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The Military and Society


DND photo

Canadian soldiers with Afghani police.

Can the Canadian Forces Reflect Canadian Society?

by Captain (N) Hans Jung

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If an army does not reflect the values and composition of the larger society that nurtures it, it invariably loses the support and allegiance of that society.1

The concept of diversity is not new to most liberal democracies. However, diversity and the concept of equitable representation of various segments of Canadian society became much more animated with the advent of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and the subsequent introduction of the Employment Equity (EE) Act. The issues of equal opportunity for women and increasing immigration, particularly from the visible minorities, have highlighted the discrepancy in the colour palate of the Canadian Forces (CF) in comparison to that of Canadian society at large. To address this discrepancy and to comply with the EE Act, military and other institutions are working hard to improve the representation of Designated Group Members (DGM).2

Beyond the legal aspect of diversity, there is a practical reason to achieve diversity, and the incumbent Chief of the Defence Staff, General Rick Hillier, has highlighted this point on numerous occasions. Given the shrinking demographics of the traditional recruit base, it is imperative that the CF ‘tap into’ the increasing demographics of the various DGMs, not only to meet the expanding needs of the CF, but also to provide the diverse knowledge base for various cultures and languages as the CF continues to engage in its international commitments.

In trying to achieve greater diversity, the CF has set targets, based upon a model of proportional representation, in compliance with the EE Act and the Human Rights Commission. The consequences, however, of setting unrealistic targets – and subsequently not achieving those targets – could produce a perception of institutional inertia. Evidence for this can be seen in the 2006 Report of the Auditor General of Canada, in which it is stated:

The Department has not been able to improve its recruiting of Aboriginal people, visible minorities, or women since our 2002 audit. Despite an increase in the youth population of these groups, the number of these recruits joining the Regular Force is declining...It has set targets for these groups. However, so far the Department has not been successful in meeting these targets. The number of women recruited into the military has steadily decreased since our last audit in 2002, and the same trend appears for visible minorities and Aboriginal people.3

The aim of this article is to explore the perils of setting unrealistic employment equity targets, based upon proportional representation, by examining Canadian demographics and the power of cultural values in influencing interest in and the propensity to enrol in the Canadian Forces. Failure to fully understand the differing cultural values of the visible minority groups from that of Canada’s mainstream society will only lead to policies that realistically cannot be implemented – to the detriment of both organizations and the overall employment equity initiatives.

Canada’s Demographics

Based upon the 2001 census,4 the Canadian population in 2001 was more than 31 million, and it was estimated that this figure would rise to just over 32 million by 2005. As of 2001, visible minorities in Canada constituted 13.4 percent of the population. Of this number, approximately 73.4 percent were immigrants, meaning that about three-quarters of the visible minority population in Canada was either first generation or ‘1.5 generation’ Canadians.5 Most of this migration occurred after 1971, with about 50 percent of the visible minorities arriving in Canada between 1981 and 2001. Even more interesting, the influx of visible minorities during the period 1991-2001 was double that of the period 1981-1991.6 What this suggests is that visible minorities, as a group, are relatively new to Canada.

Of the permanent immigrant residents in Canada, economic immigrants constitute the largest group, from a high of 85.3 percent in 1995, to 56.4 percent in 2004. The family class immigrants make up the second largest group, from a low of 8.5 percent in 1995, to the highest to date in 2004, at 29.3 percent. The third group consists of refugees, with a low of 0 percent in 1995, to a high of 8.4 percent in 2003. The refugees constituted 3.1 percent of the influx in 2004.7

From a visible minority ethnic perspective, Chinese and East Indians constitute over 45 percent of the visible minority. Looking at the Chinese and South Asian immigrants, for those who are 15 years of age or older, approximately 85 percent are foreign born. Given this actuality, and the availability of literature related to these two groups, this article will focus primarily upon these two ethnicities, in order to address the questions of demonstrated interest and the propensity for visible minorities to join the Canadian Forces.

