

## TRAIN FOR WAR AND FOR PEACE

*The use of force alone is but temporary. It may subdue for a moment, but it does not remove the necessity of subduing again.*

*Edmund Burke, 1775*

Over the course of the 20th century, there was a notable shift in the use of military force from the high- to the low-intensity range of the spectrum of operations. Beginning with the First World War, and ending with the Second, military forces were used to apply lethal force as the final element of a foreign and, in some cases, a domestic policy calculus. On the other hand, during the second half of the century, there was a gradual but steady transition to the use of military power in more non-traditional roles. Since the early 1990s, military forces have been employed around the globe at the lower end of the spectrum of operations, notably in peace support operations (PSO) providing humanitarian assistance; while patrolling demilitarized zones; or while providing a show of force for the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and a variety of ad hoc multi-national coalitions.

Given the sea change in the nature of the use of military force over the past decade, some have argued that armed forces should be trained, equipped and prepared primarily for peace support operations. Some would argue further that structuring military forces for peace support operations should be done at the expense of training and equipping for war. The actions by many nations to cash in a so-called 'peace dividend' following the end of the Cold War has reinforced this view. Military forces in many countries have had to struggle to maintain and modernize their armed forces with ever scarcer resources.

While, at first glance, a decision to train and equip military forces for peace support operations at the expense of training for war may seem an obvious conclusion, a more thorough analysis of the nature of conflict and the evolving global security environment would seem to lead to a very different conclusion. The plain fact is that conflict and war are pervasive.

A review of UN military operations during the past decade shows that the nature of peace support operations is extremely unpredictable and volatile. Much of the time, forces committed to these types of missions may need only rudimentary capabilities. However, these forces must also be able to apply lethal force in a co-ordinated and concentrated manner as and when needed. The degree to which a force can apply such a capability can play a pivotal role in determining success in a peace support operation. In the many attempts to restore and keep the peace around the globe over the past four decades, United Nations forces and those in multi-national missions have, on many occasions, found themselves in situations which can only be categorized

as war. When pitted against well-organized opponents that in many cases possess a full range of military capabilities, such forces must be robust in order to accomplish their missions.

For example, in an attempt to bring an end to the fighting in war-torn Sierra Leone over the past two years, military forces from the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) have found themselves involved in a protracted war against well armed and trained military and paramilitary forces from the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). On many occasions, UNAMSIL forces have had to rely on their war fighting rather than their peacekeeping skills to prevent loss of military and civilian life. The action around Rogheri Junction in eastern Sierra Leone in the summer of 2001 clearly illustrates the tenuous situation in the country, and supports the view that peacekeepers must retain the ability to fight at a moment's notice. Bombarded by rocket-propelled grenades and small arms fire over a three-day period, UN forces from India fought off a number of attacks from the RUF. Two companies from the 2nd Indian Battalion were required to conduct an advance to contact with artillery and gun-ship support to secure the junction and stabilize a volatile situation, albeit for only a short period of time.

The need for military forces in PSO missions to have the ability to fight was also readily apparent last summer in the United Nations Mission to East Timor (UNTAET). Fijian peacekeepers in the area of Suai exchanged fire with Timorese militiamen, armed with automatic weapons, who had crossed the border into East Timor to target peacekeepers. After a brief exchange of gunfire, the militia were forced to retreat back across the border.

These two incidents are, of course, in stark contrast to the relatively benign missions in Ethiopia and Eritrea and in Cyprus, where United Nations forces continue to use their peacekeeping skills to keep opposing factions separated and protect the provision of humanitarian support to the population. Simply put, there is a peace to keep in these cases. However, even in these low-risk missions, commanders do not discount the use of lethal force. All parties are aware that the fragile peace that is being kept can, without notice, degenerate into violence as a result of the ebbs and flows of politics, economics and geography. Moreover, the previously warring factions usually have the capability to use force at any time. In the end, even benign missions have the potential to escalate without warning, and with deadly consequences.

Most Western nations have become highly 'risk averse' when determining the scale and scope of the participation of their military forces abroad. The possibility of casualties has become all but unacceptable. This is not, however, a recent phenomena. Since the

beginning of recorded history, nations have carefully chosen where and when they would deploy their sons and daughters, weighing the likely threat against national interests. In Somalia and in Beirut in 1994, military forces were deployed with an understanding by participating nations that the threat and the risk to their personnel would be low. Instead, peacekeepers encountered a much higher level of threat than expected, including demands that they be prepared to fight. It is fair to assume, even with the benefit of hindsight, that if the real extent of threat and risk had been known at the onset of these missions, some nations may not have agreed to commit their forces, or there would have been greater public scrutiny prior to deployment. Nevertheless, because of the politics of peacekeeping operations and an ever increasing role for coalition forces, soldiers continue to be placed in tenuous and risky situations around the world, where is it relatively easy to intervene but much more difficult to withdraw.

