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Canada and the World

Moraine Lake

Banff NP/© Parks Canada/W. Lynch/1991

Moraine Lake and the Bow Range of the Rocky Mountains.

Sutherland in the 21st Century: Invariants in Canada’s Policy Agenda Since 9/11

by Dwayne Lovegrove

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[W]e should reflect that it is largely owing to our geography and our uniquely close relationship with the United States that a nation of eighteen millions has been able to achieve so large a share of wealth, power, and constructive influence.1

~ Dr. Robert J. Sutherland, “Canada’s Long Term Strategic Situation.”

Introduction

The above citation is found in a 1962 article by Dr. Bob Sutherland of Canada’s Defence Research Board (DRB), entitled: “Canada’s Long Term Strategic Situation,” which has been characterized as “…a minor classic for the cognoscenti of Canadian defence studies.”2 Sutherland identified geography, economics, and broad national interests as the three invariants of Canadian foreign policy, which determined that Canada would remain an ally of the United States in the 21st Century. The only unanswerable question for Sutherland was what sort of ally we would become.

This article will analyze the degree to which Sutherland’s prognostications are accurate today, and will indicate why these particular assumptions continue to be of importance in contemporary Canadian policy. Specifically, I will demonstrate how the American reaction to the 11 September 2001 terrorist attack, commonly referred to as ‘9/11,’ has heightened Canada’s political, economic, and military ties to the United States.

Background

As a member (and, later, director) of the Operational Research Group in Canada’s Defence Research Board, Sutherland examined Canada’s defence and security policies in depth. Despite having published only a very limited number of papers, he is widely regarded as “Canada’s most influential strategist of the nuclear age.”3 Writing during the dramatic period immediately prior to the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, Sutherland set aside his contemporary security concerns to reflect upon what foreign policy options might logically be available to Canada in the next century. 

Working on the assumptions that the world would avoid nuclear war, but still deal in ‘power politics,’ Sutherland posited that three “invariants of Canadian strategy” exist, which, taken together, shape and determine Canada’s national policy agenda. These invariants consist of “…geography, economic potential, and broad national interests which lead to certain natural alignments and alliances.”4 By examining these invariants, one may deduce “…[the] major questions with regard to which there is some genuine choice,” as well as the “…important areas where there is no choice, however much we as Canadians might like to believe that there is.” 

Based upon the combined effects of the invariants, Sutherland predicted that Canada in the 21st Century would have no choice but to remain an American ally. He felt that Canadians should not “…torture themselves with this thought... [as] no nation, including the United States, can pursue a truly independent policy.”5 Instead, the question remained whether Canada would be “a powerful and effective ally or a weak and reluctant one,” and, in parallel, whether Canada would be an effective member of the world community, or dependent upon the United States for its role in world affairs.6 By examining each invariant in turn, we can assess their modern relevance, as well as determine the accuracy of Sutherland’s predictions.

The First Invariant: Geography

“It is a safe prediction that at the end of this century, Canada will occupy the north half of the North American continent and the United States will occupy the south half.” 7 With this wry observation, Sutherland identified geography as the most important of the three invariants. He added:

This geographical fact has a vitally important strategic consequence. It means that the United States is bound to defend Canada from external aggression almost regardless of whether or not Canadians wish to be defended.  We may call this the involuntary American guarantee.  For as far ahead as one can possibly foresee, this will be the central fact of Canadian strategy and the basis of Canada’s external security.8

Looking back over the 40 years since Sutherland made this observation, historian Jack Granatstein attested: “…[that] the benefits of taking the American road [have] far exceeded those of striving for expensive neutrality or a penurious independence,” which has fiscally justified our close alliance with the Americans.9 Canada has consistently leveraged its geographic advantage to its benefit both at home and abroad:

Canada has been able to assert and successfully maintain control of its territory at a reasonable cost using its resources and those made available by agreement (NORAD, for example) with the U.S. This arrangement... has also allowed Canada to play a larger part on the international scene than might otherwise have been possible as well as to focus its budgetary resources on non-defense [sic] issues and priorities – sometimes to the frustration of the U.S.10

