

MANAGING THE REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS

Edited by Ron Matthews and John Treddenick
New York: Palgrave (St. Martin's Press), 264 pages, \$US 75.00.
Reviewed by Major J.C. Stone

Managing the Revolution in Military Affairs is a timely book that attempts to identify and evaluate the broad environmental changes being faced by military forces throughout the world. Using the issue of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) as a basis for discussion, the book discusses the changes in technical, strategic, business, financial and defence industrial environments — all part of the ‘systems of systems’ vision articulated by Admiral Owens and how they comprise the essential elements for the RMA.

Structured thematically, the book examines the RMA issue in three broad sections or, as the book refers to them, “the three principal constituent parts: defence technology, defence management and the management of technology.” Contributors come from the academic world, from industry and from defence departments, providing a good balance between theory and actual practice.

Douglas Bland’s chapter “The RMA: Managing an Idea” sets the stage for discussion of defence technology and the RMA. He raises the important point that he who defines the RMA influences how it is viewed: as a technical revolution, as a complete revolution, as a managerial revolution, or no revolution at all. Military missions can be created or deleted based on how the RMA is defined. Bland’s chapter is a critical examination of how the world is conceptualizing the RMA. The next three chapters — “Evolution of Warfare: How will the Revolution in Military Affairs Make a Difference?”, “What is Information Warfare?”, and “Combined Operations in the Age of Digitization” — all discuss the contextual issues of the RMA technologies. Of particular interest is the latter chapter by Michael Webb, and his discussion of the importance of both interoperability and political agreement at the command level when technology is providing a ‘sensor to commander’ linkage.


The defence management discussion is introduced by Keith Hartley’s “The RMA: an Economist’s View”. Hartley discusses the underlying economic and resource management challenges confronting defence decision-makers — shrinking defence budgets, defence industry globalization and changes to the defence contracting environment, as well as the escalating costs of equipment. John Treddenick’s chapter, “Financing the RMA”, builds on Hartley’s chapter by focusing on the specific issue of affordability. Treddenick notes that a decision by a nation to opt for the RMA is a decision to begin a major re-capitalization of equipment, with an increasing share of the budget being devoted to capital

and research and development, and a decreasing share to personnel. The next two chapters — “Can Revolutions be Managed?” and “The RMA: a US Business Perspective” — examine US acquisition reform policies from the perspective of government and industry, while Chapters 10 and 11 — “With the RMA, a Revolution in Acquisition” and “Smart Procurement: Revolution or Regression?” — discuss the United Kingdom’s Smart Procurement Initiative. The authors of these latter two chapters argue that the Smart Procurement Initiative is timely and forward looking, but implementation will require imagination and resolve to overcome the problems associated with streamlining procurement practices and policies.

The final area of focus for the book moves more specifically to the technology issues associated with the RMA. Matthew Uttley’s “Technology Transfer and the RMA: the Scope and Limitations of Licensed Production for the United Kingdom”, explores some of the limitations of government policies that encourage industrial licensing as a mechanism for Britain and its European NATO partners to acquire RMA-related capabilities. Although not arguing that license production will be a panacea for overcoming the constraints affecting access to RMA-related technologies in the US, Uttley does suggest that government-mandated licensed production of US-developed technology may provide cost effective alternatives when compared to other procurement options. Trevor Taylor’s “Europe’s Revolution in Defence Industrial Affairs” carries on from Uttley’s discussion by examining the industrial restructuring efforts in Europe. The chapter discusses how European industry is moving to re-organize, just as the US defence industry has consolidated into a small number of very large corporations, in order to compete on the world market.

The book concludes with two chapters that examine the RMA intentions in Russia and China. Both of these potential superpowers are trying to close the technology gap with the US. Since most literature indicates the discussions on the current RMA can be traced back to the notion of a ‘Military Technical Revolution’ and the writings of Marshall N.V. Ogarkov in the 1970s and 1980s, it is particularly useful to understand how Russia views the current RMA, and what that country’s expectations are for the future. In China’s case, there are a number of modernization efforts underway, most of which are being driven by the civil sector-developed RMA-related technologies, rather than by the military.

