

A NEW WORLD ORDER: WHITHER THOU POLLYANNA?

by Anne-Marie Slaughter

Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004
341 pages, \$23.95 (trade paperback)

Reviewed by Andrea Charron


Anne-Marie Slaughter is gaining a reputation quickly as the new guru of international relations. Therefore, when she writes about a new world order, people tend to sit up and take notice – certainly Prime Minister Paul Martin has done so. The “newer” world order, according to Ms Slaughter, is not characterized by international organizations or by non-state actors. Instead, “disaggregated” states relating to each other through transgovernmental networks represent the new world order of global governance. While Slaughter’s enthusiasm to solve international crises through increased communication is to be admired, her assertion that networks represent the new ordering principle is faulty; networks are not ordering variables, rather, they represent mechanisms by which states relate to each other. By referring to the new world order, Slaughter is necessarily focusing on the order of states. The fact that they are “disaggregated” does not change the order – merely how they relate to each other. Unfortunately, she is comparing apples (the order of states) with oranges (how they relate to each other).

Slaughter suggests that the first step to understanding this new order is to stop thinking about a system of states, and to begin to imagine a world of governments and related institutions that perform the basic functions of governments – legislation, adjudication, implementation – interacting both with each other domestically and also with their foreign and supranational counterparts. States are still important, but Slaughter suggests one cannot conceive of them as “unitary entities.” By this she means that states are not “billiard balls” connected solely through formal, diplomatic channels housed in a Foreign Office. In today’s world, states are also connected via regulatory, judicial and legislative channels. These new channels collectively make up “transgovernmentalism.”

Slaughter argues that transgovernmental network activity is the key to solving international crises. In her opinion, “networks of bureaucrats responding to international crises and planning to prevent future problems are more flexible than international institutions and expand regulatory reach of all participating nations.” For example, national regulators (bureaucrats who are responsible for the administration of antitrust policies, securities regulations, environmental policies, criminal law enforcement, and so on) regularly collaborate with their foreign counterparts in order

to solve common problems. What Dr. Slaughter has remarked is that these meetings of bureaucrats are becoming more common – and they are preferred to world organizations, such as the World Trade Organization or the International Monetary Fund, principally because networks are more responsive than formal organizations. If this is the case, statistical examples showing a decline in the use of these more formal organizations would have been most helpful in confirming her argument.

The advantages of networks, such as increased responsiveness, apply not only to governments, but also to industry, local groups, criminal gangs and terrorists. Because they are usually less formal than institutions or organizations, networks are more flexible, and can respond to changing circumstances more quickly. Because like-minded individuals concerned about a particular issue form them voluntarily, they problem-solve more effectively. Finally, as they can be very inclusive or very exclusive, networks can vary memberships based on the issue and are not bound by a predetermined caucus of representatives. Compared to large, cumbersome international organizations like the UN, working through networks is the better choice, Slaughter believes. Criminal networks and companies have capitalized on the networking advantages for some time. Slaughter is convinced that a networked government world would produce “a more effective and potentially more just world order than what we have today...”



However, the question one must ask is: Are networks a suitable panacea for states? In order for networks to be established, at the very least, government bureaucrats and representatives must think and work differently than they do today. Government officials must have the skills and freedom to work in their domestic and international arenas. They must exercise their national authority “to implement their transgovernmental and international obligations and represent the interests of their country while working with their foreign and supranational counterparts to disseminate and distil information, cooperate in enforcing national and international laws, harmonize national laws and regulations, and address common problems.” Furthermore, they must appreciate intimately the goals of their government to represent the state, and not the individual, on the network. Slaughter has made this sound much easier than it is in practice. She rightly reminds the reader that her concept is Utopian, but believes the “new” world order is possible and necessary, and will not diminish state authority nor the role of international organizations.

Slaughter has articulated how liberal democratic states do business today. For that matter, networks represent how most business is conducted in the Western world, from private organizations to parent/teacher associations. What

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Slaughter incorrectly assumes, however, is that every state has the opportunity to participate equally and actively in these networks, and this is decidedly not the case. Furthermore, her enthusiasm as well as her linear analysis (both figuratively and literally) means she does not address the more pedestrian elements of networking. For example, she does not discuss the great resources (both financial and personnel) required; many of the more successful networks that she mentions have large secretariats attached to them to “facilitate” networking. As well, she assumes that all participants of networks represent stable, legitimate governments with clear policies, and that these governments are capable of maintaining control of their representatives. Lastly, it is assumed that all states are willing to participate in discussions with every other state/organization at the networking table, and that they will not undermine such fora by establishing more exclusive networking opportunities elsewhere.

The ordering principle among states has much to do with the concepts of power, and the use and threat of use of force by states. States still hold the monopoly on the legitimate (and many would argue, illegitimate) use of force. And yet, Slaughter does not discuss power or the use of force, presumably because networks solve the world’s problems so that power and force are meaningless. Such optimism would make even Pollyanna blush! Increased communication and the sharing of intelligence through networks may well solve many of the security threats facing states today that would otherwise require the use of force. But again, networks are the mechanism, not the ordering principle.

Finally, Slaughter’s notion of “disaggregated sovereignty” discussed at the end of the book is both intriguing and frightening, as she acknowledges. But she is again confusing apples and oranges. If disaggregated sovereignty refers to the “capacity to participate in international institutions of all types,” this is a mechanism issue. If one is referring to the eventual dependence of states upon each other to the point that individual states are no longer recognized as individual entities, then we have a new world order. Presumably, if states are so intimately connected that they no longer need to be recognized separately, then states are no longer the primary actors, and we necessarily have a new ordering principle. The creator of Star Trek, Gene Rodenberry, would be most pleased.

However, a world state, which is what Slaughter is ultimately implying, is a wonderfully Utopian, Pollyanna-ish notion, but is not tenable. Individuals may be concerned about a safer, fairer, cleaner world, but states are not so inclined. States are and always will be primarily concerned with survival of the state. The mechanisms they choose to pursue survival may include networks, but they are not the panacea Slaughter claims they are. In fact, there are many reasons for states to be disconnected from state networks in order to pursue one’s survival covertly – North Korea being the glaring example. That said, it is important that the world continues to envision mechanisms by which the basic rights of all individuals are met. Slaughter should be commended for her optimism. Nonetheless, Mr. Martin should be cautioned not to place all his faith in Slaughter’s new world order.

