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The North Atlantic Treaty


NATO IMS photo b060509z

Meeting of the NATO Military Committee in Chiefs of Staff session. Canadian General Ray Henault is presiding as Chairman of the Committee.

Canada and NATO: A Starving Fish in an Expanding Pond

by Michael J. Lawless

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At the conclusion of the Second World War, Canada was a recognized power in the world. While not a major power, Canada was capable, nonetheless, of expressing its view on the world stage, and able to expect that other nations – including the major powers – would listen to those views. Canada’s contribution – politically, economically and militarily – during the Second World War was significant enough that it bought respect for the world view of Canada at the international table following the hostilities. However, without a continuing contribution to defence and security resources, Canada’s sacrifices during the war would inevitably become an investment depleted over time – to the point where the Canadian world view could be ignored with impunity on the international stage.

Unfortunately, Canada has failed to maintain its contributions to world peace and security at a high enough level to guarantee the nation a seat at the world table, or even at a level that permits it to wield even moderate amounts of influence on events and decisions made by other nations. The current state of decline is a direct result of the failure of Canada to invest in peace building activities, and the neglect of the prior role played by the nation in fostering world peace and security.

Canada’s loss of influence is particularly troubling when one considers the significant role it played in the rebuilding of the (western) world community following the Second World War, and also the role it played during the Cold War. In this respect, Canada’s role and influence has diminished greatly in terms of both international presence, and, perhaps more importantly, in international influence. As a result, the nation’s importance in the world relative to other nations could only decline. But Canada hastened and accelerated its marginalization with the decisions it made – or did not make – with respect to its armed forces, foreign aid, trade and diplomacy.1

At a time when the world is represented by a single superpower, the ability of middle powers to influence world events, and the course of action of that superpower, is an issue of singular importance. An example of how Canada’s place in the world has slipped can be seen in the country’s changing role within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). At the end of the Second World War, Canada was instrumental in the development of NATO, and it exercised significant influence over the decisions leading to the signing of the constituting treaty, and thenceforth, as a respected member of the treaty organization. However, in the present world environment, Canada’s role in NATO continues to be reduced, through the introduction of additional member states, but also, and more importantly, by the failure of Canada to adequately invest nationally and internationally in peace and security structures.



Following the signing of the surrender documents with the Axis powers in 1945, the Allied nations actively sought a mechanism whereby the horrors of the Second World War would be prevented from reoccurring. The United Nations (UN) was the ultimate manifestation of that desire. However, the United Nations, as an organization with a large number of state members, proved early on to be a relatively cumbersome body. Additionally, during the onset of the Cold War, the UN was seen as frustrated in the attempt to realize its lofty purpose through the escalating tension building between the United States and the Soviet Union. Officials in Ottawa had already reached the conclusion that the United Nations could not operate as an effective vehicle for collective security as long as the Security Council was paralyzed by the Soviet Union’s use of its veto power.2

The schism between West and East culminated in the formation of the Communist Bloc, and the world became effectively halved into two opposing camps. From the outset, the Cold War created a bipolar world in which the two contending superpowers pulled other nations towards one pole or the other.3 In effect, the UN, as an international peacebuilding organization, was suborned to the political interests of the two competing ideologies, with the more powerful state members merely treating the United Nations as a minor instrument of foreign policy.4 Indeed, during these years, the United Nations became less a mechanism for resolving international conflicts than an arena in which the great powers could prosecute the Cold War.5

In response to this seeming failure of the UN, the Western European nations of England, France, Luxembourg and the Netherlands established the Brussels Treaty of 1948, which called for the creation of a common defence system and the strengthening of political, economic and cultural ties, to help mitigate against increasing Soviet pressures.6 This Treaty, signed in 1949, provided a 50-year agreement upon “economic, social and cultural cooperation and collective self-defence.”7 It formed the basic foundation for the later NATO Treaty as a means of ensuring the collective security of the West against the threat posed by the Eastern bloc, and, in particular, the Soviet Union. The fear of Soviet expansion was not an academic or ideological threat perceived by the Western European nations, who observed a direct example of Soviet expansionism in March 1948 when the Soviet Union essentially annexed Czechoslovakia.8

