Canton 10 had to change; anything less than compliance and co-operation was unacceptable.

Eviction of Double Occupants in Livno – June 2000

By June 2000, the implementation of the Canton 10 Action Plan, including the removal of key obstructionist officials, created an increasing climate of compliance and co-operation in Canton 10. OSCE began to put pressure on the previously uncooperative Livno Municipal Housing Board to carry out evictions of so-called 'double occupants', persons who had essentially taken over another person's home during the war, and were refusing to return to their own homes. The first eviction in Livno was scheduled for the widow of a Bosnian Croat war veteran, and HVIDRA, the Bosnian Croat War Veterans Association, had threatened to interfere with the evictions process. HVIDRA demonstrations had in the past turned violent; therefore a clear challenge existed to both the secure environment and to the IC's credibility. To counter the HVIDRA threat, OHR and OSCE asked for the symbolic presence of a single SFOR officer to attend the eviction. Once this was agreed, OHR and OSCE made their request for SFOR's presence known to several local officials, who it was presumed would leak this information back to HVIDRA. The ruse apparently worked.

The eviction was subsequently conducted successfully and without interference, albeit two days later than scheduled to allow the widow time to properly move out. Clearly, simply the implied threat of SFOR involve-

ment (and IPTF too, in this case) served to underline the seriousness with which the IC viewed the situation, and the potential ramifications of either non-compliance or in undermining the security environment of any pro-Dayton elements. In basic terms, this was an object lesson in the adroit use of sanction and symbol in low-level *realpolitik*.¹⁰

Move of 1 Guards Brigade – May-June 2000

To accomplish their part of the Canton 10 Action Plan, 3 PPCLI Battle Group developed a plan to move the Bosnian Croat 1 Guards Brigade elements from the politically and ethnically contentious area of Drvar, to cantonment sites in and around Livno. This was seen as desirable as it would end the 'occupation' of an urban centre by a Bosnia Croat army formation into which a great number of Serb DPs were supposed to be returning, thereby facilitating the returns process and lessening tensions in the Drvar area. The original plan recommended that 1 Guards Brigade be prohibited from relocating any of its elements to other ethnically heterogeneous (and therefore contentious) *opstinas*, such as Kupres or Glamoc. This was the original plan briefed and accepted by the Canton 10 Principals.¹¹ However, 1 Guards Brigade, received permission from SFOR Headquarters to move significant numbers of troops to Glamoc and Kupres (both areas where we



A 3 PPCLI Master Corporal checks on the condition of a man who lost his leg to one of the many mines that litter large parts of Bosnia, 7 September 2000.

were hoping to attract a large number of Serb DP returns), despite 3 PPCLI's protests. The result was that a Bosnian Croat military formation had been allowed to redeploy to areas in which its presence may

have been potentially detrimental to the DP returns effort. At first, our partners in Canton 10 were perplexed by this last minute but significant change from the plan presented to them, although a number of them (especially OHR) had actually been present throughout the planning and negotiations, and knew all along that the plan had been modified. Nevertheless, using both the Principals' Meeting and the ICM, we were able both to explain the rationale behind the decision, and to assuage their fears that the change in plan

Group left Bosnia in September of 2000, the level of IC co-operation in Canton 10, and its results, were being held out as models for other problem areas in Bosnia, and, in fact, throughout the Balkans.¹² The combined effort of the IC in Canton 10 had been successful in engaging a number of Western governments and NGOs to begin significant reconstruction projects, thereby solidifying the gains made on the returns of DPs throughout our tour. The widespread organized crime element had also adopted a much more circum-

spect profile, due to ongoing improvements in the judicial system put into place by the IC, and the increased compliance of the Cantonal Ministries of Interior and Justice, and the local police. The HDZ remained a powerful political force, but it was increasingly showing signs of strain as pressure to reform came from both within and without. Nevertheless, one critical obstacle remains in the path towards full compliance: the culture and the will of the local population.

