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Aerospace Initiatives

The Blue marble

NASA photo

The Blue Marble.

US Space Policy and the Emerging International Environment: Cooperation and Competition

by Paul T. Mitchell

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In 2006, the Bush administration updated the ten-year-old space policy of the Clinton administration. Comment on the new policy has pointed explicitly to the change in language between the two policies. To a certain extent, the growing unpopularity of the Bush administration, especially within the American scientific community, has coloured opinion on the new policy, despite the fact that much of the material within the two policies is functionally similar. While not departing from the objectives of the Clinton policy, the Bush policy, in many respects, is far more explicit on aspects of national security. In terms of international cooperation and its stance on arms control, the Bush policy has moved the markers considerably from its predecessor. More than anything else, these changes point to new attitudes on the nature of the shifts in the international environment since the end of the Cold War. In many respects, the attitudinal shifts go beyond simple American party politics, and they reflect changing attitudes of Americans towards the international environment.

The Bush and Clinton Policies Compared

Le président Bill Clinton

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President Bill Clinton

Structurally, the two documents are roughly similar. Each lays out an introductory series of goals or principles that will guide American policy and actions in space before concentrating upon specific sectors in space activities. The Clinton policy laid out five goals:

  • Enhance knowledge of the Earth, the solar system and the universe through human and robotic exploration;

  • Strengthen and maintain the national security of the United States;

  • Enhance the economic competitiveness, and scientific and technical capabilities of the United States;

  • Encourage state, local, and private sector investment and use of space technologies; and

  • Promote international cooperation to further US domestic, national security, and foreign policies.1
President George W. Bush

White House photo by Chris Greenberg

President George W. Bush

By contrast, the Bush policy lists seven principles:

  • The United States is committed to the exploration and use of outer space by all nations for peaceful purposes, and for the benefit of all humanity. Consistent with this principle, “peaceful purposes” allow US defence and intelligence-related activities in pursuit of national interests;

  • The United States rejects any claims to sovereignty by any nation over outer space or celestial bodies, or any portion thereof, and rejects any limitations on the fundamental right of the United States to operate in and acquire data from space;

  • The United States will seek to cooperate with other nations in the peaceful use of outer space to extend the benefits of space, enhance space exploration, and to protect and promote freedom around the world;

  • The United States considers space systems to have the rights of passage through and operations in space without interference. Consistent with this principle, the United States will view purposeful interference with its space systems as an infringement upon its rights;

  • The United States considers space capabilities – including the ground and space segments and supporting links – vital to its national interests. Consistent with this policy, the United States will: preserve its rights, capabilities, and freedom of action in space; dissuade or deter others from either impeding those rights or developing capabilities intended to do so; take those actions necessary to protect its space capabilities; respond to interference; and deny, if necessary, adversaries the use of space capabilities hostile to US national interests;

  • The United States will oppose the development of new legal regimes or other restrictions that seek to prohibit or limit US access to or use of space. Proposed arms control agreements or restrictions must not impair the rights of the United States to conduct research, development, testing, and operations or other activities in space for US national interests; and

  • The United States is committed to encouraging and facilitating a growing and entrepreneurial US commercial space sector. Toward that end, the United States Government will use US commercial space capabilities to the maximum practical extent, consistent with national security.2

Comparing the two sets of guidelines, then, there are a number of similarities, although their priority is often different. For example, each policy places scientific endeavours at the top of the list. Both policies affirm the importance of space for national security. Each defines “peaceful purposes” in similar language, permitting a whole range of activities that are clearly military in nature. Finally, each claim sovereign rights of passage in order to prevent foreign interference with the missions of spacecraft. The Bush policy is considerably more detailed in terms of its discussion of how space affects the sovereign rights of the United States. While only a single goal of the Clinton policy deals with national security, five of the seven Bush principles deal with aspects of how America pursues its national security.