It was not just the Western European states that viewed Soviet expansionism as a threat. The Second World War had thrust upon the United States the mantle of superpower “with all the capabilities to form a Pax Americana,” and, further, had placed America in opposition to the ideology advanced by the Soviet Union under Stalin.9 On March 12, 1947, President Harry S. Truman delivered a speech before the joint Houses of the US Congress committing the United States to “support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressure.”10 Truman’s reference to outside influence was a clear message to the Soviet Union, which was seen as attempting to suborn otherwise sovereign states into joining the newly created Eastern Bloc. This commitment, as stated by the US president, became known as the Truman Doctrine, and it has been the effective cornerstone of American foreign policy since that time. In keeping with this new foreign policy doctrine, the US Senate passed the Vandenberg Resolution on 11 June 1948, authorizing the entry of the United States into a collective defence treaty, as contemplated by Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.11 In particular, Article 4 of the Vandenberg Resolution provides for the association of the United States, by Constitutional process, with such regional and other collective arrangements as are based on continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, and as affect its national security.12

Thus, the European states, recognizing the threat posed by the Soviet Union, and in response to the failure of the UN as a collective security organization, sought collective security arrangements with their European neighbours. Concurrently, the United States advanced a new foreign policy doctrine that would permit their participation in a collective security regime. In essence, the general position at the time was that, in the absence of an effective UN, the Western nations needed to establish a new collective security structure to preserve themselves from Soviet expansion.

Similarly, Canada focused its foreign policy on the concept of collective security. The prevailing view was that, through collective security agreements and organizations, Canada would be in a position to best ensure its own security in an increasingly uncertain world. Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson, in reflecting upon Canadian foreign policy since the commencement of the Cold War, asserted that no country, not even the most powerful, could defend itself alone. The only security, especially for a country like Canada, lay in collective action through a defensive alliance such as NATO, which rests, or should rest, upon a pooling of strengths.13

At the end of the Second World War, Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King had posited the creation of multiple collective security alliances within, and not outside, the ambit of the United Nations Charter. Mackenzie King was not alone in this view, with Great Britain’s Winston Churchill and Canada’s Louis St. Laurent (then the Secretary of State for External Affairs) having “already contemplated in 1946, the idea of a defensive alliance within the framework of the United Nations.”14 Thus, two of the key players in the Alliance that had defeated Germany during the war held the view that there was a need to develop collective security structures in order to avoid repetition of the errors that had led to the Second World War.

Furthermore, for St. Laurent and for Pearson, the Second World War had demonstrated that Canada could play a meaningful international role, and they wanted it to continue to do so.15 St. Laurent continued his advocacy of the proposed defensive alliance in Parliament, and on 28 April 1948, he advanced a proposal to replace the Brussels Treaty with a “single mutual defence system” comprised of the Western European states, Canada and the US.16 In this respect St. Laurent and his department recognized that international affairs had become the route towards responsible nationalism, and they sought to ensure that Canada was a key contributor within the global community of nations.17


CMJ collection

NATO Headquarters – Brussels.

Canadian Interests

Canada became an early and leading advocate of the proposed North Atlantic Treaty, the federal cabinet having made the decision to pursue such a treaty at a meeting in October 1948.18 Following this decision, the formal position of the Canadian government was to actively pursue the creation and development of a collective security alliance. In terms of the scope of the proposed treaty, it was clear that it should be similar in principle to that seen in the Brussels Treaty that had been actively supported by Canada. Prime Minister Mackenzie King’s statement in support of the Brussels Treaty was that Canada would play her full part in every movement to give substance to the conception of an effective system of collective security by the development of regional pacts under the Charter of the United Nations.19

Ultimately, it was agreed by the nations of the Western Bloc that a collective security organization was both necessary and advantageous for the individual states seeking to avoid the perceived communist threat. The chosen vehicle was an alliance among 12 North Atlantic states, embodied in the Washington Treaty of 1949.20 The key common goal articulated in this agreement was the commitment of state parties to the principle of collective defence, whereby each state agreed to come to the aid of any other member state in the event of aggression against that state.

