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Defence Management

Ottawa

DND photo ISC89-2156

National Defence Headquarters in Ottawa.

A Framework For Fundamental Change? The Management Command And Control re-engineering Initiative

by Lieutenant-Colonel Michael Rostek

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Introduction

The decade of the 1990s represented a period of unprecedented change for the Department of National Defence (DND) and the Canadian Forces (CF). The end of the Cold War, Globalization and the Information Age all irrevocably altered the international social order, and the new global security environment was characterized by the emergence of many diverse and hostile state and non-state actors. Demands were being placed upon defence establishments that were significantly more complex and unpredictable, compared to the relative stability of the Cold War era:

The close of the Cold War ushered in an era where international stability – a hallmark during the years of Soviet-American tensions – is unravelling. Today fractured states, national and international ethnic and religious rivalries, resource scarcity and its attendant issues have made the world a volatile and unpredictable place.1

Early in the 1990s, the declaration of a New World Order, as espoused by many strategists, left governments searching for the elusive ‘peace dividend’2 that would surely, it was felt, accompany the end of the Cold War. Particularly in Canada, defence spending cuts became highly politically desirable, and this mindset, coupled with the tremendous pressures of the federal government deficit of the day, resulted in a 23 per cent cut in defence spending and a 30 per cent reduction in CF personnel. However, as the impact of these reductions began to materialize in the mid 1990s, so did other realities of the first post-Cold War decade:

Among peace and security challenges that have emerged in this first post-Cold War decade, one can identify at least four general categories: weapons proliferation, including but not limited to weapons of mass destruction; civil or internal warfare...; terrorism; international or transnational crimes including drugs, migration, money laundering, technologies especially but not limited to the dual-use variety; and economic espionage.3

The new global security environment in the wake of the Cold War looked much different, but the world remained a dangerous and volatile place. Ironically, The CF found itself heavily tasked within this new security environment. Further, the government “... admitted that the [budget] reductions would have ‘an impact on daily operations throughout the Canadian Forces. The impact on sea, land and air operations will be significant’.”4 The Department and the CF suddenly found themselves faced with an increasing operational tempo and a significantly reduced defence budget. Ways and means had to be contrived in order to preserve operational capability. One of the methods chosen to exact more effectiveness for the ‘sharp end’ was through the process of re-engineering, the radical redesign of an organization’s processes, intended to result in dramatic improvements to delivered products and/or services. The specific CF embodiment of this redesign was the Management Command and Control Re-engineering Team (MCCRT).5

MCCR Vision 97

MCCR Vision

MCCRT

DND and the CF – particularly National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) – have undergone continual restructuring and reorganization since 1972. However, the 1990s proved to be a great challenge to the defence establishment as it struggled to come to terms with both external and internal influences, ranging from the end of the Cold War and Globalization, to a burgeoning federal deficit and perceived mismanagement and waste. In 1993, the Liberal government was elected on a platform to reduce federal spending while preserving key social programs.6 At the same time, the defence budget was viewed as an excessive anachronism, due mostly to “administrative overlap and increased bureaucratization,”7 and thus it became a target for cost-cutting measures. This was transmitted to DND and the CF by way of the 1994 and 1995 Budget Statements, as well as through a new Canadian Defence White Paper in 1994. In January 1995, DND and the CF implemented cost reductions, in part, by way of the MCCRT, which had been given a two-year mandate. The MCCRT’s aim was to reduce resources consumed by headquarters, infrastructure and wasteful business practices in order to ensure the preservation of combat capability.8 Re-engineering was thus chosen as the method to enact this mandate, and it was boldly heralded as the path to successful change within DND and the CF.

The MCCRT began life with extensive reviews of earlier management and structural studies, including the Glassco Report of 1962, the Management Review Group of 1972 and the Little Hunter Review of 1988. While not an exhaustive list of the studies reviewed, these particular efforts are perhaps the most relevant when discussing the Canadian defence establishment’s lack of progress in preserving operational capability through management reform. This early work by the MCCRT, coupled with the external and internal factors previously mentioned, spawned the development of ‘Vision 97’, outlined the need to maintain operations primacy through the development of a new organization, re-engineered processes, a new culture and an integrated information environment.9

Berlin

www.shearman.com

Perhaps nothing characterized the end of the Cold War more than the fall of the Berlin Wall.

