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Military Operations

Military Police address Afghani Shura

CF photo AR2008-T125-66

Captain Ghislain Leroux of 5 Military Police Platoon Valcartier addresses an Afghani Shura in the Zharey district of Afghanistan to explain the function of the Joint District Coordination Centre (JDCC) as a North American style 911 system.

Developing a Comprehensive Approach to Canadian Forces Operations

by Lieutenant-General Andrew Leslie, Mr. Peter Gizewski, and Lieutenant-Colonel Michael Rostek

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In today’s security environment, successful military operations are unlikely to be achieved through the use of military power alone. In a world where conflict often involves myriad ethnic, religious, ideological, and material drivers, an ability to bring to bear all instruments of national and coalition power and influence upon a problem in a timely, coordinated fashion (i.e., diplomatic, economic, military, and informational) is increasingly essential to achieving effective results. So also is an ability to address, and, if possible, to constructively engage the views and reactions of the public – both domestic and international – as well as the media – as operations unfold.

Canadian Forces (CF) acknowledgement of the need to practise a more coordinated and holistic approach to operations is ever more evident – and also pressing. Accordingly, DND leadership – both civilian and military1 – is increasingly calling for the adoption of a force that takes a “comprehensive approach” to operations. Such a force would employ diplomatic, defence, development, and commercial resources, aligned with those of numerous other agencies, coordinated through an integrated campaign plan, and then applied in areas of operations as needed. As such, the approach would entail traditional and non-traditional military activities being carried out collaboratively within a broader context known as the “Effects Based Approach to Operations” (EBAO).2 The result would be greater mission effectiveness.

Yet, what precisely does a comprehensive approach entail? Why is this important in today’s security environment? And how can the capability to practise it be achieved?

The following discussion will more fully explore the meaning of a comprehensive approach and the rationale underlying movement toward a CF capable of practicing such an approach. To this end, it will outline recent efforts by the Land Force to operationalize such an approach through the creation of a Joint, Interagency, Multinational and Public (JIMP-enabled) capability, and it will highlight a number of initiatives and actions that promise to facilitate movement toward achieving a more comprehensive approach – both within the Land Force and beyond it.

The article will conclude that while challenges do confront full realization of such an approach, it offers a much needed and viable response to the emerging security environment and the challenges that this environment is likely to pose in the years ahead.

Traditional Function-Based Organization

A Comprehensive Approach to Military Operations

CF interest in the development of a more comprehensive approach to operations derives heavily from a “whole of government” perspective recently articulated by the Canadian Government.3 This perspective calls for bringing previously separate agencies into closer collaboration in achieving policy objectives. In fact, a comprehensive approach encapsulates many of the capabilities that this perspective identifies. Indeed, it involves developing a capacity to interact with such players in a cooperative, constructive manner. As such, it can be seen as a necessary component of a more general whole of government effort.

Such an approach is hardly a Canadian invention. Indeed, similar thinking has gained currency among key allies – most notably the United Kingdom and the United States.4 And yet, all generally involve creating a competency that cuts across departments and dispenses with ‘stovepipes.’ In fact, the idea has roots in the private sector management theory of re-engineering, and it aims at streamlining processes from input to output, in order to maximize efficiency, and to remove overlap and duplication. In a theoretical sense, re-engineering seeks to create an end-to-end process that cuts across traditional ‘stovepipes,’ leading to an organization that runs more smoothly and efficiently.5

For the military, a comprehensive approach offers increased chances for achieving greater interoperability and collaboration among key players in the operational arena, as well as in the development of the requisite networking capabilities and skills essential to achieving one’s objectives.

And yet, even more fundamentally, such thinking supports a growing consensus that outward-focused, integrated, and multidisciplinary approaches to security threats and challenges must be the norm, given the complex problems and challenges posed by an increasingly multidimensional security environment.

That environment is ever more dynamic, uncertain, and challenging. Often, it involves irregular and asymmetric conflict conducted by a range of foes, including highly adaptive ‘media-savvy’ terrorist organizations, intent less upon defeating armed forces than in eroding their will to fight, warlords seeking to retain power and influence over local populations at any price, and trans-national criminal organizations ready, willing, and able to buy, sell, and trade everything from drugs to armaments for personal gain. Frequently, it involves failed and failing states whose tenuous existence and inability to meet popular demands offer ready breeding grounds for rebellion and civil war, as well as a secure base from which adversaries can function. And, it involves complex human and physical terrain – with large, densely populated cities and highly diverse populations (i.e., ethnically, religiously, economically, and culturally) often serving as the backdrop for military operations.