In its most limited interpretation, NATO, as a collective security organization, was founded for urgent and primary reasons of defence.21 However, NATO’s role as a political and military alliance was to provide for collective defence against any form of aggression, and to maintain a secure environment for the development of democracy and economic growth.22 Fundamentally, “the North Atlantic Treaty is the framework for a defensive alliance designed to prevent aggression or to repel it, should it occur. It also provides for continuous cooperation and consultation in political, economic, and other non-military fields.”23 In this regard, the NATO alliance itself has a dual nature that “proclaims the importance of economic and social progress and, at the same time, reaffirms a security policy based on nations’ inherent right to collective self-defence.”24

At least in part, national support for Canada’s entry into this treaty was a product of the perceived economic benefits to be derived from a closer partnership with the Western European nations. Unlike the nations that shared a border with the Soviet Union, or one of its communist satellites, for Canada, the threat of Soviet invasion was more theoretical than practical. However, a solid military alliance could further entrench trade relationships and partnerships for the betterment of Canadians, while concurrently acting in support of Western democratic ideology.

In pursuing the proposed Alliance, Canada sought and ultimately secured a provision that obligated all member states to promote greater economic collaborations amongst themselves. In effect, Canada secured a favoured nation clause for the purpose of furthering trade within the treaty states. Canada’s emergence as a strong voice in the NATO discussions was a signal of the nation’s growing influence.25 As a result of Canadian insistence upon the incorporation of an economic obligation in the agreement, Article 2 of the Washington Treaty has become known as the Canada Clause. This article proclaims, in part, that the signatories will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies, and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them.26

In some respects, Canada’s entry into the Alliance was predicated on the geographic and economic reality of proximity to the United States, which was, and remains, Canada’s single largest trading partner. At the conclusion of the Second World War, the US became the only Western superpower, and that superpower shared a border with Canada. For Canada to be able to influence the United States in order to better serve Canadian interests, a forum was required within which to guide, prod, or otherwise shape American responses to the international community. Lester Pearson recognized that NATO was just such a vehicle, stating “the possibilities for containing the behavior of great power decision-makers are increased if they can be induced to operate within a multilateral arena. In such a context, they are subject to the demands and pressures of smaller states, whose representatives can sometimes be mobilized in concert.”27

In Canada, advocates of NATO saw the Alliance as a means of accessing a greater economic market in Europe while concurrently bolstering the relationship with the United States. Even opponents of the close relationship that existed between Canada and the US were generally accepting of the NATO Alliance, as it was believed that, from within the Alliance, Canada could influence other Western powers and could avoid entrapment within a narrowly bilateral relationship with the United States.28 In effect, Canada gained independence as it reduced Canada’s reliance upon the US for national security, while simultaneously promoting greater economic linkages with Western Europe.

Further, the NATO treaty provided Canada with a position of influence among other states. During the war, Canada had struggled to win the right to representation on the policy committees running the war effort. The Canadian government believed that membership in the North Atlantic Treaty guaranteed it a place at the table in any future conflict.29 Although the contribution of Canada to the prosecution of the Allied cause during the Second World War was significant, its views on its conduct were, to a large degree, marginalized. With the signing of the Washington Treaty, Canada had now become a full-fledged actor on the world stage, determined not to slip back into the position of a contributing nation without a vote on the use of, or the extent of, that contribution.

In sum, through the NATO Alliance, Western Europe gained defensive assets and the commitment of North America to come to the aid of Western Europe, should Soviet aggression necessitate such action. On the other hand, North America, not requiring such defensive relationships, given its geographic position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, gained greater access to Western European markets, as well as other related economic benefits.