To complicate the discussion, some nations have begun to adopt a policy of 'early in and early out' for their forces in order to reduce the costs of peacekeeping. The prevailing view is that fewer forces are needed at the onset of a mission, and that troops can then hand over to others and depart once the mission has been established. Such an approach would ensure that nations provided their share of the world's 'moral burden', but, more important, it would ensure that military forces would not have to remain for the 'long and often expensive haul'. Such a resource driven calculus is, however, in stark contrast to the facts. In short, threat or risk levels are at their highest at the onset of a mission — the early in and out phase — and not after peacebuilding has begun. It is during this phase of an operation that deployed forces will clearly require the military capabilities to both impose and keep peace in a non-permissive environment.

What then does the future hold, and what skills are required of modern military forces deployed on peace support operations? Clearly, the re-occurrence of a general regional war in the future, as in the Persian Gulf in 1991, is highly unlikely, as are limited regional wars or conflicts. However, since the beginning of the last decade, analysts have predicted that the future will witness a rise in the incidence of low-intensity conflict. Recent history has indeed shown that inter-state and intra-state warfare has increased. Military forces committed to these types of missions will be expected to fight to protect the peace and the lives of their own soldiers, as well as the lives of others who are part of a coalition. The sudden and dramatic change in the nature of the UNPROFOR mission in the Balkans and in the UN mission in Rwanda attests to this view: military

forces there found low-risk, low-intensity operations transformed into high-risk peace enforcement missions virtually overnight.

It is clear that military capabilities can no longer be neatly categorized into a discrete place along the spectrum of operations. Such linear thinking has, however, been used by many Western militaries since the end of the Cold War to better understand and capture the relationship between military capabilities and their application in the extended battle space. Rather, the relationship between military capabilities and their application is a multi-directional and not a dyadic relationship. Indeed, the fluid and mercuric nature of conflict is beginning to blur the Clausewitzian view of when diplomatic and military actions begin and end. Combinations and permutations of diplomatic and military actions can now occur at any time in the course of an operation or mission, and the paradigm of diplomatic action followed by military action in a graduated and measured response no longer holds. The result is the accepted use and application of lethal force during any type of mission and at any time during a mission, even during peace support operations. Such a change will have a profound impact on how we conduct operations. It will also make the task-tailoring of military forces for a specific type of operation or phase of a mission more difficult and more risky. One could argue that the usually accepted 'spectrum of operations' is beginning to lose its relevance in the current geo-strategic environment.

The past decade has shown that the nature of conflict has changed, as military forces are increasingly used in ever more complex and challenging roles. Accordingly, conflict in the evolving global security environment demands military forces that possess the full range of traditional and non-traditional capabilities. On the one hand, forces need to be able to provide humanitarian support and to monitor the peace, while on the other, they need to be able to apply lethal force at any time in a concentrated and co-ordinated manner. In short, military forces must be balanced, capable and proficient at performing routine tasks, yet be prepared for the most complex. Moreover, and most important, they must be able to adapt to ever-changing threat and risk levels in any circumstance, and be trained accordingly. In the final analysis, given the historical record, to train military forces for peace support operations at the expense of training for war is dangerous logic. Simply put, military forces must be trained for war *and* for peace to be successful in the evolving global security environment.

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Colonel Walter Semianiw is currently attending the National Security Studies Course at the Canadian Forces College.

## A RESPONSE TO “MILITARY MANNING AND THE REVOLUTION IN SOCIAL AFFAIRS”

While one cannot argue that there is no need for organizational reform and revitalization within the Canadian Forces (CF), a number of key points and assumptions made in the article by Major Jeff Tasseron, “Military Manning and the Revolution in Social Affairs” [Vol. 2, No. 3], need to be challenged. These assumptions lend themselves to certain clear directions in which reform must occur, and ignore or exclude other options and changes that are, perhaps, more critically important.