Increasingly, conflict zones are highly fluid and multidimensional. Battle lines often have no clearly defined front or rear. Enemies are frequently dispersed over a wide geographical area. And distinguishing friends from foes (or neutrals) can be fraught with difficulty. Furthermore, conflict itself represents only part of the problem as rampant civil disorder, famine, and disease linger in the background and threaten societal collapse, not to mention the prospect of even more carnage to come.

Addressing these dangers is also crucial to peace and stability. In fact, military operations are likely to be as much about ‘winning hearts and minds,’ (or, at least, not losing them) and gaining legitimacy among surrounding populations as they are about engaging in armed combat and destroying adversaries. And all such efforts are likely to occur against a backdrop featuring increased media attention and scrutiny.

Such an environment calls for myriad military requirements. Externally, it not only increases the need for combat and counterinsurgency operations, but also for complex stabilization and reconstruction missions in those societies ravaged by man-made and natural disasters. In fact, the complexities of contemporary conflict heighten the need for Western militaries to fight the ‘three-block war.’6 Not only must troops be capable of effectively conducting a range of operations (i.e. high intensity combat in one area, stabilization operations in another, and humanitarian aid or support in a third), but they must be able to quickly and effectively transition from one mission to another. Given that missions may overlap, troops must also be capable of conducting a variety of operations simultaneously, and often, as part of broader, integrated teams.

Domestically, it demands constant surveillance and monitoring of national borders and airspace to guard against possibilities of infiltration and/or attack. And it requires an improved capacity for consequence management in support of the civil power in the event of domestic emergencies.

The upshot of these changed circumstances is greater complexity, both in the causes of instability and in the solutions required to address them. It also suggests that addressing future challenges will likely require a wider range of personnel, skill-sets, and resources than ever before. To be sure, traditional reliance upon military power will often provide one component of the solutions required. Yet the prospective role(s) and the relative importance of the military and other organizations in providing lasting solutions will nonetheless vary, both from case to case and within each case that arises. The need to interact, cooperate, and collaborate with a range of players will also vary.

The comprehensive approach amounts to an implicit recognition of the Canadian Forces’ need to address such challenges. In fact, it is critical in order to balance the requirement to be able to fight and win in war – the CF’s fundamental role – coupled with the need to be able to undertake a wide range of operations other than war (OOTW).

Such an approach would involve:

  • The adoption of a ‘team’ approach to develop an integrated campaign plan in order to achieve its operational objectives in full spectrum operations;
  • The ability to immediately ‘plug into’ joint battle space operating systems in order to interoperate effectively;
  • The ability to facilitate the building of organizational interoperability through collaborative planning mechanisms and protocols;
  • The willingness to consider second and third order effects in the planning process.
  • An ability to connect all relevant organizations and agencies with CF operational architecture, and to provide liaison to support these agencies in the execution of the mission;
  • The ability to communicate with joint and other multinational organizations including the ability to provide an efficient interface between conventional and special forces;
  • The capacity to access key information in an efficient and timely manner, both to identify targets for attack and influence, and to determine the resources required in operations; and
  • The ability to clearly and effectively communicate mission goals, objectives, and actions to relevant players, as required.

Achieving such goals will not be easy. Given the diversity of organizations and agencies that can characterize the operating environment – each with its own culture, mindsets, biases, and capabilities – bottlenecks and resistance are bound to arise. The sharing of information among organizational players will no doubt pose obstacles, particularly in light of concerns with respect to sensitive information. And achieving effective coordination and cooperation among disparate groups, some undoubtedly with diverse, and, at times, somewhat conflicting agendas and objectives, may also require considerable negotiation and the capacity to make difficult trade-offs. In fact, the range of challenges that may arise suggests that, ultimately, full realization of an effective, comprehensive approach may well require considerable change in the manner in which government formulates, implements, and practises policy.

