

## MORE FIGHTING FOR CANADA: FIVE BATTLES, 1760-1944

Edited by Donald E. Graves

Toronto: Robin Brass Studio, 363 pages, \$27.95 (paperback)

Reviewed by Major James D. McKillip

**M**ore *Fighting for Canada* is the second collection of essays edited by Donald Graves. The book, published by Robin Brass, is aptly named because of its unapologetic focus on the tactical level of war, the actual fighting of battles. In a more or less direct challenge to the critics of the so-called “trumpet and drum” writing of history, Graves has set out his agenda very clearly. This is not soft social history; smoke fills the pages.

As in the original *Fighting for Canada*, Graves has selected a group of essays that cover a wide span Canadian military history. Beginning with the Battle of Sillery during the British conquest of New France, the five essays cover most of the key periods of major Canadian military activity. Also included are studies of Cut Knife Hill during the 1885 North West Rebellion, Paardeberg from the Boer War, the little-known 1918 battle of Iwuy during the First World War, and the Melfa Crossing from the Italian campaign during the Second World War.

All of these studies are tied together and given context through introductory sketches written by the editor. These reinforce the overall theme of the work and do an excellent job of reminding the reader of what that focus is. The book makes wide use of diagrams, drawings, paintings and photographs, some of which have not been published before. The maps, all drawn by Christopher Johnson, are first rate, and provide good support to the associated text.

In the first essay, Ian McCulloch makes the bold claim that the Battle of Sillery, not the more famous Battle of the Plains of Abraham, was the most significant action during the British assault on New France. This claim rests on the author’s assertion that the battle was “a bloodier, more bravely and skillfully-fought action than that of 13 September 1759.” While this assessment may not convince everyone, especially since a rather strong pro-French bias emerges from the text of this essay, the author does an excellent job of describing the men and weapons associated with the battle. More importantly, the author has done a thorough and meticulous job of piecing together the sequence of events of the action itself. This is the very stuff of tactical writing and is the greatest strength


of the book as a whole. Ironically, given the book’s overall focus on the tactical level of war, the strategically minded reader is likely to interpret the results of the battle as strong support to the notion of the supremacy of strategy over tactics. The contrast between the British being able to march out of their fortress, lose a battle and still win the war lies in sharp relief to the well-known consequences of the French decision to give battle on the Plains of Abraham.

Part of Robert Caldwell’s sub-title to his study of the 1885 Battle of Cut Knife Hill describes the work as “an inquiry into the events that occurred...” and this is precisely what he delivers. In what is probably the strongest, and longest, of the essays in *More Fighting for Canada*, Caldwell has painstakingly reconstructed the events of the battle and of the key events that led up to and followed it. He does not get drawn into the trap of telling us everything he knows, but concentrates on telling us what we need to know. This is just as well, because it is clear that the author has spent a great deal of time getting to know both the documentary evidence and the ground associated with this action. Although

no longer considered as fashionable in historical writing as it once was, Caldwell makes generous use of long direct quotations to support his narrative. This is very effective, especially since the author has spent a great deal of effort describing the battle from both the Canadian Militia and the Cree/Métis perspectives. Those unfamiliar with the 1885 campaign will probably be surprised by the scale and intensity of fighting as described by Caldwell. The text is supported by fine maps and diagrams that assist in explaining the battle, and the author has made generous use of previously unpublished photographs. This inquiry is essential reading for students of this period.

The piece on Paardeberg by Brian Reid is perhaps the most frustrating of the five essays in this book. While Reid

also does a good job of reconstructing the sequence of events of the battle, the text is somewhat marred by annoying errors of fact. For example, although Reid claims that the British, unlike the Boers, did not establish range markers for controlling their fire, this was a standard technique used rather famously, if not altogether successfully, at the Battle of Isandlwana two decades previously, and in the same African theatre of operations. Reid also suggests that the Boers were armed with a rifle that was superior to that carried by the British. While gun enthusiasts may prefer one of the rifles over the other, the ballistic and technical performance of these weapons was, for all practical purposes, identical. Furthermore, having introduced the notion of superior weaponry, there is no discussion in the ensuing pages of where this might have made a difference in the battle.