Andrea Charron is a PhD candidate in the War Studies programme at the Royal Military College of Canada.

VOICES OF TERROR: MANIFESTOS, WRITINGS AND MANUALS OF AL QAEDA, HAMAS, AND OTHER TERRORISTS FROM AROUND THE WORLD AND THROUGHOUT THE AGES

Walter Laqueur (ed)

New York: Reed Press, 2004

520 pages, \$29.95 (Trade paperback)

Reviewed by Colonel Bernd Horn

Noted author and historian, Walter Laqueur, has once again produced an important work on terrorism and guerrilla warfare. This book, however, draws largely from his previous work with only the third part, “The Origins of Twenty-First Century Terrorism,” representing completely new material. Nonetheless, this should not detract from the volume’s importance.

In this latest effort, Laqueur undertakes a historical examination of political violence, terrorism and guerrilla


warfare. Its strength is in his approach – he uses excerpts of the actual writings and manifestos of the theorists, revolutionaries and terrorists themselves. Therefore, the readers are able to draw their own conclusions, inferences and understanding rather than relying on the analyses and interpretations of others. In this regard, the book is rich with writings, manifestos and proclamations that provide a unique window on the history of the ethics, morality and utility, as well as techniques, in regard to using violence as a tool for political change.

Key to Laqueur’s work is his premise that terrorism has been largely misunderstood. He notes that the prevailing belief has always been that terrorism is an ideology. However, he argues that it is a strategy, and, as such, it is not a “static phenomenon.” He explains that what is true in regard to terrorism for a specific organization in one country at a certain point in time is not necessarily effective for another at another time or on another continent. Laqueur insists that specific political, social and cultural conditions predicate the way in which terrorism can be understood in a given situation.

Interestingly, Laqueur observes that terrorism has “lasted only when it functioned within the framework of a wider political movement or when it was supported by powerful outside forces.” He also notes that terrorism is a weapon that only can be used effectively against democratic regimes.

The book is not geared toward the neophyte or casual reader in terrorism or guerrilla warfare, or anyone who is searching for a quick, succinct definition, or a clear, easy-to-follow historical overview of terrorism or guerrilla warfare. Although many of the contributions are extremely powerful, and all of them are enlightening, together they do not necessarily flow to tell a self-evident story. Although the introductions to the respective sections are exemplary, it is still necessary for the reader to draw the necessary messages, nuances and meanings, and put the entirety of the work into perspective.

Additionally, the title itself is somewhat misleading. It purports to contain the words of “terrorists” throughout the ages, which it does. However, not all contributions fit into that category. Many writings are by revolutionaries and theorists who would rail at this branding or categorization.



Equally, the title, in relation to the content, raises the question of equating terrorism with revolution as synonymous concepts, rather than terrorism as a tactic of those seeking regime change. Furthermore, one-third of the book, Part II, deals exclusively with guerrilla warfare – theory, practice and methodology – and its linkage to the title is a bit strained. Notwithstanding that, Part II is easily the most comprehensive and self-evident of the three parts of the book, and it provides a solid primer on guerrilla warfare and partisans.

In the end, *Voices of Terror*, in the tradition of Laqueur’s work, is an excellent volume that is a must read for the serious scholar, security analyst or practitioner of national security. In bringing together the thoughts, declarations, ideology and writings of 120 of history’s most controversial figures, militant organizations and guerrilla groups, as well as respected military theoreticians, Laqueur has provided a powerful depiction of the politics, psychology and methodology of terrorism and guerrilla warfare. This book is well worth its price and the time it takes to read it.

Bernd Horn is Director of the Canadian Forces Leadership Institute.

THE SOLDIER’S GENERAL: BERT HOFFMEISTER AT WAR by Douglas E. Delaney


Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2005
299 pages, \$85.00

Reviewed by Colonel Michael Cessford

This book is an important contribution to Canadian military historiography, providing insight and analyses across a range of related historical topics. As a biography, it tells the story of one of Canada’s best combat leaders – a man who made his mark as a battalion, brigade and divisional commander in operations against some of the finest formations in the German Wehrmacht. In addition, it speaks to the professional development of the Canadian Army in the Second World War, a process that demanded blood, treasure and time before the formations of the Canadian Army in Europe assumed their place among the very best of the Allied divisions. Finally, this book provides additional analysis of Canadian operations in Sicily, Italy and in the western Netherlands – areas

of historical interest that have generally escaped the attentions of the majority of Canadian Second World War historians.

This being said, Delaney’s book is, first and foremost, a biography of Major-General Bertram Meryl Hoffmeister. It tells the story of an inter-war army cadet and then militia provisional lieutenant who, as a newly promoted and very inexperienced major commanding a rifle company, was one of the very first Canadian soldiers to go overseas during the Second World War. Delaney’s initial analysis of the evolution of Hoffmeister as a combat leader reflects the insight of a professional infantry officer, deepening our understanding of the process that shaped and developed a superb battalion commander. This was neither a simple nor a speedy process. Despite possessing leadership skills of the first rank, Hoffmeister was woefully ignorant of modern tactics and weapons, and he knew it. In one of the most extraordinary sections of this work, Delaney discusses Hoffmeister’s nervous breakdown in January 1941 – the direct result of his personal concerns regarding his technical and professional ability to lead troops in modern combat. This episode, briefly and guardedly discussed in Terry Copp and



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Bill McAndrew's analysis of Canadian psychiatric casualties in the Second World War, is brought to light with understanding and compassion, placing in perspective the enormous stress facing young Canadians as they prepared for combat.¹ The fact that Hoffmeister was able to surmount this crisis of confidence was remarkable; the fact that his leaders sustained their belief in his abilities is equally noteworthy. A year-and-a-half later, after successfully completing his tenure in company command, and having excelled (after a very weak start) on an advanced staff training course, Hoffmeister was offered command of his battalion – the Seaforth Highlanders of Canada.

