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DND Photo IS2003-033 by Master Corporal Brian Walsh
Canadian Forces Combat Camera

Today, many CF operations are conducted in areas where there is an increased risk of accidents due to austere infrastructures, such as when they occur at primitive airfields.

Force Protection

by Andrew Gale and Wayne Pickering

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Today, and for the foreseeable future, Canadian Forces (CF) activities are characterized increasingly by operations that are joint, and, if overseas, conducted as part of a coalition. The mission space has no discernable “front-lines” or “rear area,” and an adversary may be expected to target CF vulnerabilities across an operational area with a wide range of capabilities. Indeed, what has been referred to as the “Three-Block War,” where humanitarian, peace support, and combat operations are occurring simultaneously in the same area of operations,1 will be a military planning consideration in addressing the new security paradigms. Security, one of the principles of war, and protection, a key component of security, assume a greater importance in such an environment.

The purpose of this article is to provide the reader with an overview of force protection in the Canadian Forces. This includes what force protection is, why it is required, whom it is meant to protect, where and when it is needed, and how it is implemented.

The CF defines force protection (FP) as, “All measures taken to contribute to mission success by preserving freedom of action and operational effectiveness through managing risks and minimizing vulnerabilities to personnel, information, materiel, facilities and activities from all threats.”2 Note that the emphasis is upon contributing to mission success and on managing, not eliminating, risks. Force protection is applicable to the joint, maritime, land, air, information, and space environments. Further, it is required throughout the spectrum of conflict and the continuum of operations, and it must be maintained in all five phases of an operation: warning, preparation, deployment, employment, and re-deployment. In today’s environment, threats and hazards can appear unexpectedly in operations, and during day-to-day activities in port, garrison, or air base, both domestically and abroad. To meet these threats and hazards, continuous FP needs to be applied, to include a wide assortment of defence, safety, health, law enforcement, and security measures.

The renewed emphasis upon force protection by Western armed forces has arisen from the concern for casualties that are not related directly to combat, particularly in operations that are not in support of traditional national interests. These include casualties from acts of terrorism, from accidents, and from disease. A successful domestic or overseas terrorist attack may not only cause personnel casualties, but also may affect the success of ongoing operations, and the governance of the nation. A recent example was Spain’s withdrawal from coalition operations in Iraq after terrorist attacks on civilian commuter trains in Madrid killed 199 people. Personnel casualties and materiel losses that are considered to be excessive or unnecessary in peace support and humanitarian operations may prove difficult to justify to the political leadership, and to the public. An example is embodied in the deaths of 18 US soldiers in Mogadishu in 1993 that resulted in the loss of political support for the operation in Somalia, and the withdrawal of American and United Nations personnel.3

Between 1945 and 1989, the CF operated in a relatively stable environment, characterized by Canada’s participation in NATO, NORAD, and traditional peacekeeping operations. During the Cold War, the CF faced conventional military threats in the North Atlantic, in Europe, and in North America, and it experienced low-level threats during peacekeeping operations between nation states that had mutually agreed to cease hostilities. There were exceptions. In 1960, our peacekeepers were kidnapped and beaten by undisciplined troops in the Congo.4 Between 1963 and 1970, CF recruiting centres, armouries, and National Defence Headquarters were bombed, and weapons were stolen from CF armouries by the Front de Liberation du Quebec (FLQ).5 The breakdown of peace agreements in the Sinai in 1967, and in Cyprus in 1974, endangered our personnel, and extraordinary countermeasures had to be taken. The force in the Sinai was withdrawn, and the force in Cyprus was reinforced. During the 1980s, additional security measures were required to protect our NATO forces against possible acts of European terrorism.6 Most of these events, however, were treated as one-time threats, and the lessons that were learned from them were forgotten.

Since the end of the Cold War, the CF has been involved in operations in areas where there is no peace to keep, where there are significant environmental hazards caused by terrain, climate, and disease, and where there is an increased risk of occupational hazards, such as accidents due to limited, austere, or damaged infrastructure, which includes ports, roads, and airfields. The events of 11 September 2001 reminded the world that no country is safe from acts of terrorism. The threat to the information systems that the CF relies upon has increased exponentially. The CF has been forced to consider the effects of these threats and hazards to its assets: personnel, materiel, facilities, information and activities. Our evolving policy framework, the experience of our allies, and our own recent operational experience are all driving current CF force protection requirements.

