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CWM Painting

CWM 19710261-1049

Harold Beament, “St. Lawrence Convoy”.

The Summer Of 1943: An Episode In The Battle Of The St. Lawrence River – surveillance, Defence And Propaganda

by André Kirouac

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On 19 June 1943, the newspaper La Presse published, as part of its series, “Are we being defended?”, an article by the journalist Roger Champoux, which began as follows:

“From a port on the St. Lawrence, 19[?]. We are at an elevation of 510 feet. The church steeple of the village at the bottom of the cliff is a thin silver spindle. The land undulates towards the river which, at this point, is no less than 40 miles wide. We are in the secret zone of the Gaspé region, where the Coast Defence Service has installed its first observation post. Since we are bound to secrecy, we cannot report what we can see. We can say, however, that modern science has been put to use and that the Engineering Branch of the army has provided the region with the most perfect facility that could be.”

What did Champoux see for him to describe some military facilities as being very modern? In a secret report of the Department of National Defence, entitled Coastal Defence, Batteries and Radars,1 the chapter, “Army radar – Gaspé Area” described the locations of 10 GL (Gun Laying) type radar stations operated by the army. According to the report, the first of these radar stations was installed near the small municipality of Rivière-Blanche, a short distance from the village of Matane, some 400 kilometres east of Quebec City, on the south shore of the St. Lawrence, at an altitude of exactly 510 feet. It is thus likely that Champoux was looking at a GL type radar of the Canadian Army.

To understand the need for installing radars along the Gaspé coast of the St. Lawrence during the Second World War, we must go back to the beginning of an extraordinary story that started with the outbreak of hostilities in September 1939, and one which has had ramifications for decades thereafter.

Amongst all the access routes to North America, the St. Lawrence is, without doubt, the one that penetrates most deeply into the continent. It is not surprising, therefore, that during the Second World War, Canadian authorities conceived a detailed plan of the best ways to both counter enemy threats and to assure the continuity of navigation on the river. Without giving a complete description of all the events related to what is called the Battle of the St. Lawrence, it should be noted that 15 German submarines penetrated the Gulf of St. Lawrence and the St. Lawrence River, particularly during 1942, and, to a much lesser extent, late in 1944. Eight of these submarines torpedoed 21 merchant ships and 5 warships, of which 4 were Canadian and 1 was American.


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Major confrontations took place during the summer and autumn of 1942. Often, the coastal population watched powerless as corvettes hunted German submarines with depth charges.

During the year, throughout the navigation season (the navigable season on the river, when it is ice-free), Sasseville Roy, Member for the Gaspé region in the House of Commons, echoed his constituents’ concerns by broaching the subject of the torpedoings. He repeatedly questioned the appropriate Ministers on the measures being taken to protect both the shipping and the population. The answers were often vague and laconic. They advised Roy to be more discrete and not to reveal anything that could be useful to the enemy. As for the newspapers, the journalists reported as best they could the very first torpedoings. But the censors quickly took to task everyone involved in the release of this information, and the riverside population remained, by and large, the only likely witnesses, aside from the warriors themselves, to the ship torpedoings.

By the end of 1942, people who had some knowledge of the situation came to the general conclusion that the German submarines were in control in Canadian waters. It is a belief that is still widespread, even though more and more sources have revealed that reality was very different matter. With the technological means available to them, Canadian military personnel attacked and counter-attacked repeatedly to prevent more torpedoings. We know today that the German crews knew they were being pursued and that it became increasingly difficult for them to attack as the navigation season continued to roll on. However, the decision to close the St. Lawrence to transatlantic ships during the autumn of 1942 led many Canadians to believe that their country could not successfully counter the German submarines. In fact, there was an entirely different reason for this measure, but at the time it appeared to be an admission of defeat. The actual cause of this decision was the great demand for ships for Operation Torch, the Allied landings in North Africa. Without a sufficiently large fleet, Canada could not participate simultaneously in these overseas operations and protect the St. Lawrence River.

Nonetheless, the rumours had had their effect, and the Canadian government needed to both reassure the population and to demonstrate that they were taking the events occurring on the river seriously. To that end, the military authorities held a series of planning meetings aimed at improving the defences of the St. Lawrence during the upcoming 1943 navigation season. According to period documents, the military personnel who prepared these meetings and took part in them were very serious about protecting the inland waters. Meanwhile, military considerations aside, the political authorities wanted to reassure the local population and to silence their critics in the wake of the torpedoings of 1942.