### WHERE WE ARE

Major Tasseron presents a valid historical analysis of the Force Reduction Plan (FRP) undertaken in the 1990s by the CF. That this plan was reactive, and failed to identify possible repercussions, is now widely accepted. The repercussions of this strategy for downsizing are still being felt within the CF in much the way described. However, it is important to remember that the CF was not alone in engaging in this type of ill-conceived budget reduction strategy. Most government departments and major private sector employers offered similar buyout packages and eliminated positions with no real thought to the future. Indeed, the term ‘competency anemia’ has been coined to capture the ensuing organizational problems.<sup>1</sup> Loss of the ‘wrong’ employees has meant loss of corporate memory, the best talent, and the potential for future growth that these experienced people represented. It has also meant that when economic circumstances changed for the better, many corporations were ill-prepared to capitalize on the opportunity and had to engage in costly and time-consuming ‘staffing-up’ exercises. Indeed, recent layoffs in the hi-tech industry in Ottawa have shown that some corporations have not learned from previous experience and continue to cut indiscriminately.

In comparison then, to the Forces’ main competitors for new recruits, it can be argued that we are no worse off than anyone else. Furthermore, the subsequent impact on the internal demography and occupational structure of the Forces has affected us to the same extent as other employers. The average age of personnel in the CF is only 35. Within the public service as a whole, 42 percent of permanent employees are aged 45-54, and only 20 percent of all employees are aged under 35.

This does not argue for complacency. As Major Tasseron rightly points out, there is a ‘ticking time-bomb’ presented by a large cohort of personnel who will be eligible and ready to retire within the next ten to fifteen years. That gives us time — although not much — to engage in some needed reforms to ensure that we are not left high and dry.

### THE TARGET MARKET

The Revolution in Military Affairs, springing from a combination of social, political, economic, technical and military innovations and changes experienced

over the last few decades, will have a radical affect on the CF. If it does not, then we can simply close shop now. We will become irrelevant and not viable within the context of Canadian society in the 21st Century.

While the notion of RMA has gained wide acceptance, there is some confusion regarding the actual meaning and implications of such a revolution. RMA involves a wide range of changes which impact on the way in which ‘war’ is defined and waged. It involves a process of change, over a period of time, which often has technological innovation at its core. In the current case, the pace and extent of such innovation is unprecedented in history. RMA, however, is not simply computerization or new weaponry. It is the collective impact of technological development, operational innovation and organizational adaptation. The changing global situation and the emerging RMA have led some to argue that the wars of the future will be more complex and varied in nature than in the past. These military engagements may require the extensive use of technology in scenarios described as ‘Cyberwar’ and ‘Systemic War’, or may rely more on conventional deployments of personnel in so-called ‘Dirty Wars’ and ‘Peace Wars’.<sup>2</sup>

Modern military forces have begun to grapple with how best to accommodate such changes within budgetary and other constraints. For some, this has meant ‘niche-building’, as in the case of the Australian Armed Forces. Australia recognized in 1997 that their “... highest capability priority was ... the ‘Knowledge Edge’, defined as the effective exploitation of information technologies to allow us to use our relatively small force to maximum effectiveness.”<sup>3</sup> Many would argue that this ‘edge’ is shared by the CF.

Whether the CF will maintain its multipurpose combat capability or opt for specific niches, we will require increasing numbers of highly-skilled workers. These people will possess the necessary hi-tech experience and knowledge to allow for the utilization and exploitation of new technologies within the new military contexts of the future. One option we may have is to bring in young people and train them so that they acquire these necessary skill sets. In this scenario, the primary recruitment group will continue to be those aged 17 to 24. If this is the case, then, as Major Tasseron points out, we may be faced with serious problems in terms of a divergence in values and beliefs between the CF and this target population.

However, other options exist to fill the hi-tech needs of the CF that would be preferable to recruitment of young, unskilled personnel. Targeting older, more skilled people will allow us to acquire the necessary knowledge base without the huge investment in training and education that otherwise would be needed. Indeed, these recruits can be used for in-house training as well as operational functions. The target population for recruitment will, most likely, be older than that traditionally focused on by the CF. This does not mean to say that we

stop recruiting youth. However, acknowledging that the key market lies elsewhere will dictate a different set of organizational priorities and changes to ensure that we remain attractive to this older, knowledge group.

In terms of human resource management, the shift in focus will require continued efforts to address quality of life issues, assistance in balancing work and family commitments, and allowing flexibility in career paths. To attract the skilled group of workers we require will also necessitate organizational changes reflecting notions that do not sit well with rigid hierarchical structures. To recruit and retain these personnel we will have to compete more directly with others in the private and public sectors. We will also need to be more competitive in our work conditions and benefits, defined in a broader way than has been done in the past.

By the very nature of the beast, the RMA will affect some of these organizational changes. The CF will become a 'flatter', that is, less hierarchical organization. Real decision-making will further devolve to the knowledgeable person, not necessarily the officer in command. The institution will lose much of its rigidity and become more flexible, more capable of change and adaptation.

