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Taliban fighters captured by the Afghan National Army (ANA) have their identities checked by Canadian soldiers

DND photo AS2006-0374a by Sergeant Dennis Power

Taliban fighters captured by the Afghan National Army (ANA) have their identities checked by Canadian soldiers, 17 May 2006.

Who is the Adversary? Pathans, the Taliban and Prospects of Peace

by Keith Cameron

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Introduction

Canada, alongside NATO and other nations, is currently engaged in a tough, arduous nation-building effort in Afghanistan under the auspices of the UN-brokered 2006 Afghan Compact. The effort has been neither easy nor straightforward and perhaps has been much tougher, longer, and costlier than envisioned in 2002 when the first Canadian troops arrived in Kandahar. More than seven years after the initial military operations to remove the Taliban from power, Afghanistan still contends with a tenacious insurgency in the south. As the British diplomat Sir Olaf Kirkpatrick Kruuse Caroe declared in 1964: “…unlike other wars, Afghan wars become serious only when they are over; in British times at least, they were apt to produce an after-crop of tribal unrest.”1 Those who fight are still largely incomprehensible to many Westerners.  Graeme Smith has highlighted this point in a Globe and Mail article under the headline, ‘Portrait of the Enemy’ (22 March 2008).  Therein, he states: “…[that] at the most basic level, the Taliban remain a mystery. Few analysts are willing to predict whether an average fighter would lay down his weapons, and under what circumstances.”

This article will examine the current tribal unrest in Afghanistan, focusing upon the Pathan tribes, which make up the bulk of the Taliban and the ongoing insurgency in the south. In particular, I will detail the respective influences of culture and power structures among the Pathan peoples. These influences have considerable importance with respect to the efforts to combat the Taliban insurgency. First, the culture is a mixture of tribalism and Islam. The chances of separating the two and isolating radical Islam affect whether diplomacy and negotiations will be effective in fostering regional stability. Second, underlying power structures fuel the conflict. Borders arbitrarily separate peoples, and internal tribal and domestic political struggles also contribute to the current violence. Power struggles may be amenable to realist balancing, and often are culled by opposing military and economic force. This article will conclude that understanding the local power dynamics is instrumental for short-term success and for setting the conditions for peace. Long-term prospects require a successful cultural appeal in order to undercut the current cycle of violence.

The People: Pathan Tribes and Taliban Influence

The Afghan security challenge is rooted in tribal dynamics, which provide fertile ground for a brutal insurgency. Central authority is historically challenged, with Afghans often identifying with family and tribal affiliations before nationhood, and this particularly applies to the largest Pashtu, or Pathan, tribal groupings in the unstable south.2 Olaf Caroe, who served as the last governor of British India before independence, was intimately familiar with the Pathan people. Emphasizing the strength of the social bonds, he noted: “…[that] it is indeed, doubtful whether there exists today elsewhere in the tribal world an organization so closely knit as is a Pathan tribe in the inter-connection and relationship of the various parts of the tree, down to the last twig.... The ancestral share in the tribal account of profit and loss is an essential part of this tribal lore, and is the tribal guide in peace and in war.”3 Afghan ground has been trod by invaders as diverse as Alexander the Great, Genghis Khan, the Indian Moghuls, the British, and the Soviets. It is hardly surprising that such a past leads to a culture steeped in the use of force.  Caroe recounts a conversation with a Pathan leader, who was retelling a tribal account of a battle in 1586 against the Moghul (present-day India) armies:  “‘Never in all history were the Yusufzais [a Pathan tribe now resident in northern Pakistan] of this country the subjects of any empire.’ The claim can be made good. The people... have never paid taxes to Delhi or Kabul.”4 Acknowledging a loose independence, the British, in the late 1800s, referred to the territory beyond the present-day Pakistani border as “ghairilaqa (unadministered territory) or Yaghistan (the land of rebels).”5 Such an attitude persists to the present day, as a Taliban fighter interviewed in Kandahar Province recently acknowledged: “We are people of war.”6

Birtish Camp in Afghanistan, 1879

Hulton-Deutsch Collection/Corbis/HU012416

British camp in Afghanistan, December 1879.

