WarningThis information has been archived for reference or research purposes.

Archived Content

Information identified as archived on the Web is for reference, research or recordkeeping purposes. It has not been altered or updated after the date of archiving. Web pages that are archived on the Web are not subject to the Government of Canada Web Standards. As per the Communications Policy of the Government of Canada, you can request alternate formats on the "Contact Us" page.


HMCS Regina

Canadian Forces Combat Camera photo IS2003-2219a by Sergeant Frank Hudec

HMCS Regina loads supplies while at sea in the Gulf of Oman during Operation Apollo, April 2003.

Assistance From Ashore: The Evolution of Naval Logistics Sites From The Korean War to Operation ‘Apollo’

by Commander Mark Watson

Print PDF

For more information on accessing this file, please visit our help page.

Without supplies neither a general nor a soldier is good for anything.

Clearchus of Sparta in a speech to the
Greek Army in Asia Minor, 401 BC

While the words spoken by Clearchus were aimed primarily at soldiers, the importance put on stores can readily be applied to the naval environment. Supplies are indeed only one component of the vital resources needed by ships in a modern environment, as engineering maintenance and a host of other logistics and administrative aspects are also essential. To facilitate these activities, dedicated naval logisticians have been deployed by the Canadian Navy to enhance the efficiency of support to deployed ships since the Korean War, and this has become an important ingredient of naval operations. Although such a capability provides obvious advantages, it was not a concept always fully embraced.

Warships are extremely complex vessels that are often required to operate for long periods of time away from their home ports. They are often referred to as “self-supporting units”, since each carries sufficient amounts of rations, ammunition, fuel and stores to sustain itself for the initial part of any deployment. But, the term ‘self-sufficiency’ is misleading, because when a ship deploys for extended periods of time, it no longer simply relies on the materiel it sailed with because the rate of consumption over time, quite obviously, outstrips what a ship can carry. Warships require land-based logistical support to ensure they receive the materiel and care they need. For the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN), in the past such support was provided by our two naval bases in Halifax and Esquimalt, or, during the Second World War, by naval facilities in St. John’s, Newfoundland and several British ports. In all of those locations, the infrastructure to support warships already existed, and support was readily available from either RCN or Royal Navy (RN) resources. There were no language barriers or currency problems. And the logistics problems resulting from a ship’s basic engineering and weapon systems (or food requirements for that matter) were relatively routine, and were taken care of by large numbers of naval officers and ratings from the Supply, Electrical or Engineering Branches. However, after the Second World War, this environment changed for the RCN.

By 1950, Canada possessed the largest peacetime Navy it ever had. Its ships were modern, and therefore required a far wider array of stores and parts to ensure the ships’ complex advanced weapon and engineering equipment functioned effectively, and also to ensure that the quality of life now demanded by its sailors was met. To ensure such efficiencies and standards, new naval supply procedures were adopted from the United States Navy (USN) to improve overall efficiency in the RCN’s system, while warehouses of stores and ration depots were either under consideration or construction. This ready availability of items ensured that ships could be ‘topped up’ with necessary commodities without having to go through any lengthy and bureaucratic tendering process. More importantly, it permitted the fleet to sail at short notice if need be.

While such initiatives greatly enhanced the RCN’s logistical capabilities, no consideration was given to supporting ships outside their traditional operating area where they would not have ready access to naval facilities or commercial markets for local purchases. This lack of planning may have been because Canada’s obligations under NATO focused the RCN’s attention on the North Atlantic. The needs differed during the Korean War when, for the first time, Canada was called upon to support warships for prolonged periods of time in waters totally foreign to their normal operations.1 To overcome the many logistical challenges that these ships faced, the RCN established its first deployed support unit, known today as a “logistic site.” Here, a small group of officers and ratings was employed ashore to assist ships in a wide range of roles. The original function overseen by this small unit dealt largely with controlling supplies and arranging food deliveries to the deployed ships. However, over time and with changing maritime and global conditions, subsequent units’ mandates have expanded to include liaison with local military and government authorities, coordination of financial arrangements, overseeing major engineering repairs, and even guaranteeing port protection. Indeed, the personnel assigned to these temporary units have carried out a variety of logistics, financial, security and engineering roles, often outside an individual’s training specifications.