This dividend is not without conditions. Echoing Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King’s 1938 response to President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s promise to protect Canada, Sutherland pointed out that Canada has a reciprocal commitment to do its utmost to ensure that the United States need not fear an attack across Canadian territory: 

If the United States is bound to defend Canada, it is also true that Canada can never, consistent with her own interests, ignore the requirements of American security; because, in the final analysis, the security of the United States is the security of Canada.11

Thus, while asserting that “…the fundamental community of interests between the two nations” meant that Canada had no reason to fear the United States, Sutherland cautioned that “…a Great Power will take whatever action it finds necessary to the maintenance of its security.”12 That Canada would be forced to sacrifice its sovereignty to the United States, should the latter feel threatened, has provided an effective counterargument to those who have suggested that Canada need not have a military at all.

HMCS Goose Bay refuels alongside Coast Guard Vessel Henry Larson

DND photo AS2006-0730a by Sergeant Dennis Power

HMCS Goose Bay refuels alongside Coast Guard Vessel Henry Larson in the eastern Arctic during Operation Lancaster, 17 August 2006, while HMCS Montreal cruises past.

Canada’s North American defences have therefore played a dual role, as both a deterrent against foreign invaders and as a “defence against help” from the United States.13 Canadians have enjoyed the benefits of sharing the world’s longest undefended border with the world’s only superpower as its friendly neighbour. However, in the aftermath of the 2001 terrorist attacks, some Americans questioned whether Canada had done enough to hold up its end of the geographic bargain.

When the United States closed its border with Canada following 9/11, it became apparent that Canada had failed a litmus test. Although the border was soon reopened, complaints soon followed from some US government officials who accused Canada of having lax immigration policies. Unfounded accusations that the terrorists had originated from Canada exacerbated the situation.  Adding further impetus, President George W. Bush warned the world that it was “time for action” and that nations would “be held accountable for inactivity.” His message was starkly clear: “You are either with us or against us in the fight against terror.”14

The Canadian government responded immediately to assuage American security concerns by tightening its immigration and refugee policies, and by creating the Anti-Terrorism Act (2001). Several bilateral policy agreements were also forged, including the Smart Border declaration (2001), the Safe Third Country agreement (2002), and the Security and Prosperity Partnership (2005). Affecting rights to freedom of movement and association, the total impact of the aforementioned legislation upon Canadians has yet to be fully examined. Canada also created the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness (now known as Public Safety Canada) as a counterpart to the US Department of Homeland Security, as well as Integrated Border Enforcement Teams, a Border Services Agency, and an Air Transport Security Authority. Additionally:

Canada has taken other actions beyond the realm of border security, including freezing terrorist’s assets, broadening the scope of terrorist activities punishable by law, extending police investigative powers, introducing legislation that would put restraints on fund-raising activities by extremist organizations, expanding cooperation between the FBI and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, and increasing outlays for countering nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons attacks.15

Still considered in force, Canada’s National Security Policy places the highest priority upon countering terrorism and preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).16Tellingly,

[a]lthough most Canadians do not share the view that terrorism and the proliferation of WMD are among the most important security threats facing Canada today, Ottawa’s stated priorities are identical to those outlined by the U.S. government.17

The proof goes well beyond mere rhetoric, for Canada spent over $C9 billion between 2001 and 2005 alone to improve physical security along its borders, a testament to our nation’s determination to fulfill its security commitment to the United States, as well as to the value we place upon our economic ties with the Americans.18

The Second Invariant: Economic Potential

Citing Canada as being “…somewhere between the seventh and ninth most powerful nation in the world” in terms of its Gross National Product (GDP) and technological competence, Sutherland predicted that “…by the year 2000, it is likely that Canada will have slipped a few places,” but would “still be at the high end... along with such nations as Britain, France, Germany, Italy and Japan.”19 Sutherland’s prediction was somewhat pessimistic, as Canada still ranks ninth in the world, according to the latest World Bank GDP figures.20 He cites the close economic integration between Canada and the United States as having “…forged an even more powerful bond” than geography, to the point where “…the two countries constitute a single target system.21