Perhaps the greatest strength of the book is the perspective it brings to the RMA debate. It is more than just the ‘nature of future war’ and new technology discussion found in the majority of other RMA-related literature. Matthews and Treddenick have brought together a collection of well-written and



well-researched articles covering subjects that expand the RMA discussion beyond the traditional areas. If there is anything to quibble about, it is the price. It is more expensive than most books of this size, but perhaps not excessive when compared to other academic texts.

Everyone interested in Canada's involvement in the RMA, and the implications for DND and industry, should read this book.

Major J. Craig Stone is a Ph.D. student at Royal Military College.

THE LIRI VALLEY: CANADA'S WORLD WAR II BREAKTHROUGH TO ROME

by Mark Zuehlke

Toronto: Stoddart Publishing Co., 492 pages, \$45.00.

Reviewed by Major Michael Boire

Mark Zuehlke's trilogy about the Canadian Army in the Italian campaign continues with this second volume. It is a fascinating account of the success of our Army's first corps-level operation in the Second World War — the battle for the Liri Valley. Like his first volume on Ortona, this new work gives us another soldiers' eye view of the battlefields of the Italian campaign. This is a first class read which has been carefully crafted. The story tells itself, reflecting the respect this great military accomplishment deserves.

We read about young Canadians who, having survived their baptism of fire in Sicily and Ortona, fight their way up the Liri Valley. This was the Allies' main approach to Rome, heavily defended by an enemy who had already proven himself a worthy foe. The author is convinced that nobody can better tell the story of battle than those who were a part of it. Though the veterans' own narratives are the book's centre of gravity, Zuehlke very effectively casts their stories against a background of material from credible primary sources. The official history of the campaign, unit war diaries, after-action reports and memoirs have been woven together to give the reader enough context to understand the significance, and indeed, the central role of the Liri battle to the Italian campaign. The balance between primary and secondary sources contributes to a tone that is neither overly emotional nor dryly technical.

Zuehlke does not lose focus on the soldiers' tale, and this spares his reader unnecessary distraction. Discussions of the value of the Italian campaign or the Mediterranean Strategy to the Allied war effort do not figure prominently. Previous Canadian operations are related with great economy, and only in relation to how they prepared soldiers for the terrible demands of fighting through the Liri Valley. Descriptions of the command styles and operational performance of Canada's senior military leadership during the campaign are kept to the minimum required to tell the soldiers' story. In

any event, they tend to correspond with other recent portrayals of Canadian military leadership in the Second World War. This is hardly surprising, as the author's concerns are farther down the chain of command.


The author strikes a sympathetic chord when he describes soldiers in battle. We read of the tank crews of 1st Canadian Armoured Brigade, who knowingly took extreme risks as they supported British infantry assaulting across the Gari River in the opening phase of the attack on the Gustav Line. That Canadian armour operations did develop rapidly in the Liri Valley underscores the daring and resolve displayed by those tank crews, often operating alone or in small groups. The hard-fighting

battalions of 1st Canadian Infantry Division receive all the credit they are due. Attacking through the Hitler Line was more perilous than the Ortona battle had been during the previous winter. In front of each attacking battalion were many more defenders, manning a far greater proportion of automatic weapons, firing from hardened defences which covered wider and deeper fields of fire. Fighting through several miles of these formidable, mutually supporting positions spilled much Canadian blood. The subsequent baptism of fire of the units of 5th Canadian Armoured Division is also well recounted. We hear all these stories from the survivors themselves.

The maps are clear and useful, and the appendices contain helpful descriptions of weaponry and equipment used by both sides during the battle. There is also a solid bibliography for the serious reader who wants more. This is popular history of the best kind, a book that contributes to our understanding of a proud moment in Canada's history.

The story has value for every type of reader. Veterans will be able to relive the sun and the mud and the danger of an Italian summer long ago. Serving soldiers will gain an insight into I Canadian Corps' preparations, which set the conditions for this determined and ultimately successful attack through a powerful German position that blocked the road to Rome. Young readers, new to Canada's military history, will find this book to be well worth their time; it tells the story of a citizen army fighting and winning on battlefields far from home, learning the soldiers' trade and becoming 'warriors for the working day'.

Major Michael Boire teaches history at Royal Military College.



MORALS UNDER THE GUN: THE CARDINAL VIRTUES, MILITARY ETHICS, AND AMERICAN SOCIETY

by James H. Toner

Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 215 pages, \$US 29.95.