Statistics Canada identifies a Metropolitan Area (MA) as “a very large urban area (known as the urban core) together with adjacent urban and rural areas that have a high degree of social and economic integration with the urban core. An MA has an urban core population of at least 100,000, based on the previous census.”8

Based upon the data available,9 the recruitment pool for the CF traditionally has been fit young men between the ages of 17 and 24, coming from rural areas or from urban areas with a population of less than 100,000. Recruits generally have been white males with previous familial CF ties, possessing a high school education or less. Since the majority of MAs, which constitute the bulk of the Canadian population, are not the traditional recruitment bases for the CF, it is questionable whether the CF has ever been truly reflective of Canada, even if one were to leave the visible minority issue on the sidelines. Therefore, since it is unlikely that the demographics, and perhaps the values, of the CF were ever truly reflective of Canada, the suggestion that somehow visible minorities should be recruited in a manner that represents the Canadian diversity is highly contentious. It is likely that the only time the Canadian Forces ever truly ‘reflected’ Canada was when conscription was in force during the two great global conflicts of the 20th Century. Thus, within a professional and volunteer force such as the CF, it is questionable if the CF can truly ‘reflect’ Canada.

Primary Reserve
Total CF
Canadian Work Force50





Visible Minorities















Table 1: Representation of EE Groups in the CF (July 2006)49

Understanding Interest and Propensity

It can be seen clearly in Table 1 that the EE groups are represented in numbers that are well below the available work force. The representation would have been even worse if one were to only look at the larger Regular Force. However, using both work force availability and the level of interest demonstrated in an Environics public opinion survey conducted in 1997, the target for minimum representation in the CF was set at 9 percent for visible minorities, and 28 percent for women.10 It is curious to note that women in the Canadian work force did not, proportionately, wish to pursue a career in the CF. Nonetheless, visible minorities were found to have the same level of interest in joining the CF as a non-designated (Caucasian) group. Since the visible minority group is inclusive of women and the pluralistic nature of culture, with the majority being non-Canadian born, this apparent level of interest is questionable. However, the very fact of taking interest into account to determine appropriate representation implicitly recognizes the reality that the CF cannot reflect Canadian society in direct proportional terms.

The 1997 Environics survey, which targeted visible minorities, Aboriginal people, and women in order to assess their level of interest in joining the CF, determined that visible minorities (33 percent) were the second largest group interested in joining the CF, following the Aboriginal people (35 percent). If so, then why is their representation in the CF so consistently low? To understand this phenomenon, it is necessary to examine the survey methodology used. Those visible minorities classified as being interested in joining the CF (33 percent) consisted of those who were very interested (12 percent), and others who were somewhat interested (21 percent).11 Of those who were very interested, 35 percent were found to be highly likely to visit a recruiting centre. This meant that only 4.2 percent of the initial 33 percent were very interested in joining the CF and were very likely to visit a recruiting centre – a group that is truly motivated and would be most likely to enrol. However, even these numbers are deceiving. When Canadians were asked their opinion of the Canadian Forces, the results were routinely highly positive. However, when the survey participants were asked to contextualize the importance of the military with all the other priorities, such as health care and education, the military priority became significantly lower. In the same vein, one must ask what is the likelihood that isolated questions with respect to interest in joining the CF would carry the same outcome if the same survey population were asked to rank the order of their interest in other occupations?

Only 37 percent of visible minorities strongly agreed that the CF was an organization that made all people feel welcome. In all, only 22 percent of visible minorities had a very positive impression of the CF, while visible minorities were the group least likely to agree that the CF would provide for an equitable opportunity for career advancement. Given these factors, the decision to include those who were somewhat interested in joining the CF, without the context of other priorities or commitments, into the calculus of interest demonstrated and propensity to join is highly suspect. What, then, does this say about the validity of both the methodology used and the target numbers derived for DGMs in the CF?