On 10 July 1943, Hoffmeister led the Seaforths ashore during the assault on Sicily. Delaney's examination of Hoffmeister's performance throughout the campaign in Sicily is comprehensive, providing a real understanding of the development of a young commander engaged in operations for the first time. Hoffmeister led from the front, and soon earned a reputation as an outstanding combat leader – winning his spurs in a series of tough engagements against a highly competent and well-equipped enemy. In particular, Delaney's discussion of Hoffmeister's actions in the battle for Agira is excellent, giving a real sense of his growing tactical expertise, leadership and confidence.

Delaney's discussion of Hoffmeister as a brigade commander is equally polished, providing an unvarnished assessment of his performance in the fight for the Moro River, and in subsequent operations to capture Ortona. Delaney is critical of Hoffmeister's initial handling of operations beyond the Moro River, providing a cogent and frank assessment of his brigade's initial failure to breach the German defences. His analysis illustrates the complexity of operations at the brigade level, and the 'learning curve' that any new formation commander will face. This being said, Hoffmeister again proved to be an exceptionally quick study, and his performance at Ortona, well developed by Delaney, stands as a model of a remarkably effective tactical combat leader.

Delaney's analysis of Hoffmeister as a divisional commander is the best and most effective portion of this book. Hoffmeister served 14 months in operations as

the commanding general, 5th Canadian Armoured Division, and saw service in Italy and the Netherlands. This comparatively long duration in command allows Delaney to fully develop a strong and insightful assessment of the further evolution of Hoffmeister's tactical and leadership skills. The lessons learned from Hoffmeister's first operations as a division commander in the Liri Valley are traced and linked to the subsequent successes of the 5th Canadian Armoured Division against the Gothic Line, in the Romagna area, and in the Netherlands. Perhaps the most important point gained from Delaney's analysis is Hoffmeister's utter dedication to mastering his craft. This was an officer who thought seriously about the business of war, and who devoted himself to ensuring that both he, and his division, were ready for the challenges that lay ahead. When necessary, he was ruthless, removing from command any leader found wanting. The result was a first-class division that ranked among the very best in the Allied armies.

My only criticism (and it is a minor one) is the lack of context in some of Delaney's analysis. It would have been useful to view a comparison between the operations of Hoffmeister's commands and those of other Allied and Wehrmacht formations. For example, an assessment and comparison of the performances of the British 6th Armoured Division in the Liri Valley, and the British 1st Armoured Division in the Gothic Line, might have served to highlight the differences in Hoffmeister's conduct of operations. In addition, some indication of the very high quality of the German defenders in Sicily and Italy would have helped placed Hoffmeister's achievements in context.

This quibble aside, I fully enjoyed Delaney's book, and consider it a very significant addition to any Canadian military library. I strongly recommend *The Soldier's General* to all serious students of the Canadian military experience, and I look forward to further publications from Major Delaney.

Mike Cessford, an armoured officer, is currently the Director of Defence Analysis at National Defence Headquarters. He holds a PhD in History from Carleton University.

NOTE

1. Terry Copp and William McAndrew, *Battle Exhaustion: Soldiers and Psychiatrists in the Canadian Army, 1939-1945* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1990), p. 22.

LIVING BY THE SWORD? THE ETHICS OF ARMED INTERVENTION

by Tom Frame


Sydney, Australia: University of New South Wales Press, 2004
278 pages, AU\$ 34.95

Reviewed by Arthur Gans

Tom Frame is the Bishop Ordinary to the Australian Defence Forces (ADF). He is a former serving naval officer, an expert on naval history, and a professional ethicist of some skill and repute. The book *Living by the Sword?* is a revised version of the New College Lectures presented in 2003. The invitation to give this lecture asked Dr. Frame to “examine “the general topic of war with the brief that he was to provide a Christian response that would engage people of varied world views in order to open up dialogue and lead to a shared understanding.”¹ I believe, along with Dr. Trevor Cairney, the Master of New College, that Dr. Frame has completely fulfilled the charge that was given to him.

This book is both Christian and Australian in its presentation. Dr. Frame begins most chapters with an examination of the Biblical tradition before moving to either the historical or modern situation. And, although the bibliography shows a very complete mastery of the primary and secondary resources dealing with military professional ethics from around the world, most of the examples that Dr. Frame discusses relate directly to the Australian situation. In my opinion, this is a useful trait because it shows clearly how the study of military professional ethics has developed outside the North American context, as well as the particularities of the North American military experience.

Following a brief preface that gives a biographical setting for the author’s interest in the topic, there is a photo essay entitled “Humanitarian Interventions” that pictures some of the incidents participated in by the ADF. The first section of the book consists of an Introduction, followed by an examination of war before and after 450 AD. This is followed by a photo essay entitled “Political Interventions,” showing another form of intervention by the ADF. A second, and major, section follows, consisting of chapters dealing with pacifism or just war, “Just War and Iraq,” Church-State Relations, Interventions, the idea and possible use of an international constabulary, and Conscientious Objection. Two brief summary chapters close the section, one dealing with the particularity of Australian experience and situation, and the other a brief epilogue.



Why should Canadian military personnel be interested in this book? Apart from the fact that Australia probably is our closest relative in the Commonwealth, I believe that the Australian experience provides us with some very interesting parallels in the area of military professional ethics. Australia has participated in most of the wars in which Canadians participated. They share with us a devotion to the regimental tradition in the army and to the British naval tradition in the navy. Their history parallels our own in many ways – in particular the fact that both our countries moved toward real independence as a result of what our military forces accomplished during the First World War.

Another reason for reading this book is that it shows a somewhat independent development of a military professional ethic not directly engendered by the experiences of the US forces. Australia participated in the Vietnam War, but its experience in that conflict appears to me to have resulted in a different result than the experience engendered in the United States. In particular, Australia does not feel that it is called to be the “world’s policeman,” as the Americans appear to be. Finally, the fact that the Australian military are all volunteers, as are the Canadians, made their Vietnam experience different from that of the Americans at the time.