The media plan carried out by the IC in Canton 10 had some success, especially in conveying the reason behind some of the actions taken against obstructionist officials. Given our limited resources, however, we could not hope to totally block out or override the message of fear and suspicion that the hard line Bosnian Croats continued to manipulate for their own purposes. The deep-seated anxiety

in the minds of many of the locals was seemingly confirmed by increasing reduction in the IC's interest in Bosnia as other new conflicts, such as Kosovo, East Timor and Macedonia, drained away both IC agencies and their resources. In short, while the IC occasionally won some victories, our actions spoke louder than our words. And our actions seemed to indicate to the people of Bosnia (or at least the Bosnian Croats) that the IC no longer thought Bosnia was an important problem, and that the IC, including SFOR, would some day abandon Bosnia to return to its ethnic strife.¹³ This perception served to undermine the willingness of many in the local populace to place their future security and well being in the multi-ethnic state outlined by the Dayton Accords.

This problem most clearly manifested itself in the wake of the Bosnian federal elections held in the Fall of 2000. Despite international pressure and the activities of the IC, the HDZ retained substantial support throughout the Bosnian Croat population. Perhaps sensing their victory as a mandate to reject the Dayton Accords, the HDZ held a plebiscite on the establishment of a separate and independent Bosnian Croat entity within Bosnia, essentially abrogating the Dayton Accords and the creation of the Federation. Despite being victorious in what was considered by the IC an illegal and fairly dubious

would lead to increased tension and decreased DP returns in Kupres and Glamoc. In this case, questioning the motives and actions of another IC actor behind closed doors was far more effective than using a more public forum. Not only could SFOR respond with more candour and information than they would have been able to under the glare of the media spotlight, but also the image of a united IC front was not undermined. Moreover, the move of 1 Guards Brigade was still viewed as a significant accomplishment, and 3 PPCLI pushed for the IC as a whole to take credit for it. Sharing in the credit with the other IC agencies was not only fair, but would further their image and efforts within Canton 10. In short, it was a success not only for 3 PPCLI, but also for the Canton 10 IC team.

RESULTS

The assertion that greater co-operation leads to greater success needs to be judged in light of what was actually accomplished within Canton 10 by the Action Plan. In the short term, it appeared that the IC was successful in encouraging (if not compelling) the local authorities to move towards the full implementation of the Dayton Accords, especially in the areas of Rule of Law and judicial reform. When the Battle



DND Photo by: Sgt Gerry Pliote, ISD 01-1-1017

A reservist belonging to Les Fusiliers du Mont-Royal checks communications prior to departing on a patrol through Bihac, Bosnia.

referendum, the HDZ were unsuccessful in establishing a formally recognized 'third entity'. Nevertheless, this unilateral attempt to renegotiate the Dayton Agreements points to the reality that not all parties in Bosnia are ready to live in a democratic, multi-ethnic state as envisioned by the IC and the Dayton Accords.¹⁴ It further serves to highlight the very underlying reality when dealing with 'nation-building' efforts by the IC: the historical and cultural context in which that change is to be made, and its effects on the ability and will of the people to change.

The existing cultural and historical context for change was the one constant factor that undermined our ability to create compliance in Canton 10. The Dayton Agreements presupposed that the seeds of a liberal, tolerant multi-ethnic democratic state would fall on fertile soil in a Bosnia exhausted by war. But experience has shown us that while the Bosnians were very ready for an end to the fighting, they were not as prepared for the significant changes that come with the imposition of liberal democratic ideals and methods that were at odds with a millennium of history and culture. The Wilsonian desire to "teach [them]... to elect good men", must take into account the reality that fully functioning, mature, Western liberal democracies cannot spring overnight in regions where centuries of history and tradition have created cultural, social and political institutions very different from our own.¹⁵ This is the key similarity between Afghanistan and Bosnia; neither have any history or cultural predisposition towards liberal western democratic institutions. In both cases, if democracy as we know it is to be created, then the cultural and social preconditions must be developed to permit that change. Without those preconditions, there can be no chance of lasting success. Any exit strategy that has wrongly assumed that these foundations are extant when they are not, is almost certain to fail.¹⁶

LESSONS LEARNED

There are a number of wider lessons to be gleaned from the experience of 'A' Company and the IC as a whole in Canton 10. First, all of the case studies point to the crucial role the military must play in creating a safe and secure environment for the other IC actors in peace support operations. This is primarily, but not exclusively, about 'military' peace, and our ability to prevent and, if necessary, terminate military hostilities. It is also about creating a presence that begins to establish the foundations of psychological peace; that is, the will of the locals to rebuild their country and work together for its future without being paralysed by fear or suspicion. Furthermore, it is about demonstrating the will to back up the IC so that they have the confidence to carry out their tasks free from threats or intimidation. It also points to the extremely valuable *symbolic* power of any military force; the adroit use of that symbolic power, as seen, often prevents situations that will require the actual use of military force. As the old cliché goes, 'an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure'. Commanders must be aware of this symbolic power, and seek to maximize its impact both on the local populace and hierarchy, and on the IC itself.