Still, Reid does probably the best job of bringing the ‘feel’ of the action into these studies. The taste of sweat joins the smell of smoke in this work.

Mike McNorgan’s analysis of the 1918 Battle of Iwuy is one of the most interesting and original of the essays in *More Fighting for Canada* by virtue of the fact that almost no one has ever heard of the action. Combining elements of all-arms fighting, the last Canadian cavalry charge, and the only engagement of Canadian troops with German tanks during the First World War, this is a singularly well-chosen battle study. In addition to a thorough reconstruction of the action from the Canadian perspective, McNorgan has done an impressive job of describing the events on the “other side of the hill” – the activities of the Germans. The technical drawings and organizational diagrams associated with this piece are well chosen to support the text and are not just extraneous ornamentation of the pages. This is a compelling read.

The final offering in *More Fighting for Canada* is John Grodzinski’s study of the Battle of the Melfa Crossing during the Italian campaign in the Second World War. Although the author might fairly be accused of writing Regimental history here – there’s more than a little glory for the Lord Strathcona’s Horse – Grodzinski has also done a good job of describing the battle in a coherent way. Although not as successful in integrating the German side of the battle as McNorgan, the author has still made an effort to include it. A great deal of effort has been put into describing the doctrine and organization of the Canadian Army and, while not always particularly relevant to the battle analysis at hand, it will no doubt

please those looking for detail. This study also fits very well within the tactical model laid out by Donald Graves for the book as a whole.

Noticeably absent from this book is any study by Donald Graves himself. This is unfortunate for two reasons. First of all, Graves’ essay in the original *Fighting for Canada* was probably the strongest offering in that volume, and an essay by him would almost certainly have strengthened this collection. It is also unfortunate because Graves’ reputation as the pre-eminent Canadian historian of the War of 1812 is part of what draws potential readers to this book. The lack of any study from that conflict only serves to drive home the point. Hopefully the editor’s editor will force Graves back into the pages of the next volume.

Which brings us to the second reason why *More Fighting for Canada* is so aptly named. The two volumes in this series hold a key place in contemporary Canadian military historiography. Indeed they are probably unique in their unabashed focus on the battlefield in the wake of the many years of criticism by social history advocates. These books have a central role in the fight for contemporary Canadian historical writing of battle studies. It can only be hoped that a third volume is already in the works.

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### **SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES AND ELUSIVE ENEMY GROUND TARGETS: LESSONS FROM VIETNAM AND THE PERSIAN GULF WAR**

**by William Rosenau.**

**Santa Monica: RAND Project Air Force, 60 pages.**

**Reviewed by Dr. Andrew B. Godefroy**


**I**n the current Global War on Terrorism, we are witnessing perhaps the greatest cat-and-mouse game in history, where the world’s only superpower has turned its full military attention to the capture of some of the most intelligent, cunning and elusive adversaries it has ever faced. History is, of course, replete with examples of the hunter and the hunted, and with examples of how the hunted have successfully evaded the hunters. Indeed, throughout the last fifty years the United States military has confronted many strategically important but difficult to locate ground targets in conflicts around the world. Thus, to better understand elusive adversaries, the United States Air Force commissioned a study in 2000 to examine how such opponents operate, why the United States has

had only limited success in defeating them, and what might be done to improve American capabilities against such adversaries in future conflicts.

In this brief study, *Special Operations Forces and Elusive Enemy Ground Targets: Lessons From Vietnam and the Persian Gulf War*, author William Rosenau explores the role of ground observers in the detection, location, identification, and destruction of elusive targets in war. Responding to suggestions that warfare is evolving in reaction to the increasing dominance of air power, stand-off sensors, and precision-guided munitions, Rosenau examines the challenges associated with the employment of ground observers to search large areas for elusive targets. In particular, he draws attention to a number of important lessons from two historical case studies – the employment of the US Special Operations Group against the Ho Chi Minh Trail between 1966 and 1972, and the employment of American Special Operations Forces and the British Special Air Service Regiment in the search for Iraqi Scud missile launchers during the 1990-91 Gulf War.