One wonders whether even Sutherland could have imagined the degree to which Canada’s economy would be so completely integrated with the United States today. Past attempts to diversify our trade and interdependence have largely been unsuccessful.  Even Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau’s concerted effort to shift the bulk of our trade to Europe and Japan as a ‘Third Option’ failed.22 Instead, Canada has pursued ever closer economic ties with the United States, inking the US-Canada Free Trade Agreement (1988) and the North American Free Trade Agreement (1993), along with the aforementioned Security and Prosperity Partnership (2005). Even greater measures are being contemplated, including a possible customs union and monetary integration.23

A Vancouver Police Department vessel patrols Vancouver harbour

DND photo ET2010-0017-27 by Master Corporal Chris Ward

A Vancouver Police Department vessel patrols Vancouver harbour. Note the Olympic rings in the background, 6 February 2010.

The results have been remarkable, as a recent Congressional Research Service report concludes:

Today, the United States and Canada have the largest trading relationship in the world with over $1.5 billion [USD] per day in goods and services crossing the border in 2007.  Canada purchases 21.3% of U.S. exports, a share larger than Japan and the entire European Union and supplies 16% of all U.S. imports.  The United States supplied 64.9% of Canada’s imports of goods in 2007 and purchased 76.3% of Canada’s merchandise exports; two-way trade with the United States represents nearly 40% of Canadian GDP.24

According to Denis Stairs, our dependence upon American trade has made it “blindingly obvious,” that “…the most basic requirement of Canadian foreign policy... is the maintenance of an effective bilateral economic relationship with the United States,”25 reinforcing Sutherland’s contention that Canada has little choice but to embrace America as our principal ally.

There is a significant risk that accompanies Canada’s intimate economic ties with the US. Sutherland warned that our overwhelming reliance upon US trade made Canada “…substantially more vulnerable than the United States,” as demonstrated by the American reaction to the 2001 terrorist attacks .26 As Desmond Morton succinctly put it, “Americans may remember 9/11; we must remember 9/12, when American panic closed the U.S. border and shook our prosperity to its very core.”27 The willingness of Americans to sacrifice trade for security has created a dichotomy in purpose between the two nations. According to Frank Harvey,

[w]hile Americans are committed to counterterrorism to prevent another attack on U.S. soil, the primary strategic motivation for counterterrorism in Canada is to prevent the negative economic consequences of America’s response to the next attack.28

As such, within the post-9/11 reality, Canada has come under increasing pressure to realign its security and defence policies even more closely with those of the United States:

As security continues to trump economics south of the Canadian border, American officials will measure the value of their relations with other nations not in terms of the potential to enhance bilateral trade but through the prism of a new security environment and their obligation (compulsion) to achieve perfection in the war on terror... Canada’s willingness to meet the “perfection” standard will have to become more transparent and increasingly dependent on policies that convey an unambiguous commitment to American security.29

Indeed, “…the Bush administration’s response to virtually every Canadian economic complaint has been to suggest that Canada reshape its policies to harmonize with those of the United States,” as demonstrated by its stance concerning softwood lumber and the Canadian Wheat Board.30

CF-18 Hornet

DND photo CX2010-0078-007 by Corporal Jax Kennedy

A CF-18 Hornet from 441 Tactical Fighter Squadron on security patrol for the Vancouver Olympic Games, 25 February 2010.

The Third Invariant: Natural Alliances Based upon Broad National Interests

While admitting “…[that] no two nations have precisely the same interests,” Sutherland posited: “…[that] there are certain natural alignments based upon a natural community of interests,” and that Canada’s “…strongest natural alignment is with the United States.31 To support this contention, he cited our close economic and security ties, as well as a common “…cultural affinity, a basic compatibility of social institutions and attitudes which goes beyond any ordinary conception of common interests.”32

This natural affinity continues today. Despite Michael Adams’s claim to have noted divergent social attitudes between Canadians and Americans, many observers agree with Jennifer Welsh “…[that] many of the values that Canada promotes internationally are values that we share with the United States: democracy, the rule of law, human rights and an enhanced role for the private sector in development.”33 More simply expressed by Jack Granatstein: “We share a continent, most values, many traditions, and much history.”34