Reviewed by Major (ret'd) Arthur Gans

James H. Toner is Professor of International Relations and Military Ethics at the Air War College at Maxwell Air Force Base in Alabama. This is his third major work in the field of military ethics. In addition to his academic background, Professor Toner served as an officer in the United States Army.

First, a warning. Watch out for the first chapter! It contains every known argument for justifying an immoral military. And frankly, these arguments are stated as well as any I have ever heard.

Toner's argument actually begins with Chapter Two, and from that point on the argument is impeccable and the reasoning tight. To me, one of the major contributions of this book is the fact that Toner has found a way around the old either/or arguments of deontology and consequentialism. Therefore, he can pursue the track of value ethics, and in particular, to relate the classic cardinal virtues of prudence, justice, courage and temperance to the military functions of the officer. From a Canadian point of view, I would suggest that these virtues are essential elements of our commission scrolls, and are, in fact, the specific reasons that we were selected to hold the office to which we were commissioned.

There is a chapter for each of the virtues listed above. Every chapter is closely reasoned and gives a very good introduction to the history of each of the virtues. Each chapter ends with a case study which shows how ignoring the particular virtue can cause an individual major problems. In these studies, Toner 'names names', and each of the cases are taken from comparatively recent news coverage in the United States.

The one difficulty I find with the book is that it sometimes assumes a broader background in philosophy than I have generally found among military officers. It does, however, provide the kind of bibliography, footnotes and index which would allow the reader to follow up and fill out his or her knowledge of classic Western philosophy and the sources of Toner's ideas.

This book is a must for everyone interested in ethics. For those who have been faced with the issue of the conflict between classical ethical schools, it provides a solid introduction to a different and, perhaps, more militarily traditional way of thinking about the sources of military professional ethics. And for a young officer who is only just beginning to think about these questions, it provides a relatively quick and very solid course of ethical thought directly applied to the function of officership and leadership in general. I would strongly recommend this book to all with an interest in military ethics.

Major (ret'd) the Reverend Arthur Gans, a noted authority on military ethics, is a retired chaplain living in British Columbia.

BAPTISTE AU PAYS DU MATIN CALME: LES MILITAIRES CANADIENS-FRANÇAIS EN CORÉE 1950-1953

by Pierre Vennat

Montréal: Éditions du Méridien, 194 pages, \$29.95.

Reviewed by Dr. Daniel Byers

The history of French Canadian involvement in the wars of the 20th century is largely an undeveloped field. Thanks to the traditional focus of Canadian historians on the well-known conscription crises of 1917, 1942 and 1944, and French Canadian opposition to such measures, we still know very little about the considerable degree to which many French Canadians supported the country's past wars. With his new book, *Baptiste au pays du matin calme*, Pierre Vennat continues the attempt to resurrect the memory and experiences of French-speaking soldiers begun in his earlier works on the First and Second World Wars — *Les Poilus québécois de 1914-18: L'histoire des militaires canadiens-français* and *Les Héros oubliés: L'histoire inédite des militaires canadiens-français de la Deuxième Guerre mondiale*. This time, he focuses on the Korean War of 1950-1953. In the end, while there are a number of flaws in his book, he succeeds in his goal of reminding readers of the important contributions made by earlier generations of French Canadians to this conflict.

Vennat himself is a journalist at *La Presse*. As he has noted in the past, he is also the son of a Dieppe veteran, who was taught to honour the memory of French Canadians who volunteered to serve in the country's armed forces during the Second World War. These experiences have clearly shaped his views. As he argued in his first book on the Second World War, Quebecers followed their soldiers' exploits with great interest; it was only in the later years that these actions were downplayed, as nationalist historians came to dominate the writing of the province's history after 1945, and described the two world wars only as a source of conflict between French- and English-speaking Canadians (*Dieppe n'aurait pas dû avoir lieu*, Montréal: Éditions du Méridien, 1991, pp. 11-12). Ironically, this is a trend that has been just as evident in English-Canadian historical writing on the subject. In *Baptiste au pays du matin calme*, Vennat carries his argument further, pointing out that the Korean War itself came to be seen as pointless and without victors, and thus made it even less likely that it would be remembered by Quebecers or anyone else. As Vennat puts it, however, "We may think that they fought for nothing. But we do not have the right to forget their sacrifice." (p. 10) [TOQ]