Sasebo, Japan

RCN Photo

The harbour at Sasebo, Japan, used by the Royal Canadian Navy as a supply base during the Korean War.

These demanding jobs routinely required sailors and naval officers to work in relative isolation from other naval units, so the people who manned these logistics sites have often been overlooked. This is probably in large part because of the small size of the sites, and the fact that the activities performed may have seemed more mundane than the highly-charged actions of those engaging the enemy. But, these logistic sites performed an essential naval role in ensuring that Canadian ships and crews were taken care of when deployed. The evolution of the logistics site concept from the Korean War to the present War Against Terrorism (known in military parlance as Operation “Apollo”) clearly indicates that shore-based support units working in a theatre of operations have become an essential component of modern naval operations.

Top of Page

The Korean War

In June 1950, North Korean troops crossed into the South. Quickly identifying the aggression as a threat to world security, the United Nations Security Council (in the absence of the Soviet ambassador) passed resolutions condemning the attack and calling on member states to assist the United States in repelling the Communist attack. Canada’s response to the UN call was to dispatch three destroyers of the West Coast Fleet. Since the RCN had very limited experience in the Far East, this meant that when His Majesty’s Canadian (HMC) Ships Athabaskan, Cayuga, and Sioux – half of all commissioned destroyers then in service – sailed from Victoria on 5 July 1950, specific policies and procedures for their replenishment had not yet been developed.

Unlike the American, British and even the Australian navies, the RCN had no naval establishment in the region. As a result, it was only when the ships arrived in Pearl Harbor that the small armada learned for the first time that their supply arrangements would be on a “repayment basis.” Besides the monetary implications, it meant that the ships would have to “draw supplies from US sources, other than items peculiar to RCN, for which arrangement will be made to have them shipped via US transport.”2 Without any independent source of replenishment, the Canadians were to “rely on the United States Navy and the Royal Navy for all base facilities and virtually all supply.”3 Being completely dependent on other nations for support meant that the RCN was not fully autonomous in its capabilities. Even though the Canadian government historically had gone to great pains to keep Army units under Canadian command and control, it appeared to have no such reservations about allowing Canadian ships to rely on the American and British for their logistics lifeline during the Korean conflict. All too soon, the difficulties associated with such an arrangement became apparent as the bureaucratic processes associated with procuring needed material and food from the dominant force in theatre, the USN, were encountered.

For most of the Korean conflict, Canadian ships operated chiefly out of the Japanese port of Sasebo (a port five miles long). Here, HMC Ships received their stores from dedicated American supply and victualling ships that were anchored throughout the harbour. This procedure was termed “afloat supply”, a concept based on the reasoning that ships in port could quickly lift anchor and move anywhere in Korean waters, en masse, to meet the changing situation on land or at sea.4 In reality, it meant that a ship’s Supply Officer first had to go to the senior ship of the American Service Squadron to have his demands screened and authorized. The Canadian ship then had to go from supply ship to supply ship to pick up its stores and food. This procedure was a complicated and time-consuming evolution that took an average of 72 hours to complete. Moreover, HMC Ships were given access to materiel only after all USN requirements were met.5 Lieutenant-Commander (S) Mel Adamic, a Supply Officer, described the procedure6:

Demands were prepared on USN forms and approved by their Senior Supply Officer who was borne afloat. An indication was given at this point where the supplies might be available from the Stores Ships in the harbour. For example, ... refrigerated frozen provisions would be obtained from the USS Marapi, dry provisions from another ship, naval stores from USS Pollux, bread and milk ... and canteen stores ashore. It was then necessary to proceed to the various supply ships, leave the demands, and get an allocation of time according to the work schedule of that particular ship. No near misses were permitted as each ship ran a very tight schedule. The supply of stores was therefore completely dependent on boats, and these were scarce. The quantity of stores required during the short stays in harbour between patrols could not possibly be carried by the ship’s boats. Unfortunately, Sioux was usually competing for the allocation of boats and times with such mighty giants as the USS Philippine Sea or the USS Missouri and as a result night storing became a fairly common occurrence.7

