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The Kananaskis G8 Summit: A Case Study In Interagency Cooperation
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Comprehensive civil military coordination, effective coordination and timely decision making between the CF and Other Governmental Departments are key to effective support without trespassing on civilian responsibilities.1
Joint Task Force “Grizzly” — The Commander’s ‘Strategic Centre of Gravity’
Cops don’t do woods [or mountains]2
In June, 2001, Prime Minister Chrétien announced that the June 2002 G8 Summit would be held in Kananaskis, Alberta. The selection of Kananaskis as the site came as somewhat of a surprise, and was not welcomed by all Albertans. The violence and property damage that had come to be associated with demonstrations at recent international events such as the Genoa G8 Summit and the Summit of the Americas in Québec City in April, 2001 was cause for great concern for the organizers and hosts. There was little doubt that the Canadian Forces (CF) would be involved in a major way as part of the security and supporting arrangements for the Summit. After all, CF support to the Summit of the Americas had been the top domestic priority for the Department of National Defence, and effectively consumed the full resources of Secteur du Québec de la Force Terrestre (SQFT), as well as some additional elements from across the CF.3 Despite the significant contribution, very few CF resources were actually committed to the security aspect as that was the responsibility of the police and law enforcement agencies. Although there was an infantry battalion on stand-by as a contingency force-of-last-resort, the CF contribution was mainly support of logistics, infrastructure, communications, ceremonial and command post activities.
Following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the security concerns surrounding the hosting of the G8 Summit increased dramatically. In addition to the security challenges posed by the forested and mountainous terrain surrounding the Kananaskis site, there was a new threat to consider. The anarchist was no longer the primary concern for the security forces. The terrorist threat, ranging from the lone sniper to bombs to weapons of mass destruction — with an equally wide range of delivery means — was clearly beyond the capability of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and local law enforcement agencies. The CF was now going to be a key partner in the effort to secure the G8 site from both ground and airborne threats.
This article examines the Kananaskis G8 Summit as a case study in interagency cooperation. Although a plethora of municipal, provincial and federal agencies were involved in the conduct of the Summit, the article focuses on the interaction between the CF/DND, the RCMP/ Solicitor-General (SOLGEN), and the Summit Management Office (SMO)/Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT). The case study will examine this interaction from the perspective of the CF and, for the most part, from the view of the Joint Task Force (JTF) formed to assist in the conduct of the Summit. A synopsis of the preparations and the Summit itself will provide the background for the examination of certain areas of interagency cooperation where lessons can be learned for the conduct of similar events in future.
Overview Of The Preparations And Conduct Of The Summit
The Organization and Key Players
The Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade was the lead agency responsible for the coordination and conduct of the G8 Summit. Ambassador Robert Fowler was appointed as the Prime Minister’s special representative for oversight of the Summit4, but DFAIT’s Summit Management Office, led by Executive Director John Klassen, was clearly in overall charge of the preparations. In March 2002, the SMO moved from Ottawa to Calgary.
The Solicitor General had overall responsibility for the security of the Summit, with the RCMP as the lead agency. Chief Superintendent Lloyd Hickman was the Officer in Charge of Summit Security Operations, and was clearly the person overall in charge of security planning and preparations. However, during the actual Summit, “the Incident Commander [Superintendent Bob Boyd for the day shift and Inspector Tim Gray for the night shift] was ultimately responsible for making operational decisions related to G8 Summit Security and all information was directed into the Unified Command Centre (UCC) [located in Calgary].”5 This became clear to the JTF only late in the planning cycle, and caused some command and control concerns for the JTF Commander that will be discussed later. The Calgary Police operated in support of the RCMP, but were responsible for their own area of operations (Calgary), which included the significant security challenges of the Media Centre and Calgary Airport. The RCMP focus was primarily on the Kananaskis site, but its responsibilities also included all security aspects associated with moving the Heads of State to and from the Calgary Airport and Kananaskis.
Photo by Major Derek Macaulay
The CF contribution to the Summit was divided into two main elements. The first was JTF “Grizzly”, commanded by Brigadier-General Ivan Fenton, based primarily on Land Force Western Area (LFWA). The mission of JTF “Grizzly” was “to support the Government of Canada in the successful execution of the 2002 G8 Summit.”6 In addition to its headquarters, the task force consisted of four components:
- A Land Component, based on 1 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group (1 CMBG).