One major difference in the Canadian and Australian experiences is the participation of Australia in the “coalition of the willing” in Iraq. Dr. Frame has a lengthy chapter examining the question of whether the second Iraq War was a just war. His conclusion: “The campaign has not satisfied three of the nine just war criteria: the cause was more expedient than just; alternatives to force had not been exhausted; and the cost may prove over the next decade to have been out of proportion to the outcome.”² This chapter is closely and carefully reasoned, and there is no way that I can do complete justice to it in this brief review. Suffice it to say I believe Dr. Frame has covered the subject thoroughly and completely. Without question, there will be some who disagree, but they will have to produce more evidence than has been provided to date in order to overcome his arguments.

In the chapter on Conscientious Objection, Dr. Frame deals with what is one of the most difficult questions there is in the Just War Theory – the question of selective conscientious objection. He does this through a close examination of the history of the changes in the Australian Defence Act. As someone who, during the Vietnam War, was charged with examining those claiming conscientious objection to that particular conflict, I believe that he has provided one of the best summaries of the problem with which I am acquainted. It is a problem that is often ignored, but, if the just war theory is to have any meaning at all, it is

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one that must be dealt with and acted upon. To put it simply, if the military is called upon to fight in a manner in accordance with the precepts of International Humanitarian Law, there must be some method of provision for selective conscientious objection. Otherwise, the justification of “following orders” can excuse any and all war crimes, as long as the individual giving the orders has the legal power to do so. I believe that the Australian Government has provided a good response to the question, and would suggest that the Canadian government should do the same.

I strongly recommend this book to all military professionals. It provides a good and reasoned presentation of some of the major questions concerning military professional ethics in our day. And, although it speaks specifically from a Christian point of view, I believe it would be helpful to those of other religious traditions as well.

Major the Reverend Arthur Gans is a retired army chaplain who has a particular interest in military ethics.

NOTES

1. Trevor Cairney, Foreword, *Living by the Sword?*... p. 8
2. *Ibid.*, p. 142.

KILL THE FÜHRER: SECTION X AND OPERATION FOXLEY

by Denis Rigden

Stroud, United Kingdom: Sutton Publishing, 1999
226 pages, £ 6.99

GET ROMMEL: THE SECRET BRITISH MISSION TO KILL HITLER'S GREATEST GENERAL

by Michael Asher

London: Weidenfield and Nicholson, 2004
303 pages, US\$ 18.00

Reviewed by Sean M. Maloney


Hunting High Value Targets: Two Reviews

Military operations in the 1990s and into the new century have highlighted the increased importance of the seizure or neutralization of High Value Targets (HVTs), that is to say, current military jargon for politically significant personalities. Portrayed in the book and movie *Blackhawk Down*, the ill-fated Task Force Ranger operations in Mogadishu are the most symbolic of the problems associated with HVT seizure missions. Less well known are the numerous unsuccessful attempts by NATO-led Special Forces to apprehend Bosnian Serb leaders. Since 2001, the hunt for Al Qaeda senior leadership, particularly Osama bin Laden, continues to occupy significant intelligence and Special Operations resources. Units from the American Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) remain on call in and around Afghanistan, prepared to conduct direct action missions in the event of an intelligence ‘hit.’ In Iraq, the successful elimination of Uday and Qusay Hussein, as well as the seizure of Saddam Hussein and most of the Iraqi personnel involved in weapons of mass destruction programmes, continues to focus the ongoing interest in HVT seizure.

The stakes are high on these politically sensitive operations. When the target is not apprehended, the media will decree the mission to be a failure, which, in turn, adds to the arsenal of influence wielded by the target, not only within his organization, but also in the international arena. The frequently resultant, simplistic ‘Monday morning quarterbacking,’ however, completely overlooks the complex tactical and political decision making problems associated with HVT neutralization. This, of course, will not surprise military commentators and operators. Nor should it surprise students of military history. Two new books dealing with HVT neutralization during the Second World War should provide us some food for thought. Both Denis Rigden’s *Kill the Führer: Section X and Operation Foxley*, and Michael Asher’s *Get Rommel: The Secret British Mission to Kill Hitler’s Greatest General*, examine the operational and political problems associated with these types of operations.

Fundamentally, former diplomat Denis Rigden’s *Kill the Führer* is a compendium of new information on Section X, the German section of the Special Operations Executive (SOE), as opposed to a coherent discussion or argument on HVT neutralization missions. Two-thirds of the book deals with Section X’s involvement in *Operation Foxley*, the planning process for the assassination of Adolph Hitler, and *Foxley II*, the assassination of lesser devils in Hitler’s own Axis of Evil. The balance of the book explores Section X’s role in SOE’s other sabotage and black propaganda activities inside the Third Reich. This information is of particular interest to those examining information operations today. It is clear that the author has accessed new primary material on SOE, which enhances the stature of what would otherwise be, or could have been, a sensationalist account.

In the operational realm, *Kill the Führer* shows us the level of detail that SOE was able to accrue on Hitler’s retreat at Berchtesgaden, its environs and its




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inhabitants. *Foxley* planning centred around two specific locations where Hitler could have been shot, while he was conducting his daily constitutional walks. A back-up plan involved a bazooka attack on his vehicle while it was situated within the confines of the Berchestgarten estate. Other plans included the use of an infiltrator-delivered poison to the water tanks of the *Führerzug* (Hitler's special train), or a sabotage attack against the train while it was passing through a tunnel.

Operationally, there were numerous complications involved in mounting *Foxley*. The main issue was the lack of predictability of the target being in location at Berchtesgaden, or at any other specific site. The second issue involved finding appropriate personnel who would accept the suicidal nature of the assignment. The extensive and robust air raid shelter and air defence systems, both active and passive, significantly reduced the possibility of success when it came to plans for saturation bombing by the RAF. Indeed, to guarantee success, SOE crafted a plan to drop an airborne battalion onto the Berchtesgaden estate, with a dedicated Special Air Service (SAS) 'kill team' embedded to eliminate the human targets.

Kill the Fuhrer moves beyond the extreme yet interesting operational details to examine the potential fallout from such an assassination. The aftermath of SOE's Heydrich assassination in Prague in 1942, in which over 3000 people were murdered in retaliation, was a significant potentially deterring factor in these discussions. Surprisingly, however, the author reveals that the main reasons for not carrying out *Foxley* involved the belief by higher authorities in Great Britain, most probably influenced by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, that Hitler's constant interference in the conduct of the war effort was, in turn, advantageous to the Allied war effort, and that his removal might, in fact, make German prosecution of the war more efficient. The historical implications of this argument, however, would require a separate book.