Having a Canadian representative ashore in Sasebo to make the necessary arrangements with the American authorities and thus expedite the entire supply process would have been of great benefit in the early stages of the Korean conflict. Unfortunately, dedicated Canadian shore-based support was non-existent when the first ships arrived and, despite the apparent benefits of such an idea, it does not even appear to have been given consideration in the Canadian planning process.

Finally, however, in April 1951, Commander (S) R.G. Harris, the Inspector of Supply and Fleet Accounting in Esquimalt, was sent to Sasebo to determine how support to Canadian ships could be improved. His recommendation – that an RCN Depot ship be established with one Supply Officer and two Supply Petty Officers – was turned down. No reason was ever given. In September 1951, Commander D. Plomer, the Commanding Officer of HMCS Cayuga, again recommended to the Flag Officer Pacific Coast that a Supply Officer be stationed at Sasebo to oversee the Canadian Navy’s logistics requirements, but no action was taken. Consequently, in January 1952, Commander Plomer recommended that Lieutenant (SB) R.A.V. Jenkins, who was the RCN’s Information Officer in Sasebo, have his tour extended and that he take over liaison and logistic duties ashore.8 This change meant that no additional officer would be needed, thus making the plan easier to implement. But, Lieutenant (SB) Jenkins was a public relations officer. He knew little of how the US Supply System worked, and therefore was only of limited assistance to the Canadian supply officers who needed someone to oversee requisitioning and procurement, and to serve as a co-ordinator for personnel transferring into and out of theatre.9

On 27 February 1952, Lieutenant R.P. Morris of Cayuga, was appointed as Canadian Naval Liaison Officer in the Far East, to be assisted by Lieutenant (SB) Jenkins. Lieutenant Morris was soon replaced on 1 April 1952, by Lieutenant-Commander (S) Peter Cossette, who arrived from Canada to assume the full-time duties as the Naval Liaison Officer. A dedicated and skilled Supply Officer, Lieutenant-Commander (S) Cossette was able to solve most of the RCN’s supply problems and act as a point of contact for ships when they were at sea. To assist him, the RCN also dispatched Victualling Petty Officer Bob Fenlon, and hired six Japanese civilians to do most of the manual work.

Lieutenant-Commander (S) Cossette served as the Canadian Liaison Officer until 4 November 1952, when he was relieved by Lieutenant-Commander (S) E. Adamic. Lieutenant-Commander (S) B.E. Smith, in turn, replaced him a year later on 23 November 1953. Smith closed out the shore establishment, and the Liaison Office ceased to exist on 28 January 1955. During their tours of duty, the Naval Liaison Officers performed excellent service for the fleet, often alleviating many supply problems between the ships and ashore establishments.

Top of Page

Three Navy members

RCN Photo

Victualling Petty Officer Bob Fenlon, Lieutenant-Commander (S) Peter Cossette and Lieutenant-Commander (S) Mel Adamic at the Canadian Naval Liaison Office layapart stores in Sasebo, Japan, 1952.