One of the first challenges faced by the new Alliance was the invasion of South Korea by communist forces from North Korea. The NATO Alliance, along with the majority of the Western states, believed that the proximate cause of the invasion was Soviet influence. Coupled with this belief was the perception that the invasion of South Korea was a prelude to a more generalized Soviet move against Western Europe.30 As the Cold War intensified concomitant with the outbreak of the war in Korea in 1950, Canada contributed materially to transforming what was still an insubstantial alliance into a formidable reality.31

While NATO did not act militarily against North Korea, a number of its member states did so under the auspices of the United Nations. In particular, Canada sent ships, aircraft, and troops to fight in support of the UN commitment to South Korea. Notably, Canada formed and sent a full infantry brigade to the theatre. This brigade was formed for the purpose of carrying out Canada’s obligations under the UN Charter.32 In so doing, Canada further enhanced its international status as an active participant in world affairs and a strong middle power. This was also in keeping with the belief of Lester Pearson, who felt that middle powers had limited thrust in the international community, but that they could exploit the influence they did have through peacekeeping operations.33

NATO Ministers

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A working dinner of NATO Foreign Ministers, 7 December 2005.

Early Influence Wanes

Ultimately, Canada maintained a powerful voice within the NATO Alliance during the early years of the Cold War. “Between 1951 and 1959, Canada was fourth among NATO members in per capita spending, the net effect of which was to enable Canada to speak with a relatively loud voice on the NATO matters.”34 Even late into the 1960s, Canada wielded a disproportionate influence within NATO as a result of both a high level of defence spending and the role it had played in the early development of NATO.35

During the 40 years of the Cold War, Canada contributed substantial land and air forces to NATO, including an army brigade and an air division. Specifically, during the 1950s, a full fighter wing of the Royal Canadian Air Force provided a large share of NATO’s front line air defence capability.36

It was this period that marked the zenith of Canadian foreign policy, when Canada was able to advance its own interests before the world community, and to have its viewpoints sanctioned and even adopted by other nations.37 Contributing to Canada’s success during this period was the fact that the United States viewed Canada as a close and reliable North Atlantic partner.38 To some degree, this relationship was a product of Canada being the only American ally actively participating in the defence of the North American homeland.39 Further, Canada, as a nation, was viewed as an important political power in the world community as a consequence of its role within NATO.40 At this point Canada’s military was armed with the first generation of post-Second World War weapons. Canada was, in short, paying full fare for its Alliance partnership.41

However, in the eventual absence of a renewed investment in defence spending – in particular, the military infrastructure necessary to meet NATO commitments – Canada lost ground in terms of its place within the de facto NATO hierarchy, ranked as it was on the military capability of its members. It was as true of NATO, as of any other collective security alliance, that a nation’s membership in an alliance gave it some form of voice with respect to alliance policy, but in an alliance, voices tend to be listened to in accordance with the military potential they represent.42 In Canada’s case, as national military potential diminished, so also did the voice that Canada could raise within NATO to guide or direct alliance policy. By the end of NATO’s first decade, Canadian defence spending had been reduced to 5.2 percent of the Gross National Product (GNP), and 27 percent of the total budget.43

As the fifth largest Allied military power during the Second World War, Canada had paid for an influential voice in international affairs.44 With the end of the Second World War and the commencement of the Cold War, Canada continued to maintain significant and capable armed forces, and enhanced those forces through entry into the NATO Alliance. The result of these investments in defence spending and security measures during the immediate post-war period was that “Canada had its first peace time professional armed forces, respected by its friends and pos si ble even feared by its enemies.”45