Bill Nye: The Science Guy

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Bill Nye, “the science guy”

This aspect of the new policy has attracted considerable critical attention, particularly in the scientific community. Louis Friedman of the Planetary Society called the policy “belligerent and bellicose ... reminiscent of a schoolyard bully.” Bill Nye, the Society’s vice president, was even more direct, calling it “creepy.” Theresa Hitchens, a noted space analyst with the Center for Defense Information in Washington, welcomed what cooperative language was in the policy, but cautioned that its “...spirit (was) undercut by language that indicates any such cooperation will be forthcoming on strictly US terms.3

It is true that there is a significant change in emphasis between the two policies. The Bush policy notes, “...[that] freedom of action in space is as important to the United States as air power and sea power.”4 By contrast, the Clinton policy noted in its introduction: “The United States will pursue greater levels of partnership and cooperation in national and international space activities and work with other nations to ensure the continued exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes.”5

The two policies also differ considerably in terms of how they specify the nature of international cooperation. The Clinton policy is much more detailed in this area, listing six objectives, including enhanced relations between the US and its allies, as well as Russia. The Bush policy is much terser, listing only a single goal. Finally, the Bush policy adopts a significantly different approach to the relationship between space and arms control. Non-proliferation and arms control are explicit goals that are listed under “Inter-sector guidelines.” The Bush policy, however, notes that it will oppose “new legal regimes” that “seek to prohibit or limit US access to or use of space.” Hitchens describes this as evidence of the policy’s “active hostility to the concept of collective security.”

Given the unilateralist proclivity of the Bush administration, one does not have to scrutinize the new space policy to detect a disdain of collective security. Nevertheless, a close examination of the 1996 document demonstrates that the new Bush policy has not departed far from that of Clinton. Freedom of access is an important goal that shaped the Clinton approach to arms control. For example: “Consistent with treaty obligations, the United States will develop, operate, and maintain space control capabilities to ensure freedom of action in space and, if directed, deny such freedom of action to adversaries.”6 Similarly, arms control is evaluated not simply for its own sake but in terms of how it contributes to American national security.7 Even before the Bush withdrawal from the ABM treaty, the Clinton policy emphasized the importance of an anti-ballistic missile program, “...as a hedge against the emergence of a long-range ballistic missile threat to the United States.”8 However, it is the words “the United States will oppose the development of new legal regimes or other restrictions that seek to prohibit or limit US access to or use of space” that have provoked criticism of the new Bush policy.

The resignation of Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld following the disastrous November 2006 election, together with the Bush administration’s willingness to pursue much more multilateral policies with respect to both the Iranian and North Korean nuclear programs, may indicate a certain moderation in the Bush administration. Thus, the new National Space Policy may be somewhat of a throwback to the style of the early, more unilateral, days of the administration. In many ways, however, the policy is more reminiscent of the first Bush administration’s 1992 Defense Planning Guidance.

Unilateralist Approaches to the Post Cold War Strategic Environment

Since 1992, the United States has quietly but successfully pursued a policy of dominating the strategic military environment to a degree that seeks to deter all other powers from challenging it. In 1992, under the stewardship of Paul Wolfowitz, who later served as Deputy Secretary of Defense under Rumsfeld, the classified Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) noted: “We will retain the pre-eminent responsibility for addressing selectively the wrongs which threaten not only our interests but those of our allies or friends, or which could seriously unsettle international relations.”9

The 1992 DPG was based upon an inherent skepticism that international cooperation to pursue security goals would be easy to orchestrate, or would be there simply for the asking. Instead of relying upon its own system of alliances, the US “should expect future coalitions to be ad hoc assemblies” and “the US should be postured to act independently when collective action cannot be orchestrated.”10

The policy did not withstand the withering criticism directed at it from both the media and US allies; the language of the Defense Planning Guidance was altered to make it more acceptable, and it appeared to be relegated to the status of a footnote in American security policy. The emergence of George W. Bush’s first National Security Strategy in the post-September 11 environment strongly recalls the words of the discarded 1992 Guidance.11 Shortly before its publication, Bush noted, in his 2002 address to the graduating class at West Point, that “America has and intends to keep military strength beyond challenge – thereby making the destabilizing arms races of other eras pointless.”12 The undertones of 1992 in subsequent US strategic policy, and the participation of several personalities from the first Bush administration, including Wolfowitz, linked the two policies.

Despite legacies from the earlier Bush administration, it seems that the quest for global military supremacy has always remained part of Pentagon policy,13 demonstrated by the development of the concept of ‘Full Spectrum Dominance’ during the mid-1990s. First articulated in the 1995 document Joint Vision 2010 (JV2010), full-spectrum dominance was supposed to enable the US ‘to dominate the full range of military operations from humanitarian assistance, through peace operations, up to and into the highest intensity conflict.’14 Here was the articulation of a policy that called for American pre-eminence across the full span of military operations, not just in the traditional conventional “force on force” engagement. The goals of the 1992 Defense Planning Guidance might have been renounced officially, but they persisted as the sub-text to the development of the US military’s response to the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA).