Among the benefits of having a Canadian naval logistics team working ashore was that they acquired a building from the US Army for use as a warehouse. This permitted ships to offload stores and equipment for which they had neither an immediate requirement nor stowage space, such as replacement gun barrels, winter clothing during the summer, or canteen supplies. The ships thus gained space to carry more urgently needed items. Furthermore, the Naval Liaison Office organization did much more than logistics-related work; they were made responsible for any matters that the ship could not, or did not want to carry out for itself. Thus, members of the Naval Liaison Office, among other things, escorted sailors to Army Detention Barracks, arranged for rest and relaxation parties for sailors in Sasebo, assisted in protocol visits, and even oversaw the return to Canada of naval casualties, including the supervision of embalming crew members from HMCS Iroquois who had died from enemy fire in 1952. While such tasks may seem like minor administrative functions, they can be major problems for the captain of a ship. Thus, the Naval Liaison Office alleviated many logistical and administrative problems. According to Lieutenant (S) Bill Davis, the Supply Officer of Cayuga, the liaison staff eliminated many of the problems that might be encountered while deployed, and made “life almost like home.”10

After the Korean War, and for the next forty years, the RCN did not have to face a situation where naval assets were deployed for sustained periods away from home ports, and it is thus understandable that not much attention was given to RCN logistics sites. As most of the effort off Canada’s East Coast was centred on NATO exercises and operations, HMC Ships simply reverted to operating in waters they knew, and where sources of support were readily at hand. And, as even NATO doctrine did not originally envision the need for deployed logistics units, there was no need for Canada to accommodate such a concept. When ships did visit foreign ports out of this region, they did so only for short periods of time and therefore did not need dedicated support. The only exception to this custom was in the Caribbean where, reinforcing pre-war practice, HMC Ships regularly exercised for months at a time. While ships sailing out of Bermuda for exercises could rely on the Canadian base situated there for support, as soon as the fleet progressed further south it became apparent that the temporary employment of support teams made up of two or three persons could greatly assist the ships. By the 1970s, officers and sailors were often deployed to Puerto Rico for the duration of an exercise where they could attend to the many supply and financial services issues that developed while ships were operating in adjacent waters. Moreover, having an official contact in the area ensured that personnel arriving and leaving the theatre were taken care of far more efficiently than leaving them to fend for themselves. Finally, by having people ashore, the Supply and Engineering Officers (as well as their departments) could concentrate on the day-to-day activities of the ship at sea, similar to what had taken place in the Korean War. Thus the temporary deployment of logistics support personnel continued on an ad hoc basis whenever the need arose, and this formed the basis for a much larger and more important deployment.

War in the Persian Gulf

In early August 1990, the Gulf War erupted after the Iraqi Army crossed into the Emirate of Kuwait in an invasion reminiscent of that nearly forty years earlier when North Korea invaded South Korea. Again, as happened in the Korean conflict, the United States promised to help the Kuwaitis regain their freedom, and soon set about creating a coalition force to do so. The first task was the establishment of a naval blockade in the Persian Gulf. The Americans solicited support from a number of countries, and the Canadian government was one of the first to back the American initiative with a visible military contribution: within a week of the UN’s condemnation of the invasion, Canada made a commitment to send three warships to the region “to deter further Iraqi aggression.”11

In many ways the Canadian response mirrored the contribution made in the Korean conflict. Interestingly, in 1950, the RCN was the first Canadian service into the Korean Theatre because it could be despatched quickly (a clear benefit of having good logistics) to provide a visible sign of Canada’s commitment to the international force. In 1990, a naval task force was again the first deployed because it was the most readily available asset at the government’s disposal. Fortunately, logistics took on a much different, and, more important, role. Even before the official decision was made to send a naval task group to the Middle East for this conflict, Canadian naval logisticians were at work.12 This was essential because the Persian Gulf was a region where the Canadian Navy had little or no experience. Since the theatre of war was over 13,000 km from Halifax, and with no allied bases nearby, there was no doubt that there would be unique support requirements when the ships arrived. Accordingly, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics at Maritime Command Headquarters, Captain (N) Greg Jarvis (now Vice-Admiral), made arrangements to send a logistics team to the operating area.

Commander [now Captain (N)] Dave Banks, the designated Detachment Commander, conducted a reconnaissance of the intended area of operation and soon after he made his report a 16-member team was sent to Manama, in Bahrain. This team was made up of classifications and trades from across the naval spectrum, with a variety of skill and experience, so it was able to put in place most of the logistics arrangements before the naval task group arrived. Over time, the size and composition of the force was adjusted to reflect the evolving needs of the Canadian ships and personnel in-theatre, and the force became known as the Canadian Maritime Logistics Detachment (CANMARLOGDET).