Navy members

DND photo ET2006-1103-37 by Sub-Lieutenant Qi Luping,
PLA(N), Qingdao

Problems with Target Methodology

The CF EE plan of 1999 set targets with respect to work force availability percentages of 9 percent and 28 percent for visible minorities and for women respectively.12 In 2004, based upon a new work force analysis methodology, those percentages for visible minorities and women were adjusted downwards to 7.8 percent and 19.4 percent respectively.13 This new methodology placed greater emphasis upon the concepts of interest demonstrated and propensity to join the work force, which should have led to more accurate targets for the DGMs. However, in determining interest and propensity, those who were somewhat interested were still included with those who were very interested – a strategy that is highly questionable.

Due to some weakness in the new methodology in arriving at work force availability for determination of targets for DGMs, another revised methodology has been produced that has yet to receive approval from the Canadian Human Rights Commission.14 The results show a further decline in work force availability for women to 17.7 percent, while the work force availability for the visible minorities moved up to 8.1 percent. This revised methodology incorporates a “military factor,” among others, into the equation to moderate further an interest in and a propensity for joining the Canadian Forces. However, this new, revised methodology increases the work force availability for visible minorities, which at first glance appears counterintuitive, since one would expect the work force availability to decline when a military factor is included.15 This notwithstanding, the real weakness, as argued previously, is that the interest and propensity surveys continue to measure non- contextualized interest, based upon being “at least somewhat interested” to predict a genuine propensity for joining the Canadian Forces.

To further examine the challenges of achieving diversity, it is worthwhile to review the very similar challenges experienced by the British armed forces within the social fabric of the United Kingdom (UK).


DND photo LC2006-020-012 by Corporal Phil Cheung,
Combat Camera

British Armed Forces

Similar to Canada, there is an expectation by the British government that “...the armed services should ‘reflect’ society...to correspond more closely with that of the wider population in terms of gender, sexual orientation, social class, and ethnicity.”16 In the UK, ethnic (visible) minorities comprise about 7 percent of the population, while in the armed forces, the ethnic minorities make up only 1.7 percent.17

In the UK, a fundamentally different approach is taken by the British armed forces with respect to representation for women, as compared to that taken towards ethnic minorities. For women, while they comprise 51 percent of the population, maximization of opportunity is emphasized with no suggestion that proportional representation is a goal. By contrast, for ethnic minorities, “...the emphasis is on proportionality of representation and the implication is clear: its absence is itself evidence of continuing disadvantage or unfairness.”18 Therefore, implicit in this difference is the notion of interest and propensity for women to enroll in the armed forces in general, while there is an assumption that ethnic minorities will have the same interest and propensity as the majority mainstream population, and all will be well if only the barriers are removed.

The British armed forces approach to women and ethnic minorities, in designing different policies for the two groups, invokes two types of representation: statistical and delegative.19 Statistical representation is equivalent to proportional representation, whereby members of a group in question are present in equal proportion to their presence in the larger population. Delegative representation, on the other hand, simply requires the presence of members of a group in question, but does not require proportional representation. A clear drawback to delegative representation is the risk of being branded as having token presence should the delegative representation fall far short of proportional representation.

In a study of Hindu attitudes, Doctor Asifa Hussain, a Ministry of Defence Fellow at the Department of Politics, University of Glasgow, has concluded that education is a stronger obstacle to recruitment than racism.20 Additionally, since education is deemed extremely important to many such ethnic minorities, competition against service in the armed forces for recruitment of this particular age group (17-22) was felt to be a serious obstacle. This is further exacerbated by perceptions that a military career represented a low status profession.21

Hussain states that “...[in] Asian families, parents have a tendency to exert a significant degree of influence on the career development of their offspring.”22 Thus, while interest in the armed forces was higher in the younger recruit age groups, the fact that this is not translating into higher representation may be related to parental and older generational influences in using education to achieve higher mainstream professional aspirations and success. This is not surprising since higher education is seen by many ethnic minorities as the means to overcome discrimination in the labour force.23