Former SAS member Michael Asher's *Get Rommel* is a revisionist (in the best sense) account of early British special operations in the Middle East during the Second World War. Asher, the man who debunked the 'Bravo Two Zero' story in his work *The Real Bravo Two Zero*, applies similar tools to analyze the ill-fated raid to assassinate German General Erwin Rommel in Libya in 1941. Asher looks at the personalities and class backgrounds of those inexperienced and ambitious British officers, who stumbled through Crete, Lebanon and the Western Desert. And he exposes several cases of careerism, which compromised operational efficiency and also resulted in needless deaths. These leaders developed plans to eliminate Rommel in a daring deep raid.



There are many pearls embedded in this book. We learn, for example, that the raid on Rommel's supposed headquarters was one of several special operations planned to distract and harass German and Italian forces prior to the *Operation Crusader* offensive. However, the raid on Rommel has generally been portrayed as a singular event with no strategic context. *Operation Flipper*, as it was called, was, in fact, a joint operation involving the Royal Navy: the force was landed from two British submarines. The problems associated with joint special operations coordination provide classic examples of lessons learned which will apply today. Asher delves into what he calls the "creation myths" of the Special Air Service, and he compares the cultures and capabilities of the various, and, at times, competing, British special operations forces stationed in the Middle East. I tend to agree with his assessment that the most professional of the bunch was the New Zealand-dominated Long Range Desert Group.

Asher practically dismembers every aspect of the raid on Rommel. Despite the fact that high value target neutralization was a new concept, Asher exposes how personal ambition, poor planning, class arrogance and sheer 'bloodymindedness' was a prescription for disaster. Tactical aspects of the raid, such as movement to the target, close target reconnaissance and the like were practically non-existent, or, at the very least, not systematic. There was no established doctrine for such a mission in 1941. Clearly, the raid did not achieve its objectives. Raid planners did not understand that Rommel led from the front, usually in his armoured halftrack, and he was not bound to a static, rear headquarters. Indeed, Asher correctly points out that strategic signals intelligence, in this case, ULTRA decrypts provided by interception of the German Enigma cipher system, indicated that Rommel was in Italy when the raid was mounted. The results suggest that this was either a case study in poor intelligence fusion, or, more ominously, that the *Operation Flipper* force was deliberately sacrificed, perhaps even to get its ambitious field leader 'off the backs' of the staff in Cairo, and/or to sow confusion in the Axis rear area.

Taken together, both *Kill the Fuhrer* and *Get Rommel* provide fascinating case studies in the complexity of special operations forces' high value target neutralization missions. The authors have done well to remind us that there is no 'silver bullet,' and that these missions will always be in high-risk territory, both operationally and politically. Guile and prudence should be close friends, and not antagonists, with respect to these forms of operations.

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SHOCK ARMY OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE: THE CANADIAN CORPS IN THE LAST 100 DAYS OF THE GREAT WAR

by Shane Schreiber

St. Catharines: Vanwell Publishing, 2005
160 pages, \$29.95

Reviewed by Lieutenant-Colonel Michael J. Goodspeed

In the days before e-mail, the Canadian Forces (CF) watchword descriptors of military writing were “clarity, brevity, relevance and accuracy.” In his book *Shock Army of the British Empire: The Canadian Corps in the Last 100 Days of the Great War*, Shane Schreiber has exemplified this old staff school adage by producing a highly readable, succinct, well-researched and pertinent study of the last six major battles of the Canadian Corps in 1918. It is a story that all too few Canadian soldiers, sailors and airmen are familiar with; but fortunately, in this brief and engaging analysis, Schreiber has laid the groundwork to change this state of affairs.

Focused almost exclusively at the operational level of war, Schreiber’s book provides a study of the Canadian Corps in its hard-fought final six battles: the Battle of Amiens, the breaking of the Drocourt-Queant line, the Canal du Nord and Cambrai, the pursuit to Valenciennes, the storming of Mount Huoy and the return to Mons. Even for most professional officers, these names, regrettably, conjure up images of distant battle honours chiselled on war memorials or embroidered on regimental colours, rather than suggestions of tactical and operational innovation, organizational dexterity and original thinking. As a nation and an armed force, we have tended to regard the single triumphant seizure of Vimy Ridge as the crowning glory of Canadian arms. Schreiber’s portrayal of the final 100 days of battle persuasively challenges this assumption.

This book is an examination of the organizational and operational workings of the Canadian Corps, and, in this respect, it is specifically focused on a narrow range of issues. In doing this, Schreiber targets his book almost exclusively at the professional officer and a select, historically inclined readership. He does not purport to examine social attitudes, political influences, grand strategy or individual experiences. Schreiber’s perspective, although not stated as such, is principally viewed from the frame of reference


of those officers who were tasked to fight the Canadian Corps. The evidence presented is restricted to the information and analysis available to the men on the ground. Schreiber does not indulge in speculative ‘what if’ scenarios, and he is equally generous in ascribing success where it is deserved – to the British, the Australians and the Americans.

Given the success of Vimy Ridge, the state of exhaustion of all the long-term major combatant nations, and the tactical and operational impasse of the day, Schreiber depicts an army that not only had considerable fight left in it, but also one that was prepared to think about its circumstances – to innovate, to experiment, and to take measured risks. These are all themes that resonate in today’s Canadian Forces, an institution that finds itself not nearly as hard-pressed, but facing no less a challenging set of operational decisions.

One of the implied themes that runs throughout Schreiber’s book is that the seeds of modern manoeuvre warfare were sown by Canadians in the final three-and-a-half months of the Great War. This is a revolutionary re-interpretation of history, but Schreiber makes his case subtly and steadily. Perhaps we have too often accepted the popular wisdom that the *Wehrmacht*, drawing upon its experiences in the *Kaiserschlacht*, conceived manoeuvre warfare in isolation in the inter-war years. Schreiber tacitly builds a different case. His description suggests that Canadians were amongst the first practitioners of manoeuvre warfare. He examines, in

each of the final six battles, the operational, organizational, and tactical developments employed by the Canadian Corps during this phase of the war. And, in each case, he outlines the distinguishing planning elements that led to this unbroken succession of victories. In this manner, he illustrates how our forebears, without the mobility or the communications available to later generations on the battlefield, carefully crafted and implemented ‘on the fly,’ the continuous push that did so much to end the Great War.