A New Organization and Re-engineered Processes

The re-engineering of processes was considered one of the major goals of the MCCRT, done with a view to transferring savings in support of operational capability. Re-engineering was intended to streamline processes from input to output across organizational boundaries in order to maximize efficiency and remove overlap and duplication. In a theoretical sense, re-engineering helps create end-to-end processes that cut across traditional hierarchical paths or ‘stovepipes’ and lead to a fundamental restructuring of an organization. As articulated by re-engineering experts Hammer and Champy:

Re-engineering is the fundamental rethinking and radical design of business processes to achieve dramatic improvements in critical, contemporary measures of performance, such as cost, quality, service, and speed.10

This formal definition can be further explained by the following definition espoused by Dr. David Detomasi, a professor of International Business at Queen’s University:

The traditionally hierarchical authoritative structure permeating most organizations is replaced by a more level structure in which employees are ‘empowered’ to make decisions. The ‘re-engineered’ corporation runs more smoothly, has a higher level of productivity, and employs fewer people than less competitive counterparts.11

In essence, an organization re-engineers to create competitive advantage12 and in the process, downsizing and alternate service delivery become by-products of the re-engineering process as the organization strives to become more efficient. Again, in the words of Hammer and Champy, “re-engineering means doing more with less.”13 In the face of the federal budget released in 1995 that called for a 23 per cent budget reduction for DND (approximately three billion dollars), re-engineering was seen as the path to salvation. Accordingly, the MCCRT identified four core processes that would enable DND and the CF to deliver a defence capability:

  1. Strategic Direction – The process of transforming government direction and assigned resources into strategic direction for DND and the CF, and defence policy for government;

  2. Force Generation – The process of transforming strategic and corporate policy into forces for employment;

  3. Force Employment – The process of exercising command and control of forces tasked to carry out operations in accordance with defence policy and strategic direction; and

  4. Common Support Services – The process of establishing, administering and communicating financial, personnel, materiel, information, and other departmental policies.

In accordance with re-engineering theory, these four core processes would conceivably have formed the basis of the new DND and CF organizational structure. There is little doubt that had they been developed, they would have led to a radical redesign of the Department and the CF. Admittedly, the MCCRT did not follow a pure process approach, due to the complexities involved in delivering defence capability within the context of the machinery of government.14 This complexity was exemplified by the competing nature of the re-engineering methodology and the concurrent reduction of 33 per cent of resources and personnel in the national headquarters. As mentioned earlier, downsizing and personnel reductions are normally the by-products of a re-engineering effort and not ends in themselves. However, the end result was to map the new core processes developed by the MCCRT onto a variation of the NDHQ structure that existed at the time. In response to this reality, the MCCRT stated:

There are several reasons for maintaining the NDHQ titles as before, but they boil down to the fact that of the many alternatives reviewed, none could as effectively provide the key operational capability that is our priority.15

Additionally, the MCCRT stated that there was no compelling reason to change the NDHQ structure as the need “to change the top level structure has to be based on something more than re-engineering theory, or concerns about optics or even internal politics, before we abandon a model that has done the job over the past three decades.”16 Therefore, one of the objectives of the MCCRT was to reorganize NDHQ along a more process-oriented basis – the new structure, as opposed to a functional basis – the old structure. That said, given the retention of the old structure, one might ask why the need to engage in re-engineering methodology?17 As noted by The Economist bureau chiefs John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge, this is not an uncommon approach to reform in the public sector. Typical management reform therein involves keeping the old departmental structure, but hoping to do it with fewer people.18 It is also known that not all departments within DND adopted the re-engineering methodology, due to such issues as resistance to change and change fatigue, and there was also uncertainty as to whether the core processes identified by the MCCRT actually reflected the outputs of NDHQ.19 Thus, one might conclude that the re-engineering of processes with a view to redirecting savings to operational capability was completed in an ad hoc manner, thereby ensuring that the status quo prevailed. Was the re-engineering effort simply a guise for the short-term gains of downsizing and/or the restructuring of NDHQ? Although NDHQ 1999 Review of Restructuring and Re-engineering20 claims that the NDHQ organization today is a result of “pragmatism and re-engineering theory”, it is difficult to quantify the approach used by the MCCRT, as, even today, NDHQ does not have a corporate view of the impact or effectiveness of its reorganization.21

What the MCCRT thus faced in the Canadian defence establishment at this juncture was a dramatically reduced defence budget coupled with a corresponding reduction in personnel. The core result was that the MCCRT put a great amount of time and effort into developing end-to-end processes, only to have them mapped onto the current organizational structure, rather than the development of a structure based on the processes themselves, as espoused by re-engineering theory. That said, DND and the CF admit that while they have no corporate view of the impact of this exercise, they are certain that NDHQ would not have evolved to where it is today without the benefit of the MCCRT process. The failings of the MCCRT are acknowledged and are consistent with our Departmental history in managerial reform.22 However, in this particular case, the main perpetrator is believed to be the indiscriminate use of a private sector management fad, namely re-engineering, in the public sector.