It is unfortunate, but nonetheless accurate, to state that Canada no longer is in the same position as it was during the early years of the Cold War. Canadian credibility within NATO, and, in fact, on the broader international stage, has been lost. Concurrently, Canada has lost the ability to influence international affairs in any meaningful way. It must be recognized that “the chances of our having an impact (for good or ill) are profoundly affected by the assets we have on the table. And the truth of the matter is that we have allowed our assets to run down.”46 While all the NATO nations witnessed a decrease in their defence spending and contribution to the NATO alliance over the first 20 years of the Alliance, Canada ‘led the pack’ in backing away from military commitments. Fourth in defence spending as a percentage of GNP in 1954, it had fallen to tenth place by 1970.47 Even beyond the low point of defence spending in the 1970s, Canada has failed to match its rhetoric on the need for peacekeeping and security with the actual capability to effect either mandates. Since 1970, Canada has consistently spent less on defence and security when compared to the European members of NATO.48

This reduction in the Canadian commitment to NATO, evidenced in reduced defence spending, necessarily decreased the ability of Canada to act within NATO to advance its own interests. Instead, Canada became further marginalized as a nation that would ‘talk,’ but could not ‘back up that talk’ with action. The ultimate consequence of this condition was the loss of Canadian credibility among the other Alliance states, which generally continued to invest in the Alliance at a level far beyond that of Canada. By 1982, Canadian defence spending as a percentage of GDP was the second lowest in the Alliance – the lowest being the city state of Luxembourg.49 It is not difficult to conclude that in an Alliance that has as one of its primary purposes collective security, a nation that does not invest enough to contribute at a level commensurate with its ability will be seen as a ‘free rider,’ and, consequently, as a nation whose views need not be taken seriously.

It is apparent that Canada lost sight of this reality under the leadership of Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau, whose view of NATO was that of an organization beyond its time. Under Trudeau, Canada’s investment in NATO and national defence was dramatically reduced.50 Even in the current day, notwithstanding the 2005 Budget announcement of an increase in the defence budget by roughly $12.8 billion over five years, the Canadian investment in defence and security is at a level where the legitimacy or validity of Canada’s viewpoint is overshadowed by its lack of capacity to meet both NATO and national security requirements.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the basic foundation for the NATO alliance – collective defence against the threat of Soviet aggression disappeared. However, notwithstanding the end of the Cold War, the NATO alliance has remained a viable economic, political, and military alliance. Even critics who had initially posited the demise of NATO concurrent with the demise of the Soviet Bloc must acknowledge the fact that no member has exercised its option to leave the Alliance, or seems likely to do so. This casts doubt upon the conventional judgment that NATO has been a military success but a political flop. It also invigorates interest in NATO as an instrument of multilateral diplomacy.51

NATO Ministers

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Representative of the new European political realities, Besnick Mustafaj (Minister of Foreign Affairs, Albania) with NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, 8 December 2005.

Back to the Present

In the current world circumstances, the evidence that NATO has been and continues to be a viable vehicle for the promotion of peace and security among nations can be seen in the dramatic expansion of NATO mem bership following the end of the Cold War. In this manner, the Alliance continues to be a vehicle for the promotion of international peace and security. Further, the interest of states in joining the Alliance stands as proof positive of the inherent value of NATO membership. Given the end of the Cold War, and the loss of the original military purpose of NATO, it can only be surmised that nations are seeking NATO membership for economic and political reasons, in addition to security and defence reasons.

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, it may be that, as the nation with the world’s greatest military, economic and technological strength, the United States is seemingly able to act without serious regard to the state of world opinion.52 However, having committed itself to the NATO Alliance, the US must still, to some extent, remain accountable to the other Alliance members, or risk their alienation. While the United States may be the predominant power in the world, it must still accept the expressed will of the other NATO states or risk the loss of support of that Alliance. Recognizing this, Canada must continue to act in furtherance of the purpose of NATO at its inceptions – that being for collective defence, and for the preservation of international peace and security.53

Ultimately, Alliance membership facilitates an increase in the ability of the lesser nation actors to penetrate the political systems of those greater, particularly the Alliance leader.54 In this case, Canada’s role as a middle power, and a key contributor to NATO over the first 20 years of the Alliance, led to a greater ability to influence the internal political direction of the United States, for America was constrained after a fashion to ensure that its actions were met with approbation from the other Alliance members.