Thus, the Bush (I) 1992 DPG policy, the Clinton 1995 military policy, and the Bush (II) 2006 policy all trace their inspiration to the emerging international environment that followed the end of the Cold War. The 1992 DPG was a first attempt to come to grips with a world in which US military power was unrivalled by any other nation, and in which the challenges that would confront the United States would stem from issues entirely unconnected with the politics of the previous 50 years. In a word, a world of unipolarity.

The Rho Oph star forming region

NASA photo

Timeless beauty – The Rho Oph star forming region, one of the closest to our own solar system. Photographed by NASA’s Spitzer Space Telescope.

American Military Power and Global Operations

Despite the United States’ ideational influence, the extent of its control over the global economy is open to question. Moreover, a rising tide of anti-Americanism is challenging American “soft power.” The status of American military power, however, is largely beyond question, both rhetorically and in practice.15 The basis of American military primacy has been described in terms of ‘command of the commons.’ The ‘commons’ are those areas over which there is no national jurisdiction (most obviously, the sea and outer space), and those areas where military control is difficult to enforce. These areas can be used by all nations if they possess the requisite capability to do so. But because of the ubiquity of America’s military power, as opposed to the ‘niche’ and localized roles played by other states, the United States is able to exploit these more effectively in pursuing its own military ends. More importantly, it may deny the commons to others. Wresting command of the commons from it would require a generalized war, which is clearly currently beyond the capabilities of any other state. Command of the commons in its essence gives the US global military agency or ability to act. When the US confronts its enemies in their own specific areas of local control, they will already have been greatly weakened through diplomatic, economic, and moral isolation, and through standoff military strikes from air, space, and the sea.16

Command of the commons is enhanced not simply through the comprehensive nature of American military might but also through its capacity for a global approach to operations. No other state possesses a comparable worldwide network of military outposts in friendly states that provide logistics support for operations distant from the US homeland. The wide-ranging exercises that American forces conduct with the armed forces of allies and security partners also enhance American familiarity with the operational characteristics of international military actors, and with diverse operating environments. Finally, no other state organizes its military activities on a global basis, as does the United States in the form of its Unified Command Plan (UCP). The UCP enables the American military to “develop responsive war plans that can generate significant combat power in far corners of the world on relatively short notice.”17

The globalized nature of American military power does not obviate the need for allies and other security partners, as every US National Security Strategy has pointed out.18 Some have challenged the notion of unipolarity on this basis, but as Kenneth Waltz, one of the world’s foremost authorities in international relations responds, the strong, “have more ways of coping” than weaker powers.19 The point here is that, at present, America’s overwhelming military power apparently provides it with options to structure the world that other states do not possess. In previous eras, this type of dominant power would be of such concern to other powers as to spawn alliances, arms races, and outright political and military confrontation. Some speculate on the gradual evolution of the European Union as a potential counterweight to American hegemony, or debate the rise of China as a potential peer competitor. However, the fact that war between the great powers is now largely ‘unthinkable’20 suggests that American power does not threaten the core interests of other potential rivals in the way that the rise of Spanish, French, German, or, to be sure, Spartan power did in the past. Concern over America’s power centres on more generalized unease about global issues confronting all states, such as climate change, religious extremism, and cultural domination in all its varied forms. The generalized nature of these challenges has limited reactions to American power, to considerations largely oriented around methods of restraint and ‘socialization’ in order to keep American behaviour within acceptable boundaries, much as one would deal with a friendly but unruly dog.21 The issue for other nations is not wars of rebalancing, but how to engage American power: prodding it into action here, restraining it there. And so, while the US seeks to shape the future of the world, other states seek reflexively to shape America’s engagement of it. In the present global society of states, they all have their own ‘special relationship’ with the US that they seek to leverage.