Second, our experiences point to the importance of both formal and informal co-ordination mechanisms in order to develop an acceptable strategy, build consensus, achieve co-ordination, and develop mutual trust. Once a common goal and unified strategy has been agreed to, all agencies can then work towards it in concert. Moreover, just as a team spirit must be inculcated in a good unit, so must that same cohesiveness be created within a potentially diverse and disparate group of IC agencies involved in any PSO. This sense of shared mission can best be facilitated by close co-operation using both the formal and informal mechanisms outlined in this paper, allowing for clear channels of communications at every level.

Third, the ineffectiveness of the IC's uncoordinated early efforts, and the lessons of the case studies, point to the limits of 'soft power' and the pragmatic necessity to adopt a *realpolitik* approach when confronted by an adversary who is not impressed by words or posturing. It was not until the IC took concrete (and some would argue fairly drastic) action, in the form of snap inspections and removals of officials, that the HDZ took them seriously. One must be armed with carrots as well as sticks, however, and the IC needed to be just as quick to praise and assist those pro-Dayton elements as it was to condemn those who were not. Part of this co-ordinated effort must be a united and proactive media campaign, because if information is power, so is control over the context in which that information is received. Deeds must not belie words, or the very legitimacy of the cause can be undermined. The public must be made aware of the reasons behind the IC's actions, especially acts as controversial as the summary removal of a seemingly democratically elected official; otherwise, the action looks arbitrary, unfair, and biased.

Last, but perhaps most important, is the need for IC actors to conduct cross co-ordination at every level in a PSO — from Theatre commander to section commander — as the organizations involved in complex endeavours like nation building must be working in close concert with the overall plan. This may sound like a motherhood statement, but it is altogether too easy in many cases to become narrowly focused on one's own mandate to the detriment of the overall good. This search for unity of effort may create some frustration, and it is seldom easily achieved, but it pays huge dividends in creating synergistic benefits to all involved. Close co-ordination and co-operation with its IC allies also affords the military the advantage of having an avenue of input on the decision making process of political and economic IC actors, thus allowing an opportunity to 'lead from the rear', should the situation necessitate such influence. One passes up such opportunities only to the detriment of one's own ability to understand, control, and influence the situation and outcome of any operation.

It would appear that the experience of SFOR in Canton 10 is not just an isolated case. Similar conclusions and lessons learned were reached by the Canadian Contingent involved in Operation "Joint Guardian", the NATO-led operation in Kosovo. In fact, the lessons learned by Major Doug Delaney and Captain Chris Ankersen in their work in the KFOR Civil-Military Co-

operation (CIMIC) Cell were put to good use in Canton 10. Clearly, CIMIC has taken on a new, far more significant role given the complex nature of post-modern conflicts. Sean Pollick has argued:

The changing nature of conflict has forced the evolution of both doctrine and practice in international efforts to restore or preserve peace. While military forces have the training and equipment to bring an end to open fighting, the concurrent demands for humanitarian aid, police training, infrastructure reconstruction and reconciliation among the population are simply beyond their scope and abilities.... [C]ivilian agencies are probably the most important elements in creating the conditions for a lasting peace in a civil societies that have been torn apart...¹⁷

Colonel Michael Ward, has, in fact, gone so far as to claim that, "In the future, Canada should project a full spectrum inter-agency capability to these [PSO] operations: credible military force, police forces, civil administrators, technical experts...humanitarian organizations and CIDA. Canadians could thus control full-spectrum human security intervention in an entire sector."¹⁸ By extension, then, the Bush Administration may do well to take the same holistic approach to their campaign in Afghanistan in particular, and to the war on terrorism in general, a fact recognized by Presidential Decision Directive 56 that mandates American inter-agency cooperation.¹⁹