Its primary task was to assist the RCMP in securing the approaches to the Kananaskis
- A Support Component, based on 1 Area Support Group (1 ASG). Its main tasks were
to provide logistics and administrative support to the JTF, provide an NBC decontamination
capability, and assist the SMO with movement control, transportation, communications
and ceremonial support;
- An Air Component, whose main tasks were to provide aerospace coordination over
the Kananaskis Valley and to provide aviation support to the JTF and
to the RCMP for the transport of Heads of State; and
- A small JTF Reserve which was prepared to respond to a number of contingencies, but was uncommitted at the outset of the Summit so as to maintain its flexibility of employment for the JTF Commander7.
Other CF elements employed in the Kananaskis area in support of the RCMP, but which were not part of the JTF, included the Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Response Team and Joint Task Force 2.
The significant second part of the CF contribution that was outside of the control of the Commander JTF “Grizzly” was the Defensive Counter Air organization. It was tasked to secure the airspace over the G8 Summit, and consisted of Canadian CF-18s, Griffon helicopters, ground-based air defence missile systems and United States Air Force AWACs and strategic air-to-air refueling aircraft. Its operations were coordinated and controlled by Major-General Lucas, Commander Canadian NORAD Region, from Winnipeg.8 The authority to engage air threats to the Summit involved NORAD, but ultimately rested with the Canadian National Command Authority.
Figure 1 depicts the CF organizations and internal command and control relationships of the military forces involved in the G8 Summit, as well as the supporting interagency relationships.9 The CF at all levels was in support of both the RCMP/SOLGEN and the SMO/DFAIT, with the exception of the Defensive Counter Air Component, which reported to the National Command Authority, through the CDS, for ‘shoot-down’ decisions.
Although many other government and private sector organizations were involved, those mentioned above were the key players that drove the planning and conduct of the Summit and thus had to work closely together.
Planning and Preparations
Planning for the G8 Summit began early. LFWA Headquarters received its Warning Order on 5 August 2001 — some ten months prior to the event — but it was immediately clear that the anticipated tasks laid out in this initial strategic guidance were based on the Summit of the America’s experience, and did not reflect the unique terrain challenges of Kananaskis. A preliminary estimate prepared by the small JTF planning team in LFWA Headquarters anticipated a far greater range of Assistance to Law Enforcement (ALEA) tasks than anticipated by NDHQ, and a request for greater clarification of potential CF tasks was sent to National Defence Headquarters on 17 August.10 In any case, the events of September 11th changed the situation and the strategic estimate concerning CF involvement dramatically. Shortly thereafter, requests for significant CF involvement began to arrive from the SMO and the RCMP. Planning, particularly with regard to the requirement for an Air Exclusion Zone (AEZ) over Kananaskis and Calgary, was carried out in some detail during the Fall months. This was focused by the need to have the parameters of the AEZ identified and published by NAVCAN/Transport Canada in the form of a NOTAM by 24 January 2002. Although a relatively detailed Warning Order was issued by the JTF Headquarters in late November 2001, detailed security planning and a clearer definition of the role that the JTF was to have on the ground was not achieved until the Spring of 2002.
In the New Year, the pace of coordination meetings and planning sessions involving all agencies picked up significantly, and the JTF Commander ultimately briefed the DCDS and the CDS on his concept of operations. The major impediment to JTF planning was a changing concept of how the Land Component was to be employed in the outer security zones surrounding the G8 site. Chief Superintendent Hickman affirmed in a later interview that until March or April he believed the CF would provide only Observation Posts (OPs) that would have no potential for any confrontation with civilian intrusions into the security perimeter. These OPs on the surrounding high ground and mountains would detect and report potential intrusions to RCMP patrols, and then vector the RCMP patrols onto the intruders. He clearly recalled from briefings that he attended in Ottawa with the DCDS present, that the CF was not to be employed in a way that had any real potential for contact with civilians.11 On the other hand, the JTF anticipated scenarios where the OPs might have to confront a suspected terrorist, or have to defend themselves with armed force as a last resort.