The Impact of Polarity on Cooperation

International anarchy is the basic cause of international cooperation, as well as its ‘Achilles Heel.’22 Security fears create the need for cooperation, and, yet, the same anarchic conditions lead to doubts as to the reliability of any agreement made at the international level. Shared interests and threat perceptions create mutually dependent interstate relationships, but do not necessarily ensure perfect cooperation between partners, even within alliances. As a state can never be certain that its partners will fulfil their obligations completely, each state participates with the goal of minimizing its contribution while maximizing each of its partners’ obligations.23

Bargaining over the strategic direction and operational tasks of international agreements assumes the form of placing them deliberately at risk in order to coerce partners into acquiescence. The bargaining power of any state is related to its overall dependency upon its negotiating partners. States that are able to exploit asymmetrical advantages effectively will gain greater bargaining power.24 Thus, “dependency refers to the degree of harm that partners could inflict on each other by terminating the relationship....”25 Those with a crucial supply of an important asset, be it military or diplomatic resources, will enjoy enhanced bargaining power with their partners. By threatening to deny access to those resources, they are able to manipulate their partners’ fear of abandonment in the hopes of gaining concessions on interests that are in conflict.26 This has been particularly evident in the American refusal to sign the Kyoto Agreement, in the hopes of controlling the agenda of international climate change policy. Without American compliance, any agreement made at the international level is of relatively little importance.

The dependency of one state upon another is powerfully shaped by international structure through the medium of threat perception. ‘Polarity’ effectively determines the rigidity of obligations each state owes to its partners. Multipolar environments are marked by high degrees of fluidity between partners, whereas bipolar environments are far more stable.27 The present unipolar environment has had a distinct impact upon how states approach cooperation. Contemporary agreements are characterized by their ‘coalition-like’ nature: the speed of their formation, their lack of a strict hierarchy (and thus, the absence of any disciplinary features), and relative lack of strong national interests guiding their creation, and thus, the cost of withdrawing from them is relatively small.28 Coalition partners may be competitors in other areas, or they may choose to oppose the interests of each other even with respect to related issues. Therefore, a coalition organized around a particular issue area tends to be driven by the state that possesses the maximal set of interests. The level of cooperation it can expect will vary with how closely this set of interests conforms to those of its partners.

In a unipolar environment, a single power represents the sole guarantor of international order. There is an absence of competing powers to impose a substantially different set of norms on international order, and there is general agreement that the norms represent all states’ best interests. As such, in the post Cold War period, we have tended to see far more flexible and temporary ‘coalitions of the willing,’ even when they have involved strict alliance partners such as in the Balkans, the Middle East, and Central Asia, where a variety of NATO partners assisted the US with peace support and anti-terrorism operations.

NASA Kennedy Space Center in Florida

NASA photo

Space shuttle Discovery 2006 awaiting launch from the NASA Kennedy Space Center in Florida.

The Impact of Globalization on Cooperation

The very nature of globalization points to a complex future wherein insecurity is bound up inextricably within the promise of progress. The complex web of interdependent and crosscutting relationships that make up globalization not only makes its precise definition difficult but also leads to considerable uncertainty in terms of its overall long-term social, political, and economic effects.29 Globalization is inherently political in its tendency to produce both winners and losers, depending upon the nature of this complex interplay of variables within each and every relationship. As each globalized relationship will produce variable outcomes for every participant, it is impossible to blandly characterize the overall process as either ‘good’ or ‘bad,’ ‘stabilizing’ or ‘divisive.’ As such, globalization is by its nature ‘ambiguous,’ and, thus, the source of insecurity even as it generates opportunities – enabling and disempowering concurrently.30

Some have suggested that regions prone to instability are part of globalization’s crosscutting impacts and varying outcomes. Such ‘zones of war’ produce what others have called ‘leaking misery’ in the form of terrorism, crime, and refugees (both political and economic) for the ‘zones of peace.’31 The product of this interaction is intervention in failed states involving operations between paramilitaries, conventional forces, and non-government organizations (NGOs), all conducting nation-building, humanitarian assistance, counter-insurgency, indigenous force training, and outright combat operations in what has been described by the US Marine Corps as a ‘Three Block War.’32 In sum, globalization produces an inherently complex security landscape defying any single solution around which international agreement can crystallize easily. This landscape will politically mobilize a multiplicity of interests, stretching across these zones of peace and war, and further complicating efforts to find common ground.