The primacy of our natural alliance with the United States is especially evident in our defence relationship. Canada’s International Policy Statement (2005) confirms that the United States “…remains Canada’s most important ally,” and understatedly notes: “…[that] Canada’s security has become more closely linked than ever to that of its southern neighbour” since 9/11.35 Heeding the call for assistance, Canada was one of the first countries to join the US-led military operation in Afghanistan. To support its heightened operations, Canada’s military spending was increased by 27 percent between 2001 and 2007, reversing decades of decline and allowing for a significant increase in military manpower and the acquisition of several major equipment systems.36

Further evidence of our increasingly close defence alignment with the United States is evident in the recent organizational transformation within the Canadian Forces (CF).  Several new structures at the operational level were created that mirror their American counterparts (CEFCOM, CANADACOM, versus CENTCOM, NORTHCOM, and so on). In sharing more than 80 treaty-level and 250 other bilateral military agreements with the United States, Canada’s defence arrangements with the US can now be considered as “intermestic.”37 Dwight Mason, a former member of the Canada-US Permanent Joint Board on Defence, has gone so far as to suggest: “…[that] probably no two militaries in the world have such an extensive relationship and understand each other so well... and work together as easily.”38

Accompanying this natural alignment, Sutherland acknowledged Canada’s well-established policy of seeking multilateral partners abroad and the pursuit of “an opening towards Europe as an off-set to excessive American influence.”39 He saw value in seeking multilateral partnerships, so long as they were brokered within the proper context:

If we expect to gather allies against the United States, we are going to be disappointed. And this is true of any other forum including the United Nations. However, by participating in NATO, and conceivably other collective defence systems, Canada can achieve two things. Firstly, by being present at the table we can serve as the spokesman for our own interests... Secondly, to the extent that Canada plays a significant role in Western security, she can maintain real influence in Washington... [T]his principle of independent representation is the key to a vigorous Canadian national existence [author’s emphasis].40

Thus, Sutherland felt that multilateralism would not provide a guarantee against American dominance. Instead, he espoused that Canada use multilateralism to support, not supplant, its primary relationship with the United States. Furthermore, he posited that Canada’s ability to achieve consistent success in both Washington and the international arena would be determined by its ability to exercise a meaningful degree of military power, what Sutherland called “the gold coin of diplomacy.”41

Getting the balance right between bilateralism and multilateralism has posed some problems. Despite Sutherland’s advice, many critics feel that recent Liberal governments overemphasized multilateralism as a way for Canada to differentiate itself from the United States. Andrew Richter cites Canada’s “multilateralism fetish” as being both ineffective and harmful to our primary alliance relationship:  

Canada’s emphasis on... multilateral diplomacy [has] created a false impression of making a significant contribution to international security, whereas in reality multilateral approaches have not proven useful in solving many global problems... The US has had little time or patience for the Canadian policies of “human security” and “soft power”... [S]everal foreign policy initiatives that Canada has supported (including land mines and Kyoto) have generated hostility in Washington.42

HMCS Regina and the USCG cutter Mellon in Vancouver Harbour

DND photo IS2009-1028-03 by Sergeant Paz Quillé

HMCS Regina and the USCG cutter Mellon, along with several Maritime Coastal Defence Vessels (MCDVs) and Orca Class training vessels berthed alongside Canada Place in Vancouver harbour, 18 October 2009.

Indeed, in the ‘Bush Doctrine’ world of heightened American unilateralism, the success of Canadian multilateral initiatives has largely been dependent upon gaining American support. For example, Canada’s leadership of the Global Partnership Program Against the Spread of Materials and Weapons of Mass Destruction (2002), announced at the G8 Summit in Kananaskis, received full support from the United States and has enjoyed notable success.43 In contrast, Canada’s ‘Responsibility To Protect’ (R2P) initiative in the United Nations was only eventually adopted in a watered-down format that rendered it largely ineffectual, owing mostly to US reluctance to support its central premise.44 Both cases aptly illustrate how Canada’s success in achieving its national policy objectives, multilateral or otherwise, is hinged upon convincing the United States that it is in our shared interests. As Allan Gotleib, former Canadian Ambassador to the United States summarizes,

Canadians will not be able to contribute significantly to international peace and a more just world without being able to influence the United States. Our inability to wield influence in Washington helps explain, more than any other single factor, the much-discussed recent decline in Canada’s role in the world.45

The Only Option: Powerful and Effective, or Weak and Reluctant?