The Vietnam case study pays particular attention to the early application of electronic detection systems along the Ho Chi Minh Trail and the deployment of forward air

controllers with Special Forces units “going over the fence” into Laos. In a number of operations, primitive but expensive listening devices were deployed along the Trail to gather intelligence on potential targets. However, even when sensors were combined with ground teams, it proved challenging, if not at times impossible, to mount effective operations against the North Vietnamese strategic life line. In addition to the difficulty posed by the terrain, highly successful North Vietnamese counter-measures (radio direction-finding of insertion teams, their ability to predict the location of insertion/extraction points and the American tactics, and effective use of human intelligence) quickly limited the effectiveness of Special Forces operations. By 1972, North Vietnamese countermeasures were so effective that American reconnaissance teams regularly found themselves fighting for their lives after as little as six hours into a mission.



emergency frequency beacon to talk directly to the pilots. A better method was needed. When liaison was established between the SAS and the American Tactical Aircraft Control Center (TACC), messages could then be relayed from SAS teams to the TACC, then to an orbiting airborne command platform, then to pilots on station who would engage the targets. The whole procedure routinely took fifty minutes or more, roughly the same time as it did during operations against the Ho Chi Minh Trail in the 1960s.

Overall, the book points to American and allied dependence on technology, and how, even when paired with highly trained Special Operations Forces teams, this combination can still be defeated by the terrain itself or by an educated adversary. Although Rosenau

acknowledges that technology will continue to improve, he notes that there remains some uncertainty about whether the return from ground observation against an elusive enemy is worth the political or strategic costs associated with it. When more is known about operations in Afghanistan and Iraq from 2003, this view may be challenged or vindicated. An interesting and perhaps timely publication, this and other works by RAND are recommended for military planners and students alike.

The case study of the 1991 Scud missile hunt in Iraq drew some remarkably similar lessons. Again, the task was reconnaissance and location of elusive ground targets, then calling in air strikes on those targets. The terrain was the exact opposite of the jungle, but the lack of cover proved just as limiting as the impossibility of silent movement in the jungle. And there were other similarities. Early in the war, when Scud targets were discovered, British SAS teams had no procedures for calling in aircraft, and had to rely on an

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## IMAGES ET SOCIÉTÉS. LE PROGRÈS, LES MÉDIAS, LA GUERRE

by Catherine Saouter

Montreal: Les Presses de l'Université de Montréal, 182 pages, \$24.95

Reviewed by Dr. Magali Deleuze

Catherine Saouter's book comes at an opportune time. In the last ten years the study of war and the media has grown. Historians have tried to show how newspapers, radio, and, more recently, television have influenced the unfolding of many local and international conflicts, but this connection is still difficult to measure accurately. Saouter, a professor in the Department of Communications of the University of Québec at Montreal, and a specialist in theories of the image from a semiological and historical perspective, offers a view of “how Western industrial and democratic

societies have portrayed themselves through the media”. The author examines documentary photography since the Industrial Revolution, in Canada and around the world, and describes the ideology underlying images of war. The author chooses to use war as a typical example of the “paradox of the utopia of progress at the service of the Concorde, in societies which this same progress has in fact placed amongst the most warlike in history”. This lends originality to this analysis of media images even though the author makes use of work that has been published previously. This book is aimed at a wide readership and the many illustrations make it a pleasure to read.

The book is organized chronologically. The first two chapters, “Documenter, représenter” (Recording, representing) and “Imprimer, diffuser” (Printing, distributing) review the use of pictures shown by the media in the Western world from 1839 to 1918. From the appearance of the ancestor of the camera, the French daguerreotype, in 1838, photography was a means for social

expression. The author shows that in Europe, as in the United States and Canada, the advances made in photography: reproducibility, the emergence of the portrait, and “scientific” photography all had an unprecedented impact. Whether it was the portrayal of the harsh living conditions of New York immigrants at the end of the 19th century, or the patriotic symbolism of the first official photograph of the fathers of the Canadian Confederation in 1864 (carefully planned and taken several times), all that was missing to inundate the newspapers and media with these modern images was a universal theme and improvement in the capability to print photographs.