An explicit example of the crosscutting nature of globalization is found in the role that the global web of electronic sinews plays in enhancing communications. The ability of ordinary individuals to inform themselves of international issues has contributed to the emergence of a ‘global citizenry,’ capable of monitoring state action and insisting upon the application of universalized ethical norms to any state’s policy.33 However, the same technology also permits those less committed to universalized notions of human identity to exploit differences in forms of justice, and, actually, to provoke violence between communities. The spectacle of globalized riots and demonstrations against the negative portrayal of the Prophet Mohammed in cartoons from an obscure Danish newspaper in early 2006 points to the fragmenting effect that global communications may possess.

As Sir Lawrence Freedman, Professor of War Studies at King’s College in London, has noted: “A world in which threats are real enough but do not come from other Great Powers is bound to ask different questions of an alliance than one which is focused on deterring or fighting a major war.”34 The questions that will be asked of any partnership of powers will revolve around issues of risks that are unevenly shared between these powers. What is striking about this condition is the necessarily subjective context in which consideration of potential policy alternatives takes place. The uneven nature of risk implies highly contextualized and individualistic definitions of what constitutes the ‘correct’ course of action. Modern democratic societies, politically mobilized by considerations of peace and war, are particularly prone to such definitions.

Sir Richard Branson

CMJ collection

The founder of Virgin Galactic, Sir Richard Branson demonstrates the potentially refined manner of future space travel.

Space, Military Power, and the Global Spread of Technology

To bring this back to a consideration of how space impacts on national security, it is clear that American military primacy and thus the underpinnings of American global power, are underwritten substantially by the growing importance of space. America’s ability to project and sustain military power across the face of the globe, unmatched by any other power – either now or for the foreseeable future – is underwritten by the capabilities it possesses in outer space. Global operations are critically dependent upon satellite communications, overhead surveillance of the entire electromagnetic spectrum, and space-based navigational/timing assets. Losing access to these features would reduce America’s ability to act rapidly on a global scale to a considerable degree.

The complexity of globalization has similar effects in outer space. Two features – the growing ability of smaller powers to access and use space and the growing commercialization of space – mean that significantly more players are entering the space arena. This development has a dual nature, however. On one hand, it is to be celebrated as it marks the growing development and sophistication of national economies and human ingenuity across the face of the planet. However, the meaning of this growth in capability and human ingenuity for specific and narrow interests is much more uncertain and worrisome.

The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the bipolar political structure have removed the political lenses through which it was possible to regard technological development and relate it into a larger security framework. As political and atmospheric scientist Doctor Jürgen Scheffran points out, the Cold War, with its clearly defined enemy, simplified the problem of evaluating “dual use” technology. In and of themselves, science and technology are morally neutral; the goals to which they are employed give them their moral character. However, the nature of morality is itself mediated through political and social lenses, imposed by the state and local culture. Proper and improper use of technology are “moral judgements based on the viewpoints and values of those who judge.”35 Thus, Iran justifies its search for an indigenous capability to enrich uranium within the principles of the non-proliferation regime (all while ignoring its responsibilities under the same), even as Israel and the United States worry that such pursuits do not reflect any peaceful purpose.

The US has enjoyed uncontested military use of space since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Even during the Cold War, the stabilizing function played by space assets ensured that neither nation seriously sought to jeopardize either their partner’s access to space or the use of it for military purposes. However, the asymmetric advantages that space brings to American power could either stimulate other powers to emulate those advantages, or to promote programs aimed at denying them in the first place.

Specifically, the ongoing European Galileo navigation program, the reviving Russian Glonass program, and the newly announced Chinese Beidou program are indicative of the first tendency.36 America’s control of GPS services has allowed it to control the accuracy of satellite navigation signals through their encryption. As more constellations enter the market place, however, and as receiver technology evolves to make use of the growing number of visible navigational satellites, the American control over satellite navigational accuracy will fade quickly, allowing levels of precision previously only available to US military forces and those cleared to receive the encrypted signals.

Shifts in the launch industry also imply a growing capability to affect military events in space. Again, a declining level of control over who uses space, and also what is placed there, as more and more nations and companies enter the space market, confronts the US. The greater number of players in this market means considerably more complex negotiations in terms of creating and sustaining international agreements. As commercial ventures such as Virgin Galactic and Space Adventures proceed, these companies may also create new business models for space launch, considerably reducing lift costs.