We have seen that invariants have given Canada little option but to remain an American ally, as Sutherland postulated. However, Sutherland left it up to his readers to predict what kind of ally Canada would become in the 21st Century. Although space constraints prevent an in-depth consideration of this question, our examination of the invariants through the lens of the post-9/11 world has revealed some of Canada’s weaker moments. Considered together, Canada’s neglect of its military and its security within its own borders, disputes over particular trade issues, and attempts to forge multilateral policies that have often run counter to American interests might lead a casual observer to question our friendship with the United States. Recent events in the new security environment have shown that when Canada behaves as a poor American ally, we suffer as a result. For example, Andrew Richter contends that Canada’s prevarication over participation in both the Iraq war and ballistic missile defence contributed to the American delay in resolving disputes over a host of economically salient issues, including duties on softwood lumber and a ban on Canadian beef.46 Conversely, several pundits have cited Canada’s support for reconstruction in Iraq and its extensive involvement on all fronts in Afghanistan as attempts to restore our ‘good ally’ status and regain Washington’s confidence. 47

USS Kittyhawk, HMCS Ottawa and HMCS Regina en route to Ex Rimpac

DND photo OTT–316dec12recce by Master Corporal Nick Bichsel

The carrier USS Kittyhawk, escorted by HMCS Ottawa and HMCS Regina in the west Pacific Ocean en route to Exercise Rimpac, 23 June 2008.

As to whether Canada has the ability to be an effective member of the world community independent of the United States, many support Michael Ignatieff’s argument that, “Ottawa’s unwillingness to adequately fund military, peacekeeping, and aid activity [has] left the Canadian government with little recourse for independent action.”48 While recent sizeable military budget increases have begun to address capability gaps, it is questionable whether Canada can afford the price tag associated with re-establishing our ‘hard power’ credibility any time soon. Meanwhile, “…anything less than a crystal clear commitment to American security will affect Washington’s enthusiasm... to protect Canadian economic interests,” which, given recent world economic conditions, is the current Canadian government’s priority.49 In light of Canada’s economic vulnerability, if maintaining our relative wealth and prosperity is in our national interests, then Canada’s choice of what kind of ally to be is really not much of a true choice at all.

Conclusion

Having distilled the essence of Canadian Realpolitik into its three invariants, Sutherland contended that the combined effects of geography, economics, and common broad national interests were so enduring that Canada would still have little option but to remain an American ally into the 21st Century. Sutherland has been proven correct in the polarized post-9/11 world, for Canada has had little choice but to greatly strengthen its alliance and its ties with the United States.

With a neighbour willing to sacrifice trade for security, Canada’s economic interests are now inescapably tied to its geographic commitment to help protect the United States. In order to conform to American expectations, Canada enacted significant legislation that had serious consequences for immigration, civil liberties, and the rights and freedoms of its citizens. Canada’s trade and economic ties to the United States are so strong that Canadians arguably fear a closure of the Canada-US border more than they fear a terrorist attack on Canada itself.

Militarily and diplomatically, Canada has embraced the anti-terrorism agenda of the United States. Canada’s operational military structure has been transformed to mirror that of the United States, pursuing even greater interoperability. Ostensibly under the NATO aegis, but strongly linked to Canada’s desire to be seen as a good ally to the United States, Canada’s foreign policy is currently focused upon the Afghanistan mission as its part in the global war on terror. Relying upon American support to compensate for its diminished ‘hard power,’ Canada’s success in the multilateral arena is ever more symbiotically linked to its bilateral relationship with the US, a partner who is both capable and unhesitant to act unilaterally if necessary.

Despite concerns over the inescapable nature of our alliance with the United States, perhaps we should keep Sutherland’s admonishment regarding the benefits of our relationship in mind. Canadians have little reason to bemoan the propitious situation that has been dealt to them. After all, it is largely due to the benefits of our unique relationship with the United States that Canada has achieved its lofty status among nations. As a close yet independent ally, Canada may aspire to even greater heights with relative confidence.