This was provided by the First World War. With the emergence of silent films, the public began to see newsreels, but the accompanying commentary was often improvised and inaccurate. The war, violent and charged with emotion, was in fact best portrayed in news photographs. Controlled and censored, they came to form a “rhetoric of the news image”. In Canada, candid images of combat scenes and the dead and wounded were not allowed, but in their place were a raft of photographs of ruins, kindly soldiers and the like. Was this hiding “the real face of war”, as the author believes? Perhaps, but then every historical period has reflected its own values towards death and war. The Greeks and the Romans did not burden themselves with metaphors to relate their wars and battles, as death was a part of society and everyday life. By 1914, death had become less and less a part of society, and mass deaths, such as during the Spanish flu epidemic, were considered an unjust calamity. Is it perhaps logical, therefore, that in 1914-1918 people preferred to represent this particularly deadly war from an angle that was more human and less brutal?

Between the wars, the pessimistic and raw portrayal of war by German painters, for example, or the reading of *Orages d’acier* (Storms of Steel), did little to ease the German people’s memory of war’s horrors. Nonetheless the fact remains, as the author explains, that the First World War was an important period for the evolution of documentary photography.

In the third and fourth chapters “Persuader, manipuler” (Persuading, manipulating) and “Démoncer, édulcorer” (Denouncing, editing), the author first discusses the important issues of press censorship and propaganda during the two world wars, and especially in Canada. This country was far from the battlefield, and the Canadian government did everything possible to eliminate the distance between Canadians and the war in Europe. An insert in the newspapers, “Mrs. Morin Bombs Berlin”, seemed to be particularly effective in convincing Canadians to buy war bonds. Photography and motion picture images from the National Film Board of Canada were thus used by the government for propaganda during the Second World War.

The author next examines the media’s depiction of war from the end of the 19th century to the war in Kosovo, along with commemorative photography, and ends with remarks on the art of good and bad representation. This chapter alone could form the basis of a book; rich and dense, it arouses interest and curiosity, and sometimes even critical judgement on the part of the reader. Photojournalism, starting in the Second World War, has become the judge of the legitimacy of conflict. Images of ‘dirty’ wars, such as photos of horrible atrocities committed during the Vietnam War, as much as those of clean wars, such as the Gulf War where no pictures of the dead were taken, show that the potential for photographers’ royalties and the portrayal of compassion have become the primary journalistic motivators in war photography.

The example of the war in Kosovo is noteworthy. Photos in *Le Monde* and the *National Post*, which invariably showed the effects of NATO air strikes on the civilian population while excluding any portrayal of Serb atrocities, seemed intent on depicting a romantic war in which the heroic warrior comes to the rescue of women and children. This made the complex stakes of these hostilities totally incomprehensible and fostered a dualistic view of this conflict and the feeling that it was unjust. In the reviewer’s opinion, the analysis of these media representations should have gone further: should people be shown the war they want to see, or do journalists really believe in the values associated with these images? As well, commemorative photographs reveal, according to the author, a “strategy of avoidance” in which ‘Others’ are often responsible for inhumane actions. Historians will be skeptical, however, at the author’s contention that the 20th century “is now recognized as having been one of the most violent in the history of humanity”, when the people of the 5th century B.C. or the 14th century A.D. were equally bellicose.

The last chapter, “Envahir, conformer” (Invading, conforming) describes the role of television and the Internet in the propagation of images. The author makes a comparison between the media success of Yves Beauchemin’s *Le Matou* and the proliferation of images that accompanied the Oka crisis in 1990. The public wants to be told about things that seem close to them, and journalists connive to keep the monster alive: “Oka, one death and 1236 articles, Rwanda, one million deaths and 310 articles”. This fact is intriguing, and calls for a more in-depth analysis. André P. Donneur and Jean de Bonville have shown that, up to the 1950s, Quebec newspapers placed emphasis on international news. The Quiet Revolution may have reopened Quebecers to the world, but it may also have led them to prefer articles with a local flavour.