Private Sector Management Theory in the Public Service

In the 1990s, it was difficult to walk the halls of NDHQ without hearing catch phrases such as ‘outsourcing non-core functions’, ‘management by objectives’, or ‘aligning core processes’. Although the management theory industry was thriving in the private sector, there was little development in the public sector.23 Peter Drucker, the American seminal thinker, writer and lecturer on organization, has been arguing for half a century that the place where management theory is most needed is in the public sector. The public sector’s thirst for private sector management theory can be explained by three factors:24

  1. A crisis in faith. The end of the Cold War and the emergence of globalization have resulted in the need for greater transparency and accountability within the public sector – and particularly in DND and the CF. No longer could DND and the CF make an unqualified claim that security was paramount and thus redundancy and reduced accountability in the name of operational effectiveness were questioned:

    The argument that military affairs and national security were matters for professionals, to be dealt with in secret and not to be short changed because of the effect this would have on morale, recruitment, operational effectiveness and commitment, carried weight during times of international crisis and tension; they were less convincing with international détente and shifting national priorities.25

Additionally, globalization began to challenge the role and nature of government institutions in society as such institutions began to be perceived as bloated, inefficient, non-creative, and overly powerful.26 These factors were major contributors to a crisis in faith in various government institutions in the 1990s, from which DND and the CF cannot be excluded.

  1. An obsession to ‘do more with less’. With the threat of true global conflict greatly diminished, most liberal western democracies decreased defence spending during the 1990s, and Canada certainly was no exception. ‘Doing more with less’ meant managing the affairs of the state more efficiently by exacting a greater return on the public dollar. Many governments were quick to note that this was a fundamental business practice in the private sector, and, as such, a new enthusiasm quite understandingly grew for private sector management theory within the public sector:

    The political leadership virtually everywhere in the western world, even in countries with left-of-centre parties in power, concluded that management practices in the public sector “should either emulate the private sector or simply privatise the function.”27

Thus, private sector management theory was heralded as the saviour of often-outdated public sector management theory. A proliferation of fads, such as Total Quality Management (TQM) and re-engineering, began to make their way into the public sector and DND and again, the Canadian defence establishment was not to be excluded.

  1. A desire to remain current. Programs such as Defence 2000, a Mulroney-era attempt to reform DND, and the New Public Management initiative were as much about moving with the times as they were about management in the public sector. The push to have public administrators emulate private sector managers and run government operations as though they were private concerns led to a desire to adopt the private sector management theories apace with private sector businesses. As a result, deregulation, streamlining, empowerment, and customer focus all became catchwords as we approached a new era of public management.28

Despite this new-found love affair with private sector management theory, there were those who remained skeptical, viewing it as a bad or, at least, not necessarily a good occurrence. Furthermore, it is certainly true that expense and management theory contradictions can prevent the public sector from attaining real gains. The costs of adopting private sector management theories, which are largely unproven in the public sector, can be high. Some of the most questionable of all costs are those associated with consultants. By way of example, in mid-1995 in Britain, John Major’s Conservative government admitted that it had spent at least £320 million on management consultants.29 Although there is little evidence that establishes the return on investment for these high costs, some consultants have admitted privately that this new-found affection for private sector management theory by the public sector has offered consultants a wonderful chance to expensively repackage the products and theories that they have already dished out to the private sector.30 Even though one may debate whether the public sector should shield taxpayers from the likes of such costs and contradictions, it must be stated that not all has been for nought, as some gains have been realized.

Kabul

DND photo IS2003-2548a by Sergeant Frank Hudec

More efficient defence management can translate into increased operational effectiveness.

Privatization, contracting out, Alternate Service Delivery (ASD) call it what you will it all amounts to private sector companies taking over public sector business lines because they are able to produce a better product or service more efficiently. This new way of doing business is not the panacea for which governments had hoped, but it is incontestable that some aspects of the Public Service are doing better today than they were yesterday. In terms of DND’s ASD initiatives, savings to date are in the order of $60 million per year versus the $300 million per year that was the originally-anticipated target. Despite the realization of only 20 per cent of planned savings, few will argue that these savings are unwelcome or that there is no ability to improve upon them. In essence, the application of private sector management theory in the public sector to date can be viewed as a disappointment rather than a mistake.