CF Policy Framework

The Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (DCDS) document Future Operations Study suggested that there is little likelihood of a major conventional war involving Canada in the next decade.7 Strategy 2020 noted that while Canada faces no direct conventional military threat, many emerging threats will be non-traditional, and new task-tailored capabilities will be required to deal with these threats.8 The DCDS Asymmetric Threat Study stated that an emerging source of global instability and risks to the CF will be asymmetric threats, where adversaries will attempt to circumvent or undermine an opponent’s strengths while exploiting his weaknesses, using methods that differ significantly from the opponent’s usual mode of operations.9 The 2004 National Security Policy paper discussed the threats of extremism, terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, espionage, natural disasters, cyber-attacks, organized crime, and pandemics, and the requirement for an integrated national security framework to address these threats.10 The Canadian Joint Task List established a framework for describing and relating the types of capabilities that may be required by the CF in today’s environment. It categorizes these capabilities into eight areas, one of which is Capability Area 5 – Force Protection.11

Allied Experience

Beginning in the 1970s, two of our principal allies were forced by circumstances to come to terms with force protection to ensure that their armed forces had the policies, doctrine, procedures, training, organizations, and equipment to deal with a wide spectrum of threats.

The United States suffered 148 battle deaths in Operation Desert Storm, its largest military operation during the period extending from 1972 to 2001.12 During that same period, the US military experienced mass casualty attacks from non-conventional opponents that jeopardized military operations. Examples include the loss of 242 US Marines and sailors outside Beirut, Lebanon, in 1983, when a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) exploded inside their barracks; the loss of 19 airmen in 1996, when a VBIED exploded outside their barracks in the Khobar Towers, Dhahran, Saudi Arabia; the loss of 17 naval personnel, when the destroyer USS Cole was attacked in Aden, Yemen, in 2000; and the loss of 125 military and civilian personnel in the 2001 attack on the Pentagon.13 As a result of the bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut, the multinational peacekeeping force was withdrawn from Lebanon14. The bombing of the Khobar towers accomplished what Iraqi air defences could not; it temporarily degraded US and coalition air operations over Iraq. The attack on the USS Cole almost cost the US Navy a major surface combatant, and the US Navy had lost no destroyers at all during the Cold War, including during the Korean and Vietnamese conflicts. These attacks received international attention. Less publicized have been the steady losses of US military personnel from terrorist attacks, and upon military attaches and advisors, embassy guards, and military personnel who are off duty, on leave, or travelling to and from their duty stations. Since Operation Desert Storm, few adversaries are prepared to conduct conventional operations against a Western coalition, and non-conventional military and non-military threats are predominant in today’s operations. However, the US military has also suffered casualties from occupational hazards, such as accidents and fratricide,15 and environmental hazards, such as disease. As a result, the US Department of Defense has recognized the need for consistent policy, doctrine, procedures, organizations, and equipment to protect its forces from losses not directly related to conventional combat operations.

Between 1972 and 1996, the British fought wars in the Falkland Islands and the Persian Gulf, and experienced a series of attacks by the Irish Republican Army (IRA), most of them on targets in the British Isles and on the European continent. During the Gulf Crisis of 1990-91, 24 British servicemen were killed in action. During the same period, the IRA killed 28 members of the British Army and the Ulster Defence Regiment.16 Most IRA attacks made upon the British forces were on ‘soft’ military targets such as messes, barracks, buses carrying soldiers and dependents, ceremonial guards, bands, military training establishments, and off-duty personnel. As the IRA campaign continued, the British adopted additional security measures for all their military facilities at home and abroad, and upgraded their policies, doctrine, procedures, and training.