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While concrete and often ultra-secret military activities were occurring during the summer of 1943, some other events of that summer demonstrated that a propaganda campaign was also being well orchestrated. On 30 January 1943, the first of two reports, entitled General Review and Report upon Defences in the Gulf and River St. Lawrence Areas by a Committee Formed under the Direction of the Chiefs of Staff Committee,2 described the measures to be taken against enemy submarines and to prevent the landing of spies. The authors of this Report described the events that had happened during 1942, and the principal measures taken by the three branches of the armed forces to counter and to prevent attacks. They hinted that the enemy would probably return in 1943, and that Canadian military authorities did not rule out the possibility that land installations would be attacked or that mines would be laid. A detailed plan, the cost of which was estimated to be more than one million dollars, explained the specific roles of the navy, the air force, the army, the police, the Civil Protection Committee and the Aircraft Detection Corps.

The second report,3 published on 18 April of the same year, was a response to a tasking from the Chief of the General Staff, who considered it essential that the three branches of the armed forces work together, in conjunction with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, the provincial police and all the other services involved in coastal defence. The authors formulated a series of recommendations for coordinating and unifying the measures that needed to be taken to defend the coasts. They described in detail almost every measure, and paid particular attention to public relations. For example, the good relations that Army Reserve units had cultivated with the public were highlighted.4 This good rapport was to be maintained and the military authorities encouraged contacts with community leaders, who would be a link with the citizens of the region. The officers of the Reserve units who lived in the villages would also be ex-officio members of observer groups for the Aircraft Detection Corps, and they would be responsible for training new members of these groups.

The authors of the Report provided clear instructions on how to involve the general population. Military personnel were to go to the coastal villages to meet with the inhabitants, and to inform them of the measures taken by the government for coastal defence. It was necessary to:

  1. Carry out these missions, in which regular Army and Reserve officers would participate, and, as early as possible in the spring;

  2. travel to the coasts of the St. Lawrence, the Baie des Chaleurs and Anticosti Island;

  3. prepare itineraries and organize meetings which would be chaired by a member of the clergy, of the local council, or by other community leaders;

  4. plan the meetings, with particular attention to presentations and films;

  5. post public notices in French and English;

  6. ensure that the people who wished to participate in the meetings were notified through the media; and

  7. create educational advertising as to what everyone could do to help.

The Civil Protection Committee for Quebec would prepare this campaign, in conjunction with the public affairs officers of the three branches of the armed forces.

Clearly, 1943 was a year marked by an extensive education of the riverside population. Could this be called a propaganda campaign, rather than an educational campaign? Judging by the media accounts and by the methods used during the summer of 1943, this was a major propaganda campaign, aimed at dispelling the perceptions of defeat created in 1942. The Champoux article, as well as all the others that appeared in the ‘dailies’, enthusiastically championed the measures taken by the military. They described the procedures for capturing spies or saboteurs, acknowledged the participation of military personnel in local festivities, and underlined the cooperation of the Gaspé community leaders. The band of the Royal 22e Régiment was even invited to participate in the centenary celebrations of the village of Grande-Vallée.

Military parade

Firmin Fournier Collection

During the summer of 1943, members of the Fusiliers du Saint-Laurent parade through the village of Grande-Vallée in the Gaspé during centenary celebrations.

In June 1943, some journalists and a film crew were given a most unusual invitation. Consequently, the newspapers reported the visit of Brigadier General Edmond Blais, Commander of the 5th Military Region, accompanied by Lieutenant-Colonel Jos Pinault, Commander of the 2nd Reserve Battalion of the Fusiliers du Saint-Laurent.

A very large number of photographs of the various activities carried out by the reservists were taken. From the Île Verte roadblock, to practice shooting towards the river, everything was done to show to advantage the organization of the defences of the Gaspé coast. As far as is known today, the film crew made three short propaganda films. One of them, Défense côtière,5 described, in very patriotic tones, the measures taken to defend the Gaspé. The narrator described Gaspé as a stronghold, where everyone had become an observer and took an active part in the overall defence effort.