With *Baptiste au pays du matin calme*, Vennat makes some significant additions to our understanding of the Korean War; particularly the role of francophone soldiers. As he notes, referring to a newspaper report from the time, Quebecers made up 30 percent of the

first group of 10,587 soldiers who volunteered to serve in Korea, a slightly higher percentage than the province's share of the national population (29 per cent). Unfortunately, Vennat does not provide more substantial evidence to support his point, and it is not clear how many of these soldiers were French- or English speaking (pp. 53-5). Vennat also reminds us that service by French Canadians in the war was not limited to the well-known Royal 22^e Régiment, which eventually rotated three battalions through the theatre (as did its two sister English-speaking Regular Force regiments). French Canadians were present in various Army, Navy and Air Force units, including the RCAF's 426 Squadron which flew supplies from North America to Japan throughout the conflict, and at least two of the small group of jet-fighter pilots who flew with American units to familiarize themselves with the new F-86 Sabre, which was then coming into service in Canada. In fact, Flight Lieutenant J. Omer Lévesque was the first Canadian to shoot down an enemy MIG in Korea, and the first to be decorated by American authorities, receiving an Air Medal for his actions. Among the several men who served in the Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry during the war and are named by Vennat, was Private Léo-Paul Gladu, a Franco-Manitoban who had the unwelcome distinction of being the first French Canadian to be killed in combat in Korea.

In one of the more substantial passages in Vennat's book, he also addresses another question raised during the war itself: that French-Canadian units were not given the toughest combat duties and the worst jobs behind the lines — an allegation made in 1951 by P.E. Gagnon, the member for Chicoutimi in the House of Commons. Vennat describes the numerous statements of support for the Canadian military that were made by public figures in response to the allegation, both inside and outside Québec. As these statements suggest, not only was the Royal 22^e Régiment treated no less fairly than any other unit in Korea, but there was also a substantial degree of support for the war in Quebec. Vennat is at his strongest when he relies on newspaper accounts from the time to describe the homecoming of French-Canadian soldiers to Montreal after serving in Korea, and particularly francophone Quebecers Paul Dugal and Arthur J. Baker, both of whom spent some months in Chinese prisoner-of-war camps.

For the most part, however, Vennat is content simply to let his sources "speak for themselves" regarding these and other developments. He often quotes the original newspaper accounts in detail, instead of describing events in his own words. The result is many lengthy passages that interrupt the flow of the book, and the type of 'cut and paste' history which tends to make for tedious reading. For example, in the case of the 25th Canadian Infantry Brigade's embarkation for Korea from their staging camp in Fort Lewis,

Washington for Korea, Vennat takes three pages to reproduce the report of the event by Georges Langlois, the Canadian Press correspondent who accompanied the troops. Other examples include later reports by Laglois on the positive and negative experiences of Canadians serving within the larger coalition forces in Korea. When Vennat is not reproducing newspaper stories verbatim, he largely paraphrases them. He makes very little attempt to analyze or describe the events any further. Thus, by the middle of the book, one begins to get the feeling that Langlois and other contemporary correspondents might even have been given some credit as co-authors.

Lastly, in a work such as Vennat's, which purports to describe the wartime experiences of French-Canadian soldiers, it might have been useful to interview a few veterans in order to gain some sense of their point of view on events. This approach has been used with success by Ted Barris, in a series of very similar works on English Canadian participation in the two world wars and in Korea (particularly *Deadlock in Korea: Canadians at War, 1950-1953* published by Macmillan Canada in 1999).

What makes Vennat's failings in *Baptiste au pays du matin calme* more noticeable, is the fact that the entire book is based solely on files drawn from his own newspaper, *La Presse*. The result is a somewhat superficial account of how the members of one (admittedly large) community followed the war through the reporting of their local newspaper, rather than of the experiences of French Canadians in the war, and their more general reactions to it. Another result is that Vennat not only limits itself to a simple chronological discussion of events as they occurred, but mentions larger issues such as French-Canadian participation in particular battles, or experiences as prisoners-of-war, only in the order that they were raised in individual stories in *La Presse* at the time. Instead, he might have considered separating these issues and dealing with them in distinct chapters. The final product is a rather disjointed account, which does not consider such questions in greater detail.