Our American allies have established dedicated force protection organizations and staff structures, and the required policy, doctrine, and procedures to assist commanders at all levels to plan, direct, coordinate, and monitor the force protection posture of their subordinate commands, formations, and units. For example, the United States Department of Defense (DoD) has established J34 Force Protection staffs at the Pentagon and at its major headquarters, such as US Northern Command (NORTHCOM), and has created force protection training and assessment organizations, such as the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA).


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Figure 1 – Most of the capability needed for force protection exists within the Canadian Forces.

Recent CF Operational Experience and the Requirement for Force Protection

In the words of then-Major-General Andrew Leslie: “The days of a blue UN helmet acting as a guarantor of invulnerability and credibility to lightly-equipped international forces are long gone.”17 The CF has organized, trained, and equipped its combat forces deployed to the Persian Gulf, the Balkans, the Adriatic, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and the Arabian Sea to protect themselves. Antagonists, however, may not challenge the CF in conventional combat, and training and equipping for combat alone did not prevent our allies from suffering casualties from non-conventional opponents such as terrorists and insurgents. There is also the need to protect our forces where and when they are most vulnerable, such as in port, in barracks, on airfields, off duty, and while in transit to a theatre of operations, and to protect soft military targets, such as headquarters, bases, logistic support facilities, lines of communications, and the civilian infrastructure that supports them. This is complicated by the increasing numbers of defence civilians, including contractors, who support CF operations in Canada and abroad. Force protection, even in coalition operations, is a national responsibility, although our allies and the host nation may be able to provide some assistance.

The threats and risks to military and civilian personnel and other assets during international operations have varied according to the type of mission, the geopolitical climate, and the operating environment. Typically, the threat has been assessed as low-to-medium, although it may rise to high or severe for brief periods. International terrorist activities, and environ-mental hazards such as earthquakes, may suddenly increase the threat, in even the most benign environment, and asymmetric threats have increased the size and complexity of the CF’s operating environment, extending the mission space to include continental North America. Hence, force protection is no longer unique to theatres and areas of deployed international operations, and it extends to CF assets and activities in Canada. Unfortunately, after the Cold War ended, some of the security infrastructure of CF bases and installations in Canada was not maintained, or it was dismantled. Overseas, our force protection measures have been tailored to each specific operation, rather than applied within a consistent and coordinated joint doctrinal framework, and, in many cases, we have relied upon our allies or the host nation to secure our bases and lines of communications.

Most of the military capability needed for force protection already exists in the CF (see Figure 1). However, these military functions need to be coordinated effectively and their efforts integrated to develop effective CF force protection capability, and apply it to campaigns or missions. Currently, many of these functions are performed in a loosely coordinated, ad hoc, and disparate manner by a number of branches, and by various DND/CF staffs. To be more effective, a convergent or unified approach to FP is required that reaches across people, processes, and technology to enable the commander to address the full spectrum of risks that will have an impact upon mission success. The risk to CF assets in the current threat environment is heightened in the absence of an effective and coordinated force protection program.

A further challenge will be to provide effective force protection to meet the needs of present CF transformation initiatives, and the stand-up of new Operational Level Commands. The risks presented by our current force protection posture include:

  • An incomplete appreciation of domestic and international threats and hazards to CF and DND assets;

  • An incomplete appreciation of CF and DND vulnerabilities;

  • A potential for risk to CF and DND assets;

  • A fragmented, partial view and implementation of CF force protection controls and measures, both domestic and international;

  • A lack of clarity with respect to authorities, responsibilities, and accountabilities related to the various force protection stovepipes; and

  • The possible loss of CF influence and relevance in national fora, including government security agencies such as the RCMP,18 and in international fora, including NATO and the US DoD, due to the aforementioned factors.