SUMMARY

To summarize, the experience of 'A' Company 3 PPCLI and its IC allies during Operation "Palladium" Roto 6 have pointed to both the difficulty and necessity of achieving a united front when trying to require the compliance of an obstructionist government. Negotiations and disagreements between IC actors must be worked out in private so as not to undermine the IC effort as a whole. It also clearly demonstrates the necessity for the 'soft power' of the IC to be backed up by a hard core, capable of concrete action against obstructionist groups or individuals. A highly effective and harmonized media campaign is also necessary to make sure that the words of the IC, and their deeds, send the same immutable message. As seen, any incongruity will be turned against the IC. Last, our experience underlines the benefits of close co-operation and co-ordination in dealing with the complex problems encountered during peace support operations, especially in environments where cultural and historical traditions must be overcome. Unilateralism often proves myopic and counter-productive, especially if the preconditions for change have not been created.

RECOMMENDATIONS

I am loathe to play the armchair strategist to persons as brilliant as Colin Powell or Donald Rumsfeld, yet the experiences and lessons learned in this specific case would lead me to recommend that consideration be given to employing the following techniques in

dealing with the campaign against the Taliban. First and foremost, the United States is absolutely correct in making the humanitarian plight of the Afghani people one of the pillars of its campaign. Richard Kidd, an American who recently returned after spending several years in Afghanistan as the head of the UN's Mine Action Program, has made the comment about the need for a rapid and sustained humanitarian offensive to win the hearts and minds of the Afghan people. Kidd, whose Afghan expertise has become highly sought after in Washington, stated that one of the key tenets of any Afghan strategy should be "to give massive amounts of humanitarian aid and assistance to the Afghans in Pakistan in order to demonstrate our goodwill and to give these guys a reason to live rather the choice between dying of starvation or dying fighting the 'infidel'." Kidd also recommends "the start [of] a series of public works projects in areas not under Taliban control (these are much more [sic] than the press reports), again to demonstrate goodwill and that improvements come with peace."²⁰ Furthermore, Anthony Cordesman and Abraham Wagner have pointed out that it was the Soviet's failure to conduct an effective humanitarian campaign in concert with its intervention in Afghanistan in the 1980s that contributed to its eventual failure.²¹

The West, however, needs to broaden its humanitarian offensive and create a wider coalition that includes not just state actors, but also the larger and more influential NGOs, such as the UNHCR, and other UN Relief Agencies, Medecins Sans Frontiers, OXFAM, and others. It should even court the International Committee of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, (although this organization is likely to spurn any such overture in order to maintain its independence and impartiality) and other Islamic relief agencies, including those located in Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. In addition, the Pakistani government, as well as the nations bordering Afghanistan, must be brought into the working group to harmonize the military efforts with the relief work.²² At worst, a dialogue must be established; a channel of communication offered (if not opened) that allows insight (if not input) into the co-ordination of the military and humanitarian components of the current campaign. Bombing the locals with emergency rations may have seemed like an effective solution to the immediate problem, but it has not engendered the kind of support or respect that the Bush Administration was hoping for.²³ Moreover, this overture must be an honest effort at harmonizing and improving the lot of the Afghans. Perception on the part of the NGOs that they are being taken advantage of by a cynical, self-serving American strategem will quickly erode instead of improve relations between the United States and its future partners in the re-building of Afghanistan and the elimination of the environment that has allowed Al Qaeda and Bin Laden to operate. In short, better co-operation with and between the West's military forces and the humanitarian relief agencies helps in winning the battle for the moral (and in this case the tactical) 'high ground' in this war on terrorism.²⁴

A second crucial part of Operation "Infinite Justice" must be a more highly attuned and effective