Media coverage of the events of 11 September 2001 completes, as it were, the author’s analysis, which brilliantly brings to light the shift in the tacit relationship between the

public and the topics covered to a relationship between journalists and the public. The anguish and the impression of unbearable savagery on the part of the “Others” – the non-Westerners – towards “Us” are now widely shared. The portrayal of this tragedy makes use of the rhetoric of the war image which was developed at the start of the 20th century – ruins, the kindly hero (in this case, the fireman), and the courtesy and the helplessness of the civilians.

This book challenges the reader and offers considerable material for reflection. Gathering together in a single book

a variety of articles published over a ten-year period was obviously a difficult task, but Catherine Saouter has produced a reference book that opens the way to the study of many topics. Historians and other researchers will find this careful analysis of the illustrations, photographs and media images of war to be an essential resource.

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## **AMERICA UNBOUND: THE BUSH REVOLUTION IN FOREIGN POLICY**

**by Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay**

**The Brookings Institution Press, 2003, 246 pages**

**Reviewed by Benjamin Zyla**

**T**he Iraqi war rekindled an old debate about whether the United States, in dealing with global security threats, should act unilaterally or multilaterally in concert with its allies. The intensity of the debate about the war can be measured in the number of scholarly articles and editorials published in the media and most recently in academic journals. The focal point of almost every article was the President of the United States, George W. Bush. He became the personification of American foreign policy. The American people and the international community opposing the war wanted to know how decisions were made, who made them, and what went wrong. Was the President a puppet of the neo-conservatives? Did the new Bush doctrine of pre-emption enhance American security, prosperity and liberty?

In their new book *America Unbound*, Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay provide a comprehensive analysis of Bush’s foreign policy record in the first thirty months of his presidency. They heavily rely on articles, reports, interviews, and statements that appeared in major American newspapers.

The first part of the book is somewhat unexciting because, for the most part, it repeats information that the informed reader already knows. It provides background information about the key actors in the Bush administration – the so-called Vulcans: Cheney, Rice, Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz and others – and their intellectual roots, and discusses Bush’s leadership and his world view. An early section of the book focuses on Bush’s apparent ignorance of foreign policy and international security issues prior to his being elected. Nevertheless, during his run for presidency, Bush made clear that “American foreign policy cannot be founded on fear”. His world view was deeply rooted in the realist take on international affairs that shares the following assumptions: (1) The United States would only get involved in

international affairs if its vital national interests are threatened; (2) The United States lives in a dangerous world; (3) Nation states are the key actors in international relations; (4) Military power and will are important to defend vital national interests: “If America leads, others will follow; and, (5) Multilateral agreements are neither important nor necessary. Overall, Bush wanted his foreign policy to be ABC – Anything But Clinton.

We are told that domestic politics, such as tax cuts and educational reforms, dominated the agenda of the White House during the first months of Bush’s presidency, and not foreign policy or the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

September 11th changed that picture. All of a sudden, Bush’s agenda was dominated by foreign policy crises, one after another, reaffirming his view that the world was a dangerous place. In the ensuing months, the war on terrorism became the defining mission of his presidency. Among the administration’s responses was a new national security doctrine that advocated pre-emptive strikes against states that pose a threat to America’s national security. Terrorists should be engaged and defeated, the doctrine said, outside American territory. Daalder and Lindsay see “the willingness to strike before rather than just in response to an attack” as a revolution in American foreign policy: deterrence and containment were now outdated concepts from the Cold War. We find here one of the book’s weaknesses – its failure to explain the deep historical roots of this unilateralist policy. We know, for example, from Walter McDougall’s book, *Promised land, crusader state: the American encounter with the world since 1776*, that American unilateralism goes back to the 19th century and the Hamiltonian tradition of US foreign policy. However, as the Hamiltonians learned quickly, the United States was highly dependent on trade relations with Europe, even though Washington wanted to abstain from European wars and stay neutral. What was new about Bush was the explicitness of this pre-emption approach and the tendency towards preventive strikes.