## SOCIAL VALUES AND THE CF

An essential part of the *raison d'être* of the CF is '... to support Canadian values'. Regardless of whom we recruit or target for recruitment, we must remain reflective of the wider society in terms of institutional values. It is Major Tasserón's contention that we must somehow reflect the values of one generation, Generation 'Y', in order to promote recruitment. As argued earlier, youth may not be our sole focus for recruitment to the future CF. However, even if it were, the idea that there is a consensus around shared values among a generation of young people is not a sound one.

As Major Tasserón rightly points out, a quarter of youth aged 17 to 24 will be from visible minority groups by the year 2016. This in itself shows that there will be some differences in terms of values within this cohort. The fact that someone comes from a different ethnic or racial background need not imply differences in values, but it may. Furthermore, some argue that there are key differences in values between the sexes regardless of age.<sup>4</sup> Generation 'Y', therefore, is not some homogeneous entity, but rather consists of individuals with different experiences, aspirations, needs and values, as with any and every other generation. There can be no such thing as a single message that will somehow appeal to all of this generation at once.

A discussion of values within the CF and Canadian society is fraught with danger and pitfalls. Major Tasserón focuses on Enviro-nic's 'value tribes' as a tool

for assessing generational values. However, this one construction may not be the most appropriate or enlightening. Through a series of questions which Enviro-nic will not divulge, researchers have attempted to cluster various sex and age groupings on the basis of their responses. In the end, they identify groups which appear to have more utility for market-driven, retail or service organizations than for the Canadian Forces.

These 'value tribes' are but one of many approaches and attempts at constructing significant social groupings with shared values in order to better understand goals, aspirations and expectations. Most major polling companies have engaged in such exercises over the past few years. One of the most influential has been the Ottawa-based Ekos. Based on research conducted on behalf of the federal government, this company has affected the Liberal government's medium- and long-term strategic thinking, and has arguably had a profound influence on government policy.<sup>5</sup> Their research took place over a three-year period in the mid- to late-1990s, and attempted to map the changing values, attitudes and beliefs of Canadians. Other variations on the value theme also exist both here and abroad that could be utilized to build a better picture of value groups within our society.

The bottom line is that one perspective on values research should not be allowed to dominate or restrict debate within the CF. What is required is a broader look at different and varied approaches so as to better inform us on the range of thought. In this way, we can more clearly identify constructs and ideas that will be of greater assistance to future planning.

## CONCLUSION

The CF must and will change to meet the challenges of the next few decades. To ensure that this change is well planned and well informed is obviously critical to our success or failure. For this reason, we need to become more familiar with the real meaning and implications of the RMA, rather than allow the term to become an ill-abused buzzword. As part of our understanding of this radical reorienting of military affairs, we must, as Human Resources specialists, become more knowledgeable about the nature of the changing society in which we find ourselves. We need to better understand the values of Canadians; the values that it is our mission to uphold. We need to better grasp the internal and external influences and 'drivers' that are affecting societal and institutional change.

It is through this work that we can also better understand and "harness the revolution in social affairs rather than be subjugated by it," as Major Tasserón noted.

Brian McKee is a Defence Scientist in the Directorate of Strategic Human Resource Coordination in NDHQ.

## NOTES

1. See Appelbaum, S. et al., "Strategic Downsizing: Critical Success Factors," in *Management Decision* 37/7, pp. 535-552.  
2. See Roxborough, I. and Eyre, D., "Which Way to the Future," in *Joint Forces Quarterly*,

Summer 1999.

3. Evans, Michael, "The Middle Way: Australia's Response to the RMA," in *National Security Studies Quarterly*, Vol. V1 Issue 1, pp. 1-19.

4. As argued in Adams, Michael, *Sex in the*

*Snow: Canadian social values at the end of the millennium*. Toronto: Viking, 1997.

5. *Rethinking Government: Exploring changing relationships among individuals, governments and business*, Ottawa: Ekos Research, 2001.

## THE METAMORPHOSIS OF MARITIME AIR

The anti-submarine warfare-oriented long-range maritime patrol aircraft, for decades an enduring symbol of the Cold War, is emerging as an indispensable multi-mission platform for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) in the highly fluid post-Cold War and post-11 September strategic environments. Indeed, it is increasingly a misnomer to speak of long-range maritime patrol aircraft or of maritime patrol squadrons. Rooted in new operational requirements, new sensors, new data management options and eye-watering potential for data fusion, the metamorphosis renders the modern ISR aircraft a key player in a diverse array of overseas humanitarian, peace support and combat applications, and makes the type even more relevant to existing and emerging domestic applications, be they military, quasi-military or non-military in nature. No longer essentially a blue water asset, the modern ISR aircraft also must be credible in littoral and overland environments.