Yet, if pursued carefully as a key component of the Government of Canada’s whole of government approach, the payoffs yielded by a comprehensive approach may well be worth the effort. Indeed, the ultimate result would be a force capable of ensuring that prospects for interaction between the CF and various other agencies and organizations not only increase, but that such interaction is also more cooperative, constructive, and useful – not only to the military but to all those involved.

CIMIC and PRT with Afghans

CF photo AR2008-T142-28

Major Bruno St-Jean of the CIMIC Team (centre) and Captain François Caron of the PRT present 5000 soccer balls donated by Toronto Region professionals and the Mosaic Institute to representatives of the Afghan Ministers of Sports and Education.

Land Force Initiatives: The JIMP Concept

Thus far, and despite interest in the comprehensive approach to operations, a detailed CF policy statement on the subject has yet to emerge. That said, efforts to formulate it are underway. Especially notable is the Land Force’s initiative to develop a more JIMP-enabled force. Movement toward a JIMP-capable7 Land Force offers one means of operationalizing a comprehensive approach to operations.8 In fact, the aim of a JIMP-enabled Land Force is to nest clearly within both the comprehensive, and, by extension, the whole of government approaches.

In essence, the term Joint, Interagency, Multinational, and Public (JIMP) is a descriptor that identifies the various categories of players (i.e. organizations, interest groups, institutions) that inhabit the broad environment within which military operations take place. Yet, to be JIMP-capable entails the adoption of an approach to operations – both domestic and international – that allows such players to interact effectively. Most importantly, it involves a belief in the requirement to adopt a comprehensive approach to problem solving that involves the holistic consideration, and, ideally, the coordination of all relevant players.


A JIMP-capable organization involves both the development of a framework identifying key players and capabilities allowing for effective collaboration with those identified.

Indeed, a JIMP-capable force would interact with players in four domains:

  • Joint – involving other national military elements and support organizations;
  • Interagency – involving other government departments (OGDs) and other government agencies (OGAs), both domestic and foreign. These agencies will include host nation government departments to include security forces, government departments and agencies from support nations, and international government bodies, such as UN agencies;
  • Multinational – involving one or more allies or international coalition partners; and
  • Public – involving a variety of elements, and including domestic and international societies, consisting of, in part, host nation populations, media agencies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), public volunteer organizations (PVOs), international organizations (IOs), and commercial interests involved in reconstruction and/or development programs, and private security firms recruited to support the government.

Yet, a true JIMP-capability also demands a willingness to actively engage other players in each of these categories in a cooperative, collaborative relationship in pursuit of a desired end-state. And it requires an organization to have an awareness of the potential impact that its actions have upon other players, and upon the likelihood of achieving strategic objectives.

Much like the whole of government and comprehensive approaches that it attempts to emulate and operationalize, the Land Force concept derives strongly from an assessment of current experience and likely future trends. Yet, it does so from a distinct land operations perspective, calling, in effect, for the development of a capacity to interact with a particularly wide range of organizations and groups in pursuit of objectives. This not only involves interaction with the organizations and agencies of governments, but also with private groups, publics, and non-governmental organizations and agencies. While this may increase the difficulty of achieving a fully JIMP-enabled force, it is ever more essential, given the context in which land operations now take place. Indeed, these latter ‘unofficial’ entities often form an important component of the land environment – a fact to which experiences in areas such as Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan amply attest. In an era in which irregular threats are on the rise, and in which global media ensure that operations often unfold before a wide audience, attention to the civilian on the ground and the informational and moral aspects of operations is evermore important to success. So also is a capacity to enhance awareness, communication, and, if possible, coordination and cooperation with such groups.

Becoming JIMP-Enabled: Initial Steps

To be sure, the development of such a capability is very much a work in progress. Yet, recent work by Land Futures of the Directorate of Land Concepts and Design (DLCD) has yielded a number of ideas and suggestions for a plausible agenda aimed at its realization.

Notably, when broken down into its component parts, it is clear that the ideas underpinning JIMP are not particularly novel. The Joint and Multinational aspects of JIMP are already well established – both within the Continental General Staff System and in the Canadian practice of staff responsibilities.9 And while the interagency and public components pose greater challenges for the Land Force – most notably in terms of interfacing with entities that are essentially non-military in nature, and that have well-established cultures – some experience is nonetheless resident in past Civil Military Coordination (CIMIC) practice.10 Since the creation of Civil Affairs units established within the US military during the Second World War, CIMIC has been considered a force multiplier11 for commanders. CIMIC, a wholly Reserve function within the Land Force, provides an institutionalized foundation from which the JIMP concept, particularly the interagency and public components, can evolve.