Because Americans demanded quick action by their government, the war on terrorism was begun without the administration being properly prepared for it. The US military had no contingency plan in place for going after


Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan, so plans for Special Forces operations and the participation of coalition partners had to be hastily drawn up by the Pentagon. In fact, little capability was available to the US military the day the bombing started. It also “lacked clarity of purpose”, Daalder and Lindsay postulate. Moreover, the political leadership argued over when and where to strike against the Taliban.

Perhaps even worse, the Bush administration had no plan as to how to reconstruct Afghanistan after the war because of its “ideological distaste for nation-building”. It is not surprising, therefore, that Daalder and Lindsay argue that the US military failed to produce effective stability and security in both Afghanistan and Iraq, and that this failure reveals the state-centric approach of the Bush doctrine, i.e., assuming that terrorists rely on nation states to plan, finance, and harbour their activities.

Daalder and Lindsay avoid the heated controversy of where and when the war in Iraq was planned, but they do examine the administration’s internal deliberations before bombs fell on Baghdad. Powell, the former General, favoured a regime change in Iraq without war, rather than an invasion which was advocated by the hardliners Cheney and Wolfowitz who thought that war would be necessary to effect a regime change. The authors also discuss Powell’s attempt to convince the President of the need to involve the United Nations, an internal struggle that Powell won, and which led ultimately to Security Council Resolution 1441.

Daalder and Lindsay suggest that, once the war in Iraq was underway, the Bush administration began to repeat many of the same mistakes it had made in Afghanistan. In particular, it grossly underestimated the enormous effort that would be required for post-conflict nation building: “With America’s extensive experience with peacekeeping operations in the 1990s, that was a lesson that should have been learned before rather than after the Iraq War”. The authors contend that the Pentagon made three wrong assumptions about post-war reconstruction: (1) that the first need of Iraqi people would be humanitarian assistance; (2) that they would have to deal with large numbers of refugees; and, (3) that they would have to prevent an ecological disaster created by burning oil wells. Instead, what Iraq needed most was security on the streets and a functioning government. Then there was the critical matter of faulty intelligence about Iraq’s suspected cache of Weapons of Mass Destruction, which were never found. This highlights one of the major weaknesses of Bush’s pre-emptive doctrine: good intelligence is of vital importance in a military campaign, and application of the doctrine “stands or falls on accurate intelligence”.

In the final chapter, Daalder and Lindsay provide an overall assessment of the Bush foreign policy record: “Were Americans better off with or without the Bush revolution”? They argue that President Bush overestimated what America’s unilateral exercise of power could achieve. Not surprisingly – the authors being former employees of Clinton’s National Security Team – they clearly favour multilateral approaches for solving international problems: global problems cannot be solved without international support.



Among their conclusions is that during the first two years of the Bush administration, American people and others around the world “lost trust in the United States, doubting that it had much interest in them or their problems.” Indeed, Bush seemed to care little about America’s image in the world. Daalder and Lindsay note that “the Iraq experience underscored that how America led mattered as much as whether it led.” The war in Iraq showed that if the United States leads unilaterally only a few will follow, and the lesson is that if America’s friends could not constrain the US administration they could stop supporting the Americans when support was needed most. The authors state: “Indeed, the more others questioned America’s power, purpose, and priorities, the less influence America would have.” They add: “In that respect, an unbound America would be a less secure America.” Bush’s foreign policy is built on military power, and not on the greater power that comes with strong alliances.

This book places Bush’s foreign policy in its historical context of similarities and differences with the policies of previous presidents. It clearly shows the dilemma of any American president: the world wants to be led by the US, but responsibilities are attached to that leadership.

*America Unbound* also points to new paths for research into American foreign policy. In a few years, when more governmental documents are declassified, we will better understand how far Bush revolutionized US foreign policy. Thus far it can be said that the Bush approach was indeed a marked change from that of Clinton, but that it drew on older traditions in US foreign and defence policy. It remains to be seen whether this approach will be sustained.

