



US Air Force Photo

US Air Force F-15 Eagle.

LEADERSHIP AND THE KOSOVO AIR CAMPAIGN

by Colonel Alain Boyer

And me, poor man! Will I have the foresight, the firmness, and the skill to overcome these ordeals till the end?

Charles de Gaulle, *Memoirs of War*, Volume 1, *The Call to Honour*

While the role of the commander in an armed conflict is vitally important for victory, in the context of a limited war the commander must come to terms with an environment that can be described as confining and complex. As part of his 'battle space', a commander must now confront the refusal to accept any deaths — the casualty-aversion syndrome that is pervasive in American culture — as well as political constraints or interference in the conduct of war, and the quest for a clean war without collateral damage or civilian victims. How do these constraints affect him? An analysis of the effects such limitations can have on the commander personally is therefore of great significance.

This article intends to demonstrate that modern armed conflicts restrict the commander in such a way that his effectiveness in pursuing a mission is compromised. Here, the term

effectiveness is intended to mean the capacity to achieve an objective with optimal use of resources.

To narrow the scope of this study, it will deal particularly with the Kosovo air campaign, as this provides a good example of what commanders can expect in future operations.

First, this study will examine the matter of refusal to accept casualties, the casualty-aversion syndrome, and will try to answer several questions. What is the origin of such a syndrome? Does it still exist? Does it arise in the same way in the public at large as in political and military leaders? What impact does it have on the conduct of military operations? Do Canadians and Europeans perceive it in the same way? Was there evidence of this syndrome during the Kosovo conflict?

Next, the study will consider the restrictions of a political nature that marked the Kosovo air campaign. It will discuss the selection of the type of campaign plan, the target approval process, and concerns about collateral damage and civilian

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casualties. It will deal with restrictions imposed by the United States concerning military information and the management of high-technology weapon systems (B-2 and F-117 aircraft and cruise missiles). It should be noted that the thesis put forth in this article is about the commander himself, and not the outcome of the campaign in question.

The scientific model proposed by Pigeau and McCann, which is used to define the command space, lends itself well to the analysis attempted here. Although there is no need to

wards, and their refusal to send ground troops to Kosovo seem to confirm such a remark. This perception has repercussions on the politics of dissuasion practiced by the United States. Saddam Hussein has taken note of this tendency: in discussions with the American ambassador to Iraq on 25 July 1990, he stated that “the United States was incapable of tolerating the loss of 10,000 men during a battle.”⁴ Did the three studies of the RAND Corporation come to the same conclusions? The 1985 report used the wars in Korea and Vietnam to provide a comprehensive examination of the link between public support and the number of casualties incurred. Its authors concluded that “the public tends to accept only minimal casualties in limited-war situations.”⁵ On the other hand, as Major Hyde points out in a US Naval War College paper, “the study did not take into account all of the factors, among others, the reason for which the public had supported an intervention, despite significant losses during a prolonged period of time.”⁶

Following the Gulf War, the RAND Corporation undertook a second study that proposed a counter-thesis to the 1985 study, and examined the issue of public support regarding a possible withdrawal of deployed forces. After examining a number of surveys, this second study concluded that Americans favour military escalation over withdrawal so that a decisive victory can be obtained.⁷ According to the

study, American leaders had misinterpreted the wishes of the population, which was not opposed to casualties, but which wanted instead an escalation that was decisive. Such a conclusion is perplexing, since it is based on an extremely limited examination of the stakes involved.

In his 1996 RAND study, Eric Larson turned his attention to the way the public reaches a decision about whether to support a military intervention. According to him, the public considers five factors when deciding on a stand: the perceived benefits of the intervention, the prospects for success, the actual or prospective costs, changes to the mission and the pronouncements of political leaders.⁸ Larson notes that public support evolves according to the comparison between, on one hand, the benefits and the prospects for success, and, on the other hand, the actual or possible costs.⁹ Furthermore, he stresses that, when the importance of perceived benefits is taken into account, the recent conclusion that the public is less and less tolerant of casualties seems questionable.¹⁰

Major Hyde maintains that it would be entirely logical if an increase in casualties resulted in a decrease in public support, unless those additional losses were counterbalanced by an increase in anticipated benefits or better prospects for success.¹¹ These studies suggest that a simple cause-and-effect relationship between the number of casualties and public support for the pursuit of a military operation is insufficient. The way that the public adopts a position seems to be much more complex: the public is indeed ready to tolerate casualties if the perceived benefits justify it.

justify the choice of this particular model, a brief overview of it is in order. The model has three dimensions: responsibility, competency and authority. It is based on the hypothesis that effective command rests on an optimal balance between these three elements. This optimal balance, however, is not static. It varies according to the various levels of command: strategic, operational and tactical. Finally, the study will attempt to discern how various elements of the chosen context affect the three dimensions of the Pigeau and McCann model in order to prove that modern armed conflicts so constrain a commander that they compromise his effectiveness.