Top of Page

Forty years after the Korean War, the logistics requirements of Canadian warships had changed dramatically. While the Logistics Detachment’s principal task continued to be receiving supplies (they were the first point of contact in-theatre for ships requesting spares, supplies and other consumables), it also had a host of other responsibilities spanning the range of engineering, administrative and logistics functions, including:

  • Assisting in the redesign of missile-launching systems;

  • Coordinating the movement of contracted sea containers;

  • Establishing financial and supply contracts;

  • Providing support to transiting CF aircraft;

  • Arranging for the arrival and departure of CF personnel;

  • Coordinating medical support when necessary;

  • Liaison with support staffs of allied navies; and,

  • Coordinating recreational activities for ships’ crews.

In the end, the Canadian Maritime Logistics Detachment proved to be a vital element in the Canadian war effort. Lieutenant-Commander Gourlay-Langlois, the Supply Officer in HMCS Protecteur, commented on the detachment’s importance:

Commander Dave Banks and his merry crew were of great assistance to all the ships.... It was handy to have someone make logistics arrangements on your behalf and meet you with the spares, mail, food from home and contractors as time was short in port. Two services they offered I consider were vitally important. One was the time and effort they took to redirect supplies, mail, etc. in theatre to meet us at whatever port it was decided that we would be going into. The other was the engineering arrangements that were put in place between port visits to perform repairs. If not for that we would have had to leave folks behind in port to make these arrangements.13

Organization chart

This strong emphasis on logistics in the Gulf War was much different than happened at the time of the war in Korea, where it took a back seat in planning and many months passed before a small, dedicated logistics cell was established. In the Gulf War, logistics was given high visibility and adequate resources at the outset, essential because logistics was (and still is) a national responsibility. This concept was reenforced by Captain (N) Jarvis when he explained that the “Americans made it very clear that their logistics train was first and foremost to resupply and support the deployed American forces. And while the US military was very good in allowing the Allies to use excess capacity, there were no guarantees.”14 Thus, the ability for Canada to control its own re-supply line was critical to a successful operation, and the Canadian naval personnel ashore played a key role.

HMCS Cayuga

RCN Photo

HMCS Cayuga undergoing a refit in Sasebo harbour during the Korean War.

As a result of the success achieved by the Maritime Logistics Detachment, the entire process was repeated when HMCS Huron was committed to Operation “Flag”, which continued the Canadian presence in the Persian Gulf following the end of the war. During this period, a much smaller detachment operated under Commander [now Captain (N)] Roger MacIsaac to lend a hand to this ship’s requirements. Following this positive experience, with the increased number and scope of commitments to peace support operations, deployed logistic units were now to be routinely authorized to assist HMC Ships in carrying out their missions.

Top of Page

Operations in the Adriatic

In subsequent years, the establishment of an ashore logistics detachment continued in operational areas where the Canadian Navy had limited experience. The most notable example of this took place on Europe’s own back door, when the federal state of Yugoslavia began to disintegrate. The resulting civil war, in large measure instigated by Serbia, threatened the stability of the whole of south-eastern Europe. Therefore, in an attempt to enforce a UN arms embargo against all republics of the former Yugoslavia and thus limit the extent of hostilities in the Balkans, NATO and the Western European Union (WEU) set up a naval blockade in November 1992. In June 1993, this came to be known as Operation “Sharp Guard”. Ships of the Standing Naval Force Atlantic (STANAVFORLANT) and the Standing Naval Force Mediterranean (STANAVFORMED), quickly established a rotating duty in the Adriatic Sea. Having a ship as part of STANAVFORLANT meant that Canada immediately took up station to enforce the embargo. The Adriatic was an area where the Navy had little experience (STANAVFORLANT ships had traditionally sailed in the North Atlantic), so it was decided to send a single man, Chief Petty Officer 2 Lew Bickford (a naval Supply Technician), to Italy to support the Canadian ship in the receipt and dispatch of personnel, mail and cargo.