What then of re-engineering? As reforms swept through the Public Service in the 1990s, re-engineering was a specific component that failed to live up to its expectations, which, in part, were arguably a result of the overselling of the concept by consultants. Its success has also been questioned since there are currently few tools available to assess both it and other reforms designed to help increase operational service effectiveness and efficiency. Also, many reforms, such as re-engineering, have been focused upon workers’ issues, with little emphasis upon management, which is but another generalized failing of reform in the public sector:

Much has been written about the ‘re-engineered’ public sector and the concept of a flatter, more entrepreneurial organization with a creative, customer-driven and self-directed work force. This transition is affecting all aspects of operations, including long-standing assumptions of loyalty and obligation in the employer-employee relationship. The employees’ side of the shift to this new workplace has received a lot of attention, but little has been said about the manager in this new arrangement.31

Private sector management theory came to be viewed as the solution to many of the public sector’s failings as they materialized during the last decade. Particular interest was generated by the ‘hype’ that surrounded re-engineering, a private sector fad, which was largely seen as an attractive solution brought about by fundamental rethinking and radical redesign of business processes to achieve dramatic improvements in critical, contemporary measures of performance, such as cost, quality, service, and speed.32 However, despite the obvious need for the Public Service to encourage creative management and foster innovation, careful assessment of any new management theory, especially that which is derived from the private sector, must be scrutinized carefully before attempting to implement it in the public sector. This is especially true for the public sector, as indicated by Doctor Ole Ingstrup, Principal of the Canadian Centre for Management Development:

It goes without saying but should be said anyway that the caution and discrimination I recommend are doubly important for those of us in the public sector. Many management ideas come to us from the private sector, and their advocates often assume that they can be applied without alteration or adaptation to the public sector. But public sector management is not and can not be applied without alteration or adaptation in the public sector. But public sector management is not and cannot be exactly the same as private sector management. We have different goals, different constraints, different measures, different accountabilities, and different values. Therefore, those of us in the public sector need to be doubly discriminating to ensure that each new concept is truly appropriate for our organizations, and is appropriately adapted to them.33

Thus, management theory, wherever it has been derived, must be put into context, for it has been said: A fad is, often, an effective idea, or concept unfortunately packaged into a large-scale application regardless of the context.”34

Re-engineering is linked to the ‘hard’ or ‘technical’ side of management. In the complex management environment faced by large organizations today, the belief and application of a ‘one-size-fits-all’ solution to competitive advantage is simply naïve and irresponsible. In conjunction with the ‘hard’ side of any new management application, the ‘soft’ or ‘cognitive’ side must also be considered. It should not be forgotten that organizations are complex systems, and no management tool can be deployed in a watertight compartment without affecting the other parts of the organization.35 A Computer Sciences Corporation Index survey suggested that re-engineering has a failure rate in the private sector of about 70 per cent, a result consistent with failure rates in all major experiments in organizational change of whatever variety.36 Additionally, few management ideas yield results in under two years – and any organization unwilling to work at least five years should not waste its time starting down this path.37 The superficial application of a management fad such as re-engineering can end up doing more harm than good to an organization, either in the public sector or the private sector.

Book cover

Cover Defence White Paper 1994

Conclusions

As had occurred at the end of both World Wars, the end of the Cold War put Canada in a position where it began to question investment levels in its armed forces. When coupled with the rise of the Information Age and Globalization, bureaucracies began to be considered dysfunctional behemoths and most Western liberal democracies began to cut defence spending in search of a peace dividend in the New World Order. A new Canadian Defence White Paper in 1994 was heralded as a bold attempt to bring DND and the CF into the Information Age and the new global security environment. However, the funding required to implement policy did not materialize. As the operational tempo rose, DND and the CF were left to determine how “to do more with ‘less”. This resulted in the resurrection of the axiom “the reduction of administrative overhead in order to increase operational effectiveness.” During this time, public sector management theory was woefully neglected, and, as a result, there was a rebirth in the confidence in private sector management theory that was applied, often hastily, to improve efficiency and effectiveness of public sector organizations.