CASUALTY-AVERSION SYNDROME: THE PUBLIC

Whether it is myth or reality, casualty aversion continues to be a central preoccupation. It is prevalent in the United States, but there is much less evidence of it elsewhere. Where does this syndrome originate? In a study conducted at the US Army Command and General Staff College, Major Mundy of the US Marines maintains “that the Vietnam War brought about the belief among American leaders that the public does not tolerate casualties in a limited-war situation.”¹ The RAND Corporation also devoted three scientific studies to this troubling phenomenon.²

Some observers describe this supposed syndrome as the “Achilles heel of the United States.”³ The events that took place during the American intervention in Somalia, the non-intervention of the United States in Rwanda some time after-



A CF-18 Hornet, about to take off on a mission over Kosovo, awaits clearance to taxi to the active runway at Aviano Air Base in Italy.

DND Photo CKD89-2029-01 by Cpl Danielle Bernier

Mission	Military	Civilian Elite	General Public
Congo	284	484	6,861
Iraq	6,016	19,045	29,853
Taiwan	17,425	17,554	20,172

Table 1: Number of Acceptable Casualties¹³

There has not yet been a study of the Canadian public in this regard. However, Pigeau and McCann maintain that Canadians are proud of the humanitarian commitments of the Canadian Forces, although they have a very low tolerance of the casualties that can result from them.¹² Should we conclude that the Canadian public has an aversion to casualties? This remains to be seen.

CASUALTY-AVERSION SYNDROME: THE MILITARY LEADERS

As has been shown, the demand for zero casualties is far from being an absolute in the eyes of the public. But what does it mean to military leaders? A recent study by the Triangle Institute for Securities Studies examined three possible intervention cases: stabilizing a government in the Congo, preventing Iraq from obtaining weapons of mass destruction, and defending Taiwan against invasion from China. The study surveyed 4,900 Americans divided into three groups: senior military officers, the civilian elite and the general public. Figure 1 shows the results for the question: *How many casualties are acceptable for each scenario?*

In light of these numbers, the study concluded that military leaders are even more casualty averse than is the public. The survey's data does not corroborate the impression of civil and military leaders that the American public will not tolerate casualties. The authors also maintain that senior military officers accept casualties even less than the civilian elite.¹⁴ According to them, this phenomenon can be explained by senior officers' lack of confidence in civilians, who are prone to do an about-face when casualties increase. The authors argue that the preoccupation with casualty-free¹⁵ interventions is becoming a measure of success or failure in the minds of military leaders.

The deployment of the American contingent to Kosovo reflects this anxiety on the part of senior officers. In the mission statement of the brigade responsible for the American sector, force protection was specified as the primary objective, whereas the tasks associated with the mission, such as maintaining a safe environment, were relegated to a secondary priority. This approach resulted in the creation of a fortified camp.¹⁶

Although the influence of casualty aversion in Europe or Canada has not yet been the subject of a study, there are obvious indications of a preoccupation with the matter. Lieutenant-General Romeo Dallaire attests to this fact in *Human in Command*. He gives the example of the Belgian contingent which, after having lost ten soldiers in a brush with the enemy in Rwanda, withdrew several days later.¹⁷ Dallaire stresses that the political impact of incurring casualties risks becoming a dominating factor in a commander's decision-making mechanism. He ponders the impact casualty aversion could have on

the military ethos of priorities: "the mission, my troops, and then myself."¹⁸

Since there is no study focusing on the Canadian reality, we must assume that General Dallaire's text reflects the thoughts and attitudes of Canadian senior officers.

Casualty aversion seems to be a pressing preoccupation for senior officers, although not for the public at large. It can also be argued that this preoccupation directly influences the way military leaders establish and evaluate a military plan.