Force Protection and the Mission

Force protection aims to preserve the freedom of action and operational effectiveness of a military force. This is achieved by countering non-combat threats to all its elements, whether originated by hostile activity, occupational hazards (such as accidents and friendly fire), and environmental hazards (such as disease and weather), and by minimizing vulnerabilities that could be exploited by these threats and hazards. Effective force protection allows the commander, and the personnel who execute the commander’s directives, to focus upon the mission. However, force protection measures must not compromise the success of a mission. In military operations, taking risks that may result in casualties and materiel losses are unavoidable. An unrealistic desire to avoid casualties may impact adversely upon the accomplishment of a mission, and, when casualties do ensue, undermine political and military resolve. Commanders must apply the appropriate level of force protection, balancing the risk to their forces against the risks to mission success, if overly stringent force protection measures are adopted. Examples of overly stringent force protection measures include:

  • in combat operations, failure to close with and destroy the enemy to avoid casualties;19 and

  • in peace support and humanitarian operations, failure to generate trust, either by isolating our military personnel from the civilian population or by using overly aggressive tactics.

DND Photo HS 2005-G002-04) (D2k - to be inserted just before section entitled Force Protection Concept

Environmental hazards are part and parcel of all Canadian Forces activities, including humanitarian operations.

Force Protection Concept

Force protection is a concept aimed at preserving freedom of action by applying controls and measures that allow tactical self-sufficiency at the lowest practical level. Planning in FP establishes the requirements, and identifies the necessary measures and means to minimize the vulnerability of personnel, facilities, materiel, and operations to any threat that would severely undermine a mission’s success. It is a dynamic and cyclical process, which constantly assesses the threat and prescribes appropriate measures to reduce the vulnerabilities at risk from elements of that threat. The majority of the controls and measures required are procedural, rather than resource-based. The CF force protection model developed in the Force Protection Concept Paper20 consists of the following planning steps:

  • identify the assigned and implied tasks through mission analysis (part of the Operational Planning Process);

  • identify those assets that are important to mission success (criticality assessment). Assets include personnel, materiel, facilities, information and activities;

  • determine threats and hazards to those assets that are important to mission success (threat assessment);

  • identify vulnerabilities that could be exploited by the threat or hazard and thereby affect mission success (vulnerability assessment);

  • determine the risks to mission success from an assessment of the ability of the threat or hazard to exploit identified vulnerabilities (risk assessment);

  • identify and implement appropriate force protection controls and measures to reduce vulnerability or threat/hazard likelihood/impact and thereby reduce risk to a level acceptable to command (risk management and the implementation of controls and measures to safeguard);

  • calculate and monitor the residual risk or gaps in security in order to manage the mission (continuous risk assessment);

  • identify and implement incident response and consequence management controls and measures,21 including the development and implementation of an emergency response plan (incident response and consequence management); and

  • reassess and maintain force protection measures and controls throughout the mission (command supervision and review).

Residual risks are those risks remaining after force protection controls and measures have been implemented. As it is not possible to eliminate all risks to an operation all the time, risk assessment is focused upon identifying the degree of residual risk that is acceptable to the commander, and assessing its potential impact upon the mission.

Force protection is not a separate operational activity, but, rather, it is a fundamental consideration for all military missions or tasks, whether in a day-to-day, domestic, continental, or international operational setting, throughout the spectrum of conflict and the continuum of operations. In operations, force protection planning needs to follow and to be consistent with the CF Operational Planning Process (OPP).22 It must consider a means to assess and manage operational risk by producing an accurate and comprehensive threat assessment, and develop and implement measures that can reduce adversary capabilities to disrupt operations to an acceptable level. Although force protection planning has always been an implicit part of the OPP, in the past its elements have not always been well coordinated or consistently implemented.


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Figure 2 – The CF Force Protection Model defines the planning steps required.

Risk Management Approach

Force protection planning is based upon risk management principles. Risk management in operations is described in two CF joint manuals, Risk Management for CF Operations, and Chapter 7 of the CF Operational Planning Process.23 It is part of 1 Canadian Air Division, US DoD, UK, NATO, and the ABCA (America, Britain, Canada, and Australia) Armies program force protection doctrine and procedures.24 An assessment of threats, vulnerabilities, and risks provides commanders and staff with a detailed and realistic list of assets that are important to mission success, vulnerabilities to these assets, and the resultant risks to the mission. Armed with this information, a risk management strategy can be developed. The risk management strategy should identify the broad lines of how risks will be managed to bring them to limits that are acceptable to a commander. Risk response involves four techniques: avoidance, transference, mitigation, and acceptance. For risks that cannot be avoided, transferred, or accepted, the appropriate force protection controls and measures are identified, developed, and implemented to mitigate identified threats and hazards. The commander makes the final decision on the extent of the force protection controls and measures to be applied, given the mission, the risk, the resources available, and command considerations. Controls and measures may be physical, such as barriers or armour protection, or procedural, such as standard operating procedures. Local force protection responsibility may be delegated to component or subordinate commanders, and they may introduce additional controls and measures to meet local conditions.