By extension, even following the end of the Cold War, the value of NATO for Canadians, and for Canada as a nation, remains intact. It is still the case that Canadian membership in NATO ensures that Canada remains within a large military and economic alliance. The function of this alliance for Canadians is, in keeping with the function of foreign policy at large, to seek peace and prosperity abroad in order to help Canada [or any nation] build a peaceful, prosperous and just society at home.55

Given the significance of the Canadian trade relationship with the United States, the NATO Alliance is of direct benefit for Canada when Canadian and American interests diverge. Canada can use the NATO Alliance as the vehicle within which to seek to change or influence American decisions of interest to Canada. When operating from within the NATO Alliance, Canada can be seen to be acting, not as a state in competition with the US, but rather as a member of a common Alliance with the United States and so not risk fracturing the economic relationship between the two countries. In this respect, membership in NATO has fostered relations with Europe that have served to “off-set the preponderant United States influence on Canada, and have constituted a forum where smaller powers could influence the policies of larger ones.”56

It is clear that, in the years since the creation of the NATO Alliance, and, in particular, since the end of the Cold War, Canada has failed to invest appropriately in defence and security measures to ensure the maintenance of the Canadian position of influence within the Alliance. In fact, Canada’s current position within NATO, and globally, is “a mere shadow of the robust presence in global politics that Ottawa had enjoyed in the 1950s.”57 Thus, the question of whether we will be able, as a nation, to regain our voice on the world stage very much depends upon the decisions made nationally with respect to our re-investment in security and defence structures, including the NATO Alliance.

The continuing debate over the level of Canadian defence spending is not likely to abate. However, it has remained true that, since the Second World War, Canada’s ability to contribute to international peace and security has diminished, and, as such, it has lost the ability to exercise influence in international affairs. Fortunately, this circumstance is one that can change, and the reinvestment of resources into national defence and security can allow Canada to reassert itself on the world stage. Doubtlessly, by ‘standing on her own two feet’ in defence matters, Canada will secure more firmly her essential independence – as well as the respect and confidence of her Allies.58

It is well accepted that Canada, like any other middle power, has greater status when it has more to contribute, and lesser status when it has nothing to contribute.59 Consequently, it is imperative that Canada recognize that it is a middle power with a diminishing contribution to international security, which necessarily leads to a more limited ability to influence world events. The acceptance of this reality has been difficult, but it appears that, in the post-9/11 world, Canada has taken certain positive steps to reassert its position on the world stage. In addition, Canada has actively pursued a renewed relationship with the constituent nations of NATO, and, of course, with the last remaining superpower, the United States of America.

In Canada’s experience, the value of organizations such as NATO was an increased ability to constrain the behaviour of the United States by compelling it to act within a multinational forum. By compelling action on the world stage to take place only through a collective security organization, America was more likely to adapt to influence brought to bear by a group of lesser powers.60 Further, NATO has created a cross-Atlantic economic and political relationship between Canada and the Western European states. The consequence of this has been not only to expand Canadian markets and assert Canadian values within the Alliance, but also to seek to constrain the actions of the United States without directly jeopardizing the Canadian/American relationship. This latter consequence is of significance, since the maintenance of an effective bilateral economic relationship with the United States is of primary importance to the Canadian economy.61

Through the creation and maintenance of the NATO Alliance, Canada has secured a forum through which to assert its viewpoints, and to attempt to moderate inter-state conflict. This ability has been greatest when Canada’s security and defence investment clearly demonstrated the nation’s commitment to international peace and security. With the diminution of national investment in peace and security structures, Canada has lost its ability to do more than speak out, for without the military and defence structure to match its voice, the ability of Canada to influence world events and the actions of other nations has diminished to a point where it no longer can be well heard. In failing to invest appropriately in defence and security measures, Canada effectively has relinquished its middle power status, both globally and within the NATO Alliance. This is such that it usually does not matter what policy positions Canada takes upon an issue, since it can now do little or nothing to influence most of those positions.62


Lockheed Martin photo 12197

These changing times... Former Warsaw Pact member nation Poland now flying the advanced Block 52 F-16C.