Unloading supplies

Author’s collection

Lieutenant (N) Bob MacGregor helping to unload a C-130 Hercules at the NATO Forward Logistics Site in Grottaglie, Italy during Operation “Sharp Guard”.

However, as this was the first time NATO had actually deployed naval forces into an operational theatre, and, as many other countries were also establishing small support units ashore, the participating nations decided to organize a multi-national naval logistics operation. The ability of the Allies to co-operate in maritime logistical arrangements provided several benefits. First, it allowed operational groups of ships to streamline their support structures and lines of communication, a necessity in this technological age. Second, at a time when NATO was trying to remould itself after the Cold War, it ensured that NATO’s multinational forces would have the requisite degree of support to operate with flexibility in a wide range of operational environments. And finally, the better use of scarce resources permitted economies of scale and reduced operating costs. In summary, the goal became group or force sustainability through a sharing of resources and skills.

In 1993, because of the extensive naval activity in the Adriatic Sea, it was decided to set up a NATO Forward Logistics Site for Operation “Sharp Guard”. Canada quickly decided to participate, and ceased its single-man operation. The NATO Forward Logistics Site was established in Grottaglie, a small Italian naval air station near Taranto in southern Italy. This site, chosen more for political than for strategic reasons, was far from ideal. Located a half-hour away from the commercial seaport in Brindisi, direct sea support was possible, but difficult. But, Grottaglie’s location far inland meant that helicopter crews were reluctant to sling dangerous cargo out to sea for fear that the load might inadvertently drop over a populated area. Despite its shortfalls, when the Forward Logistics Site was formally ‘stood up’ in December 1993, Canada played a major role in its operations, providing the administrative Chief Petty Officer and a naval Lieutenant who acted as the unit’s logistics officer. Headed by an Italian naval Captain, the participating nations included France, Greece, Italy, the United States, the United Kingdom and Germany. An old hangar at the naval air station offered a consolidating point for incoming materiel, while participating countries offered helicopter support on a rotational basis to ferry out passengers, mail and cargo. Over the next four years, a number of Canadians served at this site on a six-month rotational basis.15 The NATO Forward Logistics Site was deemed a success, and the experience gained there helped form the basis for NATO’s policy of cooperative naval logistics systems.

In following years, the Forward Logistics Site concept would become a regular feature in Canadian naval planning. In Somalia and East Timor, for example, small teams of between two and six people were set up to ensure that whatever logistical or liaison assistance was needed was provided to Canadian ships. Often these teams were the first Canadians in theatre, and they greatly facilitated the arrival of other Canadian units. Furthermore, once larger National Support Units (NSU) were set up to oversee all national support requirements (this was done when there were Army and/or Air Force involved in the mission), the small naval support teams were absorbed into the larger units. By year 2000, the concept of the Forward Logistics Site had become so ingrained in naval thinking that when Canada decided to dispatch nearly half of its surface fleet to the Arabian Sea in support of the United States-led War on Terrorism in 2002, one of the first initiatives was to set up a logistics support cell, led by Lieutenant-Commander Mark White.

While in years past ships may have been the main targets in war, in today’s environment of terrorism it is now the logistics sites that have become the most vulnerable to attack. Hence, the logistics team members supporting operations in the Arabian Gulf wear civilians clothes instead of uniforms so as to conceal their identity and the nature of their work. This fear of terrorism has resulted in the Forward Logistics Site expanding its role beyond the traditional logistics and engineering. As a result of the threat of attacks against ships while in harbour (as demonstrated by the attack on USS Cole in Aden), the Forward Logistics Site is now also responsible for force protection when ships visit foreign ports. The unit thus includes military police, who ensure that when a Canadian warship docks in an Arab country it is provided the best possible security.