The objectives of force protection are to:

  • reduce the risk of mission failure posed by threats or hazards, and manage the residual risk;

  • preserve the freedom of action to successfully accomplish the mission; and

  • facilitate and enhance operational effectiveness.25

Force protection objectives are achieved when the activities of an adversary or the effects of a hazard, and the apprehension generated by these threats, are reduced to a level so that operations or routine activities can proceed without significant interference. Force protection reduces the vulnerability of mission critical assets, the likelihood of compromise to those assets, and the severity of the consequences. Specifically, force protection addresses avoiding, transferring, mitigating or accepting risks to CF assets, rather than eliminating them entirely. Nor does force protection necessarily eliminate or reduce threat agents, which may require offensive combat operations.

Progress to Date and the Way Ahead

A force protection governance structure has been established within the Department and the Canadian Forces. A force protection Concept Paper has been approved. A policy document has been written, and the resources required to implement the policy are being identified. Joint doctrine, including a Joint Force Protection Doctrine Manual, has been written. A set of force protection levels and measures has been drafted. A number of vulnerability assessments have been conducted on CF establishments at home and overseas. A force protection training strategy has been approved. Links have been established with other government departments and our principal allies. The following paragraphs will highlight progress in governance, linkages, assessments, and training.

Force protection, by nature, has a very broad definition covering a diverse spectrum of measures and disciplines. Strategically, however, this has reinforced the prerequisite for an effective and credible departmental security program that provides for the coordination of security policy functions and the implementation of security policy requirements provided in governmental and international agreements. Thus, the Departmental Security Program remains the cornerstone of an effective CF FP program, both of which require executive DND/CF involvement. Subsequently, the Force Protection and Security Steering Committee (FPSSC), chaired by the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff, and including the Environmental Chiefs of Staff and all Level 1 supervisors, has been the DND/CF governing structure for force protection capability development.

At the national level, the Government of Canada established the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada (PSEPC) in December 2003. PSEPC is leading two new initiatives with significant force protection implications, namely Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) and Business Continuity Planning (BCP). Links have been established between the CF force protection staff and PSEPC, the RCMP, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), and the Communications Security Establishment (CSE). Links have also been established with US NORTHCOM, and combined Canadian/US vulnerability assessments have been conducted for CF bases where there are significant numbers of US DoD personnel. The CF approach to joint force protection has been discussed with our American, NATO, and Australian allies.

Commanders determine the vulnerability of their facilities and operations through a regular and comprehensive force protection vulnerability assessment (VA) process. The size of an operation and the potential threat level normally dictate the level of VA detail. The VA may be conducted by existing staff, by an FP specialist assigned to the operations staff, or by a VA team convened to analyze the threat and to provide recommended FP measures to the commander. VA team composition and the scope of the assessment are tailored to meet the unique requirements of the respective threat and facilities. Additionally, there must be a suitable mechanism established via the chain of command to implement the resultant actions required. By June 2006, 15 Force Protection VAs had been completed at DND/CF overseas and domestic installations, including the Haiti deployment, the draw down in Bosnia, the camp consolidation for Camp Julien in Afghanistan, the Chairman Military Committee (CMC) NATO Residence in Brussels, CFB Halifax, CFB Esquimalt, CFB Gagetown, 3 Wing Bagotville, 4 Wing Cold Lake, 14 Wing Greenwood, 17 Wing Winnipeg, 22 Wing North Bay, the NDHQ Pearkes Building Ottawa, CFB Borden, and CFAD Dundurn.

