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FROM COLD WARRIORS TO EXPEDITIONARY FORCES – THE CURRENT CHALLENGES FACING THE GERMAN ARMED FORCES

by Major J.P.F. Lepine

Preface

The German Armed Forces (*Bundeswehr*) are attempting to find solutions to the difficult organizational and doctrinal issues involved in moving away from the static force structure that served them well since their formation in 1955, to their new goal of becoming an expeditionary-focused force. Since their inception, they have been organized and trained for high intensity conflict against the threat posed by the former Warsaw Pact. And they were originally conceived, as a result of the historical context of the Second World War, to be employed only within the borders of Germany. However, the German government and its armed forces are now attempting to find a new role and structure that is appropriate in a time where there is little threat of conventional high intensity conflict, and also when Germany is emerging from its self-imposed long period of semi-diplomatic isolation to seek a higher profile within the world. As such a diplomatic effort normally requires both financial and military components, significant efforts are being made to posture the military to support this government objective.

The German Armed Forces, using the current buzzword ‘transformation’, are attempting to develop alternatives intended to provide the government with a variety of options to support foreign policy objectives. These could include the dispatch of forces on missions ranging from purely humanitarian assistance, to peace support operations, up to engagement in high-intensity conflict. The armed forces restructure is a significant challenge to a military entity that, for the past 50 years, has had but one purpose and mission. The result has been to design a three-tier structure, within which different levels of capability, in terms of equipment, training, and personnel, are present.

The challenge facing German military force planners is to ensure that the proposed structure is capable of meeting the government’s foreign policy objectives, while at the same time balancing the significant organizational, training and equipment disparities that necessarily will result from the proposed three-tier solution.

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German Army Leopard 2 tank

itself as a major player in the new world order. The desire for increased influence on the international stage had led the German government to authorize the deployment of German troops to Somalia in 1993, the first such deployment outside national boundaries since the creation of the *Bundeswehr*. The German Armed Forces would also be directed to undertake other extra-territorial missions in the 1990s, participating in various UN, NATO, or EU sanctioned operations in the Balkans.

The attack on the World Trade Center in 2001, and the concomitant and continuing 'War on Terror', combined with the experience gained during various peace support and peace enforcement operations, have led the Germans to conduct a reappraisal of the

organization, role, and mission of all their armed forces. In a series of policy reviews, Germany has embarked upon a path to restructure the *Bundeswehr*, using its own interpretation of transformation.

Introduction

At the end of the Cold War in 1989, the German Armed Forces, as was the case for the majority of its peers within the NATO alliance, were faced with serious questions concerning their continuing relevance, the lack of a clearly defined role and mission for military forces, as well as fiscal restrictions and other budgetary pressures imposed by politicians seeking to redistribute scarce financial resources to more popular and pressing political problems. Driven by the popular perception amongst the general population and groups outside the defence community that large standing military forces were no longer required, following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact alliance, the German armed forces, driven by political and fiscal imperatives, commenced a series of force reductions and downsizing initiatives that mirrored those of their NATO partners during the 1990s.

However, during the last decade of the 20th Century, long-standing ethnic and cultural divisions, previously held in check by the restraining influence of the single-party communist states of Eastern Europe, were renewed. Armed conflict broke out in areas, such as the Balkans and in the former republics of the Soviet Union. Spurred by these events, a reappraisal of the need for military forces was conducted in Germany. In addition, participation in a series of military interventions was eventually undertaken at the international level under UN auspices, and later under that of the European Union (EU) or NATO. A newly re-unified Germany was also seeking to re-establish

Transformation Defined

Transformation is a term that has been in vogue within military circles for a number of years. The term, as it specifically applies to the various aspects of change, is, however, subject to different interpretations. The definition used by the German Armed Forces is typical. "This (transformation) process is not like a reform, where outdated procedures and equipment are replaced by a new and improved one. Rather, transformation means complete reorientation."¹ As a definition, the foregoing is relatively imprecise and unclear as either to how transformation is to be *achieved*, or the process *measured*. The goals of the German transformational process seem to be included in a subsequent statement to the effect that, "...the object is not only to conduct crisis management and crisis prevention, but also to develop the capability to contain and settle conflicts that have already broken out, making use of state-of-the-art technologies."² However, as diplomacy and warfare have always attempted to make use of the most up-to-date technologies to achieve their objectives, the value of this statement on the goal of the German transformational process is questionable.