Forward Logistic Sites have become an integral part of deployed naval logistics in Canadian and Allied navies. While Canada’s first foray into this field over fifty years ago involved only a minimal number of personnel, and concentrated mostly on stores and administration, today’s Forward Logistics Site teams fulfill a vast array of roles that range from overseeing logistics to arranging diplomatic clearances to administrating engineering repairs. And, depending on the operation, they may even be international in composition. For the deployed ships, the Forward Logistics Site provides liaison with shore establishments in the host nation and communications back to Canada. The men and women who now man a Forward Logistics Site when the Canadian Navy deploys a ship or task force are following in the footsteps of the Canadian Naval Liaison team in Korea. Today, just as then, these dedicated officers and sailors ensure that HMC ships are always capable of fulfilling the Canadian Navy’s motto of being Ready Aye Ready.

HMCS Winnipeg

DND Photo IS2002-1736a by Master Corporal Brian Walsh

Members of the crew of HMCS Winnipeg turn to storing ship during a lull in operations in the Arabian Sea, November 2002.

CMJ Logo

Commander Mark Watson is Formation Administrative Officer at CFB Halifax. His book, Sea Logistics: Keeping the Navy Ready Aye Ready, was recently published.


  1. Although several warships had served in the Pacific’s Far East, namely the Prince Robert and Uganda in the Second World War, and the Cayuga in 1949 (during the Communist takeover in China), these deployments were of a short duration and relied almost exclusively on British support throughout their missions.
  2. T. Thorgrimsson and E.C. Russell, Canadian Naval Operations in Korean Waters 1950-55 (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1965), p. 4.
  3. Thorgrimsson and Russell, p. 135.
  4. Second Amendment to Specimen Supply Officer’s Standing Order for an HMC Destroyer, 1 September 1951, p. 134.
  5. Ibid., p. 137.
  6. The (S) behind a rank indicated the officer was a member of the Supply Branch. This identifier was a part of the RCN rank structure until 1959.
  7. Lieutenant-Commander (S) M.E. Adamic, “Sioux’s Korean War,” Supply Mercury, Vol. 2 No. 1 (June 1951), p. 19.
  8. SB stood for Special Branch and included such classifications as Intelligence Officers, Bandsmen and Public Affairs Officers.
  9. For more information see Thorgrimsson and Russell, p. 4.
  10. Interview with Tom Treherne and Bill Davis, 9 August 2000.
  11. Major Jean Morin and Lieutenant- Commander R.H. Gimblett, Operation Friction 1990-1991 (Toronto; Dundurn Press, 1997), p. 30.
  12. Up to 1988, the Navy had focused on the Cold War and the potential threat from “across the pond” with very much of a tunnel vision aimed at supporting Task Groups operating out of the Northern Atlantic and the Mediterranean Sea against a Soviet threat of one form or another. Although various relief actions had occurred involving naval assets, supply philosophy had centred on the Cold War so when civil unrest in Haiti began capturing the attention of Canada’s political leaders in late 1987, the decision was made to send a Task Group into the Caribbean for a potentially significant military action. Notwithstanding the fact that physical confrontation did not occur, pre-deployment planning this action (Operation “Bandit”) was a significant departure from standard Atlantic Task Group operations and forced many to ‘think outside the box.’ Although many differences existed between Operation “Bandit” and Operation “Friction”, they were very similar at the pre-deployment stages and many of the lessons learned in Operation “Bandit” were subsequently applied as Canada’s Navy prepared to depart for the Persian Gulf. Information from Bill Gregory, 4 February 2002.
  13. E-mail Anne Gourlay-Langlois, 10 August 2000.
  14. Interview Greg Jarvis and Richard Gimblett, 22 September 1992.
  15. Neither the Italians nor senior members of the other staffs thought that any country would use the facilities for the first month or two. Thus the Italians were caught off guard completely when Canada jumped wholeheartedly into the venture and transported tons of materiel to HMCS Iroquois in the first month of the unit’s operation.