Hussain concludes that various ethnic minorities, particularly those of the Asian communities, have values and cultural expectations that are different than the mainstream population, which will influence both interest and the propensity for a career in the armed forces. Thus, progress toward greater representation may be harmed, “...unless unrealistic goals are revised to reflect the scale and reality of the task still facing the Forces.”24 Even more strongly worded, Mohammed Ishaq of the University of Paisley’s Department of Management and Marketing, writing in conjunction with Asifa Hussain, state that by setting improper or unrealistic targets, the resultant “...failure to meet targets may be construed as a failure by both those inside and outside the organization.”25 In support of this idea, Doctor Christopher Dandeker, a military sociologist in the Department of War Studies, King’s College London, and Professor David Mason, an area specialist from the University of Plymouth, suggest that the British armed forces, while supporting diversity, should utilize delegative representation in lieu of statistical or proportional representation.26

A Closer Look at the Canadian Multicultural Context

Similar to the findings in the UK, it is worthy to note that, in Canada, there is a strong focus placed upon education by many minority groups. In a study by Frances Henry, one of Canada’s leading experts in the study of racism and anti- racism, with respect to the Afro-Caribbean community in Toronto, it was found that “Caribbean parents place an inordinately high value on education. It is seen to be both important in its own right and the only avenue of social mobility for people from the lower social classes.”27 The Chinese community shares this sentiment where the respect for higher education has been entrenched for centuries. “Members of both the old and the newer Chinese communities in Ontario encourage their children toward careers in engineering, medicine and the law.”28 For many visible minority immigrants, “...policing, a civil service position, doesn’t hold the prestige, or the pay cheque, of a profession such as law, medicine or accounting.”29 This should hardly be surprising when one reviews the most common reasons for immigrating to Canada. Additionally, for refugees or political immigrants, “...they look at police [and the military] as brutal and corrupt because that’s the way it is back home.”30

Given these conditions, do cultural values and differences hinder full integration of visible minorities into some segments of Canadian society? To understand more comprehensively these unique cultural values, it is necessary to understand the importance of human and social capital.

Human and Social Capital

The decisions taken with respect to whether to go to college, to enter the job market, or to join the military are thought of as investment decisions affecting human capital.31 These decisions are made, much like many other investment decisions, using cost-benefit analysis of various scenarios over a set period of time.

The importance of education in influencing the value of human capital is evident in many areas. This is driven by the desire to improve economically, to not only better themselves, but also to enhance their children’s prospects. For Tariq Modood, Professor of Sociology at Bristol University, this phenomenon has been particularly evident in the South Asian and Chinese populations in the UK. Modood speculates that this is the result of family and community influences using the following sequence of logic:

  • Parents, other significant relatives, and community members share some general, but durable, ambitions to achieve upward mobility for themselves and, especially, for their children. And they believe that (higher) education is important in achieving those ambitions, and so, they prioritize the acquisition of (higher) education; [in other words, human capital]

  • They are successfully able to convey this view to the children, who, to a large degree, internalize it. And even where they may not fully share them, they develop ambitions and priorities that are consistent with those of their parents;

  • The parents have enough authority and power over their children, suitably reinforced by significant relatives and other community members, to ensure that the ambition is not ephemeral or fantastic, but that the children do whatever is necessary at a particular stage for its progressive realization.32

For many visible minority communities, education is seen as a driver of human capital leading to future success. While human capital can be viewed as an individual assessment, a confluence of such values within a community will lead to the development of social capital, whereby “...social capital, a...metaphorical construction, does not consist of resources that are held by individuals, or by groups but of processes of social interaction leading to constructive outcomes.”33 In this sense, social capital can be seen as incorporating or becoming part of a culture:

Constituted from social interactions based on common ties, ethnic communities often provide social and economic resources to members. In such communities, the monitoring actions of members can reinforce parental efforts at communicating values, norms, and expectations to young children.34

It can be seen that while immigrant parents of ethnic communities may have little of direct economic human capital to pass on to their children, the social capital within the community may lead to active acquisition of human capital by their children through “...transmission of norms-laden and goals- directing identities.”35 For visible minority groups, this passage of social capital occurs most commonly within communities known as enclaves.