"A newly re-unified Germany was also seeking to re-establish itself as a major player in the new world order."

Further clarification of the goals and objectives of the German transformational process are contained in the following statement that better outlines

the process but leaves the actual methodology of achievement of the objective elusive.

The transformation process of the Bundeswehr aims to improve [in a sustained manner] its operational readiness across the task spectrum specified in the Defence Policy Guidelines. Anything not conducive to this goal is of secondary importance. Structures, organizational measures and training will be adapted to it, material and equipment planning will be brought into this focus and realigned to the financial possibilities.³

The preceding three statements provide a better description of defence policy guidance than they do of the German transformational process or the desired results. Examinations of other national statements on the subject do, however, provide a clearer picture of the desired end state.

As with most military conceptual and structural reform issues, the current leader in the transformation process is the United States of America. In its publication *Military Transformation: A Strategic Approach*, the desired goals of the process are defined in relation to global US defence strategy and thus make it easier to understand the rationale for the desired modifications. The US definition states that transformation is "...a process that shapes the changing nature of military competition and cooperation through new combinations of concepts, capabilities, people and organizations that exploit our nation's advantages and protect against our asymmetric vulnerabilities to sustain our strategic position, which helps underpin peace and stability in the world."⁴ The Americans view transformation as a strategic process consisting of three interrelated concepts. These interrelationships are outlined in Figure 1.⁵

This portrayal of transformation, with its emphasis upon 'jointness', better depicts the desired end-state than the German definition, and it is consistent with statements by other NATO partners on their transformational goals. The United Kingdom describes its transformational goals in terms of "...effects based planning and operations combined with highly networked and adaptable forces across all three Services,"⁶ while the French also describe this as a strategic process, defining the objective as "...a general networking of all actors (sensors, decision makers, effectors) with the objective of increasing the pace of planning and conducting the

operations, as well as optimizing the effects."⁷ Canada's definition of transformation mirrors those of its allies, and describes the process as "...better integrating maritime, land, air and special operations forces to provide more 'focused effects' in operations – that is, the ability to deploy the right mix of forces to the right place, at the right time, producing the right result. They will adapt their capabilities and force structure to deal with the new threats at home and abroad, including those that arise from the kind of instability that we have seen in failed and failing states."⁸

From the examination of various sources and definitions, a clearer vision of the desired transformational objectives emerges. They consist of establishing forces that are capable of working together *nationally*, (joint) as well as within a *multinational* environment (combined). These forces will require highly effective and integrated command and control structures, as well as centralized and coordinated intelligence, surveillance and targeting capabilities. The issue, then, is whether the current German initiatives are likely to produce the results needed to achieve these goals.

The German Transformation Process

As previously noted, transformation is considered to be a strategic initiative, and thus it should have its roots in national policy. This is the case in Germany, where direction on the transformational goals of the Armed Forces is found in the current *Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien* (Defence Policy Guidelines).




Figure 1 – The Strategic Process of American Transformation

To orient itself more strongly and quickly on the more probable tasks of international conflict prevention and crisis management, the *Bundeswehr* needs armed forces that are categorized according to their operational readiness and availability, and can be employed rapidly and effectively in combined operations with other nation's forces. This calls for a capability profile focusing on six essential, interlinked capabilities: (1) command and control, (2) intelligence collection and reconnaissance, (3) mobility, (4) effective engagement, (5) support and sustainability, and (6) survivability and protection.⁹

While it is arguable that the last capability category has little to do with the transformational process, its inclusion denotes the relative importance placed by the Germans upon survivability and protection in relation to the other factors in the current political climate. This means that military casualties incurred during missions that have no direct impact, in the public mind, on the direct defence of Germany or German citizens, are likely to be criticized.