CASUALTY-AVERSION SYNDROME: THE KOSOVO AIR CAMPAIGN

What impact did casualty aversion have on the Kosovo air campaign? This phenomenon seems to have been a central preoccupation at the highest level of the military hierarchy. In his book *Virtual War*, Michael Ignatieff asserts that General Wesley Clark's political instincts dictated a minimal loss of aircrews.¹⁹ Since US Lieutenant General Short, commander of the air campaign, was placed under the immediate command of General Clark, the two military leaders no doubt discussed the matter extensively. Views expressed during the Eaker Institute Colloquium on the Kosovo air campaign help to clarify the context. According to RAF Air Vice-Marshal R.A. Mason, too many aircraft were used to disable enemy air defences during the mission, and this resulted from a deliberate decision to seek a zero-casualty outcome.²⁰ According to Mason, the zero-casualty objective clearly had priority over the accomplishment of the mission.

POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS

In any conflict, military leaders must face certain political constraints. Lieutenant General Short, the Joint Force Air Component Commander, was no exception. NATO is an organization that operates by consensus and, for the Kosovo campaign, it was therefore necessary to adopt a three-phase campaign with a gradual escalation of the strikes. This crescendo conforms to coercive diplomacy, but does not correspond to a traditional military campaign. These three phases can be described as follows: in Phase I, anti-aircraft defence elements are targeted, as is their command and control centre; in Phase II, a set of military targets south of the 44th parallel are hit; in Phase III, the strikes are not limited to purely military targets, even in downtown Belgrade.²¹ This gradualism runs counter to theories about the use of the air arm by Douhet, Mitchell and Trenchard, as well as the doctrine of

The public does not so much insist on a lack of casualties as on risks that are worthwhile.

the US Air Force, which calls for decisive application of air power rather than half-measures. General Short would have much preferred to begin the campaign with Phase III. During his testimony before the American Senate

The demands of modern conflicts so constrain commanders that their effectiveness in pursuing a mission can be compromised.

Committee, he clarified that he would have directed these attacks toward the “head of the snake” from the first night onward. He would have struck down the electricity grid, hit the bridges spanning the Danube, and destroyed five or six military headquarters in the middle of Belgrade.²² The renowned historian John Keegan sides with him, saying that there were really two campaigns: the first, lasting a month, which was a failure, the second, lasting six weeks, which was a success.²³ This first element of political constraint was, however, only the tip of the iceberg.

The target authorization process was a second considerable constraint. Throughout the campaign, Washington and NATO closely controlled the authorization of targets. According to General Short, there was so much interference that he thought he was back in 1968, when the President of the United States personally approved targets that could be hit in Vietnam.²⁴ General Clark also mentions this interfer-

imagine the impact that this second constraint had on the generation of air mission orders, which are normally produced 72 hours in advance.

Without doubt, the high concern of various governments about collateral damage and civilian casualties explains this interference. General Clark admits that the key variable for the acceptance or refusal of a target was the level of risk of collateral damage presented.²⁶ This political interference had even worse results at the tactical level: during the bombing of a bridge a train arrived unexpectedly, resulting in massive civilian casualties. Following this incident, General Short was forced to restrict strikes on bridges to precise times, which in turn made them highly predictable.²⁷

This extreme concern about limiting collateral damage also had repercussions for General Short himself. He was so concerned about possible legal ramifications for the aircrews that he told pilots to call him directly on the radio if they had any doubts whatsoever. Michael Ignatieff tells of an incident in which a pilot, having spotted a tank near a house, asked Short’s authorization for the strike. Short answered: “Tell him to go ahead. If he damages the house, it will be my responsibility.”²⁸ As for the British and French governments, they also imposed restrictions on their aircrews: they could not attack Serbian troops in Kosovo when there was a village within 500 meters of their targets. Nevertheless, according to Clark, these targets were of the highest importance in order to stop ethnic cleansing.²⁹