The history of Canada’s relationship with NATO is one of which Canadians can be justifiably proud. A key contributor to the creation of the Alliance, and the architect of the Canada Clause that served to generate the second of the dual purposes of the Alliance (the creation of an economic relationship between states as the vehicle for the creation and maintenance of peace), Canada has been successful in using the Alliance to affect its national goals. However, Canada’s years of neglecting its security and defence institutions have crippled the nation’s ability to act on the world stage as it did during the early-NATO years. In order to regain that primacy of place among middle powers, and to avoid permanent relegation to the ranks of the lesser powers, Canada must immediately and aggressively act to invest appropriately in security and defence structures that can serve both national and Alliance interests. Until such time as this investment is generated, Canada will be forced to raise its voice and ask to be heard upon the basis of its past contributions to NATO, rather than upon its current ability – and this is an increasingly difficult proposition.

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Michael Lawless, a lawyer practising in Victoria, British Columbia, is also a member of the Naval Reserve and a doctoral candidate in the War Studies Program at the Royal Military College of Canada.


  1. Andrew Cohen, While Canada Slept: How We Lost Our Place in the World, (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Publishing, 2003), p. 166.
  2. Norman Hillmer & J.L. Granatstein, Empire to Umpire, (Toronto: Irwin Publishing, 2000), p. 202.
  3. Wayne C. McWilliams & Harry Piotrowski, The World Since 1945: A History of International Relations, (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001), p. 171.
  4. Geoffrey Grenville-Wood, “An Agenda for United Nations Reform,” in Eric Fawcett & Hanna Newcombe (eds.), United Nations Reform: Looking Ahead After 50 Years, (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1995), p. 2.
  5. K.J. Holsti, International Politics: A Framework for Analysis, 7th Edition, (Englewood Cliffs, California: Prentice-Hall, 1995), p. 353.
  6. Hillmer & Granatstein, p. 202.
  7. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO Handbook, 1985, (Brussels: NATO Information Service, 1985), p. 70.
  8. C. P. Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conflict, Volume 2: 1921-1948 – The Mackenzie King Era, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981), p. 416.
  9. Peter N. Schmitz, Defending the NATO Alliance: Global Implications, (Washington, D.C.: National Defence University Press, 1987), p. 28.
  10. NATO Handbook, p. 69.
  11. Ibid., p. 70.
  12. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO Facts and Figures, (Brussels: NATO Information Service, 1969), p. 237.
  13. Lester B. Pearson, Words & Occasions, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970), p. 200.
  14. NATO Facts and Figures, p. 19.
  15. Hillmer & Granatstein, p. 193.
  16. NATO Facts and Figures, p. 21.
  17. Hillmer & Granatstein, p. 209.
  18. John English, The Worldly Years: The Life of Lester Pearson, Volume II: 1949-1972, (Toronto: Vintage Books, 1993), p. 21.
  19. C. P. Stacey, p. 416.
  20. The original members of NATO were: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America.
  21. Lester B. Pearson, The Four Faces of Peace, (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Limited, 1964), p. 45.
  22. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO in the 21st Century, (Brussels: NATO Public Diplomacy Division, 2003), p. 6.
  23. NATO Handbook, p. 17.
  24. NATO Facts and Figures, p. 23.