There are clear conceptual and structural parameters under which the *Bundeswehr* is supposed to be planning its transformational process. These include: (1) focusing on the most probable operations; (2) dispensing with capabilities and structures solely related to the defence of Germany; (3) strengthening the joint approach to include a joint command and control organization; (4) creating response, stabilization and support forces that allow for differentiated training and equipment; (5) integrating conscripts; and (6) generating cost efficiencies.¹⁰

As noted above, the German transformational plan calls for the restructuring of military forces into three distinct levels, each with specific capabilities. These levels are categorized into *Eingreifkräfte* (Response Forces), *Stabilisierungskräfte* (Stabilization Forces), and *Unterstützungskräfte* (Support Forces), whose roles are defined as follows:

Response forces are intended to conduct peace enforcement measures against an adversary that is predominantly organized along military lines in order to create the prerequisites for peace stability operations, while keeping own losses at the lowest possible level. The response forces are capable of rapid response, [and] consist of land, air and maritime forces with state of the art equipment and the required joint command and support assets. They comprise a total of 35,000 male and female military personnel

The force potential for Stabilization Forces amounts to 70,000 military personnel. They are intended to be employed in multinational operations of low and medium intensity for an extended period of time across the broad spectrum of peace stability missions. These forces must be robust enough to assert themselves – while minimizing their own losses – against a quasi-military but primarily asymmetric adversary.

The main task of the Support Forces will be comprehensive and efficient support of Response and Stabilization Forces during preparation and execution of operations both in Germany and in operation areas abroad. There will be 147,500 male and female military personnel in the Support Forces.¹¹

The actual breakdown of troops within these new force capabilities is indicated in the chart contained in Figure 2.

As can be seen, capabilities from all five services (Army, Navy, Air Force, Support Base, and Medical Services) are included in the total force structure.¹² This leads one to the impression that the three new force categories have *been*, or will *be*, brought together into a cohesive and joint structure.

While that may be the long-term goal, a review of current German capabilities, structures, and initiatives reveals a gap between the *stated* policy objectives and current *realities*. The development of three joint forces would seemingly necessitate the requirement for a joint command and control organization responsible for operations, training, and the support of assigned forces. That particular structural development has not yet been completely realized within the new German force and command structure. A new joint command headquarters has been created in Potsdam, the *Einsatzführungskommando* (*EinSatzFüKdo*, or Deployed Forces Headquarters), and its mission statement makes it clear that the new headquarters will have a key role as a joint command cell in the transformation of the German Armed Forces.

Das Einsatzführungskommando der Bundeswehr, das als die operative Führungsebene der Bundeswehr ist, plant und führt alle Auslandseinsätze deutscher Streitkräfte im nationalen und multinationalen Rahmen. (The Deployed Forces HQ, as the operational command level of the Bundeswehr, plans and commands all out-of-Germany deployed German military forces in both national and international settings.)¹³

While the mission statement outlined above clearly indicates that the *EinSatzFüKdo* should be responsible for all missions outside German national territory, its actual scope of responsibilities is, to date, limited to overseeing some, but not all, operations conducted outside national borders. This issue will be further explored later in the article.

Transformation or Reduction?

Figure 3 demonstrates the reduction in force levels in the German military under the various defence policy papers and initiatives that have been implemented since the end of the Cold War in 1989, and projected out until year 2009.¹⁴ As can be clearly seen, the scale of reductions has been substantial, with overall force levels declining by 56 percent. For the Army, the last policy change has meant a reduction in the number of brigades from 22 to twelve. There has been a corresponding reduction in the number of combat arms battalions, where, for example, the armoured




Figure 2 – Authorized Number of *Bundeswehr* Positions

corps has declined from 80 units down to a mere five. This process has not been undertaken under transformational policy guidelines, but, rather, it has been driven by fiscal reasons present since the onset of the force reduction push dating back to the 1990s, as was the case in most Western military organizations.

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The Navy will, under the new guidelines, consolidate its existing type flotillas (frigate, destroyer, mine warfare, patrol boat, and U-boat) into two naval task flotillas, with the goal to move “...from an Escort Navy to an Expeditionary Navy.”¹⁵ How this consolidation will achieve the desired end-state of better jointness with the other four service branches is unclear. Improving national joint capability is further complicated by the fact that, under the new structure, the Navy will retain its own fleet headquarters. This strictly naval headquarters will exercise command over some naval forces operating outside national waters – for example, those currently committed to Standing NATO Response Force (NRF) Maritime Group 2 in the Mediterranean – while the *EinSatzFüKdo* will command other naval forces – such as those assigned to the Arabian Sea as part of *Operation Enduring Freedom*. As both these deployments are similar in terms of their mission and support requirements, the rationale for splitting command between two different headquarters is not evident.