The author wishes to acknowledge and thank Lieutenant-Colonel Ian McCullough for his advice, editing assistance and guidance in the preparation of this paper.

Moraine Lake

Cape Breton NP/© Parks Canada/Barrett & MacKay/1985

Ingonish Beach on Cape Breton Island, Nova Scotia.

CMJ Logo

Lieutenant-Colonel Dwayne Lovegrove, CD, a pilot, is currently the Commding Officer of 440 (Transport) Squadron in Yellowknife, Northwest Territories. He holds a Master’s degree in War Studies from the Royal Military College of Canada. A veteran of several deployments to the Middle East, Lovegrove recently served as Task Force Commander of Operation Gladius, Canada’s contribution to the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) in the Golan Heights.

Notes

  1. Robert J. Sutherland, “Canada’s Long Term Strategic Situation,” in International Journal, Vol. 17, No. 3 (Summer 1962), p. 223.
  2. Paul Buteux, “Sutherland Revisited: Canada’s Long-Term Strategic Situation,” in Canadian Defence Quarterly, September 1994, p. 5.
  3. Andrew Richter, “The Sutherland Papers: A Glimpse into the Thinking of Canada’s Preeminent Strategist,” in Canadian Defence Quarterly, Autumn 1997, p. 28.
  4. Robert J. Sutherland, p. 201.
  5. Ibid., p. 223.
  6. Ibid.
  7. Ibid., p. 202.
  8. Ibid.
  9. J.L. Granatstein, “The Importance of Being Less Earnest: Promoting Canada’s National Interests Through Tighter Ties with the U.S.,” in Benefactor’s Lecture (Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute, 2003), p. 15.
  10. Dwight N. Mason, “The Future of  Canadian-U.S.. Defense Relations,” The American Review of Canadian Studies (Spring 2003), 72.
  11. Sutherland, p. 203.
  12. Ibid.
  13. Nils Orvik, “The Basic Issue in Canadian National Security: Defence against Help, Defence to Help Others,” in Canadian Defence Quarterly, Vol. 11, No. 1 (Summer 1981), as cited by Donald Barry and Duane Bratt, “Defense Against Help: Explaining Canada-U.S. Security Relations,” in The American Review of Canadian Studies, Vol. 38, No. 1 (Spring 2008), p. 63.
  14. President George W. Bush, “President Welcomes President Chirac to White House,” in White House Press Release, Washington, DC: Office of the Press Secretary, 6 November 2001, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/11/print/20011106-4.html,, accessed 19 October 2008.
  15. United States, Congressional Research Service, “Canada-U.S. Relations,” CRS Report for Congress, 12 May 2008, Library of Congress, CRS Report No. 96-397, 16 – 8, at http://digital.library.unt.edu/ govdocs/crs/permalink/meta-crs-8946.
  16. Canada, Privy Council Office, Securing an Open Society: Canada’s National Security Policy (April 2004), p. 48.
  17. Frank P. Harvey, “Canada’s Addiction to American Security: The Illusion of Choice in the War on Terrorism,” in The American Review of Canadian Studies, Vol. 35, No. 2 (Summer 2005), p. 275.
  18. Ibid., p. 274.
  19. Sutherland, pp. 203-204.
  20. The nations that ranked ahead of Canada were the United States, Japan, Germany, China, United Kingdom, France, Italy, and Spain respectively. World Bank, “Gross Domestic Product 2007,” in World Development Indicators database, revised 10 September 2008,  at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/ DATASTATISTICS/Resources/GDP.pdf, accessed  23 October 2008.
  21. Sutherland, p. 204.
  22. Andrew Cohen, While Canada Slept: How We Lost Our Place in the World (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 2003), p. 108.
  23. Maureen Appel Molot, “The Trade-Security Nexus: The New Reality in Canada-U.S. Economic Integration,” in The American Review of Canadian Studies (Spring 2003), p. 30.
  24. United States, Congressional Research Service, “Canada-U.S. Relations,” CRS Report for Congress, p. 28.
