



US Army Photo PAC 3 part 9

The Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC-3) missile has increased effectiveness against tactical ballistic and cruise missiles because of its advanced hit-to-kill guidance technology.

NATO, EUROPE AND THEATRE MISSILE DEFENCE¹

by Dr. James Fergusson

Over the past two years, the US National Missile Defence (NMD) programme has been the centre of public attention. All of the major European NATO members, as well as Canada, have expressed a range of concerns about the implications of the US decision to proceed with NMD deployment. However, this public focus has served to mask two inter-related developments that provide the foundation for a nascent strategic missile defence for Europe, not unlike NMD for North America. The first development entails a range of Theatre Missile Defence (TMD) programmes in the US and Europe which are earmarked for deployment over the next decade. The second is the February 2000 North Atlantic Council (NAC) decision to proceed with a Stand Alone Project on TMD within the context of an Extended Integrated Air Defence (EIAD) architecture for the Alliance, and the subsequent awarding of two TMD feasibility study contracts in June of 2001.

While it is possible (even if highly unlikely) that NATO will obtain its own interceptor capability, possibly based upon the ongoing NATO Medium Extended Air Defence (MEAD) programme, the most likely NATO role will be to provide centralized early warning and command and control/battle management (C²/BM) capabilities. These would serve to integrate planned US

and European TMD systems into a layered missile defence capability against limited ballistic missile threats emerging from the 'South', and for expeditionary forces deployed out-of-area. In fact, NATO is the only institution capable of integrating US and European programmes, not least because Europe will remain dependent on certain key US capabilities for effective missile defence for both scenarios.

This analysis concentrates on missile defence developments occurring within NATO. It examines the evolution of NATO policy since the early 1990s, and the place of missile defence as outlined in the Washington Summit's updated Strategic Concept for Article 5 and Non-Article 5 missions. In so doing, it demonstrates that the internal Alliance debate about these two missions is clearly evident in the discussion of missile defence, even though the capabilities necessary for an effective missile defence for both missions are largely identical. Subsequently, it identifies the areas under development within NATO concerning its future role in missile defence that recently culminated with the awarding of two feasibility study contracts. Finally, it examines the importance of a NATO missile defence capability to the future viability of the Alliance.

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NATO POLICY ON MISSILE DEFENCE

Integrating US and European TMD capabilities does not represent a new role for the Alliance. Rather, it is simply a continuation of its Cold War-era role of providing an integrated air defence capability for Europe. What will be new is the extension of this role from strictly air defence to tactical and theatre missile defence. This extension is the product of the new strate-

Senior Defence Group on Proliferation (SDP) at the Brussels Summit in 1994.³ The former was mandated to examine a political approach to proliferation, whereas the latter was tasked to investigate military requirements either to deter proliferation or to protect NATO territory and forces from attack.

Alongside these developments, the Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD), the NATO Air Defence Committee (NADC), the Defence Planning Committee (DPC), and Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) also began to examine missile defence requirements.

In 1993, the CNAD established an ad hoc working group on extended air defence and theatre missile defence. At the same time, the NATO Air Defence Committee had already been tasked to begin work on the modernization of the existing air command and control system (ACCS), which includes ground-based radars, local and regional air control centres, and the operational communication and data management system — which was necessary regardless of missile defence issues. Finally, the threat of proliferation and the ballistic missile defence requirement were reiterated in the Alliance's updated Strategic Concept released at the April 1999 Washington Summit, followed by the establishment of a Weapons of Mass Destruction Centre in early 2000.