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## WAR AS CRUCIFIXION: ESSAYS ON PEACE, VIOLENCE AND “JUST WAR”

Edited by John M. Buchanan and David Heim

Chicago: Christian Century Press, 2002. 42 pages, US\$ 9.00 plus postage.

## WHEN GOD SAYS WAR IS RIGHT: THE CHRISTIAN’S PERSPECTIVE ON HOW AND WHEN TO FIGHT

by Darrell Cole

Colorado Springs, CO, Waterbrook Press, 2002. 161 pages, C\$ 16.99

Reviewed by Major Arthur Gans, ret’d

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decided it was appropriate to review these two books together as they both cover some major ideas in the area of the ethics of warfare. That does not, however, mean that they are in any way equal.

*War as Crucifixion* is a collection of articles from the *Christian Century* over a period of some sixty years, from the 1930s when Nazism and fascism were spreading over Europe to the 1990s when the first President Bush was contemplating the Gulf War. For anyone familiar with theology during these years, the names of the authors will ring bells: H. Richard and Reinhold Niebuhr, James Turner Johnson, Alan Geyer, and John Howard Yoder. As one might expect from these, the articles are solid expositions of their respective positions. Five of the articles come from the Niebuhr brothers, Richard taking an essentially Christian pacifist view while Reinhold speaks clearly from a “just war” position. Reinhold’s contribution foreshadows his major work: “Moral Man and Immoral Society”. I find all of these articles interesting, but Reinhold’s more realistic.

The second part of the book, “Morality and War in the Persian Gulf”, brings together three modern authors to discuss just war theory as applied in a post-Second World War, post-Vietnam world. James Turner Johnson is perhaps one of the best scholars in the field, and his books are key texts to any discussion of modern “just war” theory. Geyer brings out a number of facts concerning the decision-making process leading to Gulf War I. John Howard Yoder, representing the pacifist point of view, responds to both Johnson and Geyer.

For anyone working in modern “just war” theory, I would commend this small book as a resource and thought-provoker.

Darrell Cole is a professor of religion at Drew University. His book *When God Says War Is Right: The Christian Perspective on How and When to Fight* is written from a fairly conservative point of view, and I am afraid that Professor Cole has bitten off substantially more than he can chew, particularly when you look at his subtitle.

Most of the book is a competent rehash of points from the works of Ambrose, Augustine, Aquinas and Calvin. Each of these authors is summarized on the topics. The chapter headings will give a good idea of the direction of the work. Some are: Why Christians use force; Christian Virtue and Warfare; When Christians should fight; How Christians should fight; and then three chapters dealing with the Second World War, Vietnam and the Gulf War; Nuclear Weapons and Deterrence; and finally Just Warfare and Terrorism.

The book is fairly short to cover the territory it stakes out. In the theoretical portions, it gives good summaries both of what classical authors have said and of the major points of “just war” theory. It is unfortunate that Cole seems unaware however of much of the philosophical and military work that has been done in this field in recent years. He is unaware of people like James Turner Johnson, James Toner, Nicolas Fotion, Malham Wakin, to name a few who have worked in this vineyard over the past thirty or more years.

I had a difficult time reading this book. I was constantly saying to myself: “But what about...?” Although I would say that I tend to be somewhat on the liberal side of the continuum, both theologically and philosophically, I do respect the work of a number of conservative scholars. Unfortunately, I cannot say that of this book. It really does not answer a questioning Christian in its presentation of either the classical or the ignored modern positions on Christians and warfare. It does not deal adequately with either the early Church’s rejection of participation in military action, nor does it look at the rejection of war by later branches of the Christian tradition. And because it ignores so much of modern scholarship in the field, it really does not present what modern Christians are faced with when dealing with whether God does say that war is right. And I certainly cannot say it puts *the Christian Perspective on How and When to Fight*.

Major the Rev. Arthur Gans is a retired chaplain with a particular interest in military ethics.