Figure 1: Command Space

Some purely American political constraints should be mentioned. For its own reasons, the United States decided not to place the B-2 and F-117 stealth aircraft or Tomahawk cruise missiles under the orders of the Joint Force Air Component Commander. These remained strictly under American control.³⁰ Thus, a parallel command structure was created, and the principle of the unity of command was violated. This situation no doubt had a major impact on the relations between General Short and the many national representatives who served under his orders. By his own admission, Short felt ill at ease during the daily review of the air mission orders.³¹ Also, the sharing of military information with the Allies was subject to certain restrictions by the United States, but we do not know how significant these restrictions were. In describing the lessons that can be drawn from this campaign, General Short only mentions a certain lack of transparency.³²

Political constraints in the execution of a military mission appear to be more and more the way of modern conflicts. Governments seek to ensure public support, and the public is becoming increasingly disapproving of violence. This leads governments to want to control everything. Unfortunately, such interference has disastrous consequences on operations because it contravenes the application of basic principles of war. As General Clark points out, the conduct of operations in Kosovo violated almost all of those principles.³³

ence in his book. For example, he maintains that, after the attacks of the first night, he still had not received approval from Washington or from the Secretary-General of NATO for the targets planned for the following day.²⁵ It is easy to

The Kosovo campaign, then, involved the following political constraints: a gradualist approach to the means used, a restrictive target approval process, a need to limit collateral damage and civilian casualties to an absolute minimum, the creation of two air mission commands, and a lack of transparency concerning military information. These five elements will be discussed again in the third part of the analysis.

THE PIGEAU AND McCANN MODEL

This article contends that the demands of modern armed conflicts so constrain commanders that their effectiveness in pursuing a mission can be compromised. After having studied the essential stakes — casualty aversion and political constraints — it is now necessary to adopt an analytical framework that will make it possible to interpret these different elements and see how they influence the quality of military leadership. Many scholars have tried to define what makes a good leader, and most analyses are based on personality traits. There are lists of characteristics so long that one wonders if a single human being could ever possess all of them.

On the other hand, Pigeau and McCann contributed significantly to the knowledge on this subject not by focusing exclusively on the competencies of leaders, but by introducing two other important dimensions in the command space: authority and responsibility. An effective command must not only find equilibrium in the command space, it must also reach an optimal equilibrium for a specific level of responsibility. A commander must have the appropriate authority and the necessary competencies required by the level of responsibility associated with his position. (See Figure 1.)

McCann and Pigeau also take into account the concepts of legal and personal authority, as well as notions of intrinsic and extrinsic responsibility. These concepts are not new to the study of command. However, while the concepts of legal and personal authority are well known, the notion of responsibility deserves to be mentioned here. According to Pigeau and McCann, extrinsic responsibility implies an obligation to be accountable to the public and to the higher authority. Intrinsic responsibility, on the other hand, implies a personal obligation towards accomplishing the mission.³⁵ In addition, they propose a new definition of the military commander: a combination of a position/person who manoeuvres in a balanced command environment and possesses special powers — the power of disciplinary order and the power to put subordinates' lives in harm's way.³⁶ These powers differentiate the military commander from the civilian administrator.

Pigeau and McCann specify that the competencies of the commander must be physical, intellectual, emotional and interpersonal in nature. According to a US Army leadership study by Gary Yulk, the various attributes are rather of a technical, cognitive, and interpersonal nature.³⁷ The technical aptitudes Yulk refers to can include the physical competency mentioned by Pigeau and McCann. In Yulk's opinion, what Pigeau and McCann describe as emotional competency is nothing other than a personality trait, and not a competency.³⁸ Despite this opinion, the emotional competency from Pigeau and McCann's model is worth maintaining, since this attribute can potentially be learned — and potential learning is highly relevant to the notion of command.

For the purposes of this study, we will use the analytical framework proposed by Pigeau and McCann, as well as their concepts of command space and optimal balance. We will also incorporate the technical, cognitive and interpersonal competencies mentioned by Yulk, while at the same time retaining emotional competency as discussed by McCann and Pigeau. It will then be possible to locate the imbalances in the Kosovo air campaign commander's command space. This approach reflects that of Pigeau and McCann, who conclude that a commander must have a balanced command environment to ensure that the power of the commander not be exceeded or rendered ineffective, and that the individual who fills this position have the overall competency to lead the mission to success.³⁹

ANALYSIS: CASUALTY AVERSION

Lieutenant General Short claims he was not compelled by General Clark to maintain a zero-casualty outcome, and that he executed his mission without this factor dominating his



US Air Force F-16 Fighting Falcon used over Kosovo during Operation "Allied Force" for the suppression of air defences and to destroy vehicles, tanks and structures.

thinking.⁴⁰ However, General Clark, in his recent book, asserts that "his primary measure of merit was not to lose any planes, to minimize aircraft loss," which, according to him, corresponded to Short's concerns.⁴¹ The formulations used by

both men seem contradictory: there is indeed a difference between *no* casualties and *minimizing* casualties.