  25. Denis Stairs, “Trends in Canadian Foreign Policy: Past, Present, and Future,” in Behind the Headlines Vol. 59, No, 3 (June 2003), Canadian Institute of International Affairs, p. 4.
  26. Sutherland,  p. 204.
  27. Desmond Morton, “Keynote Address to the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society,” Toronto, 1 October 2004, as cited by Derek H. Burney, “The Perennial Challenge: Managing Canada-US Relations,” Canada Among Nations 2005: Split Images, Andrew F. Cooper and Dane Rowlands  [Eds.] (Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2005), p. 73.
  28. Harvey, p. 272.
  29. Ibid., p. 273.
  30. John Herd Thompson, “Playing by the New Washington Rules: The U.S.-Canada Relationship, 1994-2003,” in The American Review of Canadian Studies, Vol. 33, No. 1 (Spring 2003), p. 13.
  31. Sutherland, pp. 204 – 205.
  32. Ibid., p. 205.
  33. Jennifer M. Welsh, “Reality and Canadian Foreign Policy,” in Canada Among Nations 200…, p. 33. For a contrary opinion, see Michael Adams, Fire and Ice: The United States, Canada and the Myth of Converging Values (Toronto: Penguin, 2003).
  34. Granatstein, p. 27.
  35. Canada, “A Role of Pride and Influence in the World: Defence,” in Canada’s International Policy Statement (2005), NDID A-JS-005-000/AG-001, p. 21.
  36. Steven Staples and Bill Robinson, “More Than The Cold War: Canada’s Military Spending 2007-2008,” in Foreign Policy Series 2, 3 (October 2007), p. 1, at http://www.policyalternatives.ca/documents/ National_Office_Pubs/2007/More_Than_the_Cold_War.pdf, accessed 30 October 2008.
  37. The term ‘intermestic’ was coined by social scientists to describe the merge of domestic and international concerns within and between states, or the internationalizing of domestic issues. (Ed.). United States, “Canada – U.S. Relations,” CRS Report for Congress, p. 9.
  38. Mason, p. 71.
  39. Sutherland, p. 207.
  40. Ibid., p. 222.
  41. Ibid., p. 203.
  42. Andrew Richter, “From Trusted Ally to Suspicious Neighbor: Canada-U.S. Relations in a Changing Global Environment,” in The American Review of Canadian Studies (Autumn 2005), pp. 474-475, 486-487.
  43. Canada, Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, Global Partnership Program: A Tangible Canadian Contribution to Reducing the Threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction (2007).
  44. Ernie Regehr, “R2P and the Global Summit,” Project Ploughshares Briefing (September 2005), at http://www.ploughshares.ca/libraries/Briefings/brf056.pdf, accessed 29 October 2008. Duane Bratt, “Warriors or Boy Scouts?  Canada and Peace Support Operations,” in  Readings in Canadian Foreign Policy: Classic Debates and New Ideas, Duane Bratt and Christopher J. Kukucha [Eds.](Don Mills, Ontario: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 243.
  45. Allan Gotleib, “The Paramountcy of Canada-U.S. Relations,” in National Post, 22 May 2003, p. 24.
  46. Richter, “From Trusted Ally to Suspicious Neighbor…” p. 490.
  47. Donald Barry, “Chrétien, Bush, and the War in Iraq,” in The American Review of Canadian Studies, Vol.  35, No. 2 (Summer 2005), p. 232. Janice Gross Stein and Eugene Lang, The Unexpected War: Canada in Kandahar (Toronto: Viking Canada, 2007), p. 184.
  48. Michael Ignatieff, “Canada in the Age of Terror: Multilateralism Meets a Moment of Truth,” in Independence in An Age of Empire: Assessing Unilateralism and Multilateralism, G.F. Walker [Ed.] (Halifax: Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, 2004), pp. 31-41, as cited by Douglas Ross and Anil Hira, “Canada, A Land of Deep Ambivalence: Understanding the Divergent Response to US Primacy after 9/11,” in Canadian-American Public Policy 68 (December 2006), p. 11.
  49. Harvey, p. 288.

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