Notwithstanding the fact that many of the problems faced by DND and the CF at the end of the Cold War were not unlike those faced by large organizations in the private sector, the private and public sectors remain fundamentally different. The concept of new public management emerged, which debated the use of private sector management theory in the public sector. Despite the known deficiencies of private sector management theory fads, many of them, such as TQM and re-engineering, were adopted wholeheartedly, evidenced by their inclusion in DND and CF policy documentation. Some success was evident, but, on the whole, results never came close to the claims made for re-engineering at the outset. The private sector suffered many of the same desultory experiences. However, it appears that results there were generally either ignored or misunderstood. Often, both private and public sector organizations did not bother to scrutinize these initiatives close enough in order to penetrate the hype through which these concepts were being marketed. In reality, they tended to be basic ideas repackaged and resold to organizations looking for short-term gains.

Management theory requires a holistic systems approach encompassing the technical, cognitive, and behavioural components, and most of all, it requires time for application. Re-engineering was a particularly good example of a ‘technical’ fad that gripped DND and the CF in 1995 as it began to cope with a 23 per cent budget cut and downsizing. The MCCRT was tasked to recommend a smaller national headquarters organization for DND, coordinate re-engineering efforts throughout the CF, and identify resource management and support services that could be re-engineered in order to reduce overhead costs. Did the MCCRT attain its objectives? To this day, there remains little evidence that any component of the MCCRT was even measured. In fact, today there is little heard in the halls of NDHQ, or throughout the Department, about re-engineering. This embodies the most telling characteristic of a management theory fad. Its life cycle is astonishingly short.

What have we learned from the MCCRT, and how does this affect DND and the CF for the future? On the surface, both organizations have a legacy of instituting managerial reforms ineffectively and in an ad hoc manner. That is, there are no clear lines between achieving greater operational effectiveness and systematic managerial reforms. The MCCRT has perpetuated this legacy – there is little to suggest that this change initiative was successful. However, when one delves deeper into the management theory world, it becomes readily apparent that there are no easy remedies or ‘silver bullets’. The disappearance of interest in re-engineering from the halls of the national headquarters has not meant its abrogation from our management ‘toolbox’, but rather, it has become part of the complex managerial dimension of our armed forces. It is generally agreed that the hype that surrounded re-engineering and its implementation was misplaced and possibly destructive. However, it is believed that it is more appropriate to view the results as a disappointment rather than an outright failure. The reasons for the MCCRT’s lack of success are familiar territory for the Canadian military establishment. The Information Age, a new security environment and an altered international social order define the 21st century and are vital characteristics that conspire to create an environment less tolerant of waste and mismanagement in public institutions. If a greater operational capability is to be based, wholly or in part, on some form of managerial reform, then DND and the CF must be compelled to invest the time and money to implement it effectively, and, most importantly, learn from the mistakes of the past.38

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Colonel Rostek is an Armour officer and, currently, a postgraduate student in War Studies at the Royal Military College of Canada.