One criticism of the book is that, with such a brief format, it inevitably tends to overlook much of the human element of this momentous period. With Schreiber focusing almost exclusively on the details of operations, organizations, and tactics, we are, for the most part, denied an examination of the crucial human dimensions of this phase of the war. Certainly one of the key contributory elements of the Canadian Corps’ effectiveness was to be found in its uniqueness. And that uniqueness was driven by the personalities who shaped the Corps’ culture. Moreover, some of the credit for this succession of victories must be



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attributed to the political leadership that insisted that the Canadian Corps was not to be broken up and incorporated on a divisional basis into the larger British Army. Instead, wiser heads prevailed, and the Canadian Corps, despite having in its organization the weight and punch of a numbered army, remained a coherent, dense and formidable formation.

Unfortunately, in this otherwise-exceptional little analysis, we do not get any real feel for the kinds of people who developed the Canadian Corps into the reliable fighting machine that it was. Schreiber makes reference on a number of occasions to the fact that the executive leadership of the Canadian Corps was cast from a different mould than those regular officers who commanded the British Army. Sir Arthur Currie was a provincial militia officer, and it was his mindset and leadership that unleashed the tactical and organizational creativity of his subordinates. Currie's leadership enabled farsighted men, such as McNaughton, who devised innovative grouping systems and new tactics for the employment of artillery, as well as subordinate commanders like Macdonell and Griesbach, who worked out new concepts of tactical manoeuvre and battlefield administration. Schreiber gives us an excellent overview of the consequences of their thinking, but in a work of this length, we are left with little insight as to the personalities and characteristics of the men who led the corps during this period.

In that vein, a study of this size cannot be expected to address, in a meaningful way, the wider context in which the Canadian Corps fought during this critical period. And thus, those searching for the sounds, smells and emotions of combat will not find it here. Nonetheless, *Shock Army of the British Empire* is an excellent examination of one of the most important formative periods in the Canadian Forces. From a historical viewpoint, this is unquestionably an important period, but its greatest current value to members of the CF is probably as a springboard for assessing contemporary problems. Schreiber's book has a judiciously clinical quality to it, and, in its examination of operational change, it is thought provoking, timely and pertinent. The book is both a fine piece of scholarship and a military analysis, but its contemporary significance qualifies it as a candidate to become required reading for any officer interested in studying historical parallels to the issues of transformation that currently face the Canadian Forces. This book, because of its size and quality, would be an excellent primer for unit officer and NCO training.

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NO HOLDING BACK: OPERATION TOTALIZE, NORMANDY, AUGUST 1944

by Brian A. Reid

Toronto: Robin Brass Studio
491 pages, \$39.95


Reviewed by John Marteinson

Book reviewers usually try to avoid high praise or total condemnation, but, in this case, I simply cannot adhere to that custom. This book in every respect merits high praise. In my view, it is one of the very best books written in recent years about Canadian operations in the Second World War.

Operation Totalize is one of the four most important battles fought by Canadian troops in northwest Europe in 1944-45. It was a resounding success, but it has always been surrounded by controversy, because things went badly wrong for the Canadians in Phase 2 of the attack on 8 August. There are a significant number of reasons why that

happened – poor leadership at several levels, overly ambitious operational plans made at Corps headquarters, last minute changes of the Corps plans that caused confusion, a failure of battle procedure, tanks that were markedly inferior to their German counterparts, and an eight-hour-long pause between the First and Second Phases that gave the Germans time to redeploy. All these conditions were topped off by skilled and determined German opponents, whose deadly-accurate anti-tank guns could kill our armour at longer ranges than our tank guns could reach out. Because there were so many factors contributing to what was a near disaster, it is remarkable there has never yet been a good, sound analysis of the operation from start to finish. Fortunately, we now have that embodied in Lieutenant-Colonel Brian Reid's new book, *No Holding Back*.

The book is sub-divided into four parts: The Roots of *Totalize*, Preparing for *Totalize*, The Night Push, and From the Jaws of Victory. In addition, there are six valuable appendices that, among other things, give the complete orders of battle of First Canadian Army and the German forces in the Caen sector.



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In the first part, Reid looks at how the Army got to Normandy in August 1944 – through the bleak inter-war period, and then, its rapid and almost haphazard expansion in the early years of the Second World War, to finally encompass a numbered field army, two corps, five divisions and two independent armoured brigades. The important point Reid makes is that because of that rapid growth, the senior leadership of the Army, from battalion on up, were completely inexperienced. And the consequence was that units and field formations were being trained for battle in Canada and England by people who hadn't the foggiest idea what they were doing. There was thus a whole lot of 'on-the-job' learning taking place once the Germans were shooting at our troops in June and July 1944, and this was before most of the officers in command positions had developed much tactical skill.

Reid deals with the detailed planning for *Totalize* in the three chapters of Part Two. Lieutenant General Guy Simonds, Commander of II Canadian Corps, had begun to study the problems associated with a corps attack astride the Caen-Falaise highway soon after the first attempt to break through the crust of the German line south of Caen fizzled out in late July. Even though *Totalize* was in reality to be a 'holding attack' intended to keep the bulk of the German armour deployed against the Canadian front, Simonds appreciated that the strength of the German defences necessitated employment of a number of innovative concepts if there was to be any hope of success. As many readers will know, for Phase 1, these included attacking at night with tanks, and other armoured vehicles in phalanx-like columns, massed to avoid exposure to the deadly German anti-tank guns, the use of armoured personnel carriers 'jerry-rigged' from surplus self-propelled guns, so that the infantry would have the same mobility as the tanks, and the use of heavy bombers as part of the fire plan in order to neutralize the enemy on the flanks. Because intelligence reports indicated there was a second, partially prepared German position some 10 kilometres south of the first, Simonds decided it would be necessary to conduct two separate break-in operations. In that he intended to use heavy bombers as an important part of his fire plan to neutralize the enemy, he recognized that a "pause with loss of speed and momentum must be accepted" between the two assaults.