The Air Force plans to reduce its organization by one divisional headquarters, and the number of airframes from a total of 746 in 1990 to just 262 by the year 2015. However, the move towards rationalizing capabilities within the Air Force has been uneven. The service retains infantry troops, whose sole task is the protection of airfields, and it has recently purchased two Surface-to-Air Missile Operations Centres. These facilities will be static rather than tailored for use as deployable Airspace Coordination Centres or components of a deployable joint Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition, and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) centre. The fact that the Army retains Surface-to-Air missile defence systems, independent from similar Air Force units, indicates the level to which mission capabilities have yet to be integrated into a coherent joint force structure. The *Luftwaffe* appears to be retaining all its Cold War/high intensity capabilities, without a clear vision of future missions or tasks. This is evident in the acquisition of the *Eurofighter*, a weapons system conceived and designed in the early 1980s to replace the F-4 *Phantom* as the prime fighter-bomber system of the *Luftwaffe*. The Air Force remains equipped and trained for employment and deployment against a similarly high technology equipped opposing force. All this, while official German policy indicates that the threat from such an enemy is considered very unlikely within the current planning horizon.

Strukturelle/Personelle WE

(Authorized Number of Bundeswehr Positions)




Figure 3 – Bundeswehr Strength

The Medical Service will, under the new policy concept, reduce the number of military hospitals in commission by half, leaving just four open, while hospital services at a fifth location will be accessible to the *Bundeswehr* under a joint venture agreement reached with a civilian organization. Finally, the Territorial Defence Administration will also be restructured, reducing its presence across Germany.

The German Army, as is the case with most NATO members, is the major provider of personnel and equipment when the government decides to undertake missions abroad. Thus, it is important to examine what consequences the new transformational structure will have on the Army. Figure 3 outlines the new organization under the transformational concept.¹⁶ While five divisions remain under the new structure, only three of the headquarters are considered to be operational, those being the Response Force, the *Division Spezielle Operationen* (DSO – Special Operations Division), which includes two airborne brigades as well as the Special Operations Brigade, and *Division Luftbewegliche Operationen* (DLO – Airmobile Division), with its Air Assault Brigade, Combat Support Brigade, Attack Helicopter Regiment, and Transport Regiment. The remaining two divisional headquarters are simply administrative entities, to be used as force providers to the other divisions.

There are inherent risks associated with this new structure. While German policy describes the requirement for forces capable of participating in all types of mission categories – from peace support operations in relatively benign environments, to high intensity conflict – in reality, there exists a much greater likelihood that Response Forces will be deployed with great less frequency than those assigned to the Stabilization Force. As the use of military force in a democratic society is dictated by governmental policy in support of its national foreign policy initiatives, it is therefore relative to determine the circumstances under which the German government would foresee the deployment of German troops.

Doctor Peter Eickenboom, the *Staatssekretär beim Bundesminister der Verteidigung* (Associate Minister of National Defence, in a statement made at the German War College in 2004, remarked that Germany had no independent foreign policy.¹⁷ This surprising declaration is, in fact, official policy, indicated by the following statement:

“... the scale of reductions has been substantial, with overall force levels declining by 56 percent.”

Deutschland kann seine Interessen nur gemeinsam mit Verbündeten und Partnern sowie im Rahmen der Europäischen Union, der NATO, der Organisation für Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit in Europa (OSZE) und der Vereinten Nationen wahrnehmen. (Germany

can look after its interests only in conjunction with its allies and partners, as well as in the context of the European Union, NATO, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the United Nations.)¹⁸

Thus, from this policy direction, it is clear that the types of German military forces deployed are likely to be constrained by any coalition that Germany is prepared to join, as well as by the types of missions to which the government is prepared to deploy troops. The German government's reluctance, shared by the majority of western nations, to be seen to engage with heavily armoured troops in situations where national security is not directly threatened, mitigates against the deployment of the Response Force, structured as it is for high intensity warfare. The costs alone of shipping elements of the Response Force outside Germany, as compared to sending the personnel and equipment of the Stabilization Force, would appear to make the deployment of the second organization much more likely, in view of the government's ongoing concerns with respect to reducing military financial expenditures. This fiscal reality, combined with the inevitable outcry over both friendly and civilian casualties that accompany the use of heavy armoured forces, makes their employment and deployment, beyond response to a major international crisis, highly unlikely. The deployment of the Stabilization Force as the prime vehicle for the projection of German foreign policy is also readily evident when a comparison is conducted of the numbers of personnel assigned to the Force structures, as well as consideration of the planned training and deployment readiness rotation schedule that has been developed. Stabilization Forces have been tailored for repetitive use over multiple rotations on missions that have extended mandates, such as the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, or European Union Force (EUFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Response Forces, on the other hand, have been designed for single use deployment of a fixed duration for a relatively short time period. This is based upon the fact that rotation of Response Force elements is considered impractical.