Not surprisingly, references to missile defence in the updated Strategic Concept reflect the much larger political-strategic debate within the Alliance over the relative importance of the traditional Article 5 mission, and the new post-Cold War Non-Article 5 (out-of-area) mission. Concerning the Article 5 mission (collective defence), missile defence logically entails a limited strategic defence for Europe:

...the Alliance's defence posture must have the capability to address appropriately and effectively the risks associated with the proliferation of NBC weapons and their means of delivery, which also pose a potential threat to the Allies populations, territory, and forces. A balance mix of forces, response capabilities and strengthened defences is needed.⁴

With regard to Non-Article 5 missions:

The Alliance's defence posture against the risks and potential threats of the proliferation of NBC weapons and their means of delivery must continue to be improved, including through work on missile defences.... Capabilities for dealing with proliferation risks must be flexible, mobile, rapidly deployable, and sustainable.... The aim in doing so will be to further reduce operational vulnerabilities of NATO forces while maintaining their flexibility and effectiveness despite the presence, threat, or use of NBC weapons.⁵

With the release of NATO's updated Strategic Concept, the Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI) was established.⁶ Its purpose is to identify key Alliance



US Navy Photo 010125-N-0000X-001

A Standard Missile (SM-3) leaving the vertical launch system of the cruiser USS *Lake Erie* during a January 2002 test of the new exo-atmospheric missile developed to counter theatre ballistic missile threats.

gic political environment in which the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons on mass destruction, primarily in the Middle East and southern littoral of the Mediterranean, will pose a major threat to Western security interests.

Theatre Missile Defence is also the product of significant technological developments, primarily in the US, which have demonstrated the feasibility of intercepting ballistic missiles. Notwithstanding the mixed record of the Patriot Advanced Capability-2 missile (PAC-2) in the Gulf War, feasibility has been demonstrated by a series of successful intercept tests of the PAC-3 missile, the Theatre High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) system and the NMD system. As a result, the concept of extended air defence (EAD) has emerged to encapsulate the integration of traditional air defence, tactical ballistic missile defence (PAC-3) and theatre missile defence (THAAD) systems into an active, multi-functional, layered defence. EIAD simply refers to the additional components — primarily early warning and C²/BM — that integrate the 'sharp-end' interceptor and fire control radars (FCR) into a single 'system of systems'.

Following the Gulf War, the proliferation of ballistic missiles and associated weapons of mass destruction became a major security concern for the Alliance. The 1991 Rome Declaration identified "the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and of their means of delivery" as a clear threat to international security.² This new threat to NATO territory was clearly noted in the New Strategic Concept, and was followed by the establishment of the Senior Political Group (SGP) and the

requirements for the complete range of possible missions, to facilitate interoperability (especially with regard to concerns about the growing technology gap between US and European forces), and to avoid unnecessary duplication of effort (and thus ease the pressure on constrained defence budgets).

TMD is one of fifty-eight elements of the Defence Capabilities Initiative. Its priority ranking within these elements is, however, unclear for several reasons. First, TMD technology remains in the developmental stage, with some notable variances between US and European missile and air defence programmes. Missile defence systems are scheduled for deployment at various times over the next decade, with US theatre or upper-tier systems (such as THAAD) earmarked for sometime in the later part of the decade. Second, many of the core elements of a combined and joint TMD architecture, such as C²/BM and ACCS, have multiple purposes, and would proceed even in the absence of missile defence. Finally, there is yet no political consensus on TMD for Europe, which in part reflects the current NMD issue.

The absence of a public consensus on a TMD-based strategic defence for Europe also reflects the nature of these systems. Such systems simultaneously provide effective defence for both Article 5 and Non-Article 5 missions. These include lower-tier endoatmospheric capabilities designed to defend against tactical ballistic missile and air-breathing threats, and upper-tier, high altitude endo/exoatmospheric capabilities designed to counter medium and intermediate range ballistic missile threats. Lower-tier systems are essential for limited area defence for deployed expeditionary forces, and also provide limited point defence for counter-value targets such as cities and disembarkation points. Upper-tier systems provide a significantly expanded area of coverage, which is essential for defence against longer-range missile attacks. They also have significant political value by extending defence to host nations in out-of-area coalition operations.

Most of Europe is within range of intermediate range missiles from the Middle East, and, depending upon deployment patterns, the systems designed to support Non-Article 5 missions are also functional for the strategic defence of Europe. For the foreseeable future, however, these systems would have little value against an advanced, sophisticated ballistic missile attack from the east or north, at least under current plans.