Nonetheless, the term radar did not appear in either of the two military reports, or in the newspaper articles or documentaries. Champoux alone hinted at radars, and only decades later would it be understood to which type of facility he was referring. Moreover, in July 1943, the Canadian and American forces exchanged letters with respect to limiting the use of the word radar. For example, in one letter dated 8 July 1943, the Chief of Review Branch of the US Army asked his Canadian colleagues to avoid using this term in the subject heading of messages and in military operations. At that time, as far as other Allied nations were concerned, they emphasized that radar technology must not fall into the hands of the enemy. For example, in an article published in 1995, former wartime army engineer Captain R.O. Lafond wrote:

“One morning in April [1943], my commanding officer, Colonel Richardson, ordered me to meet three or four senior officers at Rimouski [it might have been at Mont-Joli], to accompany them and to be at their disposal. “It seems to me”, he said, “that an important and secret project has been under consideration for some time in Ottawa.” Without giving any more information. I don’t think the colonel himself knew at that point about the project. The objective of the project was finally revealed to me, but I was told emphatically that it was to remain ultra-secret ...All the data provided by the officers from Ottawa were transmitted to me verbally, and nothing was written, since everything had to be kept very secret.”6

On that day, Captain Lafond got a preliminary view of the mission he would carry out in the Gaspé. The idea of installing radars along the Gaspé coasts verified, on one hand, the importance the military accorded the probable return of German submarines, and on the other hand, their eagerness to trial technology being developed by the scientists at the National Research Council of Canada.

Radars made in Canada

During the 1930s, the Americans and the British7 had each designed a device that could detect the enemy from a distance. Canada followed with interest the progress of the British, and in March 1939, Major General McNaughton sent an emissary to London to learn how the research was progressing. In the months that followed this visit, the National Research Council commenced a new program.

Since one of the military’s priorities was to protect Canadian coasts, a coastal defence radar had been installed at the entrance to the port of Halifax, at Duncan Cove, Nova Scotia. Coastal defence radar was actually being tested during August and September 1941, and throughout the war, this type of radar equipment was constantly being improved.

In late-1941, once budgets had been approved, researchers hired and buildings were under construction, the National Research Council started to devote its attention to developing the GL Mark III C type advanced microwave radar, the “C” standing for Canadian. Therefore, at the same time as coastal defence type radars were being fielded, the National Research Council was working assiduously on this Canadian version of the advanced British radar. The development of the GL Mark III C required major outlays in terms of personnel, equipment and capital.8 Great Britain provided Canada with the GL Mark I and the GL Mark II radars, from which scientists subsequently developed the Canadian version. It is interesting to note that Canada’s Mark III version would ultimately become operational before that of the British, even though the British were the pioneers in this field.

This type of radar was a technological revolution, because microwaves accomplished the detection process, making it easier to spot small targets at a distance greater than that of the earlier radars. The military believed that such a device could probably detect the conning tower of a submarine. This capability was not lost on service personnel, who had to find the best ways to defend the coasts of Canada. According to a memorandum dated 20 August 1943, these GL type radars had theoretical range of 40,000 yards, could detect the conning tower of a submarine at 12,000 yards, and its periscope at 8000 yards. However, the author of this memorandum pointed out that the detection range in the St. Lawrence was short, since, due to geographical constraints, a large area could not be covered, and he also added the caveat that these radars had not actually been tested for submarine detection.

The GL Mark III C system consisted of two trailers that carried the equipment. The first, called an Accurate Position Finder, allowed the operators to send and to receive radar waves to and from the target. Two parabolic antennae were mounted on its roof and they rotated on a vertical axis. The second, called a Zone Position Indicator, contained the necessary equipment to locate and plot on a map, ships that were to be monitored. Besides these trailers, the vehicles needed for the operation of the radar consisted of a diesel unit and a truck for transporting cables and spare parts. Since all the components of the radar were easy to move by road, a GL Mark III C system could be installed in just a few days.

In spite of the many problems that could have undermined the development of such a device, Canada had succeeded, back in the summer of 1941, in convincing the Allies to order 660 of these evolving Canadian radars. Five were quickly built and, even before the end of 1941, Canada had sent one to England and one to the United States for testing. As the months passed, Canada eventually contributed the full order of 665 GL Mark III C radars to the war effort.9


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A Type VII U-boat on its way out to sea from its base on the west coast of France.

Even though this particular radar became operational and effective, the scientists were doing more. They also developed long-range Microwave Early Warning [MEW]) radars for the Royal Canadian Air Force, used to detect aircraft. This type of radar, which utilized a radio frequency much higher than that of conventional radars, could, according to reports generated at the time,10 detect flying objects at a distance of almost 200 miles. As for detecting surfaced submarines at long ranges, a MEW/AS (anti- submarine) variant was also developed.