Interestingly, Vennat's book is part of a larger trend of commemorating the 50th anniversary of the Korean War that has been going on for the past few years, in English as well as in French. For his efforts to revive the memory of French Canadians who served in Korea, in particular, Vennat deserves congratulations. And his book is an important contribution in a field in which only a few university-trained historians are currently working. One hopes that Vennat's work will spark other French Canadians to want to know more about the impact that war had on their society, and to seek to reconstruct more fully this area of Canada's rich past.

Dr. Daniel Byers is a professor in the Department of History at Royal Military College.

THE UNITED STATES ARMY IN VIETNAM – COMBAT OPERATIONS: STEMMING THE TIDE, MAY 1965 TO OCTOBER 1966

By John M. Carland

Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, United States Army, 410 pages, \$US 43.00.

Reviewed by Lieutenant-Colonel Bernd Horn

I suspect that the book title conveys a misleading image. Although it is an official military history, this book is far from being a stilted, dry, sterile account of the period in question. It is crisply written, combining official reports with individual accounts and diary entries. It is rich with detail, and the material is presented in such a coherent, succinct manner as to make the many complexities of the conflict easily understandable, especially the political dimension. Moreover, the text also captures the drama of the chaos of the field operations. In many ways, it is an ideal ‘Vietnam 101’ text.

Technically, this is a very handsome book — hardcover and printed on high quality paper. It contains detailed coloured maps, as well as numerous photographs that enhance the text. The bibliographical information is superb, and the host of footnotes in each chapter provides excellent research references. In addition, there is an appendix that provides additional information on published and non-published sources that will be of enormous value to researchers, students and military enthusiasts alike.

The book itself, the eighth volume of *The US Army in Vietnam* series, chronicles the first eighteen months of combat — May 1965 to October 1966 — of the US ground forces in Vietnam. The author uses General William Westmoreland’s warning, in March 1965, that “we are headed toward a ...[communist] take-over...” as a launching point. From here, Carland quickly provides a compact and powerful overview of the events and decisions leading up to the fateful conclusion to commit massive numbers of ground troops to Vietnam, which cemented the trend towards the Americanization of the war.


In describing the initial deployments and the establishment of a bridgehead, the author expertly describes the growing pains, problems and frustrations, particularly in light of the many political constraints and restrictions the military commanders and their soldiers were under. He also details how the slippery slope of troop escalation is difficult to avoid. Carland lucidly outlines how the initial deployment only thickened the quagmire and led to the American decision to intervene in an even more forceful manner. Quite simply, with increasing South Vietnamese Army tactical defeats, it became obvious to Westmoreland and the other US commanders that the war was being lost both tactically and psychologically. As a result, American commanders argued for an immediate abandonment of the emphasis on using

American combat troops to only defend military installations, and instead argued for placing the effort on offensive combat operations. But, inherent in this shift was the need for more troops — twenty-four battalions to be exact — as well as the necessary air and naval support. Therefore, in July 1965, President Johnson briefed the nation that American fighting strength in theatre would increase from 75,000 to 125,000. He further pointed out that additional forces would still be required in the future, and that they would be provided when requested.

Throughout the book, the author maintains a very discerning and objective focus. He clearly highlights the shortcoming in the strategic thinking of both the political and military leadership. Specifically, he poses some fundamental, yet critical, questions that were not adequately addressed. For instance, where was the enemy’s military centre of gravity? And what strategy would afford the best approach to it? And what concept of operations would ensure its destruction? Moreover, he is very critical of Westmoreland’s response to these queries, namely Westmoreland’s declaration that they would have to wear the enemy down and that it would be a “war of attrition.”

Carland then proceeds to document the American combat experience through the various stages of expansion and escalation. His account is filled with graphic detail that provides a clear picture of both American and Viet Cong (VC)/North Vietnamese Army (NVA) tactics. He also brings out the steep learning curve for the US combat troops and their commanders, and how they quickly adapted their tactics and technology to overcome problems. In addition, the author also illustrates the underlying paradox of the war — for example, how a village can be the focus of civic action efforts one moment, and less than 24 hours later “lay barren, a lifeless smoldering ruin” because it was used as a firebase to launch and support an attack against Americans.