public affairs campaign capable of overcoming the cultural and historical barriers that separate Afghanistan from the West. My recommendation would be to find the best public relations firm in the Arab world, and hire them to 'sell' Operation "Infinite Justice". Prima facie, this may seem an almost ridiculous and cynical tactic, but such a non-traditional campaign calls for some serious 'out of the box' thinking. Who, after all, would be more in touch with the cultural and social nuances associated in creating an 'advertising campaign' capable of winning the hearts and minds of not just the Afghani people, but of the significant number of Arab Moslems (and non-Arabs, for that matter), whose sympathy goes out to those killed in the attacks on 11 September, but who do not necessarily agree with the current American military campaign or tactics. Osama bin Laden has been beating the Bush spin doctors at the game they created, but neither he nor his intended audience is impervious to the ubiquitous phenomenon of mass media advertising hype; he was last photographed wearing a Timex watch.²⁵ The Bush Administration's recent overtures to enlist the aid of Hollywood in the war on terrorism seem more intently focussed on maintaining domestic and Western support for the campaign.²⁶ What is really needed is the media savvy to sell the righteousness of the cause (and the necessity of some of its tactics) to the Arab Moslem world, to counteract Osama bin Laden's attempts to paint the current conflict into a much wider war between the West and Islam. Current initiatives by the Bush Administration in this respect have been categorized as 'tone deaf', but there is some indication that the United States is taking action to address this shortcoming in its propaganda war.²⁷ As demonstrated by our own little test of wills in Canton 10, a proactive media campaign aimed at the proper target audience is absolutely essential in creating the conditions for compliance and co-operation.

Most important, what seems to be required is some vision of an end state that takes into account the specific cultural and historical environment of the

Afghanis. This would then translate into goals that the new IC or coalition could work in harmony towards. In short, the United States and its partners, be they Western or Arab States, Afghani groups, influential NGOs, or supranational actors such as the UN, need to come to some agreement on what is to be achieved through the military, humanitarian and propaganda campaigns. Ironically, we may not see this agreement happen immediately, or even without some serious disagreements between the players. As the experience in Canton 10 has shown, as well as other historical examples, i.e., the Big Three's wrangling over an overarching strategy during the Second World War, coming to an agreement on war (or peace) aims takes time, talk and effort. One should not despair that these aims have not yet been fully developed, yet alone articulated. The United States will find itself acting as a shepherd for what can be a very disparate flock, but the Bush Administration, at least, must have some vision of where the flock eventually needs to end up. Moreover, that goal must take into account the very different history and cultural constructs of Afghanistan, including religion, the existing clan-based political system, and its geopolitical diversity. In short, the creation and execution of an action plan to deal with such a complex problem is a difficult and dynamic process, but one that cannot be overlooked. Significantly, it would appear that this reality has not been lost on the Bush Administration. Secretary of State Colin Powell dismissed the allegation that efforts to create a co-operative and effective coalition were interfering with the American military's ability to conduct a more robust campaign as "meddlesome nonsense by people who want to poke the administration."²⁸ While it may sound like a shibboleth, cooperation in the development of the strategy, and coordination at every level in the execution of it, are principles that should not be violated in search of a quick or easy solution.



NOTES

1. In reality, a small number of observers had warned of the terrorist threat and the use of "alternative" weapons of mass destruction, but their warnings were tragically unheeded; see, for example, Richard Betts, "The New Threat of Mass Destruction," *Foreign Affairs*, Volume 77, No. 1, January/February 1998, pp. 26-41.
2. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, eds. Peter Paret and Micheal Howard (Princeton: University University Press, 1984) p. 75. See also David Bercuson, "Instant Gratification? In War it's just not on," *National Post*, www.NationalPost.com, 7 Nov 01.
3. The other two *opstinas* in Canton 10 (Drvar and Bos Grahovo) were controlled by B Company 3 PPCLI. These areas had their own unique set of problems, which are best covered under another paper. The Glamoc *opstina* was subsequently handed over to A Battery 1 Royal Canadian Horse Artillery when they deployed to Bosnia in mid-April 2000. For a complete overview of the role and conduct of the Bosnia mission by NATO, see www.nato.int/sfor. For the Canadian contribution, see www.dnd.ca/menu/Operations/palladium/index_e.htm.
4. OHR Inter-Agency Memo, "Regionally Coordinated Strategy for Canton 10," dated 30 March 2000.
5. OHR Inter-Agency Memo, "Regionally Co-ordinated Strategy for Canton 10," 23 March 2000.
6. *Canton 10 Principal's Meeting Minutes*, 12 April 2000.
7. Vandana Patel, OSCE Human Rights Officer, to author, 10 April 2000.
8. A Company 3 PPCLI Post Operation Report, "OP BLOODHOUND 1" 21 March 2000.
9. A Company 3 PPCLI Post Operation Report, "ELECTIONS 2000" dated 10 April 2000.
10. A Company 3 PPCLI Daily Situation Report (SITREP) 0623 dated 23 June 2000.
11. 3 PPCLI 3350-1(CO) *The Future of 1 Guards Brigade – SFOR's Contribution Within the Emerging Strategy for Canton 10*, dated 31 March 2000.
12. Assessment given to Commander Multinational Division Southwest, Major General R. Brims, by the heads of the Office of the High Representative (OHR) and Organization for the Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in Mostar; see Roland Hayes, "Meeting with the Heads of OHR and OSCE for Canton 10 27 July 00," dated July 28 2000.
13. For a more detailed analysis of the pitfalls of media campaigns or "information operations" in Bosnia, see Pascale Combrelles Siegel, "Target: Bosnia – Integrating Information Activities in Peace Support Operations," www.nato.int/acad/fellow/96-98/combrelle.pdf.
14. For more details, see "NATO in the middle," *The Economist*, www.economist.com, 14 April 2001.
15. American President Woodrow Wilson used this phrase when talking about bringing "American" democracy to the republics of South America. This dangers of this "Wilsonian