NOTES

  1. Department of National Defence, Canadian Defence Beyond 2010, The Way Ahead: An RMA Concept Paper (Ottawa: DND Canada, 1999), p. iv.
  2. Peace dividend refers to any valid alternative use to which excessive military spending may be re-directed now that the Cold War is over. For some people, this may mean the preservation of threatened federal programs in education, health or the environment. For others, it might be rapid progress toward a balanced budget, or a welcomed cut in federal income tax. <http://www.fas.org/pub/gen/mswg/ncpd> dated 12 September 2002.
  3. David B. Dewitt, “Future Directions in Canadian Security Policy”, Canada and the New World Order – Facing the New Millennium, Michael J. Tucker et al. (eds) (Toronto: Irwin Publishing, 2000), p. 95.
  4. Joseph T. Jockel, The Canadian Forces: Hard Choices, Soft Power (Toronto: The Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1999), p. 15.
  5. The MCCRT can trace its origins to a number of initiatives in the early 1990s that were designed to improve how DND and the CF managed their business. The MCCRT was established in January 1995 with a mandate to re-engineer the DND/CF command, control and resource management structure, with the emphasis on National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ), Command and operational headquarters restructuring and downsizing. The primary guidance for the MCCRT was contained in the 1994 White Paper. The main features of this guidance included: resources devoted to headquarters functions would be reduced by 50 per cent; Chiefs of Environmental Staffs would be established in Ottawa as both Environmental Commanders and strategic staff to the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) and the Deputy Minister (DM); Command headquarters would be eliminated; NDHQ would continue to function as an integrated civilian/military headquarters; and resource management would continue to be improved through initiatives such as Defence 2000.
  6. David Detomasi, “Re-engineering the Canadian Department of National Defence: Management and Command in the 1990s”, Defense Analysis, Vol. 2, No. 3, 1996, p. 329.
  7. Ibid., p. 330.
  8. Of interest here is that this dictum surfaced more recently in the “Report to the Minister of National Defence by the Advisory Committee on Administrative Efficiency” in stating that significant efficiencies and savings will accrue from a “reduced requirement for personnel involved in headquarters functions, enabling military personnel and civilian personnel costs to be re-invested in combat capability...”, Department of National Defence, “Report to the Minister of National Defence by the Advisory Committee on Administrative Efficiency”, Executive Summary (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2003), p. v.
  9. Department of National Defence, ANDHQ 99: Review of Restructuring and Re-engineering”, Vol. 2: Background and Review Framework (Chief of Review Services: File 7050-10[CRS], 2001), p. 5/20.
  10. Michael Hammer and James Champy, Re-engineering the Corporation: A Manifesto for Business Revolution (New York: Harper Business, 1993), p. 32.
  11. David Detomasi, p. 331.
  12. Competitive advantage the success or failure of any firm depends on competitive advantage delivering the product at a lower cost or offering unique benefits to the buyer that justify a premium price. Michael E. Porter, Competitive Advantage: Creating and Sustaining Superior Advantage (New York: The Free Press, 1985).
  13. Michael Hammer and James Champy, p. 48.
  14. Department of National Defence, ANDHQ 99: Review of Restructuring and Re-engineering”, Vol. 3: Results in Brief, Annex A: Organizational Restructuring, pp. 1,3.
  15. Management Command and Control Re-engineering Team, Background Information for Senior CF/DND Managers on Re-engineering and Change: Questions and Answers (Ottawa: DND Canada, 1996), pp. 13, 32
  16. Ibid., pp. 14, 32.
  17. The Advisory Committee on Administrative Efficiency noted that the lack of clearly identified core competencies remained one of the management challenges for the defence establishment. It noted, “... defence has not been successful in identifying activities and functions which are core to the defence mission, resulting in both military and civilian personnel often not being optimally employed on non-core activities”, Department of National Defence, “Report to the Minister of National Defence by the Advisory Committee on Administrative Efficiency”, p. iv.
  18. John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge, The Witch Doctors (New York: Random House, 1996), p. 303.
  19. Department of National Defence, ANDHQ 99: Review of Restructuring and Re-engineering”, Vol. 3: Results in Brief, Annex D: Process Re-engineering, pp. 1, 5.
  20. NDHQ 1999 B Review of Restructuring and Re-engineering presents an overview of a review undertaken to develop an appreciation of progress with respect to the restructuring and re-engineering of the national headquarters.
  21. Department of National Defence, ANDHQ 99: Review of Restructuring and Re-engineering”, Vol. 3: Results in Brief, Annex A, pp. 2-3.
  22. For a complete account of managerial reform in DND and the CF since 1945 see Douglas Bland’s Canada’s National Defence, Volume 2: Defence Organization (Kingston: School of Policy Studies, Queen’s University, 1998), p. 37.
  23. John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge, p. 291.
  24. Ibid., p. 294.
  25. Douglas L. Bland (ed), Issues in Defence Management (Kingston: School of Policy Studies, Queen’s University, 1998), p. 37.
  26. Donald J. Savoie, Globalization and Governance (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1993), p. 1.
  27. Ibid., p. 12.
  28. Ibid., p. 13.
  29. John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge, p. 294.
  30. Ibid.
  31. Andy Tamas, “The Manager and the New Public Service”, Canadian Public Administration, Vol. 38, No. 4, Winter 1995, p. 613.
  32. Ole Ingstrup, Re-engineering in the Public Service: Promise or Peril (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1995), p. 7.
  33. Ibid., p. 4.
  34. Pareena Kawatra, “Deconstructing Management Fads”, <http://www.niit.com/Quotes/quote 1.htm> dated May 2001.
  35. Ibid.
  36. Ole Ingstrup, p. 16.
  37. Pareena Kawatra.
  38. Although not explicitly stated, the conclusion that the ‘business as usual’ approach will not be sufficient for the transformation of DND stated by the Minister’s Advisory Committee on Administrative Efficiency echoes similar sentiments expressed in this article. Department of National Defence, “Report to the Minister of National Defence by the Advisory Committee on Administrative Efficiency”, p. xiii.

Soldier

DND photo iv-2004-3137 by Sergant David Snashall

Mr. Larry Diebel (retired Major), from the Royal Canadian Legion, participated in a memorial service with the Canadian Forces at Vimy Ridge in France. 2005 has been officially declared the Year of the Veteran in Canada.