DND photo IS2006-1140 by Sergeant Roxanne Clowe,
Combat Camera


An interesting phenomenon that has transpired in Canada’s pluralistic and multicultural society has been the rise of ethnic neighborhoods and their implications with respect to acculturation and integration. “Recent immigrants are increasingly likely to settle in ethnic neighborhoods in Canada’s three biggest cities, raising concerns that they are becoming isolated from the rest of the community.”36 Immigration/diversity reporter Nicholas Keung, based upon Statistics Canada numbers, reported that the number of ethnic communities in Toronto, Montreal, and Vancouver rose from six in 1981 to 254 in 2001. By 2001, 94 percent of the immigrants who arrived in Canada during the 1990s lived in large census Metropolitan Areas. More specifically, 73 percent of the immigrants who arrived in 1990s settled in Montreal, Toronto, and Vancouver.37 Given that the traditional recruit base for the CF is not from the large census Metropolitan Area, as stated previously, the growth of enclaves and the concentration of visible minorities within these enclaves have major implications for recruiting visible minorities into the Canadian Forces.

Statistics Canada reported that of 254 enclaves that existed in 2001, 157 were Chinese, 83 were South Asians, and the remaining 13 were black.38 The positive sides of ethnic enclaves include the preservation of language and other aspects of culture that are promoted within the spirit of Canadian multiculturalism. However, the ‘flip side’ of these enclaves is the potential to promote racism and to assist in the development of ghettos.39 The existence of such enclaves can clearly lead to perceptions that enclaves are not conducive to early integration or cultural adaptation, since they tend towards further social isolation from Canadian culture, thus impeding societal integration. Keung quotes Usha George, Director of Canada’s Joint Centre of Excellence for Research on Immigration and Settlement, as saying that “...ethnic minorities congregate in enclaves for reasons that include family ties and community bonds.”40 Further, it is not surprising that new immigrants would choose such enclaves, as such communities will likely consist of previously arrived relatives and friends, while additionally providing employment opportunities.41

There are a number of theories that explain why enclaves form. The social class hypothesis asserts that enclaves that form as new ethnicities tend to fall into distinct social classes, and that, as time passes and conditions improve, members of the enclave disperse to move into neighbourhoods that are more desirable. This theory should then predict less residential segregation over time, and while this does happen, it is too dependent upon economic factors and does not explain the growing number of enclaves, in spite of the socio-economic advancement of many ethnicities.

The second hypothesis, social distancing, is significantly influenced by prejudice and discrimination, and thus, the natural desire for groups of people to live among those who accept each other and to have greater sense of community and commonness – a trait that is clearly found in enclaves.


DND photo CX2007-0071-23 by Sergeant Joanne Stoeckl,
19 Wing Imaging

Thus, residential segregation may occur for two involuntary reasons. As new immigrants tend to occupy a lower socio-economic class, they are only able to live in certain sectors of a city. Further, as these new immigrants may have greater cultural differences, the social distance and the concomitant lower acceptance rate into “mainstream” society causes them to segregate into a localized setting.42

The third hypothesis, that of ethnic identity, is a form of voluntary segregation, based upon ethnic identity that maintains and enhances a vibrant self-sustaining economy, within which “...persons of the same ethnic ancestry choose to live in proximity so that social interaction can be maximized, and group norms and values can be maintained.”43 What is significant about this hypothesis is that it is relevant and can be generalized over multiple generations – and not just to the first affected generation.

While it is not possible to determine one all-encompassing hypothesis, it is clear then that all three can play some role in the evolution of enclaves. Further, both the size of the community and its concentration within a specific area provide some advantages for the development and advancement of such enclaves.