With the nascent foundations for JIMP already in place, (i.e. the Continental Staff System and CIMIC), further development of JIMP as an enabling concept can proceed.

Within the Land Force, this is undertaken through the Land Force Capability Development12 process, and use of the Land Force Capability Development Continuum. This continuum consists of four pillars – Conceive, Design, Build, and Manage. Each has a lead agency appointed to discipline, analyze, and record the documentation necessary to guide the capability through to realization. Moreover, the work performed within each pillar sets the foundation and conditions for subsequent iterative or spiral activity.

Land Futures, the lead agency for the Army of Tomorrow (AoT) and the JIMP enabling concept, focuses its activities within the ‘Conceive’ pillar. Meanwhile, the research performed to establish the foundation and conditions for future work is articulated through a systematic analysis,13 which provides a structured approach to identifying new Land Force capabilities and/or deficiencies, and also provides a process to design conceptual structures.

In terms of the JIMP concept, this systematic analysis yields a number of insights in a range of key categories:

  • Human capital is the key to developing a JIMP capability within the Land Force.
  • The successful implementation of a JIMP concept will require continued active endorsement from CF and Land Force leadership, as well as from other Government of Canada departments.
  • From a philosophical standpoint, there is considerable literature and research that concludes that soldiers, in response to what are referred to as “new wars,”14 are taking on greater non-warfighting functions that seem at odds with their traditional warfighting roles (i.e. policing and development projects), and this will require a shift in individual training.
  • Viewed primarily as a holistic approach to operations, the chief focus of JIMP is upon inculcating a new approach to operations primarily involving new agencies and populations, while retaining and, indeed, improving joint and multinational collaboration and cooperation in both war fighting and stability and reconstruction operations.
  • Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs),15 new forms of organization currently being used in Afghanistan, inform the JIMP concept as they bring together the military, OGDs, and populations under a single construct in a conflict zone. Although there are many lessons that still must be learned from this new type of unit, the PRT can been seen as representative of the next iterative step for both brigade and battle group structures incorporating political, developmental, and other JIMP players (i.e. RCMP, Corrections Canada, NGOs, and so on) on a permanent or non-permanent basis.
  • Collective training must incorporate OGDs, IOs, NGOs, and PVOs to inculcate coordination aspects of the JIMP concept, such as collaborative planning. An ability to integrate the aforementioned agencies into the operational architecture and to provide liaison to support them is crucial for JIMP success.

The analysis also underlined the need for additional JIMP research and development work through the Army’s Thrust Advisory Groups (TAG); Land operational research and experimentation on key questions relating to JIMP requirements; focused research aimed at creating a JIMP inventory (i.e. who are the players?); historical research investigating the antecedents of the JIMP concept; and the creation of a database of lessons learned from current operations. Each of these lines of inquiry is now underway.

Potential Payoffs

By attempting to better enable collaboration and cooperation between the military and other organizations and interests, JIMP promises to increase the likelihood that the information skills and resources needed to address the problems and challenges that the complex security environment raises will be available, and will be brought to bear effectively. Such interaction would promise to increase the quantity, quality, and types of information available to commanders, thereby increasing prospects for gaining greater situational awareness. It would also help sensitize players to a variety of viewpoints and variables at work within an operation, as well as to a number of potential second and third order effects which their actions may yield. And, it would help to better ensure that the actions of the military, as well as those of other players, are better coordinated in support of broader mission goals and objectives. Indeed, JIMP promises to make decisions and actions more ‘strategic’ in character.

Most importantly, a JIMP capability could serve, over time, to better socialize both the military and other organizations within the JIMP environment to the varied demands of the security environment itself, and to the important contributions which each can and should make in addressing its challenges. The result would be a clearer understanding, respect, and appreciation of the assets that varied players bring to the table in addressing security challenges, a willingness to cooperate with these players if and when possible, and a deferment to others in reaching such goals when circumstances warrant. This would serve to generate a more holistic view of security and better strategies and methods for achieving that security. It would also ensure that the practice of JIMP clearly and effectively mirrors the philosophy underlying a whole of government approach.