Even though the Bush Administration re-structured the US missile defence programme by merging TMD and National Missile Defence into a single integrated research and development effort and cancelling the Navy Area Wide (tactical) system, the key elements of the US TMD effort remain in place.⁷ Alongside the PAC-3 missile (deployment underway) and THAAD, these systems currently include the US Navy Theater Wide system and the US Airborne Laser boost-phase system. European programmes include the deployment of PAC-2 missiles by Germany and the Netherlands and their interest in acquiring the PAC-3, the NATO-MEAD

lower-tier project (Germany, Italy and the US), several naval lower-tier programmes (France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom),⁸ and Turkish interest in acquiring the Israeli Arrow TMD system.

Although the European programmes are located within the lower- or tactical-tier, it is important to recognize that they also serve as a basis for expanding into upper-tier capabilities. For example, several of the planned naval programmes will employ the Mark-41 vertical launch system, which is able to launch the



A Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC-2) missile, already in service with Germany and the Netherlands.

lower-tier Standard Missile 2 Block-IVB, the Franco-Italian Aster 30 and the upper-tier Standard Missile 3. In other words, the option to move towards an upper-tier capability exists on the basis of the current European naval programmes as technology comes on-line, depending on resolution of political issues concerning technology transfer and support by the integrated US research and development effort.

The current lower-tier European concentration also has political value in that it serves to avoid public debate on missile defence. There is no need for formal debate and or decision because each nation is free to interpret the purpose of missile defence as it sees fit. The same is true for the Alliance, given that the interceptor systems and fire control radars have to be integrated to provide an Extended Integrated Air Defence capability for both Article 5 and Non-Article 5 missions.


Systems International, a Paris-based consortium consisting of Thomson-CSF and Raytheon.⁹ The central focus is on developing software architecture and software computing systems.

It is unclear, however, whether LOC-1 will be sufficient for the complicated integration of missile and air defence C²/BM at the operational/tactical level. LOC-2 has been identified as the follow-on modernization requirement for ACCS. However, LOC-2 has neither been funded nor agreed upon by the Alliance. Moreover, there are significant concerns about the escalating costs of LOC-1. Nonetheless, with LOC-1 scheduled to reach operational status sometime in the 2005-06 period, it is likely that the capability will be expanded during the development process, potentially mitigating the requirement for a full-fledged LOC-2 programme.

Alongside this requirement is, of course, the overarching need for the NATO air command and control system to integrate into the full US C³/BM systems. In addition, ACCS cannot simply be a system for ground and air forces. With the development of naval platforms for Extended Air Defence in the US and Europe, the ACCS system must also be interoperable with forward-deployed naval assets, and it must be able to facilitate C²/BM based upon a single integrated picture of the battlespace. In so doing, it must ensure that naval assets are tied in and, specifically, that the system is interoperable with the US Navy's Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) which is designed for coordination among naval platforms. In fact, discussions are already underway to ensure that the Maritime-ACCS Ship-to-Shore Tactical Interface Component (MASSTIC) serves this purpose.

The ACCS element is only one part of an Extended Integrated Air Defence requirement for NATO. Early warning requirements for forward deployed units in out-of-area operations and European defence are an important first stage. This involves the modernization of the radar network surrounding Europe to develop the ability to track theatre ballistic missiles, discriminate, and then cue fire control radars. The first phase of this modernization is focused primarily on the radars along the southern periphery of the Alliance, including those in Turkey, as these are essential to dealing with the emerging ballistic threat in the region.

At the same time, Extended Integrated Air Defence also requires linking radars into early warning systems for cueing purposes. In 1994, NATO accepted a US offer to share early warning data from US space-based satellite systems (the Defense Support Programme (DSP) and the future Space-Based Infrared High (SBIRS-H) DSP replacement), and the ground-based Ballistic Missile Early Warning Network. As a result, the Early Warning Inter-Agency Staff Group (EWISG), linked to the CNAD and the NATO Air Defence Committee, was established. At this time, data from US Space Command and NORAD are transmitted to the Joint Analysis Centre in the United Kingdom, then to NATO Headquarters, and finally to the member nations. Phase One became operational in June 1999, and a Phase Two offer is expected soon.



US Navy Photo

The USS *Ticonderoga*, an Aegis cruiser.