For British and European immigrants, it has been well established that enclaves or residential segregation diminishes over successive generations. The assimilation into mainstream society of Europeans over time is seen as the cost of economic mobility within the dominant culture, since the retention of “ethnicity” may carry economic and social costs.44 Yet, for visible minorities, assimilation does not appear to confer economic or social mobility, but rather, on the basis of racial minority status alone, there is an ‘across the board’ social and economic loss.45 This being the case, there would be no apparent advantage to assimilate. On the contrary, these conditions would appear to encourage the formation and strengthening of enclaves to promote ethnic self-esteem.46

For some visible minority groups, such as the Chinese and the South Asians, rather than having assimilation take place over successive generations, the contrary appears to have occurred whereby the second generation tends to have a higher degree of segregation than the first generation.47 This may be a reflection of the fact that such minority groups have more distinct cultures and are relatively ‘new’ arrivals, and it is over time and through subsequent generations that they have been able to amass enough numbers to effectively create (new) enclaves. Once enclaves are established, it is not too difficult to predict that subsequent visible minority immigrants will voluntarily choose to settle in these well- established enclaves, whether for social class, social distance, or ethnic identity reasons – or for all of them.

While enclaves are important for the visible minorities, the relationship between occupational and residential segregation is lessening. This means that visible minorities are diversifying into various occupations and are becoming economically assimilated, but “...the persistence of residential segregation among the various ethnic groups means that, in spite of their occupational mobility, and hence the ability for a wider residential choice, many may prefer to live in close proximity to others of the same ethnic background to retain their ethnic identity and maintain ethnic connectedness.”48


It is readily apparent that careful management of diversity is in the CF interest, not only for meeting regulatory requirements, but for operational necessities in having a sufficient recruit base to sustain the CF’s operational commitments, both domestic and international. However, from an EE perspective, can the CF mirror the civilian society? Inherent in this question is an assumption that the CF reflected the Canadian society before the rise in population of the visible minorities made the issue of proportional representation visible.

Based upon the recruit patterns provided, it is evident that the majority of CF members now come from small urban centres or rural areas. Since the majority of the Canadian population lives in large cities, it is clear that there is little in the manner of proportional representation based upon geographic distribution. Further, since the majority of visible minorities resides in those large metropolitan areas, the challenges to recruitment are self-evident.

For visible minorities, the target set by the CF, in accordance with EE and the Human Rights Commission, is 7.8 percent, while visible minorities make up 13.4 percent of the population. While 7.8 percent appears reasonable, it is based upon surveys using ‘interest and propensity’ questionnaires. A key and controversial feature of the survey is the means to determine what constitutes interest. The strategy of combining both those who are strongly and somewhat interested in joining the CF as the means to determine the target base is highly questionable. While those who are strongly interested in joining the CF should be considered in determining the target base for visible minorities, the positive predictive value of those who were only somewhat interested in joining the CF should be considered highly suspect.

It has been demonstrated that human capital is viewed as a major determinant by visible minorities for improved economic mobility. Specifically, higher education is seen as the means to future success. This sentiment is strongly engraved and it spans many generations. For those immigrant parents who are first generation, the desire to educate their children, and thus provide them with the opportunities that brought them to Canada in the first place, cannot be underestimated. This pervasiveness of the importance of human capital translates into ethnic social capital in determining cultural norms and maintaining these norms, even through subsequent generations. The evident rise of enclaves in Canada supports the social capital concept, and the continued value placed on education by the visible minorities. Additionally, the slowness of assimilation of visible minorities into the dominant Canadian society is reflected in and can be explained by the rise of enclaves.

Air Force Member

DND photo NB0LO250

The importance of education, family, and ethnic identity of the visible minorities, the majority of whom are either first or ‘1.5 generation,’ will conspire to limit participation of this group in the uniformed services of the nation, such as the Canadian Forces. Additionally, the relatively low ranking of military service as a career by visible minority cultures, combined with the negative image experienced by many cultures, as perpetrated by their own native militaries, conspire to limit or withhold a career in the Canadian Forces as of primary interest for the majority of visible minorities in Canada. This does not mean that a draw towards military service is totally discarded. On the contrary, surveys have shown interest, but this interest is often higher in the reserves, where the primacy of family, higher education, and professional (respectable) careers can still be pursued within the civilian sector. Lastly, the ‘bottom-up’ career progression that categorizes the military, with no avenue for lateral entry into more senior ranks, means that it will take many years for there to be sufficient numbers of senior ranks of visible minorities to provide the necessary positive role models.