Debating Comprehensive Approaches: Objections and Answers

To be sure, both JIMP and the comprehensive approach that it attempts to reflect will raise some concerns – both within military circles and beyond.

It may strike some that, despite all that is said, such approaches offer little that is truly new – particularly given the CF’s already longstanding military experience with joint and multinational coalitions and CIMIC. What they promise in terms of tangible, that is, clearly identifiable and measurable benefits and results, is often unclear and difficult to gauge. And, whatever the merits, the holistic character of any such approach strongly suggests that efforts by the military to take the lead in fashioning them cannot succeed, and may even be misguided.

Yet each of these objections, while valid on the surface, fails to provide sufficient reason for abandonment of the idea, or CF efforts to actively pursue, develop, and implement JIMP.

True, aspects of JIMP and the comprehensive approach are already present in existing CIMIC doctrine and capability. Yet both represent a broader, more all-encompassing capability that is under-represented in current CIMIC doctrine and practice. While there is focus upon the development of Interagency and Public cooperation and coordination within CIMIC doctrine, indications are that even here, weaknesses exist in the current way of doing business, and that additional resources are required. For instance, discussions with senior Land Staff officers indicate the presence of a number of bottlenecks in present capabilities, including underdevelopment of operational level CIMIC doctrine and procedures, as well as insufficient political and development advisory capacity. In fact, the entire area of CIMIC, and, by extension, JIMP and the comprehensive approach, remains essentially a secondary consideration in the capability development process. This is despite the growing indications, given the character of security challenges as well as Canadian Government calls for more multidimensional approaches to meet them, that it must be considered as part of its core.

Claims that gauging the actual effectiveness of such approaches can be difficult also have merit. This is particularly true in light of the fact that many of the benefits claimed for adoption of a comprehensive approach are primarily qualitative – for example, in the character of relationships within and between organizations, in information quality, in information sharing and management, and in the operational outcomes achieved. As such, evidence of progress is not easily measurable. The fact that information gained at one point in an operation may be utilized to great effect only after considerable time elapses also suggests that the actual utility of some of the benefits made possible by such approaches may often not be immediately or easily discernable.

Still, while difficulties in measuring the ‘value added’ of such concepts are apparent, this is hardly a reason to dismiss them out of hand. Notably, CIMIC has long confronted similar dilemmas. Yet, as to which a considerable body of anecdotal evidence can attest, the capability has yielded sufficient gains to be considered a useful component in the CF’s military tool kit.

This is also currently the case for the comprehensive approach. True, the development and practice of the approach is still in its early stages, yet, even now, efforts to emulate its logic are underway, and they show signs of having some benefit. For instance, over the course of Western involvement in Afghanistan, coalition allies have combined counterinsurgency operations involving Special Forces and regular infantry with broader efforts aimed at the stabilization and reconstruction of the country. Military, diplomatic, developmental, and law enforcement personnel are, in fact, working together in a relatively collaborative, cooperative framework to help realize the Afghanistan National Strategy (ANS), thus helping to bring stability, prosperity, and good governance to the country. Indeed, Canada’s dedication to its mission in Afghanistan has not gone unnoticed, garnering accolades and influence, both within NATO and upon the world stage. From election support to school building to disarmament and the mediation of factional conflicts, Canada’s focus in Afghanistan clearly bolsters CF efforts to build a more robust, comprehensive approach.

Nor, for that matter, is the task for providing more systematic measurement of the effectiveness of a comprehensive approach to operations insurmountable. In fact, it is likely that a number of posited benefits deriving from such efforts can, indeed, be measured. In this regard, metrics, such as the number and general quality of interactions made possible by a comprehensive approach, the range of information types available to decision-makers, and the extent to which such information aids in decision-making should, in principle, be within reach. And, in those areas where measurement and assessment is especially difficult, it is still likely that useful tests can be developed, provided sufficient intellectual capital is directed toward devising them. In fact, rather than dismissing the concept itself as flawed, what is required are more conscious, sustained efforts to develop practical tools and metrics capable of ensuring that the implementation and performance of a comprehensive approach is optimized.