Canadian Forces Combat Camera photo by Sergeant Rick Ruthven
In April the situation changed dramatically, when the “RCMP human resource projections were subsequently shifted to a maximum of 4,500 regular members [reduced from an original projection of 6,000]. DND was asked to accept a more substantive role in the ‘policing’ of the zone surrounding the Kananaskis village.”12 This relatively late and significant change of task resulted in planning and training challenges for both the RCMP and the JTF, and these were further exacerbated by delays in getting the JTF Rules of Engagement amended, approved and issued by NDHQ.13 However, this change of task also resulted in much closer ties with the RCMP, and eventually led to highly successful Joint CF/RCMP ‘Wilderness Patrols’ conducted in what was essentially the JTF’s own security zone.
All JTF components carried out their own preparatory training and exercises, with those of the Air Component being the most detailed and thorough. The culmination of JTF-level training was Exercise “Virtual Grizzly”, held in Edmonton from 6 to 10 May. This exercise, conducted by the Army Simulation Centre, involved all the JTF components, the RCMP, the SMO and several provincial and municipal agencies. It was the only interagency exercise conducted, and post-operation reports of all the involved agencies judged it to be a key factor in the overall success of the G8 Summit.
The Conduct of the Operation
Initial deployment of JTF Headquarters communications personnel began in May, and on 19 June the JTF Headquarters and the RCMP Unified Command Post became operational. By 22 June, all JTF elements were deployed, and the Kananaskis security perimeter was established in conjunction with the RCMP that same day. The first dignitaries arrived on 25 June, and the Summit itself occurred on 26 and 27 June. At 0001 hours on 28 June the RCMP Command Post stood down, and redeployment of CF units began at daylight.
Other than one small gathering at the entrance to the Kananaskis Valley, all the protest demonstrations were confined to Calgary.14 The protests were generally peaceful, and the RCMP made only two arrests for Criminal Code violations.15 The Calgary police reported that protester-related damage was limited to one broken window. The Land Component patrols did have to steer some civilians (hikers for the most part) out of the security zone, but there were no significant incidents. There were three inadvertent ‘no fly zone’ infractions, but the aircraft cooperated by leaving the area once informed of the violation.16 In short, the G8 Summit was conducted successfully, and the “Summit Security effectively broke the cycle of violence that had been steadily escalating since the WTO Conference.”17 While all agencies cited interagency cooperation as being the key to the success of the Summit, there were areas of interagency participation that deserve further analysis.
ANALYSIS AND LESSONS LEARNED
National Command Authority
While the Defensive Counter Air part of the G8 Security Plan was ably executed by Canadian NORAD Region and NORAD assets, it was not clear that the practical procedures were in place at the highest levels of government to authorize a shoot-down of an airborne threat to the Summit in a timely manner. Colonel Duff Sullivan, who was the A3 Operations during the planning and conduct of the G8 Summit, conducted an examination of the National Command Authority (NCA) at the Canadian Forces College. He noted:
The manner in which the NCA [authority for shoot-down] prepared to participate in the G8 Summit in June 2002 was also of great concern. The Prime Minister was the host of the G8 Summit and was not available to fill the role of NCA. Deputy Prime Minister John Manley was designated as the NCA, but only a few days before the event. This last minute appointment precluded Minister Manley from participating in any part of the extensive four-month training period.18
It would seem clear that for future events such as a G8 Summit, and to contend with the possibility of having to deal with an unpredictable terrorist threat that could manifest itself at any time, a thoroughly prepared National Command Authority must be in place and empowered to make a ‘shoot-down’ decision. Furthermore, should the Prime Minister be prepared to delegate National Command Authority — as he did during the Kananaskis Summit — all potential holders of that authority (including the Minister of National Defence) must be practised in the procedures and process.