Given the totality of evidence presented, it is doubtful that the Canadian Forces can accurately reflect today’s Canadian society. Since EE already accepts the concepts of interest and propensity, any inclination toward proportional representation should be dropped in favour of delegative representation, based upon more realistic interests and propensities. This is not simply a matter of philosophy, but it is one of great importance. The setting of unrealistically high targets for DGMs, based upon faulty interest and propensity data, can only lead to a situation whereby the CF will be perennially unable to meet its targets, no matter the effort. The consequences are plainly clear. It will inevitably lead to criticism of the CF that will only entrench further the perception of organizational inertia and systemic racism. Once this impression is reinforced, what reasonably minded visible minority will wish to become part of an organization that is seen to be unable and unwilling to be receptive to all Canadians to serve their country.

CMJ Logo

Captain (N) H.W. Jung, OMM, CD, MD, MA, is a medical officer in the Canadian Forces, and he is currently the Director, Health Services Human Resources at Canadian Forces Health Services Group Headquarters.


  1. David Bercuson, Significant Incident (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1996), in Franklin C. Pinch and others, Challenge and Change in the Military: Gender and Diversity Issues (Winnipeg: Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, Canadian Defence Academy, 2004), p. 198.
  2. DGMs for the CF comprise women, Aboriginal people, and visible minorities. For bona fide occupa-tional requirements, the CF does not actively recruit Persons with Disabilities. N. J. Holden, The Canadian Forces Workforce Analysis Methodology (Ottawa: Canada, Department of National Defence,[2004]).
  3. Office of the Auditor General of Canada, “2006 Report of the Auditor General of Canada,” (Ottawa: 2006).
  4. Statistics Canada, “2001 Census of Canada,” Statistics Canada, <http://www12.statcan.ca/english/census01/home/index.cfm>.
  5. ‘1.5 generation’ describes those who were born outside Canada but immigrated here at a very young age. Madeline A. Kalbach and Warren E. Kalbach, Perspectives on Ethnicity in Canada: A Reader (Toronto; Fort Worth: Harcourt Canada, 2000), p. 350.
  6. T. R. Balakrishnan and Stephen Gyimah, “Spatial Residential Patterns of Selected Ethnic Groups: Significance and Policy Implications,” Canadian Ethnic Studies 35, No. 1, (2003), p. 113.
  7. Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Facts and Figures 2004, Immigration Overview: Permanent Residents (Ottawa: Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2004).
  8. Statistics Canada, “2001 Census of Canada,” Statistics Canada, <http://www12.statcan.ca/english/census01/home/index.cfm>.
  9. Tracey Wait, Canadian Demographic and Social Values at a Glance: Impact on Strategic HR Planning (Ottawa, Canada: Department of National Defence, 2002).
  10. Environics Research Group Limited, A Survey of Visible Minorities, Aboriginals and Women to Assess their Level of Interest in Joining the Canadian Forces Environics Research Group Limited, 1997).
  11. A similar survey carried out in 2000 showed that 31 percent of visible minorities were at least somewhat interested in joining the Canadian Forces. However; this study did not differentiate between those who were very interested and those who were only somewhat interested.
  12. Department of National Defence, Employment Equity Plan: Building Teamwork in a Diverse Canadian Forces (Ottawa: Department of National Defence,1999).
  13. Holden.
  14. Irina Goldenberg, A New Approach to Estimating Workforce Availability for the Canadian Forces. (Ottawa: Canada, Department of National Defence, 2005).
  15. This change is due to a combination of updated use of census data and changes to the methodology itself.