The retention of the Response Force, with its 35,000 troops and heavy armoured equipment, is not necessarily inconsistent with the transformational goals of the *Bundeswehr*. But it does raise interesting questions as to whether the term 'transformation' is being used to justify the retention of combat capabilities that have little to do with stated objectives or intentions.

Stationing Concept

The recent announcements by Doctor Peter Struck, the former *Bundesminister der Verteidigung* (Minister of National Defence), with respect to base closures, were designed to complement the transformational activities of the *Bundeswehr*. As noted by the Minister, "...eine weltweit operierende Bundeswehr benötigt andere Standorte in Deutschland als die Bundeswehr in den Jahrzehnten der militärischen Ost-West-Polarität in Europa. (German Federal Armed Forces operating worldwide need other locations in Germany than [what] the German Federal Armed Forces [had] in the decades of the military east-west polarity in Europe.)"¹⁹ Infrastructure reductions amount to 105 *Kaserne* closings, leaving a total of 392 in existence.

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Base closures, through rationalization and consolidation, are a necessary prerequisite to transformation, as they

will permit the recovery of funding that can be used to finance transformational activities, rather than to maintain unnecessary infrastructure at locations around Germany that no longer have any operational or administrative significance. This type of initiative was long overdue for both structural and financial reasons, and the former Minister is to be commended for having the political will and courage to undertake such a program in the face of significant opposition from local, regional, and state governments.²⁰

Conclusions

While the stationing initiative can be viewed as a necessary step towards structural reform, there are other initiatives that could be taken by the German Forces that could facilitate achieving their desired transformational goal. These include the creation of a joint military personal management system, consolidation of similar capabilities under a single command, and a joint equipment program. They also entail organizational steps needed to move the military away from the traditional single service orientation that currently dominates tactical and operational thinking within the German Armed Forces.

Although there have been many positive movements towards creating a truly joint system within the German Forces, one glaring exception remains. There is no central or joint personnel system in place that ensures that joint requirements receive priority over single service personnel needs. This issue could have serious future consequences, as the competition for individuals with the necessary training and competence increases, especially for the critical higher staff and

command positions. The lack of discussion within the German Forces over the requirement for a joint personnel system is a clear indication that the concept of jointness has not yet become widespread.

There is no clear indication, at this point in time, that force or mission tailoring has been a factor in transformational force structure design. Almost all former Cold War capabilities have been retained, and, for the most part, they have not been rationalized or integrated into joint organizations. Exceptions, such as the transfer of electronic warfare elements out of the Army to the *Streitkräftebasis*, should be the way of the future. The fact that the Air Force has decided independently to retain control of its electronic warfare units is a clear indication of the reluctance to merge single service capabilities into a new joint structure. That the *Luftwaffe* has been permitted to make this decision clearly indicates that the organizational mindset within the Army, Navy, and Air Force, has not progressed very far towards the transformational goals of 'jointness'. It also demonstrates that the *Generalinspektor* has been unable or unwilling to direct such changes, perhaps reflecting the continued institutional single service mindset that exists.

This mindset is also clearly evident in the failure to consolidate command and control over deployed forces in a single joint headquarters, as well as the failure to combine similar capabilities under a single organization. It is therefore valid to question whether the current transformational measures will require additional ministerial direction to achieve the desired end-state. The problem may be a failure to agree upon a vision of where the precise boundaries of jointness are to be at end-state, and where the single services can retain their distinct environmental identities. This clash of cultures remains a principal issue for the German Forces. In the words of a member of the Naval Directing Staff at the *Führungsakademie der Bundeswehr* (German General Command and Staff College), "The Services (army, navy and air force) lead missions, and the others don't." There is little ambiguity in either the statement, or the mindset that inspired the statement.