In formulating his plan, Simonds envisaged three phases.

- Phase 1 would be conducted by two infantry divisions (2nd Canadian and the British 51st Highland divisions) each supported by an armoured brigade (2nd Canadian and 33rd British armoured brigades). Their task would be to break through the forward

German line with strong, narrow armoured columns, and establish a firm base from which the second phase could be launched.

- In Phase 2, after a second bomber strike on suspected German positions, one armoured division (4th Canadian Armoured Division) would penetrate through the Germans' second position, closely followed by an infantry division (3rd Canadian Division) to expand the depth of the penetration.
- Phase 3 was to be an exploitation toward the town of Falaise by a fresh armoured division (1st Polish Armoured Division), with the infantry divisions following on to occupy the captured ground.

On 5 August, two days before *Totalize* was to be launched, intelligence reported that 1st SS Panzer Division, holding the front opposite II Canadian Corps until then, was being replaced by 89th Infantry Division, but, even more important, that 1st Panzer was reinforcing 12th SS Panzer Division in the second or depth defensive line. To cope with a significantly strengthened second position, Simonds changed the plan of the operation. On the morning of 6 August, he issued revised orders: in Phase 2, 1st Polish Armoured Division was to be introduced on the left of the 4th Armoured Division (through the 51st Division) and launched at the same time, on a parallel axis, toward their objectives just short of Falaise. Phase 3 was thus cancelled. This last-minute change in plan resulted in many very serious problems, and undoubtedly contributed to the near-failure of Phase 2.

The five chapters of Part Three cover the execution of Phase I, 'The Night Push' through the tough first line of German defences by the British and Canadian armoured columns. Reid very adeptly describes the confusion of the slow but relentless advance in the dark and the dust, and the consolidation in the objective areas during the early dawn of 8 August. There is a very good chapter detailing the British advance on the left flank, something often all but ignored in Canadian accounts. Reid also deals very effectively with the most controversial aspect of this Phase: that there were no organized German defences on the Canadian front when the 4th Infantry Brigade and the Sherbrooke Fusilier tanks consolidated their hold on their Phase 1 objectives, and the contention that the Canadians, at that time, could have driven down the road all the way to Falaise without much opposition. He demonstrates that there was, indeed, a considerable and dangerous German force in that area, even before General Kurt Meyer began to redeploy the German troops to counter the Canadian penetration. Then too, had elements of 2nd Division and 2nd Armoured Brigade been able to press forward, they very soon

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would have moved out of range of their supporting artillery. But, most telling, Reid suggests that General Simonds, in any case, would have had little detailed knowledge of the situation at the front, and therefore no compelling reason to alter his plan once again.

Phase 2 and all its questionable aspects is recounted in considerable detail in the seven chapters of Part Four, 'From the Jaws of Victory.' This is where *Totalize* broke down, and where most of the controversy still resides. There were simply a host of problems that contributed to the near debacle. Some stem from the confusion generated by 4th Armoured Brigade, which issued orders to its units far too late for standard battle procedure, meaning that many of the tank crews, especially in the Grenadier Guards, which was to lead the advance in Phase 2, had no idea what was about to happen. Major Ned Amy, commanding the lead tank squadron, thought that his H-Hour was to be at 0500 hours on 8 August; he appears never to have been told about the bomber strike across the immediate front that was scheduled for 1300 hours. It was this bomber strike that made it necessary to delay launching Phase 2 for some eight hours after the Phase 1 objectives had been taken. And, it was this lengthy delay that gave General Kurt Meyer time to rally and redeploy the German forces that remained in the area, to rebuild a credible defensive position, and even to launch a counterattack that lost many of the remaining German tanks. Should the bomber strike have been cancelled so Phase 2 could have begun earlier? Colonel Reid contends that even had the bombing been called off, neither 4th Armoured Division nor 1st Polish Armoured Division would have been ready to push off: there were still large groups of bypassed Germans offering resistance in the area 'cleared' in Phase 1, and many of their units were stalled in traffic jams. Then too, the divisional artillery had not yet been deployed forward. Reid then goes into considerable detail about the action once Phase 2 finally got underway, as well as the many instances of 'finger trouble' – too many to recount in a short review.

In an epilogue at the end of Part Four, Reid tackles the principal 'myths' that have grown up around *Totalize*, and he corrects many commonly held errors of fact and interpretation. This, in itself, is worth the price of the book. In fact, throughout the book Reid's analyses

of the rationale for decisions, and his explanations as to why events developed as they did, are logical and dispassionate, even though some may disagree with some of his interpretations.

One of the striking features of this book is its superb presentation. Even though it is all black and white, it is beautifully illustrated, with carefully chosen photos, maps, organization charts and vehicle and weapon drawings. The 27 maps drawn by Chris Johnson are simply excellent: accurate depictions of the ground and the action, with just the right amount of detail provided. Johnson also drew the charts and the vehicle profiles, for which he has become so well known. And, as with all Robin Brass books, the layout is thoroughly professional.

I do have one criticism, and that has to do with style. The author has chosen to use the original language for German and Polish rank designations, and for the names of units and formations. I find this both pedantic and annoying. For example, ranks are shown as *SS-Oberführer* or *Sturmbannführer* or *Hauptsturmführer* or *Pulkownik*. Formations and units are *1. Dywizji Panczernej* (1st Polish Armoured Division), *24. Pulk Ulanów* (24th Lancer Regiment), *1. Abteilung SS-Panzerregiment 12*, *Divisionbegleitkompanie 12*, or *SS-Werferabteilung 12*, and so on. If the author were writing about Russian units, would their names be in Cyrillic script? While it is indeed common practice to use some commonly understood German words, such as *Panzer* or *Panzer-Grenadier*, the usual convention is to translate ranks and most unit titles into English. It makes it easier to follow the narrative.

In addition to being highly instructive, this book is a most enjoyable read. The writing style is lively, sometimes even with a bit of an 'edge,' sometimes showing the humorous side of a situation. Reid's descriptions are vivid, and have that ring of soldierly understanding that comes from long experience in the field. This book should be in the library of every student of Canadian military history.