The book is also testimony to the American way of war — the reliance on technology and massive firepower to overwhelm and annihilate the enemy. The narration, whether intended or not, expertly captures the attritionist mentality that existed. Each engagement, operation or action is concluded by detailing the corresponding casualty count for both antagonists, much like a scorecard. Of course, the casualty ratio was the major determinant of success. But the author clearly explains that this mentality was in consonance with Westmoreland’s misguided belief that eventually they would inflict enough unacceptable losses in men and material on the VC and NVA that they would then settle on terms favourable to the US and its allies. However, Carland correctly summarizes that although American commanders favoured the ‘Search and Destroy’ tactic, its utility was actuality limited. He insists that all it achieved was to keep the Communists at bay by thwarting their attempts to mass for attacks by demolishing their supply and base camps, by cutting their lines of infiltration into the South, and by spoiling their plans to seize important harvests. In the end, Carland



concludes that the VC/NVA still controlled the tempo of fighting and, thus, the rate at which they suffered casualties.

Stemming the Tide is an elegant book that is as captivating and enlightening as it is disturbing. It is certainly a must read for those interested in the Vietnam War or military history in general. Authoritative and comprehensive, it provides an excellent account of the

policies and strategies, and the philosophies behind them, as well as their execution in the operational theatre. As such, it contributes enormously to the understanding of the American prosecution of the war in Southeast Asia and its inevitable outcome.

Lieutenant-Colonel Bernd Horn, Ph.D., is Commanding Officer of the 1st Battalion, Royal Canadian Regiment.

MONTGOMERY'S SCIENTISTS: OPERATIONAL RESEARCH IN NORTHWEST EUROPE

Edited by Terry Copp

Waterloo: The Laurier Center for Military Strategic and

Disarmament Studies, 478 pages, \$75.00.

Reviewed by Captain Andrew Godefroy

Over the past decade, the Canadian Forces has seen considerable emphasis placed on lessons learned, leading to the creation of lessons-learned centres, warehouses, and a number of professional journals and publications. What may be surprising to some is the fact that the Canadian military has been in the business of lessons learned for quite some time. In fact, aspects of operational research can be traced back to the First World War, but it was during the Second World War that the discipline truly emerged. A handful of scientists and engineers left civilian careers in Canada to join the Army Operational Research Group (AORG) in Britain. These men later went on to serve throughout the world collecting, analyzing and reporting on valuable lessons taken from battlefields and captured personnel. Operational research sections were vitally important to the Army in learning how to fight more effectively and, more important, learning how to win. Their efforts made a solid contribution towards the Allied victory in Europe.

Terry Copp's edited volume, *Montgomery's Scientists: Operational Research in Northwest Europe*, presents the reports of No. 2 Operational Research Section of 21st Army Group during the liberation of Europe, from June 1944 to July 1945. At 478 pages, the book presents enough technical detail, graphs and maps to assuage the appetite of even the most needy Normandy enthusiast. Professor Copp has successfully brought to light some of the most insightful assessments of Canada's experience in war fighting. This book is about lessons learned the hard way.

No. 2 Operational Research Section (ORS) was formed in July 1943, and after a brief stint as a liaison group between army staff officers and the technical specialists in the AORG, the group found itself preparing for the Allied invasion of Europe. Almost immediately after D-Day, 6 June 1944, No. 2 ORS began publishing the results of investigations carried out while serving with Canadian combat troops in the bridgehead, including a

revealing report about the ineffectiveness of self-propelled artillery in the Canadian assault at Juno Beach. While self-propelled gun crews had performed in accordance with doctrine and training, the report concluded that the design of German gun positions on the beach — enabling enfilade fire along the beaches rather than pointing out to sea — protected them from most of the frontal bombardment. As a result, the Germans were able to pour withering fire into the landing forces, and were only neutralized after courageous assaults by Canadian Duplex-Drive (DD) tanks, engineers and infantry. After D-Day, No. 2 ORS continued to support the Canadian advance, providing assessments of air support and bombing during Operations "Goodwood", "Bluecoat" and "Totalize". Throughout the campaign, the section provided valuable information that honed the ability of the Canadian Army to defeat the adversary on the battlefield.