There are future trends that will need to be examined closely to determine if the German Armed Forces transformational goals are likely to be achieved. Should the Stabilization Force become, in fact, the main effort of the Armed Forces, by virtue of the fact that it will likely be assigned the majority of future missions supporting German foreign policy, it will thus become the element of the Armed Forces where the majority of the resources (equipment, personnel, training, and

financial) are expended. The result of this tendency, should it appear, will be the diversion of funding away from the much more costly, and, likely, infrequently used Response Force, to the benefit of the Stabilization and Support Forces. This trend would, in the medium-to-long term, lead to the 'rust out' of the current fleets of tanks and other heavy and medium armoured vehicles, which today make up the bulk of the Response Force, and are now reaching the end of their usable life span. As experience with foreign operations increases, so the divergence of equipment requirements between the Response Force and the Stabilization Force should become more evident. There should be little need for tanks to be deployed during the types of stabilization missions likely to be undertaken in support of German foreign policy.

The tendency towards budgetary allocations for training and equipment, as well as personnel rotation and promotions, should indicate where the new German *Schwerpunkt* (point of main effort) lies. Who gets priority for the increasingly scarce training funds, as well as who gets promoted first, will provide an indication of where the Germans are intending to focus their efforts. If the traditional methods of operations continue, there is little chance that the German military will achieve its operational and structural goals of transforming itself.

The Germans have, with their three-tiered structure, developed a rational force model to support their stated foreign policy goals. The inherent flexibility incorporated into the structure design will enable them to tailor their participation in various national and international missions to specific circumstances with the level of force necessary to meet the objectives. What is less evident is how stable this new force structure will become over the long term. How well the Germans reconcile the divergence that will likely develop in the medium-to-long term between the Response and Stabilization Forces will determine the success of this model.

One of the desired transformational objectives is to produce forces that are capable of working together *nationally* (joint), as well as within a *multinational* environment (combined). The success or failure of that objective – combined with the ongoing efforts to change the institutional mindset of the three single services to adopt a coherent joint doctrine applicable at the tactical, operational and strategic levels – will ultimately determine if the current reorganizational initiatives will succeed, or will have to be replaced with a different model. German forces will require highly effective and integrated command and control structures as

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The Eurofighter *Typhoon*, in service with the Luftwaffe, the Royal Air Force, the Aeronautica Militare Italiana, and the Spanish Air Force.

well as centralized and coordinated intelligence, surveillance and targeting capabilities. It is still unclear if the current German transformation initiatives will produce these capabilities. This is particularly so, given the institutional reluctance to establish a strong central joint staff with the necessary authority to direct and control all aspects of operational and strategic planning for all types of deployments.

Structural and organizational changes are necessary elements in the evolution of all military forces, as those forces adapt to ever-changing threats. How adaptable the current German model – with its division between Response Forces designed to operate in high intensity conflict and Stabilization Forces designed for operations ranging from Peace Support to less robust Peace Enforcement missions – will be to meeting these challenges over the medium-to-long term will be interesting to observe.

A final note of caution must be considered in this transformational process. While the evolution of military organizations, structures, and doctrine is, and should

be, continuous, nations must be careful not to scrap current capabilities simply because no precise and defined threat currently exists. Threats evolve and develop over a much shorter time span than national equipment programs can produce weapons systems to counter them. Thus, for example, while the current usefulness of deploying heavy armoured forces may be questionable for the vast majority of missions likely to be undertaken in support of current German national interests, the retention of these forces – and the continued development of combat capabilities to replace them – should be considered to be a necessary component of the national military strategy. Nations need to remember that military forces are, in the final analysis, their only insurance policy against current and future threats. Developing and fielding military forces only against current or existing threats, and ignoring potential or emerging threats, is a mindset that inevitably leads to crisis.



NOTES

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20. Of those closed, 28 were installations with up to 10 positions, 31 installations with between 11 and 100 positions, nine installations with between 101 and 500 positions, 28 installations with between 501 and 1000 positions, and nine installations with more than 1000 positions. BMVg, *Stationierung Ergebnis*, Berlin: BMVg, <www.bmvg.de/C1256F1200608B1B/CurrentBaseLink/W268SJ8S406INFOEN>, 26 June 2005.



German Flag and Coat of Arms.