A memorandum dated 18 July 1943 stated that one of these anti- submarine radar sites, in this case operated by air force personnel, at Rivière-au-Renard, could cover the entire area between the tip of the Gaspé and Anticosti Island. Although this type of radar had some definite advantages, one lingering concern remained: would the radar operators be able to distinguish between an Allied ship and a submarine on their screens? Nevertheless, and even though it would never actually occur, the military also considered installing this particular type of radar on the north shore of the St. Lawrence at Pointe-des-Monts, Sept-Îles, and Havre-Saint-Pierre.11

Mounted on a tower and not on trailers, the MEW/AS type radar was specifically adapted for detecting naval vessels, especially surfaced submarines. The military quickly realized that this new defensive weapon could be very useful for scanning the surface of the waters of the Gulf of Saint Lawrence. The MEW/AS equipment could detect the enemy from a distance. Moreover, its wavelength made it possible to detect small objects, especially submarine conning towers or periscopes.

Thus, the Canadian military had high hopes for using radar technology for coastal defence. After the incursion of German submarines in Canadian waters in 1942, it was only natural that some officers decided to include radars in the planning of defence measures for 1943.


Naval Museum of Québec

Radar sites established along the St. Lawrence River.

Radars on the Picturesque Gaspé Coasts

Back in a memorandum dated 18 March 1943, the RCAF’s Air Vice-Marshal N.R. Anderson presented his conclusions and recommendations on the defence measures that should be taken if German submarines returned that year. According to the information that had been passed to him, the radars could detect submarine conning towers in the waters of the St. Lawrence. He therefore suggested installing a minimum of 10 radar units, spaced 10 miles apart, and at a minimum elevation of 200 feet, between the villages of Matane and Gaspé. He maintained they were all to be operated by army personnel.12 However, this proposal did not seem to be based upon knowledge of the actual range of the radars in question. Two days later, on 20 March, Anderson also suggested installing Radio Detection Finder (RDF)13 stations to monitor the Belle Isle and Cabot straits, as well as the Honguedo Strait, which separates the Gaspé Peninsula from Anticosti Island. Without explicitly saying so, he was suggesting the use of MEW/AS type radars

Except for these two memorandums, it is difficult to find written documents pertaining to the installation of radars in the Gaspé region. The most interesting details with respect to this subject have been provided by that army engineer, Captain (retired) R.O. Lafond, who, in December 1995, published the aforementioned article entitled “Le sous-marin de Maisonnette et les radars de la Gaspésie”.14

Location15 Latitude Longitude Elevation (in feet)


48° 45’ 40”

67° 40’ 50”



48° 52’ 15”

67° 23’ 00”


Ruisseau à Sam

48° 00’ 00”

67° 04’ 00”



49° 05’ 20”

66° 44’ 15”



49° 09’ 30”

66° 24’ 05”


Ruisseau Arbour

49° 13’ 30”

65° 58’ 05”


Manche d’Épée

49° 15’ 15”

65° 28’ 30”



49° 13’ 50”

65° 08’ 20”


Chloridorme [sic]

49° 11’ 20”

64° 51’ 50”


Cap Gaspé

48° 45’ 05”

64° 09’ 44”


Locations of the GL Mark III C Radars in the Gaspé.

In the spring of 1943, Captain Lafond was assigned to the 5th Work Unit of the Corps of Engineers in the Quebec City region. At the headquarters located there, he was entrusted with an ultra-secret mission. He and his team were tasked to determine the best sites between Matane and Gaspé for installing radars, and he subsequently spent several days touring that region. As work progressed, he was given more details about his mission. Lafond and his team visited the villages of the Gaspé, one by one, and they located sites at regular intervals that met the requirements of the army headquarters in Quebec City.

During the summer of 1943, Captain Lafond and his team of 45 sappers cleared and leveled the sites, then installed the radars. He never divulged the exact locations. The military descended in force upon the Gaspé, installing telephone lines to link the radar sites and the coastal observation posts, going to the villages to meet the inhabitants, making documentary films, carrying out many simulated combats and drills for capturing spies, and so on.16 In short, military personnel were everywhere. Was it because of this omnipresence that no local residents appear to have noticed the unusual radar installations? This theory is plausible because if one questions the people who were living in the coastal villages in 1943 today, they are adamant that no radar had been installed in their village.

The work progressed during the summer and fall, except for an interruption of about two weeks at the beginning of September.17 In December, in spite of the snow and a few storms, the last radar was installed at Cap Gaspé. It appears that the team was happy to finally leave the Gaspé.