The reports have been presented in as near to the original format as possible, though the book designer, Mike Bechthold, has made many of the maps and charts much easier to read than the originals through skillful reproduction. Everyone familiar with other Laurier military publica-

tions will be pleased to see more of the same high quality aerial photographs and portraits that have given their books such appeal to both the general reader and discerning historian alike.

The book offers page after page of information and detail, divided into four sections that deal with air support, tanks, artillery and infantry. Its publication will surely influence future assessments of Canadian operations in North West Europe, and may shed a different light on some views about the successes and failures of the Canadian Army during the Second World War. As well, the book preface reports that *Montgomery's Scientists* is the first title in a series of volumes from the Laurier Center for Military Strategic and Disarmament Studies that will document the contribution of operational research in the Second World War.

Seldom are technical matters the subject of books on Canadian military history. Though pricey, *Montgomery's Scientists* is an attractive and easily readable book that will be a solid investment for any student of the Canadian campaign in Normandy.

Captain Andrew Godefroy is the commander of the Canadian Forces Joint Space Support Team. He is also completing his doctorate in War Studies at Royal Military College.



THE CANADIAN MILITARY ATLAS: THE NATION'S BATTLEFIELDS FROM THE FRENCH AND INDIAN WARS TO KOSOVO

Text by Mark Zuehlke, Maps by C. Stuart Daniel

Toronto: Stoddart, 228 pages, \$100.00.


Reviewed by Professor Ronald G. Haycock.

Given the rare public interest in the state of Canada's military as the result of the recent deployment of our troops to yet another 'battlefield' — this time in Afghanistan, the appearance of a Canadian military atlas is a long overdue and welcome sight. This current volume is indeed a handsome presentation. It combines crisp text, fine photos and illustrations with clear maps, and it covers in ten chapters the battle history of Canada from New France's 150-Year War, 1609-1755 to Peacekeeping Operations, 1948-2001. As one would expect, each major conflict has its own treatment. Therefore, there are sections dealing with the Seven Years' War, the war with the American Colonies, the events around the struggles of 1812-1814, and the 50 years of rebellions from 1837 to the last Riel episode in 1885. The book then embarks on the big fights: the Boer War, the Great War, the Second World War, Korea and the long-term 'standing-to' of the Cold War. It even ends with a useful bibliography. Indeed, the layout is spacious; the use of contemporary paintings adds to the historical touch of the maps and text. The paper quality and binding of this large-format book is excellent. It has the look and feel of a high quality 'coffee table' presentation.

But this book is not the one that either the well-informed reader or the military specialist has been waiting for. It is too general. There are several things, both by omission and commission, that lead one to this conclusion. First, there are the maps. There is no doubt that they are clear. In fact, cartographer Daniel applauds the works of a map mentor, the late J.F. Horrabin, as "exceptional examples of the art of leaving out." (p. xi) But perhaps too much was left out. For instance, the Phips campaign of 1690 needs to have a map for his operations in front of Quebec (p.14). There is no siege map for the investiture of Louisbourg in 1745, but there is one for 1758 (pp.20-21 and 38). Wolfe and Montcalm's deployment on the *champs de bataille* in 1759 is vital for the fate of France in North America. But there is no detailed field map of this famous battle; yet there is a three-part local map for the battle at Batoche in 1885 (p.98). A general map illustration showing the various naval manoeuvres on

the Great Lakes in the War of 1812-14 would have been useful. The Battle of the Windmill is not represented at all, although it is described in some detail in the text (pp.86-87). There is no map of the battle at St. Eloi Craters or the fight at Mount Sorrel in 1916 that matches the narrative. And finally, when the reader tries to work through the details of the D-Day landings in 1944 and immediately after, it is very difficult to follow, especially when trying to find some of the place names mentioned in the text. In all, sometimes the "the art of leaving out" can be the "art of putting in". Whatever the case, the task of historical cartography is particularly demanding.