Request and Approval Procedure
The procedures utilized by the SMO and RCMP to request CF support were seen to have both positive and negative ramifications. General Fenton, pointed out that:
Of particular concern is the request and approval procedure, which brings unique military capabilities to bear in support of OGDs [Other Government Departments]. Op GRIZZLY, like other domestic operations, did not follow the request procedures to the letter; however, this is not a negative lesson learned. To the contrary, the informal and early practice of agency-to-agency discussion, planning and refinement allows for longer timelines to prepare for an operation. The normal process can take an inordinate amount of time because of the political dimension of some domestic operations. Agencies, which know of their eventual involvement in an operation, do well to begin the coordination process as early as possible to facilitate both the formal process and the subsequent execution of the task.19
Early and detailed coordination allows the agency being asked to provide support (in this case the CF) to help the supported agency craft the request in such a way that will ultimately better support the achievement of the overall mission. Liaison Officers can facilitate this, but it is through “joint”20 planning — well before the formal request is submitted — that this is best achieved. This interagency coordination (if not joint planning) was successfully utilized in the preparation of requests for CF support. Having said that, the approval process at the strategic level, particularly legal approval, was often too slow. On occasion, approval of all aspects of support contained in a letter of request were held up while one or two contentious items were examined in detail. This may account for Chief Superintendent Hickman’s concern with “this area [which] is focused on the process by which a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) is amended, once signed.”21 He questioned whether it is “necessary to reopen the MOU in order to change certain clauses, or is it necessary to engage in new negotiations and create a completely new agreement?22 In any case, in a post 9/11 world, it is certain that the RCMP and CF will be working closer and more often than ever before, and the request and approval procedures need to be streamlined to reflect that relationship, or standing broad MOUs should be established.
Photo by Major Derek Macaulay
Interagency (Joint) Planning
It is in the area of interagency planning, particularly between the CF and RCMP, where there is the greatest room for improvement. That is not to say that cooperation between the two agencies was anything but excellent, but cooperation is one thing and joint planning is another. Once it became clear that the CF would have integral and unique roles in assisting the RCMP in the security of the Summit, a Joint Planning Team should have been established. Liaison Officers were indeed provided to the other agency, but that was not enough to allow coherent plan development. Major Don Senft, the key JTF planner (J5 Plans), summarized the problem:
While the integration of an LO was of great benefit, it is my recommendation that for future operations of this nature, a truly “joint” planning team be formed.... By not integrating our two planning teams, the JTF ended up essentially one planning cycle behind the RCMP. The RCMP planners would develop their plan, making a number of assumptions as to the support available from the CF and its capabilities, then upon completion of that planning cycle, they would “task” the CF for the already integrated support required. JTF planners would then have to begin their planning cycle, seeking authority to employ the assets requested by the RCMP, re-aligning assets where required to better match capabilities to tasks.... A truly joint planning team, fully integrated from its inception, would eliminate this “planning lag”....We expended a great deal of time and effort by not integrating these teams fully....23
Although the RCMP Post-Operation Report does not make a formal recommendation for a Joint Planning Team, it does quote Chief Superintendent Hickman as stating: “They’re [CF] very good planners and I think that we can learn a lot from them.”24 Superintendent Boyd went on to say: “They’re [CF] outstanding, they’re extremely cooperative and professional and the planning methods are something to behold. We could learn a lot from the way they do business.”25 As well, Chief Superintendent Hickman expressed concern that the RCMP Post-Operation Report did not have an explicit recommendation for a Joint Planning Team, as he was “adamant that joint planning was absolutely essential”26 for future operations that involve the CF in the security apparatus to the same degree as the G8 Summit. Brigadier-General Fenton was just as emphatic in his recommendation for joint planning between the RCMP and the CF, but cautioned CF planners to remember that “the although the CF needs to be part of the Joint Planning Team, it is not an equal partner in security planning — the RCMP/SOLGEN remains the lead agency.”27
Finally, although the focus has been on some of the difficulties in joint planning between the JTF and the RCMP, it should be highlighted that the joint planning between the JTF and the SMO was judged to be very effective. John Klassen, Executive Director of the SMO, attributed this to not only the SMO-led Joint Planning Groups, but also to the fact that CF personnel were actually seconded to the SMO to work in some of the functional areas where there was to be significant CF support, such as communications and movement control. These personnel were in fact embedded in the SMO organization and are not to be confused with the two JTF Liaison Officers sent to the SMO.28