The installation of the 10 stations took a little over seven months, from May to December 1943. It is therefore surprising to read in a report, dated 20 August 1943:

“Submitted for your information: besides the radar station at Rivière-au-Renard operatedby the Royal Canadian Air Force, there are now 10 G.L. stations operated by the army in the following locations.”18 Was the intention to impress a superior, or was this due to the distance from the work sites of Captain Lafond’s team? According to this document, the station at Rivière-au-Renard was opera-tional and reliable, for, in spite of a thick fog, the operators detected the passage of a convoy of ships. Again, it is intriguing to read, in a memorandum dated 22 May 1944,19 that the station at Rivière- au-Renard was only partially built, and that it was only expected to be operational by 1 July 1944.


DND photo DHH 3-1198

HMCS Clayoquot, one of the stalwart Bangor-class minesweepers pressed into long-term escort duty on the Atlantic coast and in the Gulf of St. Lawrence.

What is further surprising is that, starting in the spring of 1944, Captain Lafond was asked to return to the Gaspé to dismantle the radar stations, one by one! The mission was carried out efficiently and there was only one incident, at Cap-Chat, that could have been tragic. The work of dismantling and removing the radar trailers began in the east of the peninsula, at Cap Gaspé. When all the equipment was ready, it was added to the convoy and the team would proceed onward to dismantle the next site. At Cap-Chat, a convoy of 18 trailers was parked on the side of the road for the removal of another radar. The station had been constructed at 310 feet elevation and the slope of the access road approached 80 percent. Needless to say, the trip down the road was precarious. Rope was used for extra safety but, in spite of the precautions, one of the radars slid down the road, overturned and ended up a short distance away from the convoy. Even though the accident had not been disastrous, the military held an inquiry into the actions of the captain (Lafond) and his men to shed light upon the incident. Ultimately, no one was severely blamed.

While Captain Lafond and his men installed and then removed the GL type radars in 18 months, another team was busy at the building site of the aforementioned MEW/AS radar a short distance from the village of Rivière-au-Loup. However, as was the case with the GL Mark III C radars, the MEW/AS site at Rivière-au-Loup was dismantled before the end of the war.


The invention of radar in the years preceding the outbreak of the Second World War enabled, for the first time in the history of conflict, the (technological) detection of the enemy’s movements at very great distances. Radar was one of the deciding factors of the war. Subsequently, the acquisition of this technology became a priority for nations that wanted to have a competitive edge. The Canadian authorities were as determined to use radars in their military operations as were their American and European allies. They even supported research in this ‘cutting edge’ area, through the direct participation of the National Research Council of Canada, The work carried out by Canadian scientists was as good as that of other Allies, and it can be said that, in this field, Canadians made a significant contribution to the war effort.

Radars were built for every possible use and theatre of operations. They were adapted as needed, whether for detecting aircraft, ships or surfaced submarines. As one can imagine, the equipment was rudimentary. But, in the eyes of the combatants, it had an effect that was reassuring for allies and worrisome for enemies. Senior officers and politicians, who knew of the existence of this new weapon, considered it crucial, and they hoped to make good use of it as often and as effectively as possible. Canada, being far from the major battlefields in an era when many long-range aircraft did not exist, had to have the capability to effectively monitor her coastlines. Thus, radars were installed at the approach of major ports, particularly at Halifax. Elsewhere in the country, radars were used on secret missions, such as for the possible capture of a German submarine in the Baie des Chaleurs during the autumn of 1943.

It was essential that the use of radars be kept secret at the time, and it is not surprising that the installation of ten of them along the Gaspé Peninsula apparently went unnoticed. On the other hand, it is somewhat ironic that their installation took a relatively long period of time, and that ultimately, they were not even used. The work of 1943 served no useful purpose, since all the radars were eventually dismantled, commencing early in 1944.


CMJ collection

The ferry SS Caribou, the last merchant ship to be lost in the 1942 Battle of the St. Lawrence. She was sunk by U-69 on 14 October 1942, with the loss of 136 men, women and children.