The book's introduction notes that while the maps are "the heart of the atlas, containing the details of each



selected battle or campaign, the text provides an overview that sets the maps in historical context." This intent sometimes falters. While the text, like the maps, is clear and concise, there are some aggravating elements. First is the lack of analytical historical narratives connecting the chapters. Examples include the continued problems of the growth and defence of British North America from 1783 to 1812. A paragraph or two about the travails of, for example, Sir Guy Carleton and John Graves Simcoe would make that bridge. So too would the addition of some analysis joining the various rebellions from 1837 to 1885, or commentary on the Canadian Militia and military affairs from the end of Riel's rebellion to our active participation in the Second Anglo-Boer War. Instead, the narrative starts

the African commitment on 29 November 1899 with barely a word as to how we got there from 1885. Much could be added to the flow and connectivity if succinct historical impulses could cross the synapses between events.

There are a few other textual 'flecks' here and there. For each battle, the author has a nearly formulaic presentation, which seems to dwell on numbers in establishments, casualties, dead, weather and disease. Also, one is not sure what a '19-shell salvo' is in the naval warfare of 1745 (p.21), but 'shells' are usually associated with the mid-19th century, not the mid-18th. In 1756, that both "Britain and France recognized that in North America, this war [the Seven Years' War] represented a final showdown" (p.28) is not clear. One could equally argue that France, at least, did not recognize it, and likely could have done little to dispossess the English from this continent even if she had won the European conflict. Above all, 18th century warfare was about negotiation as well as battle. Equally, in the Boer conflict, it is doubtful if Black Week in December 1899 was "largely because

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the Boers enjoyed numerical superiority over Britain's South African forces." (p.105) The reader needs to know that in these early days mobility, surprise, adaptability, knowledge of terrain and superior mounted tactics and small arms accuracy were much more important to victory than numbers. The "Royal" Dragoons should be the Royal Canadian Dragoons (p.115). And in 1939, the declaration of war was officially 10 September, not the day before (p.146). Finally, as noted above, sometimes the text out-runs the maps. This only builds the case for more maps, not less text.

In all, this attractive volume is not for those who have a detailed knowledge of this country's military history. They will still have to rely on the maps in the official histories or the other specialized works while waiting for the definitive atlas. However, for the general reader — for those who are simply interested in the subject as well as those who are beginning its study — this volume has satisfying utility not only for its span, but in dispelling the myths that have down-played our fascinating martial past.

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WARSHIPS OF THE GREAT LAKES, 1755-1834

by Robert Malcolmson

Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press (in Canada, Vanwell Publishing Ltd.), 192 pages, \$70.95.

Reviewed by Dr. James Pritchard

This well illustrated book is a welcome addition to the maritime history of the Great Lakes. It brings together much data and many illustrations of the warships of the inland seas into a handy reference work. The author recently published *Lords of the Lake: The Naval War on Lake Ontario, 1812-1814* (Toronto, 1998). Not surprisingly, his newest work is organized around the War of 1812, but the author has written a new book.

Mr. Malcolmson is to be congratulated for his inclusiveness as to time and place. He arranged his material into two almost equal parts, each organized into four chapters, followed by a ninth, concluding chapter. Chapters one through four, spanning more than a century and a quarter from 1675 to 1812, cover the warships built during the Seven Years War, The American War of Independence, and the subsequent 29-year period of peace and war scares. He interprets warships broadly to include virtually all government built and owned vessels. Chapters five to eight are devoted to the War of 1812, when a great naval arms race occurred on the Lakes. Unfortunately, Malcolmson has organized the text

about annual campaigns by lake, rather than by ships or ship types, dockyards or builders, which tends to leave the text somewhat unfocused. Though inclusion of the warships that contested Lake Champlain during the nearly sixty years between 1754 and 1814 enhances the completeness of the work, the text reveals little that is not already known about the wars.

Some chapters are rather ordinary. Accounts of various battles might have been sacrificed to allow more extended discussion of the warships and the human resources and material challenges that arose during their construction. John Goudie was more than an "a master ship builder from Quebec". More space devoted to shipbuilding might have cleared up some confusion. The book's chief attraction and *raison d'être* are the illustrations. Maps, ship drawings, photographs, sketches and tables are scattered in profusion throughout the text. There is an illustration on almost every page. The author's diligence in searching out material for inclusion deserves high praise, as do the publishers for reproducing images of often-faded drawings as clearly as they have.

This book is intended for a broad audience, and is highly recommended to both general readers and students of maritime history,

as well as those readers particularly interested in the naval history of the Great Lakes.

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