  25. Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Canada World View, Issue 3 (1999), p. 5.
  26. North Atlantic Treaty, Treaty Series, 1949, No. 7, (Ottawa: King’s Printer, 1949).
  27. Kim Richard Nossal, “Canada: Fading Power or Future Power?” in Behind the Headlines, Vol. 59, No. 3, (Spring 2002), p. 12.
  28. John English, “Problems in Middle Life,” in Margaret O. MacMillan and David S. Sorenson (eds.), Canada and NATO: Uneasy Past, Uncertain Future (Waterloo, Ontario: University of Waterloo, 1990), p. 47.
  29. Hillmer & Granatstein, p. 204.
  30. Robert Jervis, “The Impact of the Korean War on the Cold War,” in Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 24, No. 4, (December 1980), p. 568.
  31. Greg Donaghy, “Domesticating NATO: Canada and the North Atlantic Alliance, 1963-68,” in International Journal, LII, No. 3 (Summer 1997), p. 445.
  32. David Bercuson, “Canada, NATO and Rearmament, 1950-1954: Why Canada Made a Difference (but not for very long),” in John English and Norman Hillmer, Making a difference?: Canada’s foreign policy in a changing world order, (Toronto: Lester Publishing, 1992), p. 108.
  33. Adam Chapnick, “The Canadian Middle Power Myth,” in International Journal, Vol. 55, No. 2 (Spring 2000), p. 195.
  34. Andrew Cohen, p. 45.
  35. Greg Donaghy, “Domesticating NATO: Canada and the North Atlantic Alliance, 1963-1968,” p. 445.
  36. Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Canada World View, Issue 3 (1999), p. 9.
  37. C. P. Stacey, p. 418.
  38. Greg Donaghy, Tolerant Allies: Canada and the United States, 1963-1968, (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2002), p. 4.
  39. Joel Sokolsky, “A Seat at the Table: Canada and its Alliances,” in Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 16, (Autumn 1989), p. 12.
  40. David Bercuson, p. 103.
  41. Steven L. Canby and Jean Edward Smith, “Canada’s Role in NATO: The Laggard Who Can Rescue the Alliance,” in Strategic Review, Vol. 13, No. 3 (Summer 1985), p. 48.
  42. R.A. MacKay, “The Canadian Doctrine of the Middle Powers,” in H.L. Dyck and H.P. Krosby (eds.), Empire and Nations, (1969), p. 140.
  43. David Bercuson, p 105.
  44. Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Canada World View, Issue 3 (1999), p. 9.
  45. Andrew Cohen, p. 45.
  46. Denis Stairs, “Trends in Canadian Foreign Policy: Past, Present, and Future,” in Behind the Headlines, Vol. 59, No.3, (Spring 2002), p. 7.
  47. David Bercuson, p 120.
  48. Douglas Stuart, “NATO’s Anglosphere Option,” in International Journal, LX, No. 1 (Winter 2004-2005), p. 186.
  49. Steven L. Canby and Jean Edward Smith, p. 49.
  50. Ibid., p. 48.
  51. Peyton V. Lyon, NATO as a Diplomatic Instrument, (Toronto: The Atlantic Council of Canada, 1970), p. 4.
  52. Karsten Voigt, “Transatlantic Relations: the influence of differing histories and states of mind,” in International Insights, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2004), p. 2.
  53. North Atlantic Treaty, Treaty Series, 1949, No. 7, (Ottawa: King’s Printer, 1949).
  54. Peyton V. Lyon, p. 23.
  55. James H. Taylor, Canadian Foreign Policy and National Interests, (Ottawa: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1999), p. 1.
  56. Greg Donaghy, “Domesticating NATO: Canada and the North Atlantic Alliance, 1963-1968,” p. 460.
  57. Kim Richard Nossal, p. 10.
  58. Steven L. Canby and Jean Edward Smith, p. 58.
  59. Adam Chapnick, p. 200.
  60. Jennifer M. Welsh, “Canada in the 21st Century: Beyond Dominion and Middle Power,” in Behind the Headlines, Vol. 61, No.4, (Summer 2004), p. 12.
  61. Denis Stairs, p. 4.
  62. Robert Bothwell, “Canada-United States Relations: Options for the 1970s,” in International Journal, Vol. LVIII, No. 1, (Winter 2002-2003), p. 67.