Why so much time and effort for such an insignificant outcome? Was Ottawa really worried that the Germans would attack in 1943, as they had done in the preceding year? If the only goal was to reassure the population, why choose a technology that was secret and could not be made known to the public? One could theorize that the military authorities had to show the local government that Canada had the technological means and military capability to defend the country. After the setbacks of 1942, during which time over 25 ships were torpedoed, the military had to prove that, in future, they would be able to counter-attack. In governmental and military headquarters, it was believed that Canada had reacted well to the incursions of the German submarines, and that, when all was said and done, there could have been many more losses than those actually suffered. On the other hand, public opinion, especially from Members of Parliament who represented the region, interpreted the events very differently. Viewed from the outside, and with only the few bits of information that the censors let slip by, these events constituted a Canadian debacle. Thus, the military had to fight on two fronts: to reassure the Gaspé population, and to convince governmental authorities of the nation’s military capability. These two wartime goals were tackled head on, and the objectives were achieved during the summer of 1943.

Nonetheless, damage had been done and, in the long run, a certain spirit of defeatism won out.20 In spite of the newspaper articles and the use of ‘state-of-the-art’ technology that was very impressive, many of those interested in the subject today still believe that Canada lost the Battle of the St. Laerence.21

In light of what we now know about the secret mission of Captain Lafond and his men in 1943, it is interesting to note that M. Champoux, through a few lines in his censored newspaper article, was able to hint at an ultra- secret wartime military undertaking. Today, a trip along the Gaspé coasts can be very interesting for those who want to trace the sites of the radars installed during the war by Captain Lafond.

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André Kirouac is the Director of the Musée naval de Québec. He has worked for more than 25 years in museums in Québec and the United States, specializing in naval or maritime history.


  1. File 84/264, Archives of the Directorate of History and Heritage, Canadian Department of National Defence.
  2. File S.22-1-17, Archives of the Directorate of History and Heritage, Canadian Department of National Defence.
  3. Second Report upon Defences in the Gulf |and River St. Lawrence Areas by a Committee Formed under Direction of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, 193.009 (D19), CSC Miscelleanous memoranda, April/May 43, Vol.18, Archives of the Directorate of History and Heritage, Canadian Department of National Defence.
  4. The document refers particularly to the reserve battalions of the Fusiliers du Saint-Laurent.
  5. The two others are about the centenary celebrations of Grande-Vallée and a military exercise carried out by of the Fusiliers du Saint-Laurent at Gros-Morne.
  6. R.O. Lafond, “Le sous-marin de Maisonnette et les radars de la Gaspésie”, Revue de la Société historique Nicolas-Denys, décembre 1995, pp.76-77.
  7. W. E. Knowles Middleton, Radar Development in Canada: The Radio Branch of the National Research Council of Canada 1939-1946, Waterloo, Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1981, p.8.
  8. For more information on Canadian research on radars, see Wilfrid Eggleston, Scientists at War, Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1950, and W. E. Knowles Middleton, Radar Development in Canada: The Radio Branch of the National Research Council of Canada 1939-1946.
  9. Eggleston, p.45.
  10. Ibid., p.60.
  11. Army Radar Stations – Gaspé area, NOIC to C, C.C.N.A. 20-8-43, 1052-3-1 (1), Archives of the Directorate of History and Heritage, Canadian Department of National Defence.
  12. Memorandum, R.D.F. Anti-submarine Measures in the Gulf of St. Lawrence, March 18 1943, RG24, Vol. 3901, Library and Archives Canada.
  13. As stipulated, he does not use the term radar.
  14. R.O. Lafond, pp. 74-90.
  15. The spelling of the locations comes from Army Radar Stations – Gaspé Area. NOIC to C. in C.C.N.A. 20-8-43, 1052-3-1.
  16. Coastal Defence, Batteries and Radar, File 84/264, Archives of the Directorate of History and Heritage, Camadian Department of National Defence.
  17. Captain Lafond had to go to New Brunswick because the Canadian Army urgently needed two radars for a secret operation. The operation is too complex to describe in this article. For more information, visit the web site of the Musée naval at Quebec City: <www.mnq-nmq.org>.
  18. Coastal Defence, Batteries and Radar, [TCO].
  19. Memorandum: R.C.A.F. Radar Anti-Submarine Measures in Gulf of St. Lawrence Area, N.S. 1037-2-6, May 22, 1944, Archives of the Directorate of History and Heritage, Canadian Department of National Defence.
  20. To put all this in perspective, the articles and works of Roger Sarty, especially Le Canada et la Bataille de l’Atlantique (Montréal: Art Global, 1998), and The Maritime Defence of Canada (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1996), are recommended reading.
  21. To learn more about the Battle of the St. Lawrence, visit the web site of the Musée naval at Quebec City. <www.mmq-mmq.org>.