As for CF efforts to develop the concept, risks admittedly do exist. If not properly linked to the development of the broader whole of government approach, a CF effort may not foster the collaboration and cooperation it seeks to achieve. In this regard, it should be noted that NGOs have found it especially difficult to strike an effective balance between interacting with official agencies and retaining the independence they view as necessary to pursue their goals effectively.

Yet, while these problems can occur, they are by no means confined to military efforts to develop a comprehensive approach to operations. In fact, problems of interagency and NGO coordination and cooperation represent a challenge in the more generalized development of a whole of government approach. And they must be addressed by all departments and agencies at that level.

Only then will it be possible to develop the requisite trust and cooperation between players required to ensure that both a comprehensive approach and the whole of government approach, of which it is a portion, are truly effective. In fact, pursuit of a comprehensive approach in this manner will better ensure that support to operations is available when needed and from a wide variety of sources. More to the point, it will increase prospects for achieving a more effective ‘whole of mission approach’ to operations in the years ahead.

Villagers welcome a PRT

CF photo AR2007-T109-042

Villagers welcome a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) composed of members of the Civil Military Coordination Team (CIMIC) protection force.


In the final analysis, virtually all the aforementioned dilemmas discussed suggest that efforts to achieve and practise a comprehensive approach must be measured and realistic. In particular, efforts must be based upon a recognition that the involvement of certain organizations and players within the security environment can and will vary. So also will the character and quality of the relationships and interactions that ultimately emerge. In fact, possession of a CF capability to practise such an approach cannot – in and of itself – guarantee that it will always be followed. Rather, both the capability and willingness of other organizations and players to engage in a cooperative relationship is essential. And that, in turn, will often be dependent upon the character of the players involved, as well as their resources, agendas, and goals.

Clearly however, the need for multidisciplinary approaches to security is gaining traction, both within and outside of government. And concepts, such as the comprehensive approach and JIMP, are drawing increasing interest.

While this arena has long been regarded as being of secondary importance to the military, times have changed. Recently, the US declared conventional warfighting operations and stability and reconstruction operations as being equally decisive.16 And, the Government of Canada has endorsed a perspective that explicitly states that security is no longer the sole purview of military forces. The nature of operations today and in the future will resemble the Three Block War construct – one that demands that soldiers interact with many different players other than their own armed forces, and undertake non-traditional tasks.

Accordingly, the time has arrived to embrace a new vision of military operations – one that incorporates a broader view of security as well as those capabilities required to attain that security. The CF pursuit of a comprehensive approach, nested within whole of government thinking, offers just such a vision. Eventually, the upshot may well be a new norm for the CF – one that reflects the dynamics of the current and future security environments. Increasingly, security, coordination, networking, and consequence management will be key CF activities. As military forces evolve, they will not only engage in security missions but will also have a hand in governance and development activities leveraging the military, political, and economic instruments of a state’s power. The relative weight of each of these components will be largely dependent upon the state of the conflict. The CF may play both central and supporting roles, depending upon the circumstances. Yet, whatever the case, the collaborative and cooperative nature of a CF informed by a comprehensive approach to operations is likely to provide a more effective means for coping with the increasingly complex challenges likely to characterize the security environment in the years ahead.

CMJ Logo

Lieutenant-General Andrew Leslie, CMM, MSC, MSM, CD, has held numerous senior staff and command appointments, and is currently Chief of the Land Staff, Canadian Forces.

Mr. Peter Gizewski is a Defence Scientist/Strategic Analyst with Defence Research Development Canada – Centre for Operational Research and Analysis, Ottawa.

Lieutenant-Colonel Michael Rostek, CD, an armoured officer, is currently completing his doctorate in War Studies at the Royal Military College while employed as a staff officer in the Land Futures section within the Directorate of Land Concepts and Doctrine.