But what an influence casualty aversion had on the balance of the command space of General Short! If one considers the dimension of responsibility in Pigeau and McCann's model, it is evident that the commander had been assigned an extensive mission. However, since the order to have a casualty-free victory emerged in a prominent way, it is reasonable to suggest that this objective dominated the accomplishment of the mission. As a result, a problem of military ethics occurred, as defined by Dallaire and Snider. There was therefore an imbalance on the level of intrinsic responsibility.

Turning to the authority dimension, there was also an imbalance concerning legal authority (putting soldiers' lives in harm's way), which General Short should have been allowed to possess. This authority was diminished to such a point that the mission's chances of success were reduced. As for the competency dimension, the pressure to focus on having zero casualties influenced the way Short dealt with the problem of force protection. His judgment (cognitive competency) in fact became biased because of it, and this led to a non-optimal solution. As mentioned earlier, Air Vice-Marshal Mason stressed this fact when he examined how offensive and defensive strengths were divided during the strikes. Implicitly or explicitly, this zero-casualties constraint directly influenced the commander's level of risk tolerance. There was a complex imbalance between the dimensions of authority and responsibility, and this exerted negative pressure on his cognitive competency. During the first month of operations, only 15 percent of the total sorties undertaken were devoted to strikes, but this later rose to 30 percent.⁴²

How can such a change in orientation be explained? Perhaps it should be noted that at the beginning of the conflict General Short disagreed with the limited strike strategy. This

the air strike strategy evolved into a strategy that was closer to the one he had advocated (the authorization to bomb Belgrade systematically), that is, a decisive power strategy, Short was able to realign his priorities. However, a second hypothesis should be offered. Since the first four weeks of bombing were devoted to destroying the enemy's anti-aircraft defence infrastructure, the risks facing aircrews were certainly reduced. Consequently, the change Short brought about concerning force protection was not caused by an increased acceptance of the risk of casualties, but rather by the diminished threat. This second hypothesis seems more plausible, and we must therefore conclude that the imbalance of the dimensions brought about by casualty aversion was evident throughout the campaign.

ANALYSIS: POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS

It was emphasized earlier that the approved campaign plan did not take into account theories about the role of the Air Force. This plan caused repeated confrontation between General Clark (SACEUR) and General Short, who asserted:

During one of SACEUR's visits to the air operation command center, he had everyone leave the room and he told me I had been very curt with him. I answered that this had not been my intention, but that I was stunned by the orders that had been given to me. I believe I did everything I could to make SACEUR understand what the Air Force was. I did everything I could to oppose what I thought were bad orders. I am not trying to shirk my responsibilities, and I am the one who is responsible for the air campaign.⁴³

This quotation is revealing. General Short demonstrates determination (emotional competency) in correcting an imbalance between his discretionary legal authority, which allows him to select targets, and the way his mission was being carried out. Moreover, the quotation clearly shows his intrinsic responsibility concerning the accomplishment of the mission. Yet there are grounds for asking oneself about his interpersonal competency (communication), since the message was not understood by SACEUR. As for his cognitive competency, it must have been put to the test a great deal during the formulation of his arguments.

His creative cognitive competency was also strongly shaken by the many political constraints to which he was subjected. As mentioned in the first section, every new incident that involved collateral damage was followed by increasingly stringent restrictions which further limited opportunities to demonstrate creativity. In the same way, he had to impose restrictions concerning strikes on bridges: aircrews were only permitted to attack bridges between 2200 hours and 0400 hours, and this predictability made them more vulnerable to enemy anti-aircraft fire.⁴⁴ This lack of legal authority brought about by political constraints



CF-18 at Aviano Air Base in Italy during Operation "Allied Force."

resulted in his desire to make force protection a dominant feature in the accomplishment of the mission because, according to him, the success of the mission seemed improbable. When




Figure 2 - Short's Position in Relation to the Dimensions of Authority and Responsibility⁴⁶

created, once again, an imbalance between his technical competency (tactics) and his cognitive competency (judgment), while eroding his personal authority. Pigeau and McCann specify that personal authority is granted by peers and subordinates who expect that the leader will act in a way that reflects the confidence that has been placed in him. Personal authority therefore implies a responsibility downwards, to those who are the source of that authority.⁴⁵ When Short imposed restrictions on attacks, his capacity to command was compromised. How can a leader obtain the optimal balance of the Pigeau and McCann model when his legal authority is not equal to his responsibilities?