Last, the ongoing advances in computer technologies are permitting both smaller and more capable satellite systems. Concern with respect to the manoeuvrability of so-called “micro” and “nano-sats” have led to proposals for “rules of the road” for “proximity operations.”37 Such rules would be designed to create “space assurance,” or the creation of an “environment that best assures space is used for commercial, scientific, and military benefit” in a manner similar to the rules of the road established between the United States and the Soviet Union in their Incidents at Sea (INCSEA) agreement.38 This was so successful that ultimately the model spread and was adopted by other navies to regulate their interactions with Soviet vessels. What made INCSEA effective, however, was the bipolar environment in which it was conceived. Similar agreements between the Israelis and Palestinians, and within South East Asia, have not worked as effectively, and have broken down during periods of crisis.

AS-3 test ABM Missile

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Military applications: An AS-3 test ABM missile launch from shipboard.


It is easy to decry the new Bush space policy as more of the same unilateralist arrogance from an administration already marked by considerable strategic missteps. However, an examination of the policy reveals that it differs only slightly in tone from the Clinton predecessor. Further, a strong case can be made that it is the strategic environment to which the Bush administration is responding. The growing number of strategic players in the space field, the collapse of the strategic logic underlying bipolarity and the emergence of a new logic associated with unipolarity, and the growing challenges associated with globalization have all caused the Americans to reassess their role in the international environment. It is important to point out that this is an American phenomenon as opposed to a party phenomenon. In other words, a Democratic president, should one be elected in 2008, is unlikely to make fundamental changes to the tone or tenor of the present policy. Despite differences in the conduct of the Iraq war (and even here, the differences are more in terms of rhetoric than in substance), both parties are pursuing essentially a bipartisan approach to national security that places heavy emphasis upon the need to maintain American pre-eminence in all fields of military endeavour. More pragmatic, multilateral approaches are unlikely to appear until American power declines, or until other powers emerge to challenge such power. The crossing point for this event, however, is likely to be a period of extreme danger.

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Doctor Paul T. Mitchell is an Associate Professor of Strategic Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School for International Studies in Singapore and the Canadian Forces College in Toronto.