A summation of deficiencies during force protection assessments noted that:

  • there is limited capability to provide strategic and operational assessments of vulnerabilities of CF assets to deliberate, accidental, and environmental threats;

  • there is no centralized approach to address systemic vulnerabilities determined from force protection assessments;

  • there is limited trend analysis to identify common force protection vulnerabilities and concerns and to plan cost-effective projects to implement controls/measures departmentally, functionally or regionally according to criticality and to the threat;

  • there is no reporting and limited follow-up action at the strategic and operational levels to correct the noted vulnerabilities and concerns;

  • there is no formal capability for capturing force protection lessons learned, sharing of best practices, and developing standard CF responses to vulnerabilities to enhance the overall DND/CF FP posture; and

  • there is limited force protection staff advisory capability for commanders relating to force protection, threats, vulnerabilities, and concerns.

Much of the individual training needed for force protection, including sentry duties, individual weapon proficiency, first aid, and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) defence is included in basic recruit training. The Force Protection Training Concept identified the need for four levels of force protection training, including the development of standards and course packages, and instructional Subject Matter Experts (SME), and the requirement for force protection input to collective training. These levels include:

  • Level 1 – Training and awareness for all CF/DND personnel to improve individual and collective force protection posture, as well as the ability to respond to an attack or emergency;

  • Level 2 – FP training for force protection staff officers and advisors to develop and maintain the necessary FP programs and plans;

  • Level 3 – Force protection training and awareness for formation/unit/ base/installation commanders, in support of the Canadian Forces College (CFC), to increase the understanding and development of the force protection process and implementation of the methodology into the OPP; and

  • Level 4 – Collaborative emergency and risk management training for senior DND/CF leadership, in support of the Canadian Defence Academy (CDA).

A Level 1 training package has been developed. Four Level 2 pilot Force Protection Program Officer Courses have been conducted at CFB Borden, CFB Gagetown, and the Canadian Police College in Ottawa, that have trained 200 DND/CF personnel and a limited number of civilian and foreign military and police officials. Many of these personnel were subsequently involved in the force protection assessments described previously. There are currently no Level 3 or Level 4 FP training standards or course packages.


DND Photo IS2004-0666a by Corporal Robert Bottrill,
Canadian Forces Combat Camera

A Canadian Forces Nyala in use near Kabul.


Force protection, while conceptually new in CF terms, has been an implicit military planning factor throughout the ages, and it has been invariably categorized by individual nations as the “Principle of War” of security. In the absence of a clear definition, however, the harmonization and employment of force protection measures lacked effectiveness, and they failed to capitalize on the strengths of individual CF capabilities and components. Added to this was a lack of force protection specialists, which further exacerbated the limited cohesion of force protection and security policy issues. Today, however, CF operational needs and the increased global threats of terrorism have prompted an urgent review of the CF’s operational capabilities – which now includes the emerging concept of force protection.

It should be evident that force protection is a continuous and risk-driven process that features an integrated set of activities. Force protection is applicable to the joint, maritime, land, air, information, and space environments. Further, it is applicable throughout the spectrum of conflict and the continuum of operations, and it must be maintained in all five phases of an operation. Ultimately, force protection is focused upon contributing to mission success, and it has assumed an increased importance in CF operations at home and overseas. Steps are being taken to integrate it into all DND/CF activities.

The survivability of the Canadian Forces is a principal consideration in strategic planning and decision-making – with implications that extend well beyond the military mission and into issues such as public support, political cohesion, and national credibility. Potential adversaries will focus invariably upon perceived weaknesses and vulnerabilities, giving rise to the need for a comprehensive and resilient strategy for the protection of forces. Force protection is essential to operations – and, therefore, a clear responsibility of command – and all military units must be able to defend and protect themselves appropriately against the prevailing threat throughout the range of military operations, both at home and abroad.

CMJ Logo

Commander Andrew Gale, CD, is the Deputy Provost Marshal (Security) at National Defence Headquarters. Lieutenant Colonel (ret’d) Wayne Pickering is a retired armour officer with an interest in force protection.