urge” are best examined in William Appleman William’s excellent work, *The Tragedy of American Foreign Policy*, 2nd ed. (New York: Dell, 1972).

16. The exit strategy debate over Bosnia has raged since before Dayton. For a good discussion, see Charles Boyd, “Making Bosnia Work,” and Gideon Rose, “The Exit Strategy Delusion,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 77, No. 1 (Jan-Feb 1998), pp. 42-67. See also, of course, Richard Holbrooke, *To End A War* (New York: Random House, 1999).

17. Sean Pollick, “Civil Military Cooperation: A New Tool for Peacekeepers,” *Canadian Military Journal*, Vol. 1, No. 3 (Autumn 2000) p. 57.

18. Colonel Micheal Ward, et. al, “Task Force Kosovo: Adapting Operations to a Changing Security Environment,” *Canadian Military Journal*, Vol 1, No. 1 (Spring 2000), p. 71.

19. Chris Ankersen, “Unity of Effort: A Joint

Strategy for Peacebuilding”; *CISS Strategy Datalink*, June 2000, p. 4

20. Richard Kidd outlined his experience and thoughts on the war against the Taliban in an e-mail to his former West Point Classmates. This letter was considered so insightful that it eventually made its way to the JCS, and became the basis of a presentation to the United States Marine Corps Command and Staff College at Quantico, on 1 November 2001. Kidd’s e-mail was forwarded to me by a current student at Quantico, to whom I am greatly indebted.

21. Anthony Cordesman and Abraham Wagner, *The Lessons of Modern War: Volume 3, The Afghan and Falklands Conflicts*. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990) pp. 95-99. This work is an excellent primer for anyone interested in the conduct of operations in Afghanistan, and specifically the history of the Soviet “intervention.”

22. Richard Boudreaux and Tyler Marshall, “Great Game II Has A Wealth of Players,” *Los*

Angeles Times, www.latimes.com, 2 Nov 2001.

23. The very same point has been made by many other observers; see, for instance Larry Seaquist, “Our New Kind Of War Needs Team Spirit,” *Christian Science Monitor*, www.csmonitor.com, 7 Nov 01, and “War Support Falls Worldwide,” *Washington Post*, www.washingtonpost.com, 6 Nov 2001.

24. See also “Rebuilding Afghanistan,” *The Economist* www.economist.com, 7 Nov 01.

25. Video released by *Al Jezeera Network*, and shown on Cable News Network and other broadcasters, 10 October 2001.

26. Dana Calvo and Rachel Abramowitz, “Hollywood May Enlist in Unconventional Warfare,” *Los Angeles Times*, www.latimes.com/la-111001holly.story, 10 Nov 01.

27. “The Battle for Hearts and Minds,” *The Economist*, www.economist.com, 9 Nov 01.

28. Secretary of State Colin Powell, “Meet the Press,” *ABC News*, 11 Nov 01.



414 SQUADRON REUNION

The 414 (CS) Squadron would like to gather past and present Black Knights in Comox for one last time before the Squadron is disbanded on 15 July 2002, after 52 years of active service. A reunion will take place on the first weekend of May 2002, and all former T-33 operators and maintainers are invited to attend.

For further information on the 414 Squadron Reunion/T-33 Retirement,
please visit the 414 Squadron web site:

www.414squadron.com

e-mail: streak@414squadron.com or phone (250) 339-8117