THE NATO ARCHITECTURE

Integration of national capabilities under the Alliance entails several components, of which the modernization of the air command and control system is key. Its modernization is by no means settled. It has been driven by the requirement to modernize the network of Air Control Centres and Combined Air Operations Centres for traditional air defence requirements, to develop a mobile capability for forces deployed in out-of-area missions, and to bring the air defence systems of the three new allies (the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland) into the fold to complete an integrated air picture for Europe.

Funding for the modernization of ACCS as a whole will come from the common fund and the NATO Security Investment Programme, and will be under the purview of the NATO Air Control Management Agency (NACMA), which reports to the NATO Air Defence Committee. The Level of Operations Capability-1 (LOC-1) programme, a 5-year programme signed in July of 1998, is designed to upgrade software and tie existing radars into the system. The initial contract for the modernization programme was let to Air Command

With regard to out-of-area operations, during the Gulf War early warning information was transmitted from NORAD's Cheyenne Mountain Operations Centre to Patriot batteries deployed in Israel and Saudi Arabia. Since then, the US has deployed the Joint Tactical Air-to-Ground Station (JTAGS) for forward deployed forces in the field. JTAGS provides direct access to DSP satellites, thereby reducing the time between launch identification, attack assessment, forward control radar cueing and intercept. There is no indication yet that the US, as part of its Phase Two early warning offer, will provide JTAGS to the Alliance. In the absence of such a capability, the NATO Early Warning-ACCS interface will also have to be interoperable with JTAGS.

With the centralization of early warning and C²/BM for Extended Integrated Air Defence in NATO, and the linkages they entail to US systems for both missions, the final piece of the puzzle is the modernized component of the former NATO Integrated Air Defence System (NATINADS). Work on the development of the concept of EAD has taken place in three areas. First, under the direction of the CNAD, the Ad-Hoc Working Group on Extended Air Defence/Theatre Missile Defence (established in 1993) completed its first report for NATO political authorities in 1995. The report identified four major categories for research and development: sensors, interceptors, C³/BM and simulation. In the summer of 1999, the CNAD approved the programme for a layered TMD feasibility study.¹⁰ The Ad Hoc Group formally became the Theatre Missile Defence Project Group (TMDPG), and now oversees the feasibility study being managed by the NATO Consultation, Command, and Control Agency (NC3A). In addition, the NATO Industrial Advisory Group (NIAG) also recently completed its own study on TMD.

Alongside the CNAD process, the NATO Air Defence Committee in 1993 also began to examine the integration of air defence and TMD through its two sub-groups: the Panel on Air Defence Philosophy and the Panel on Air Defence Weapons. Finally, SHAPE examined the requirements for Extended Air Defence along with Allied Command Atlantic, and denoted the four pillars of EAD as counter-force, lower-tier, upper-tier, and boost-phase capabilities.

Conventional counter-force is considered to be an integral part of traditional counter-air operations. The primary focus of counter-force for EAD is not, however, destruction of mobile missile launcher systems, since, as demonstrated in the Gulf War, the ability to find mobile missile launchers is an extremely difficult mission. While mobile launchers are not likely to be ignored, especially for political reasons, the primary counter-force targets are likely to be an adversary's C³ capabilities and his production and logistical support facilities.


Lower- and upper-tier systems are the second two pillars for EAD. The final pillar is a boost-phase capability, although the specific capability requirement remains unclear. Of the four pillars, the first is largely in-place, the second and third will likely come on-line over the next decade, and the last remains open. Overall, the goal is to have the first three EAD pillars

in-place by around 2010. When linked to early warning, C³/BM, the air command and control system, and the Maritime Ship-to-Shore Tactical Interface Component, NATO will possess an Extended Integrated Air Defence capability against missile and air-breathing threats.

In support of this goal, SHAPE formally identified a need for TMD and sent a capability package requirement to the Military Committee and the International Staff. This, in conjunction with the work of the other NATO groups, resulted in North Atlantic Council approval of a Stand Alone Project in February 2000. The project has two components: an industrial survey (completed in the spring of 2000) to identify interested companies and receive feedback on the forthcoming request for proposal tender. The second part of the project is two feasibility studies for TMD/EAD, to be completed by 2003.