What were the consequences of having two types of air mission orders and of the lack of transparency regarding military information, which were two other political constraints directly imposed by his government? First, these constraints eroded his legal authority, which was already shaky. As we know, confidence is gained through concrete gestures. The gestures made by General Short because of the delicate position in which he found himself could have seemed to his subordinates to be a lack of confidence in them, which only furthered the crumbling of his personal authority. If he did not show confidence in the members of his team, how could he demand that from them? All of these political constraints had repercussions on his personal and legal authority, as well as on the set of competencies defined by the Pigeau and McCann model. Perhaps Short gained a certain balance in his command space; but it was certainly not an optimal balance. In order to demonstrate the situation in which he found himself, Figure 2 illustrates the dimensions of responsibility and authority and Short's position in relation to them. This figure reveals his lack of authority in relation to his level of responsibility.

CONCLUSION

To command is first and foremost a human endeavour. That is why this article has attempted to look at a specific commander. The Kosovo air campaign was its backdrop, and the theoretical model of Pigeau and McCann its easel. First, the article examined that important element, casualty aversion, which

has its origins in the traumas of the Vietnam War. This syndrome has influenced American foreign policy in one way or another ever since. The article also showed that the public does not so much insist on a lack of casualties as on risks that are worthwhile. It also notes that public discourse played a key role in the formulation of the population's position. On the other hand, there seems to be a paradox among military leaders: they seem to tolerate the possibility of casualties less readily than does the public. Their position has been influenced by a preconceived idea, false as it turns out, of what the public really wants. If we followed this logic to its conclusion, the goal of zero casualties would take precedence over the accomplishment of a mission. Obviously, the situation is far from being this clear-cut, but this problem remains very real.

The article made use of the model of leadership evaluation proposed by Pigeau and McCann. This model conceives of the command space in relation to the three dimensions — responsibility, authority and competence. It defines ideal leadership as an optimum balance between



Another view of a CF-18 at Aviano.

these three dimensions in a given situation. Although the model is a significant contribution to all analyses of command, the complex relationship between the three dimen-

sions remains a problem that is difficult to solve. Determining the optimal balance between these dimensions is not an easy thing. However, this model may lead to discussion of ideas that will help military leaders to acquire the tools essential to their profession.

The analysis of elements that entered into play during the modern conflict in Kosovo revealed that the commander of air operations was not in a position of optimal balance in his command space and that, by this very fact, his military effectiveness was compromised.

Determining the optimal balance between [responsibility, authority and competence] is not an easy thing.

Casualty aversion played an important role in this situation, as did the political constraints the commander had to face. All of these restrictions considerably decreased

his legal and personal authority, thereby creating an imbalance in relation to the responsibilities he had to assume. Moreover, this imbalance between authority and responsibility affected his cognitive competency in a negative way, placing him, in fact, in a stifling operational yoke. This situation limited the expression of his creativity and of his professional judgment. One wonders if such control was not excessive, in spite of the apparent success of the campaign. As Martin van Creveld has pointed out, if control is necessary, it must be

well balanced: "Control must be sufficiently tight to guarantee sufficient execution, but not to the point of undermining authority or stifling initiative."⁴⁷

There is no doubt that the commander of this modern conflict was far from experiencing optimal balance in his command space. His efficiency as a leader was undermined by numerous constraints. General Jumper, Commander of the American Air Force in Europe, bears witness to this:

It is the political realities of the moment that will dictate what we will be able to do. If the limit of that consensus means gradualism, then we are going to have to find a way to deal with a phased air campaign with gradual escalation. Efficiency may be sacrificed.⁴⁸

Of course, the Allied Forces won the victory, but against an enemy that did not measure up militarily. It is therefore all the more intensely that we have to wonder whether this victory would have been won against a more formidable adversary.



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