Unified Command and Control
Despite the integration of significant CF assets into the overall Summit security plan, the RCMP and the JTF Headquarters were not co-located at the Unified Command Centre. Brigadier-General Fenton clearly felt that this was significant:
Since we are usually in support of the RCMP... in matters of security, we need to insist on a unified command structure and location. This issue was raised early in the planning process but the RCMP could not find a building with the space capacity required to accommodate us and we ended up in different locations depending, once again, on Liaison Officers. Separate HQs unnecessarily complicates coordination, direction and control.29
This position was supported by the DCDS staff who commented that, “a co-located HQ would be indeed desirable in a Domestic Operation to facilitate coordination and crisis management. The fact that it was not possible for this operation should not prevent us from considering the issue for the next such operation.”30
Perhaps most importantly, the RCMP’s afteraction report also identified this as something to strive for in the future:
If anything was learned in this process it was the need for as much integration as possible.... It would have been advantageous to have all managers located in the same facility....This is regarded from the OIC’s [Chief Superintendent Hickman’s] perspective, as absolutely essential in any future endeavour. Such a facility should also be designed to include the Department of National Defence; the degree of their participation and their importance to the success of the mission was not anticipated at the outset of planning.31
Another challenge for the overall unity of command of the Summit was the different command and control philosophies of the JTF and the RCMP. The RCMP philosophy was very much driven by the ‘Incident Commander’ approach to security operations. As a result, Chief Superintendent Hickman, who was clearly the ‘Commander’ (in CF terminology) throughout the planning and preparations, had a different relationship with the Unified Command Centre during the actual conduct of the Summit than did General Fenton with his JTF Headquarters. During the Summit itself, Superintendent Boyd and Inspector Gray — the day and night Incident Commanders at the UCC — were essentially ‘Commanders’ in terms of their authority to make decisions in responding to foreseen and unforeseen security incidents. They were far more empowered than a ‘Chief of Staff’. This only became an issue when it was suggested that the ‘Troika’ of Klassen/Hickman/Fenton should stick together (which meant in the Kananaskis Valley) during the Summit itself, in order to be able to advise each other should a Summit altering (or ending) decision have to be made.
While this may have seemed reasonable at first glance, once it became clear that the security decisions — and potential requests for JTF assistance — were going to be made at the UCC and probably without reference to Chief Superintendent Hickman, it caused a dilemma for General Fenton who needed to be able to co-locate from time to time with the Incident Commander at the UCC in Calgary. In CF terminology, when Chief Superintendent Hickman was away from the UCC it was not in the role of a ‘Commander’s Tactical Headquarters.’ He had (from the JTF viewpoint) essentially established another level of Command above the Commanders at the UCC. However, it should be pointed out that, while this issue was a concern for the JTF Headquarters, it was not seen as an issue of concern for either the SMO or the RCMP.32 In the end, there were no direct problems as a result of the different approaches, but it must be remembered that the structures were not truly tested by a significant security event. Notwithstanding, given the RCMP/SOLGEN lead in domestic and Homeland Security operations, it is the CF, and future JTFs, that should be prepared to adjust their command and control structures if necessary to remain in synchronization with the lead agency.
In an ideal world, the structures and interagency procedures will be perfectly sound, efficient, well understood and operationally effective. However, this will not always be the case; they were not perfect for the G8 Summit. Fortunately, where there were problems, the spirit of mutual respect, trust, and even camaraderie that evolved between the players at all levels of the agencies involved in the Summit, tended to facilitate solutions.
Interviews with the three principals — John Klassen, Chief Superintendent Hickman and Brigadier-General Fenton — affirmed the importance of their close and frank relationships to the operation. John Klassen summarized their almost identical views, stating that “good interpersonal relations can make up for deficiencies or difficulties in the structure and organization” and that he was “confident throughout that there was no serious operational problem that could not be overcome” by the three of them getting together.”33
Unquestionably, the G8 Summit was a highly successful operation from virtually every perspective, including that of interagency cooperation. However, there were a number of valuable lessons learned or reinforced that need to be formally embraced well before planning for another such operation begins — and without doubt there will be other such operations with similar security challenges. The requirement for a National Command Authority (delegated or otherwise) to be well briefed, rehearsed and competent in making the difficult but timely decisions required in the full range of terrorist scenarios is of paramount importance. The more formal and less ad hoc this process is, the better.