NATO AND THE POLITICS OF MISSILE DEFENCE

European opposition to NMD, which began to be expressed vociferously in the fall of 1999, declined significantly following the election of George Bush, although it did not disappear. This decline can be explained by two factors prior to 11 September. First, the Europeans were no longer dealing with an American



Administration only ambivalently committed to missile defence, but a Republican team set to proceed regardless of Allied opposition. Illustrating this new reality, German Chancellor Schroeder downplayed the significance of missile defence for German-US relations, and emphasized German economic interests in technological development.¹¹ Second, the decision to merge the TMD and NMD programmes into a single integrated robust research and development programme pushed the NMD deployment issue well into the future.

The terrorist attacks of 11 September further reduced the political profile of missile defence. While many speculated that missile defence would be vulnerable as a result of the terrorist attacks, the events have not only served to reinforce arguments

about the importance of missile defence and that rogue states are undeterrable, but also significantly altered its importance relative to relations with Russia. The Russian relationship with NATO has been rejuvenated. At the Crawford Texas Summit, Putin and Bush emphasized that Russian-US disagreement on missile defence and the future of the ABM Treaty would not damage their new relationship.

Because of ballistic missile and WMD proliferation in the Middle East, Europe will be threatened long before North America. In fact, southern flank members of the Alliance already face a ballistic missile threat. To accept the US threat assessment, however, is to raise the spectre of a European public demanding a response, and questioning why the US is seeking defence, but European governments are not. This, in turn, could compel the various governments to respond by re-directing defence investment away from a range of other vital programmes related to DCI and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), and/or to increase defence spending. It could also significantly affect diplomatic relations with Middle Eastern states.

Other areas of European opposition — deterrence, strategic de-coupling and security differentials, and consultation — can also be understood in the context of the timing of the inevitable US decision to move to deployment. Most important, the strategic de-coupling and security differentials have not been clearly understood. There can be little doubt that the US is indeed seeking to de-couple strategically from Europe with regard to emerging threats from proliferating states. However, this does not mean that the US would be strategically de-coupled if a Cold War-style threat were to re-emerge from the direction of Russia. For the US, strategic de-coupling is a vital element of political coupling, and hence it is vital to the future of the trans-Atlantic relationship. A North America Missile Defence (NAMD), along with TMD for deployed forces and the defence of Europe against emerging threats, is politically vital to an internationalist US, rather than a unilateralist one from a Fortress America posture.

It is important to remember that during the 1950s when the US was relatively invulnerable, and thus strategically de-coupled, the issue of the US commitment was not questioned. In a way, missile defence through NATO replicates this condition. At that time the security differential between Europe and the US was at its greatest.

Different levels of security have always existed within the Alliance, and that will continue simply as a function of geography. In fact, North-West Europe is more secure today than South-East Europe, quite apart from missile defence. Moreover, missile defence centred on the Alliance holds the promise of reducing the security differential by reinforcing the US political commitment and providing defence for all of Europe. Finally, during the Cold War there was no option for deterrence other than the threat of nuclear retaliation. In the near future, the US and Europe will, in certain circumstances, have the option of defence, thus precluding the politically and morally problematic decision of having to retaliate with nuclear weapons. This, in turn, will alter political calculations on the part of potential adversaries, and reinforce the credibility of the West as whole as being willing to intervene in defence of its interests and those of regional allies.

Of course, there remain several political issues confronting cooperative missile defence within the



US Army Photo PAC 1

A Patriot missile being fired.

Subsequently, Bush's December 2001 announcement of the US intent to withdraw from the ABM Treaty in six months, as permitted by Article XV, got only a muted response from Russia. More significantly, the announcement was greeted by silence from the Allies, including Canada.

By no means, however, does this new political environment concerning missile defence mean that future progress will be straightforward. As the US moves closer to a decision on deploying a layered limited missile defence system for North America in the next several years, and as 11 September recedes from memory, European opposition is likely to re-surface. When it does, the arguments against NMD will once again be made. European beliefs that the threat remains in the distant future, even though there is no actual consensus among them, have not disappeared.