  1. Department of National Defence interest in a comprehensive approach to operations has been evident for some time, most notably in drafts of the Strategic Operating Concept. See Department of National Defence, Canadian Forces Strategic Operating Concept, Draft 4.4, 21 May 2004, For CDS Review (Ottawa: Department of National Defence; 2004). See specifically pp. 17-18.
  2. As defined by Edward R. Smith, Effects Based Operations are coordinated sets of actions aimed at shaping the behavior of intended targets (i.e., friends, allies, neutrals, and foes, in peace, crisis, and war). See Smith, Effects Based Operations: Applying Network Centric Warfare in Peace, Crisis and War (Washington, DC: DoD Command and Control Research Program, July 2003), p. 108.
  3. See, for instance, speech given by the Honorable Peter MacKay (Minister of National Defence) at Canadian Forces College, Toronto, 3 December 2007. (Full text available at <http://www.canada-afghanistan.gc.ca/cip-pic/afghanistan/library/sp_mnd_031207-en.asp>), and Government of Canada, Canada’s International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World; Defence (Ottawa: Government of Canada, 2005), p. 28.
  4. See, for instance, Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre, The Comprehensive Approach, Joint Discussion Note 4/05, (United Kingdom: Ministry of Defence, January 2006). Similar calls have been echoed in NATO circles. See the Dr. John Leggat speech at <http://www.act.nato.int/multimedia/speeches/ 2004/110304keynoteleggatcde04.htm>.
  5. The mid 1990s witnessed a plethora of ‘re-engineering’ projects in response to the dramatic budget cuts of the time. In particular, DND and the CF undertook a re-engineering project – The Management Command and Control Re-engineering project – that resulted in scattered ‘tactical’ successes. However, the cause is different today, and the experience and knowledge gained from the successes and failures of past re-engineering projects may provide the CF pivotal experience and information in creating a comprehensive approach.
  6. Indeed, the ‘three block war’ concept is often described as a growing motif for military operations today and for the foreseeable future. In Canadian doctrine, the term ‘full-spectrum operations’ is used to better capture the essence of the simultaneous conduct of operations by a force across the spectrum of conflict.
  7. As used in this article, the term JIMP refers to a concept that in effect leads to a capability. The Canadian Forces Experimentation Centre lists JIMP in its Glossary of Terms. See Canadian Forces Experimentation Center Glossary of Terms Website at <http://www.ops.forces.gc.ca/cfec/ viewHTML_e.asp?islandid=452>).
  8. To be sure, the focus of the military operations today reflects a ‘land centric’ approach. Search and rescue or maritime patrolling tasks, and so on, will arguably require similar degrees of leadership, collaboration, and coordination with OGDs and NGOs, further highlighting the necessity of creating a core process cutting across several institutional ‘stovepipes.’ In fact, initiatives moving in this direction are emerging in the maritime realm – both in the navy’s Maritime Operations Surveillance and Information Centre (MOSIC), an organization intended to upgrade intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance centres on both coasts, and, more recently, with the creation of Marine Security Operations Centres (MSOC); information-gathering centres on each coast headed by Canadian Forces Maritime Command, and staffed by personnel from the RCMP, CBSA, Transport Canada, and the Canadian Coast Guard.
  9. Department of National Defence, Land Force – Command, B-GL-300-003/FP-000, 1996, p. 70.
  10. For a complete review of CIMIC doctrine, see Civil-Military Cooperation Tactics, Techniques and Procedures, B-GL-355-001/FP-001, 2006.
  11. Force multiplier – A force multiplier is a military term referring to a factor that dramatically increases (hence, ‘multiplies’) the combat-effectiveness of a given military force.
  12. The methodology and procedure is detailed in the Army Strategic Decision Making Handbook (ASDMH). For the history of capability development within the CF, see Major Andrew B. Godefroy, PhD, “Chasing the Silver Bullet: The Evolution of Capability Development in the Canadian Army,” in Canadian Military Journal, Vol. 8, No. 1, Spring 2007, pp. 54.
  13. Systematic analysis is achieved through the use of the “PRICIE” tool and is described as follows: Personnel, Leadership and Individual Training; Research & Development and Operational Research (plus Experimentation); Infrastructure, Environment and Organization; Concepts, Doctrine and Collective Training; and Equipment and Support.
  14. Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999): pp. 1-2.
  15. For more information on Canada’s PRT, visit <http://www.canada-afghanistan.gc.ca/ prov_reconstruction-en.asp>.
  16. United States Government, Secretary of Defense presentation, at <www.ndu.edu/ITEA/storage/ 687/Army%20Support%20to%20SSTR>, accessed 3 October 2006.

Soldiers on patrol

DND photo AR2007-T072-115

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