The security environment has changed, and for the foreseeable future the CF, the RCMP and other agencies will be working together more often than ever. Regardless of how important and advantageous good interpersonal relations are between the key players and their staffs, the request and approval procedures for providing support need to be streamlined even more with respect to domestic and, most especially, Homeland Security operations. Where there is a significant contribution from another agency or agencies, there must be Joint Planning, while still respecting the principle of ‘lead agency.’
For security operations, the key agencies must have meaningful command and control elements co-located in a truly Unified Command Centre. Ideally these three process-related lessons learned should be formally embedded in a new MOU between the Solicitor General and DND, stipulating that for Homeland Security operations there will be Joint Planning Teams and colocated command and control elements. This MOU must be broad with regard to the type of support that the RCMP can expect to receive from the CF so as not to hamstring the operational level commanders in the CF and RCMP by detail. What the MOU should do in this regard, is to empower the operational level commanders to work out the details of equipment and capabilities needed to ensure the success of the overall mission — with reference to the strategic level headquarters (and their lawyers) only for the most sensitive issues. An MOU that covers these three areas would save a tremendous amount of time, energy and angst at the outset. In effect, it would form the basis for the development of more useful interagency standard operating procedures.
Not surprisingly, this notion of a broad MOU — covering the areas of joint planning, unified and co-located command and control structures, and, most importantly, empowering the interagency operational-level commanders to work out the details of the support to provide each other — resonated well with the three principals at Kananaskis.34
In 2010, Canada will next host the G8 Summit, as well as the Winter Olympics. Between now and then there will no doubt be several other high-profile international events in Canada that will also demand ‘post 9/11 security’ measures. Canada’s recent success in hosting the Kananaskis G8 Summit was due in no small part to the excellent interagency cooperation at all levels, but most especially between the Summit Management Office/ DFAIT, the RCMP/SOLGEN and the CF/DND. Reinforcement and, where necessary, implementation of the interagency lessons learned will ensure that the planning and conduct of future events like the G8 Summit and the Olympics is even more joint and operationally sound. Only then will “comprehensive civil military coordination and timely decision-making between the CF and Other Governmental Departments”35 be so embedded that it will not have to be considered a ‘strategic centre of gravity’.
Colonel David Barr is both the Project Director for Land Force Reserve Restructure in NDHQ and Director of Infantry. He was the Chief of Staff for the CF Joint Task Force “Grizzly” formed to support the G8 Summit in Kananaskis in June 2002.
- Land Force Western Area Headquarters. (Ops 174), Operation Order 002 — Op GRIZZLY. 22 May, 2002. pp. 1-2. Although quoted from the final version of the Op Order, BGen Fenton consistently stated this as his Strategic Centre of Gravity for the Planning and Preparation Phase as early as September, 2001.
- This expression was often used as the short explanation as to why the Canadian Forces had such a unique role to play in the security effort for the Kananaskis G8 Summit.
- The additional elements required from outside of SQFT were primarily Military Police.
- Ambassador Fowler (a former Deputy Minister of DND) was also the Prime Minister’s special representative charged with developing the G8 response to the African initiative known as NEPAD.
- RCMP. RCMP G8 Summit Security After Action Report. ca. Fall 2002. p.48. The UCC was the “supreme” headquarters for the G8 Security operation and included the Joint Intelligence Group. The JTF had two Liaison Officers (day and night shift) with this HQ.
- Land Force Western Area Headquarters. (Comd 032), JTF Op GRIZZLY Warning Order 001. 20 November, 2001. p.6.
- There was also a national level strategic reserve (an infantry battalion) that was co-located in the JTF Area of Operations that would have been “cut” to the JTF Comd had he required their assistance.
- Col C.S. Sullivan. “North American Homeland Defence Coalition.” Canadian Forces College, Advanced Military Studies Course 5, December, 2002. p.19.
- The diagram was designed by the author to show the interagency relationships. The CF portion of the diagram differs somewhat from the diagram portrayed in: DCDS Staff. National Defence Headquarters, Annex A, 3453-31/GRIZZLY (J7 Lessons Learned), Operation GRIZZLY Lessons Learned — Staff Action Directive (LLSAD). 22 November, 2002. p.A7.