Alliance. Issues concerning consultation and, more recently, burden sharing and technology transfer have a long history in NATO. Managing these issues has always been important to the Alliance. At the same time, simple functional requirements for some degree of common military standards and interoperability will remain important for both sides of the Atlantic, especially in light of growing concerns about the widening technological gap between US and European military capabilities.

This gap relates directly to setting priorities for the many military requirements identified in the DCI, and for those related to the ESDP initiative tied into NATO at the Washington Summit. At one level, the Europeans are unlikely ever to have the resources or the will to develop an independent early warning capability necessary for effective missile defence, despite French desires to do so.¹² Thus, European defence against missiles — for the continent and for deployed forces — will have to rely upon access to US early warning data. And, the only institution available to coordinate and disseminate this vital data is NATO.


In this light, NATO's central role as the core security institution for Europe is not only cemented, but also enhanced. Just as air defence required a collective effort during the Cold War, so EIAD also requires it. This collective response, with its core trans-Atlantic component, also spills over into the other aspects of crisis management and collective defence. EIAD extends beyond traditional air defence to include the integration of naval forces, and is thus one of the key elements of interoperability through jointness. It also supports efforts to enhance combined operations. Moreover, it reinforces the reality of *separable, but not separate* relative to ESDP as the European pillar of NATO.

The development of early warning sharing represents one of the important means of avoiding the duplication of efforts at the heart of the DCI. Whether it will evolve into a more formal relationship like Canada and the US in NORAD remains to be seen.¹³ Still, a US-NATO Integrated Tactical Warning/Attack Assessment (ITWAA), beyond the current arrangements on early warning, would appear to be the logical outcome. Both the US and the Europeans share a common interest in just such an integrated approach, and this would thus serve to reinforce the role of NATO and reduce underlying concerns that either or both the parties would drift apart.

Similarly, in terms of missile defence platforms, NATO's key role in C³/BM also provides opportunities to avoid duplication of effort. As European missile defence programmes are concentrated for the time being in the lower tier, the requirement for Europe, as a whole or as individual nations, to develop multi-layered missile defence capabilities is reduced. As the US TMD systems come on-line, it is unlikely that the Europeans will entirely eschew their own TMD capabilities in upgrading their naval platforms. Nonetheless, the overall requirements will be significantly less than if Europe and/or the current European nations involved were to attempt to do it on their own. Moreover, the need for

ground and naval missile defence capabilities will be significantly less as a function of the cooperation through the Alliance with the US.

Of course, the core role of NATO in facilitating combined and joint operations implies that the key issue of technology transfer, given US dominance in missile defence, will be resolved. In this regard, NATO's EIAD programme may serve an important function facilitating the resolution of transfer issues. The key indicator here will likely be the outcome of the NATO-MEAD programme. Regardless, US willingness to transfer technology will be an important indicator, and NATO's role is important in this regard. One cannot expect Europe to be willing, on economic grounds alone, to accept rigid



US Navy Photo

The launch of a Standard Missile.

constraints on the way technology is handled. If the US is truly willing to share missile defence technology, as repeatedly enunciated by successive Administrations, the future of the EIAD project may well be a core indicator over the near term.¹⁴

The development of NATO's role through EIAD, alongside greater technology transfer and related industrial cooperation between European and US firms, will enhance political cooperation. In fact, the feasibility study now underway will likely serve to promote greater

trans-Atlantic industrial cooperation, and have an impact on longstanding defence trade issues. One should not expect that EIAD will be a panacea for all the problems of cooperation, but it will be an important indicator of the direction of the trans-Atlantic relationship as the Cold War fades into memory.

CONCLUSION

The future of NATO is likely to hinge on a variety of issues beyond missile defence. This analysis has touched only the surface of many complicated issues concerning missile defence in the context of politics within NATO. Nonetheless, evidence indicates that missile defence is likely to be central to the Alliance in the future — one that may well be of strategic value to Europe, and certainly important to the trans-Atlantic relationship. Whether concerns about North American Missile Defence will evolve into a political roadblock are difficult to predict, in the same sense as predicting the evolution of the missile and WMD threat, or the impact of 11 September on the missile defence political environment. In particular, the full impact of the US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty on the relationship Russia remains to be seen.