  16. Christopher Dandeker and David Mason, “Diversifying the Uniform? The Participation of Minority Ethnic Personnel in the British Armed Services,” in Armed Forces & Society 29, No. 4 (2003), p. 481.
  17. James Jupp, “Do Ethnic Minorities really Want to Sign Up? A Question of Imbalance,” in Human Resource Management International Digest 11, No. 5 (2003), p. 13, at <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=388121431& Fmt=7&clientId=65345&RQT=309&VName=PQD>.
  18. Dandeker and Mason, p. 486
  19. Ibid.
  20. Asifa Hussain, “The British Armed Forces and the Hindu Perspective,” Journal of Political & Military Sociology 30, No. 1 (2002), pp. 197-212.
  21. Asifa Hussain and Mohammed Ishaq, “British Pakistani Muslims’ Perceptions of the Armed Forces,” in Armed Forces & Society 28, No. 4 (06//, 2002), p. 601.
  22. Hussain, p. 202.
  23. Mohammed Ishaq and Asifa Hussain, “British Ethnic Minority Communities and the Armed Forces,” in Personnel Review 31, No. 5/6 (2002), p. 722, at <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=269034951& Fmt=7&clientId=65345&RQT=309&VName=PQD>.
  24. Hussain, p. 210
  25. Mohammed Ishaq and Asifa Hussain, “Race and Recruitment from a Uniformed Services’ Perspective: The Scottish Dimension,” in Policy Studies 22, No. 3/4 (09//, 2001), p. 226.
  26. Dandeker and Mason, pp. 481-507
  27. Wsevolod W. Isajiw, Understanding Diversity: Ethnicity and Race in the Canadian Context (Toronto: Thompson Educational Pub., 1999), p. 123.
  28. Brian K. Cryderman and Augie Fleras, Police, Race and Ethnicity: A Guide for Police Services, 2nd Ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 1992), p. 201.
  29. Darah Hansen, “RCMP no Longer Colour Blind,” in Richmond News Online Edition March 10, 2004.
  30. Ibid.
  31. Robert L. Phillips and others, “The Economic Returns to Military Service: Race-Ethnic Differences,” in Social Science Quarterly (University of Texas Press) 73, No. 2 (06//, 1992), pp. 340-359.
  32. Tariq Modood, “Capitals, Ethnic Identity and Educational Qualifications,” in Cultural Trends 13, No. 50 (06//, 2004), p. 95.
  33. Bankston and Zhou in Ibid., p. 99.
  34. Kalbach and Kalbach, p. 350.
  35. Modood, p. 101.
  36. Nicholas Keung, “Ethnic Mini-Cities on Rise, StatsCan Study Finds; Immigrants Settle in Enclaves Concerns Raised about Isolation,” in Toronto Star, sec. A. 01, March 10, 2004.
  37. Balakrishnan and Gyimah, Spatial Residential Patterns of Selected Ethnic Groups: Significance and Policy Implications, 113.
  38. Nicholas Keung, “Ethnic Mini-Cities on Rise, StatsCan Study Finds; Immigrants Settle in Enclaves Concerns Raised about Isolation,” Toronto Star, p.. A. 01, March 10, 2004.
  39. Balakrishnan and Gyimah, p. 113.
  40. Keung.
  41. Balakrishnan and Gyimah, p. 113.
  42. Kalbach and Kalbach, p. 350.
  43. Ibid.
  44. Jeffrey G. Reitz and Sherrilyn M. Sklar, “Culture, Race, and the Economic Assimilation of Immigrants,” in Sociological Forum 12, No. 2 (06//, 1997), pp. 233-277.
  45. Ibid.
  46. Ibid.
  47. Balakrishnan and Gyimah, p. 113.
  48. Kalbach and Kalbach, p. 350.
  49. The actual number is likely higher as this number is based upon self- identification as of July 2006, provided by the Directorate of Human Resource Development.
  50. The Canadian Workforce numbers from Human Resources and Social Development Canada, Fact Sheet on Members of Designated Groups, 2001 Census, 2004, at <http://www.hrsdc.gc.ca/ asp/gateway.asp?hr=en/lp/lo/lswe/we/ee_tools/ data/eedr/annual/2001/facts-2001.shtml& hs=wzp>.


DND Photo

A CF-18 Hornet from 409 Squadron, Canadian Forces Base Cold Lake, flies formation upon a Russian Tupolev TU-95 Bear bomber, one of two participating in a Russian exercise in the far north, 5 September 2007. Canadian NORAD Region aircraft visually identified and monitored the Russian aircraft as they passed through the North American Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) in international airspace. All aircraft subsequently returned to their respective bases without incident.

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