- Maj D. Senft, J5 Plans. Joint Task Force HQ. Land Force Western Area, 7370-1 (J5 Plans), J5 Plans Post Operation Report — Op GRIZZLY — CF Support to G8 Summit. 5 August, 2002. p.2.
- Chief Superintendent (Ret’d) Lloyd Hickman. Telephone Interview. 6 June, 2003.
- RCMP. RCMP G8 Summit Security After Action Report. ca. Fall 2002. p.103.
- BGen J.I. Fenton, Comd Joint Task Force GRIZZLY. Land Forces Western Area, 3301-7 (Op Grizzly), Post Operation Report — Operation GRIZZLY (Executive Summary). 28 August, 2002. p.4. The report goes so far as to say that “while there [were] good reasons why we experienced a change in our ROEs, the resulting delay in their authorization by NDHQ was unacceptable.” In fact the JTF had to begin deployment without all aspects of the ROE having been approved.
- This assessment applies only to Calgary/ Kananaskis. There were significant, but peaceful demonstrations in Ottawa, and in the lead up to the G8, the potential for demonstrations in Ottawa and other major cities was a cause of great concern at the national level.
- RCMP. RCMP G8 Summit Security After Action Report. ca. Fall 2002. p.1.
- The third incursion was by a small plane that did appear to be heading in the general direction of the G8 site. Initial attempts to communicate with the pilot were unsuccessful, and it did take visual contact with a CF-18 to make the hapless pilot and his wife all too suddenly aware that they were in a place that they best leave in a hurry — which they proceeded to do.
- RCMP. RCMP G8 Summit Security After Action Report. ca. Fall 2002. p. 8.
- Col C.S. Sullivan. “Canada’s National Command Authority.” Canadian Forces College, National Security Studies Course 5, April, 2003. p.16.
- BGen J.I. Fenton, Comd Joint Task Force GRIZZLY. Land Forces Western Area, 3301-7 (Op Grizzly), Post Operation Report — Operation GRIZZLY (Executive Summary). 28 August, 2002. p.1.
- For the purposes of this paper, “Joint” refers to interagency activities, i.e. RCMP/CF planning.
- RCMP. RCMP G8 Summit Security After Action Report. ca. Fall 2002. p. 99.
- RCMP. RCMP G8 Summit Security After Action Report. ca. Fall 2002. p. 99-100.
- 23. Maj D. Senft, J5 Plans. Joint Task Force HQ. Land Force Western Area, 7370-1 (J5 Plans), J5 Plans Post Operation Report — Op GRIZZLY — CF Support to G8 Summit. 5 August, 2002. p.2-3.
- RCMP. RCMP G8 Summit Security After Action Report. ca. Fall 2002. p. 102.
- Chief Superintendent (Ret’d) Lloyd Hickman. Telephone Interview. 6 June, 2003. He reiteraated that, in his view, the main reason that there had not been a Joint Planning Team from the outset was due to the initial RCMP understanding of a much smaller security role for the CF on the ground than what actually transpired as a result of the “major shift” in the tasks for the CF that occurred in April.
- BGen Ivan Fenton. Telephone Interview. 5 June, 2003.
- John Klassen. Telephone Interview. 5 June, 2003.
- BGen J.I Fenton, Comd Joint Task Force GRIZZLY. Land Forces Western Area, 3301-7 (Op Grizzly), Post Operation Report — Operation GRIZZLY (Executive Summary). 28 August, 2002. p.3.
- DCDS Staff. National Defence Headquarters, Observations on Executive Summary Post Operation Report — Comd JTF Grizzly. Fall, 2002. p. 2.
- RCMP. RCMP G8 Summit Security After Action Report. ca. Fall 2002. p. 101.
- Interviews with John Klassen and C/Supt Hickman confirm their comfort with the Command and Control during the Summit itself.
- John Klassen. Telephone Interview. 5 June, 2003.
- All three supported this notion of a new MOU during the interviews of 5 and 6 June, 2003. BGen Fenton saw its value as a “default setting, from which to start the conversation” at the start of the operation.
- BGen Fenton’s slightly paraphrased Strategic Centre of Gravity as cited in Land Force Western Area Headquarters (Ops 174) Operation Order 002 — Op GRIZZLY. 22 May, 2002. pp. 1-2.