In the past, Russian opposition to NMD has played on European concerns about strategic stability, arms control, and an arms race. In addition, President Putin has also offered some form of boost-phase defence for Europe, apparently in return for Europe breaking with the US on the issue of NMD. European fears about NMD could indeed thus divide the Alliance.

This Russian position appears in some ways to signal a return to the classic Soviet objective of splitting the Alliance. However, emphasis should not be placed on the divisive nature of NMD for relations

with Russia relative to NATO, but rather on the possibilities of using missile defence as one means of enhancing relations with Russia based on a common interest, one that goes beyond the common proliferation threat that Russia shares with the West, to include greater cooperation in an evolved and expanded security architecture for Europe centered on NATO. It seems to be forgotten that one of the components of the 1997 Russia-NATO Charter was cooperation on missile defence.¹⁵ The recent Russian offer should not necessarily be understood in old Cold War terms, but perhaps rather as a subtle attempt to open a dialogue about future cooperation in the area of a common security institution for all of Europe: NATO.

Finally, perhaps the time has come for Canada to develop a public policy on NATO Theatre Missile Defence. Canada did participate in several components of the CNAD Ad Hoc Working Group. But, since then, Canadian involvement appears to be absent. Like its European allies, Canadian attention has been directed only to the NMD question, even though Canadian officials have recently re-emphasized the importance of NATO and concerns about ESDP. No Canadian firms joined the consortia competing for the NATO Feasibility Study. It is important for Canada to engage the TMD issue in the Alliance, not least of all because Canada has a range of interests involved. Above all else, Canadian policy on North American Missile Defence should not be taken in isolation. NATO-TMD developments must also be taken into account.



NOTES

1. This article is a condensed version of a major study funded by the NATO Academic Fellowship Programme. The views expressed are the author's, and do not represent the position of NATO or any of its member nations.
2. NATO, "Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation," *NATO Review*, December 1991.
3. See David Martin, "Towards an Alliance framework for extended air defence/theatre missile defence," *NATO Review*, May 1996.
4. NATO, "The Alliance's Strategic Concept," *The Reader's Guide to the NATO Summit in Washington*, Washington, 1999, Paragraph 53 (h), p. 57.
5. *Ibid.* Paragraph 56, p. 58.
6. "Defence Capabilities Initiative," pp. 61-62.
7. Lt. Gen. Ronald Kadish, "Ballistic Missile Defense Program," Testimony to the House

- Armed Services Committee, 19 July 2001.
- Robert Wall and David Fulgham, "What's Next for Navy Missile Defense," *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, December 24-31, 2001.
8. For a detailed discussion, see Jeremy Stocker, "Sea-Based Missile Defence," *Bairrigg Study 2*, Lancaster: Centre for Defence and International Security Studies, 1999; and James Fergusson, "Ballistic Missile Defence: Implications for the Alliance," NATO Fellowship Report, June 2000.
9. Luke Hill, "NATO's Plan for Air Defense Picks up Steam," *Defense News*, 29 May 2000.
10. Luke Hill, "NATO Targets Theater Missile Defense Study," *Defense News*, 27 September 1999.
11. Television interview, www.Euobserver.com, 8 August 2001.

12. For a relatively detailed discussion, see Shaun Gregory, "France and Military Satellite Systems: Implications for European Security," *Research Paper No. 33*. Athens: Research Institute for European Studies, 1997.
13. For a discussion of the Canadian dimension and NORAD, see James Fergusson, "Deja Vu: Canada, NORAD and Ballistic Missile Defence," *Occasional Paper No. 39*. Winnipeg: Centre for Defence and Security Studies, 1999.
14. Randall Mikkelsen, "US Set to Share its ABM Research," *Washington Post*, 1 June 2000.
15. Article III, *Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation*, Paris, 27 May 1997.