  1. The White House, National Science and Technology Council, Fact Sheet: National Space Policy, 19 September 1996, <http://www.fas.org/spp/ military/docops/national/nstc-8.htm>.
  2. The White House, National Science and Technology Council, US National Space Policy, 31 August 2006, <http://www.ostp.gov/html/US%20National%20 Space%20Policy.pdf>.
  3. Theresa Hitchens, “The Bush National Space Policy: Contrasts and Contradictions,” 13 October 2006, <http://www.cdi.org>.
  4. US National Space Policy 2006, p. 1.
  5. US National Space Policy 1996, p. 1.
  6. Ibid., p. 5.
  7. Ibid., p. 12.
  8. Ibid., p. 5.
  9. Barton Gellman, “Pentagon Would Preclude a Rival Superpower,” in Washington Post, 11 March 1992, p. A1.
  10. Excerpts From 1992 Draft “Defense Planning Guidance,” <http://www/pbs.org/ wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/iraq/etc/wolf.html>.
  11. For example: “It has taken almost a decade for us to comprehend the true nature of this new threat. Given the goals of rogue states and terrorists, the United States can no longer solely rely on a reactive posture as we have in the past. The inability to deter a potential attacker, the immediacy of today’s threats, and the magnitude of potential harm that could be caused by our adversaries’ choice of weapons, do not permit that option. We cannot let our enemies strike first. ... The United States has long maintained the option of preemptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security. The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction – and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively.” The National Security Strategy of the United States, 2002, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss5.html>.
  12. Quoted in Robert Jervis, American Foreign Policy in a New Era (New York: Routledge, 2005), p. 90.
  13. It should be remembered that Hubert Védrine famously described the United States as a hyper puissance during the Clinton administration. David Calleo, “Power, Wealth, and Wisdom: The United States and Europe after Iraq,” in The National Interest, Summer 2003, p. 8.
  14. Gen. John Shalikashvili (USA), Joint Vision 2010 (Washington: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1997), p. 25.
  15. Of course, this does not imply that the US is militarily omnipotent, as the ongoing insurgencies around the world amply demonstrate. But, as Hanson points out, where smaller powers challenge the US, they do so in their own lands, often using the technology developed by the United States. They have not been able to develop indigenous technology capable of defeating the US, nor are they free to operate in the heartland of North America. Victor Davis Hanson, Carnage and Culture (New York: Doubleday, 2001), pp. 443, 453; Barry Posen, “Command of the Commons,” in International Security, Vol. 28, No. 1, 2003, pp. 8-9.
  16. Posen, pp. 8-9.
  17. Ibid., pp. 17-18.
  18. The first National Security Strategy of 1991 lists a whole range of “Interests and Objectives” the US would pursue “in concert with its allies.” In the 2002 version, it notes that the US will: “Strengthen alliances to defeat Global Terrorism and work to prevent attacks against us and our friends.” <http://www.fas.org/man/docs/91805-nss.htm>. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss3.html>.
  19. Kenneth Waltz, “Globalization and American Power,” in The National Interest, Spring 2000, p. 54. One might point to the ongoing problems with sustaining American military power in Iraq. The point is that any problem in sustaining military force abroad is experienced even more strongly by every other power at the present moment. To quote Charlie Brown on Snoopy: “He isn’t much of a dog, but then again, who is?”
  20. Jervis, p. 12.
  21. Ibid., p. 31.
  22. Glenn H. Snyder, Alliance Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997) p. 17.
  23. Ibid. p. 17.
  24. Charles W. Kegley Jr., Gregory A. Raymond, When Trust Breaks Down: Alliance Norms and World Politics (Columbia SC: University of South Carolina, 1990), p. 55.
  25. Snyder, p. 170.
  26. Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987), p. 43; Snyder, p. 171.
  27. Raymond Kegley, pp. 266-267.
  28. Steven Metz, ‘The Effect of Technological Asymmetry on Coalition Operations,’ Problems and Solutions in Future Coalition Operations, Thomas J. Marshall, Phillip Kaiser, Jon Kessmeier (eds.), (Carlisle PA: US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, December 1997), p. 56.
  29. Ian Clark, Globalization and Fragmentation: International Relations in the Twentieth Century (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 1. R.J. Barry Jones, Globalisation and Interdependence in the International Political Economy: Rhetoric and Reality (London: Pinter, 1995), p. 13. Andrew Hurrell, “Explaining the Resurgence of Regionalism in World Politics,” in Review of International Studies, Vol. 21, No. 4, 1995, p. 345.
  30. Christopher Coker, Globalisation and Insecurity in the Twenty-First Century: NATO and the Management of Risk, (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2002), p. 21; Ian Clark, Globalization and Fragmentation: International Relations in the Twentieth Century, p. 18.
  31. Coker, p. 25. Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organised Violence in the Global Era (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999), p. 70. M. Singer, A. Wildavsky, The Real World Order: Zones of Peace/Zones of Turmoil, (Chatham NJ: Chatham House, 1993), pp. 4, 6. Thomas P. Barnett, The Pentagon’s New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-First Century (New York: Berkley Books, 2004).
  32. Frank G. Hoffman, “The New Normalcy,” <http://www.fpri.org/enotes/ 20060512.americawar.hoffman.newnormalcy.html>; Charles C. Krulak, “The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War,” in Marines Magazine, January 1999.
  33. Coker, pp. 27 – 31.
  34. Lawrence Freedman, “The Transatlantic Agenda: Vision and Counter-Vision,” in Survival, Vol. 47, No. 4, Winter 2005-06, p. 20.
  35. Jürgen Scheffran, “Dual-Use in a New Security Environment: The Case of Missiles and Space,” in INESAP Information Bulletin No. 26, June 2006, p. 48; Ju”rgen Scheffran, “The Janus Face of Science and Technology: Inextricable Links, Inalienable Rights, and Double Standards,” in INESAP Information Bulletin No. 26, June 2006, p. 2.
  36. “China Starts to Build Own Satellite Navigation System,” GPS Daily, Nov. 03, 2006, <http://www.gpsdaily.com>; “Russia’s Glonass System Should Cover Whole Country by Late 2007,” in GPS Daily, 22 November 2006, <http://www.gpsdaily.com>.
  37. Matthew Hoey, “Military Space Systems: The Road Ahead,” paper presented to Symposium on Non-Proliferation and Disarmament – The Way Forward”, 22 October 2005.
  38. Michael Katz-Hyman, “Proximity Operations in Space: The Case for a Code of Conduct,” in INESAP Information Bulletin No. 26, June 2006, p. 64-67.

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