John Marteinson is the former editor of *Canadian Military Journal* and *Canadian Defence Quarterly*. He teaches Second World War history at the Royal Military College of Canada.

GÉNÉRAL DOLLARD MÉNARD, DE DIEPPE AU RÉFÉRÉNDUM

by Pierre Vennat

Montreal: Les Éditions Art Global, Montréal, 2004
340 pages

Reviewed by Dr. Béatrice Richard

The Disenchantment of Life After War


Biographies of French-Canadian military leaders are rare, and for good reason. It is only from the Second World War onward that a significant enough number of them would rise to the rank of general. This was the case, in particular, with Bernatchez and Allard, who both won their spurs in European campaigns. Consequently, francophone officers reached the senior ranks most often during the Cold War, a period which scarcely lent itself to spectacular armed operations. This contrasts with the experiences of Currie, McNaughton and Simonds, who were all senior commanders during the two world wars.

With his recent biography of General Dollard Ménard, journalist Pierre Vennat attempts to rectify this situation. In the process, the author takes on an individual who is complex and very controversial. Did not the hero of the Dieppe raid create a sensation by taking a stand in favour of the “yes” side in the 1980 Referendum?

General Ménard was the commander of the Fusiliers Mont-Royal, the only francophone unit that participated in *Operation Jubilee*, conducted on 19 August 1942 against the French port of Dieppe. He was also one of the few officers who survived the massacre. Recalled to Canada, he became the central figure of an avid propaganda campaign searching for a war hero at a critical time of the war. The Allies were retreating on all fronts and a disillusioned public could quickly turn against the Dieppe debacle. However, possibly even worse was the fact that nearly four months earlier, Quebec francophones had voted *en masse* against conscription. As in 1917, war policy was dividing the two founding peoples. The War Information Office had no other option but to portray the disaster as a heroic raid. In this context, the fact that Ménard was a French-Canadian was a windfall. Who, if not him, could revive the patriotism of the inhabitants of La Belle Province? Wounded five times in combat, the commander of the Fusiliers Mont-Royal thus became

a veritable media star who was taken to the four corners of Canada to boost the sale of Victory Bonds, all while minimizing the disaster at Dieppe.

The major point of interest in this book is Vennat’s presentation of the “before” and the “after” of this disorganized media campaign that remains unparalleled in the history of war propaganda in Canada. How does one become a war hero? What are the “profits and losses” associated with such a distinction? The author attempts to answer these questions based on interviews he conducted with Dollard Ménard when he was still alive, and through the contents of Ménard’s personal diary. He traces the life of the future general, from his entry into the Royal Military College of Canada until his death in 1997. Vennat includes Ménard’s experience as an officer in the Indian Army, where he fought rebel tribes on the frontier between Pakistan and Afghanistan. This episode, in particular, provides an understanding as to why Ménard, amongst others, was selected for the 1942 raid: Combined Operations required experienced men to quickly train shock troops. In this case, only four months passed between preliminary approval of the plan and its execution. The “after Dieppe” period is, without doubt, the most poignant part of the book.



For obvious reasons, there is a tendency to turn the spotlight on generals when they are in the heat of the action. However, in this case, Ménard is mainly tracked through an unglamorous maze of military bureaucracy. In fact, Vennat describes a descent into hell for the man. After Dieppe, and still not fully recovered from his wounds, Ménard was sent at the head of the Hull Regiment to liberate Kiska Island. The mission unfolded without incident, since the Japanese occupiers had already abandoned the island before the Canadian troops landed. End of story.

Ménard’s subsequent career was one long series of disappointments, starting with the after-effects of his wounds, which kept him away from the European fighting fronts for the rest of the war. Of course, these health problems had a direct effect on promotions, which were slow in coming. Between the lines, we discover the extent to which the career soldier who has stopped fighting has a difficult time coping and thriving. Vennat shows very well how much the return to the monotony and the red tape of bureaucracy was difficult for this hero, who had experienced the intensity of the operational theatre and who subsequently had

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been highly praised in a propaganda campaign. In addition, there was the difficulty associated with being a francophone in the army, especially in peacetime. Like other francophone officers of his generation, Ménard continued to denounce the discrimination faced by French-Canadians. Nevertheless, he was able to obtain a position as military attaché in Paris after the war, and then served as United Nations chief of staff in Kashmir from 1950 to 1951. His later career was rather lacklustre, complicated by alcoholism and depression, which, one suspects, poisoned his interpersonal relationships. He returned to civilian life in 1965, nine years after having been promoted to brigadier-general, but he faced serious problems upon re-entering the work force.

Bitter and disillusioned, Dollard Ménard was in the headlines again, but this time generating controversy, particularly when he filed a libel suit against Generals Jean-Victor Allard and Jacques Dextraze after the 1980 referendum campaign. Ridiculed by his comrades-in-arms for his statements favouring the “yes” side, the old warrior bared his teeth and ultimately received a public apology. Another controversy erupted on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of Dieppe. The hero of *Jubilee* was offended at not having been invited to the commemorative ceremonies.

Through these anecdotes, Pierre Vennat paints a human and touching, although not a sympathetic portrait of a man who, after having given everything for his country, felt that he had been abandoned by it. Was he right or wrong? This is what the reader wonders at every page of this biography. Admittedly, the author observes the rules of journalism here and extensively allows his subject to speak for himself, without diminishing his shortcomings or pettiness. The advantage of this approach is that it allows the reader to form his or her own opinion. However, the “professional” historian will perhaps not find this linear account very useful. Frequently, it is in the form of a patchwork of interviews, press clippings and extracts from personal diaries. As a result, there are occasionally some very long quoted passages, for which the sources are forgotten in the course of reading them. The reader no longer knows who is being cited: be it Pierre Vennat, General Ménard or even someone else. In short, the style is sometimes confusing, but this book tells a good story and portrays an engaging individual whose fate leads one to reflect on the disenchantment of life after war.

Béatrice Richard holds a doctorate in History. She teaches at RMC, in Kingston



CMJ collection

Aftermath of the raid – The beach at Dieppe.