The transformation of the traditional maritime patrol aircraft has found expression in a variety of upgrade programmes for USN P-3 Orions (including some with significant Canadian sensor content), in the innovative use of P-3s in recent peace support and other operations, in the US Navy's projected successor to the P-3, in the RAF's remanufactured Nimrods and — to varying degrees — in the upgrade programmes of other P-3 operators. Also drawing attention are the prospects for teaming such aircraft with Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, and the synergies inherent in the pooling of data from space-based sensors, new-generation ground-based radars (e.g., high frequency surface wave), and other sensors and platforms.

In Canada, the initial cost of admission to the era of the multi-mission intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft is the Aurora Incremental Modernization Project (AIMP). The AIMP, which has suffered from a frustratingly convoluted gestation period, will provide a quantum leap over the existing Aurora by addressing major deficiencies in navigation and communications, sensors, data management and self-defence systems. The AIMP is vital, but has drawn fire for its incremental nature — which inevitably poses a plethora of technical, aircraft availability, training and maintenance challenges — and for failing to take full advantage of current and emerging sensor, data management, data fusion, precision-guided munition and other ISR-relevant technologies. As the Dalhousie University Centre for Foreign Policy Studies noted in its 2001 report, *Joint Airborne Surveillance and Patrol: A Force Development Project*, there was a "concern" that, "notwithstanding approval of the [AIMP], the CP-140 Aurora was stuck in the maritime patrol/anti-submarine warfare paradigm, and that its potential as a strategic, joint-force surveillance platform was not being examined."

Substantially reduced flying hours, and the projected, but admittedly gradual, reduction in Aurora fleet size from 18 to 16 aircraft — coupled with the recent elimination of the coastal patrol Challengers and the projected disposal in 2004 of the trio of relatively youthful CP-140A Arcturus Arctic and Maritime Surveillance and

training aircraft — have also generated adverse reaction in various quarters. Intriguingly, some of these concerns have been registered by environmental groups.

It would be easier to be sanguine about Canada's ISR prospects if the past quarter-century of Ottawa decision-making had not been characterized by a monotonous proclivity for indecisiveness, ill-considered qualitative and/or quantitative reductions, false starts, false economies and ill-conceived business plans. The Aurora, for example, was the world's finest long-range patrol aircraft (LRPA) upon service entry in 1980, but fiscal considerations limited the fleet to a mere 18 aircraft and, in concert with inter-departmental wrangling, eliminated the planned civilian sensor package. The latter, ironically, would have provided valuable overland capabilities. The 1987 White Paper promised six additional LRPAs and a major upgrade of the coastal patrol Tracker, but these plans were foiled by the budget of April 1989. As an added indignity, the Tracker's mandate was transferred, in an exercise of short-sighted political and bureaucratic haste, to civilian King Airs chartered by the Department of Fisheries and Oceans.

The Mulroney government regained a measure of credibility by acquiring the Arcturus, admittedly mission avionics-challenged, and transferring three Challengers to coastal patrol. The latter were expected to be retrofitted with appropriate mission avionics — a goal never, in fact, accomplished — and supplemented by additional aircraft. The resulting plan for a ten-aircraft fleet of coastal patrol Challengers quietly disappeared during the first Chretien mandate, but planning continued for a comprehensive life extension and upgrade for the entire Aurora fleet and an essentially similar initiative, less ASW, for the Arcturus. The most recent *volte-face* has, as noted, confined full Aurora modernization to 16 aircraft, abandoned the coastal patrol Challenger and mandated the disposal of the Arcturus.

It is true that the AIMP Aurora will offer major advances over the current version, that AIMP makes provision for "technology insertions", and that there are glimmers that at least some elements of DND are not "stuck" in old paradigms, but it is very far from certain that its full potential — including targeting and electronic intelligence gathering — will be realized. It is true, too, that enhanced simulation capabilities will partially offset the loss of the Arcturus, but simulators cannot actually monitor anything. Nor was the deletion of coastal patrol aircraft, for the second time in a decade, necessarily an inspired move. The decline in numbers — partial in the case of the Aurora, total in terms of the Arcturus and the Challenger — also portends a deeply troubling loss of flexibility. At a time when Canada's requirements for a meaningful ISR capability — both at home and abroad — are expanding, it is imperative that the Aurora's full potential be realized and that more than 16 appropriate aircraft remain on Air Command's inventory.

Martin Shadwick teaches Canadian defence policy at York University. He is a former editor of *Canadian Defence Quarterly*.