  1. The term “three block war” was first enunciated by former USMC Commandant, General Charles Krulak.
  2. Definition endorsed by DND/CF Force Protection and Security Steering Committee (FPSSC) meeting 3 June 2004.
  3. M. Bowden, Black Hawk Down, A Story of Modern War (New York: Penguin Putnam, 1999).
  4. S. M. Maloney, Canada and UN Peacekeeping (St. Catharines, Ontario: Vanwell Publishing, 2002).
  5. G. Pelletier, The October Crisis, (Montreal: McClelland & Stewart, 1971).
  6. S. M. Maloney, War Without Battles, Canada’s NATO Brigade in Germany, 1951-1993 (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1997).
  7. Department of National Defence, DCDS Future Operations Study, 1999.
  8. Department of National Defence, Shaping the Future of Canadian Defence: A Strategy for 2020, June 1999, pp. 2, 4, 9.
  9. Department of National Defence, DCDS Report Number 2000-1, The Asymmetric Threat, 31 August 2001.
  10. Government of Canada, Securing an Open Society: Canada’s National Security Policy, April 2004, Chapters 1 and 2.
  11. Department of National Defence, Canadian Joint Task List, Version 1.4, last updated 30 September 2003, at <http://www.vcds.forces.gc.ca/dgsp/pubs/rep-pub/dda/cjtl/cjtl14/intro_e.asp>.
  12. R.W. Barnett, Asymmetric Warfare (Washington: Brassey’s, 2003), p. 46. During Operation Desert Storm the US suffered 138 non-battle deaths, mostly from accidents and disease.
  13. S. Strasser (ed), The 9/11 Investigations, Staff Reports of the 9/11 Commission (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), p. 393, and Appendix C.
  14. The multinational peacekeeping force included contingents from the US, France, Britain, and Italy. The French army barracks was attacked at the same time as the USMC barracks, resulting in the deaths of 58 French peacekeepers.
  15. The most costly incident of fratricide in recent years occurred in April 1994, when two USAF F-15 Eagle fighters shot down two US Army Blackhawk helicopters in the no-fly zone over Northern Iraq. All 26 personnel in the helicopters were killed.
  16. T.P. Coogan, The I.R.A. (London: Harper Collins, 1995), Appendix I (figures supplied by the Royal Ulster Constabulary).
  17. Andrew Leslie, The 2004 Haycock Lecture, “Boots on the Ground: Thoughts on the Future of the Canadian Forces,” Canadian Military Journal, Vol. 6, No. 1, (Spring 2005), p. 22.
  18. The security environment has changed, and for the foreseeable future, the CF and the RCMP will be working together more frequently than ever. For an example, see Colonel David Barr, “The Kananaskis G8 Summit: A Case Study in Interagency Cooperation,” Canadian Military Journal, Vol. 4, No. 4, (Winter 2003-2004), pp. 39-46.
  19. Colonel Alain Boyer, “Leadership and the Kosovo Air Campaign,” Canadian Military Journal, Vol. 3, No. 3, (Autumn 2002), pp. 37-44. This article discusses the casualty aversion syndrome.
  20. CF Force Protection Concept Paper, November 2004.
  21. Incident response includes measures to anticipate, prevent, pre-empt, neutralize, isolate, contain, and/or resolve a specific threat or act. Consequence management involves the coordination and implementation of measures intended to mitigate the damage, loss, hardship, and suffering caused by a natural, accidental, or deliberate threat event.
  22. B-GJ-005-500/FP-000, CF Operational Planning Process.
  23. B-GJ-005-502/FP-000, Risk Management for CF Operations and B-GJ-005-500/FP-000, CF Operational Planning Process.
  24. 1 Canadian Air Division Orders, Volume 1, 1-902, Force Protection Program; US DoD 0-2000. 12-H Antiterrorism Handbook, UK Joint Doctrine Pamphlet 1/99, Force Protection in Joint Operations; NATO Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-3.14 Force Protection (Third Study Draft); ABCA Coalition Operations Handbook (Chapter 12).
  25. B-GG-005-004/AF-000, Canadian Forces Operations, (Chapter 26).