The Pathan tribal bonds are traditionally expressed in the honour code of Pushtunwali.  On one hand, the code embodies the concepts of kinship, hospitality, and sanctuary to those who request it. On the other, Pushtunwali sanctions feud, advocating violent retribution for attacks on one’s kin. The code both establishes a loose form of security, and perpetrates a culture of violence:

[A] means is provided whereby, in the absence of a state, zones of security are established for travelers. Yet the system is based on an ever-shifting balance of terror which turns friends into enemies, and back again into friends, in a heartbeat. And this ethos of honor writes violent revenge and collective guilt deep into the cultural psyche.7

The tribal culture is one of changing and balancing internal loyalties. Akbar Ahmed is a former Pakistani political agent for the frontier province of South Waziristan, and is currently a professor at American University. He is familiar with tribal internal power strategies. As he notes in his book, Resistance and Control in Pakistan, “…to create a problem, control it, and terminate it is an acknowledged and highly regarded yardstick of political skill.”8 The tribal culture is both cohesive and divided amongst itself.

The Afghan tribes have known unity in the past, although the historian Louis Dupree characterizes the pattern as that of “…a charismatic leader who fused but left fission in his wake.”9 The most notable example of Afghan unity was the empire of Ahmad Shah (of the Durrani branch of the Pashtun tribe), called the “first and most powerful of Afghan Kings.”10 The Durrani Kingdom lasted from 1747 until it disintegrated in internal rebellions following Ahmad Shah’s son’s death in 1793. Other rulers rose and fell over the following years, culminating in the last king, Zahir Shah, (also of the Durrani lineage) who was crowned in 1933.11 Modernization, which occurred in the early 20th Century, witnessed a fragmentation of tribalism. With migrations and movements to urban centres for work, a “…shift of economic functions from the clan village to the extended family occurred, in spite of the loss of proximal residential unity.”12 Despite some dilution of tribalism with urbanization, Afghan political intrigues were still often family-based. King Zahir Shah was deposed by his cousin in 1973. However, the tribal pattern persisted:

A leader appears, and unites tribal sentiment in a surge of enthusiasm that carries all before it…. Then the leader gives way to vain-glory, the stimulus which gave unity fails, envy and malice show their heads. The effort, steady and sustained, which is needed to maintain the position won, proves to be beyond the tribal reach. The ground won is lost, and the leader forfeits confidence and is discarded.13

The Pathan people must also be understood in terms of the historical influence of Islam on top of existing tribal culture. Caroe dates the influence of Islam to the period between the 7th and 10th Centuries.14 The combination of Islam and a deeply tribal society resulted in what Dr. Louis Dupree of Duke University, one of the world’s foremost authorities on Afghanistan, has termed an ‘inward-looking society,’ which results in “…the perpetration of a predeterministic status quo, in which a man who performs his given (not chosen) roles in society can expect Paradise as a reward.”15 Islamic fundamentalism also runs deep. Despite Pakistani journalist and bestselling author Ahmed Rashid’s claim that, “…before the Taliban, religious extremism had never flourished in Afghanistan,”61 the Islamic saint Pir Baba was referred to as a “…talib-ul-‘ilm, or searcher after the truth”17 in a 1540s religious controversy that galvanized the Pathan tribal groups.

The modern Taliban take the same name, and they claim the same orthodoxy. They emerged as a result of the Cold War Soviet occupation and the protracted civil war that immediately followed. Ahmed Rashid notes that, in 1994, the Taliban “…saw themselves as the cleansers and purifiers of a guerrilla war gone astray, a social system gone wrong and an Islamic way of life that had been compromised by corruption and excess.”18 Rashid writes before the events of 11 September 2001, but he provides a solid analysis of the rise and the effects of the Taliban in Afghanistan. The Taliban is portrayed as a radical Islamic movement, which sought to replace both the traditional tribal customs and the traditional moderate Islamic culture. The corrosive influences of long-term warfare are stressed. The Taliban, largely from Pathan refugee camps and madrassas (Islamic schools) along the Pakistani frontier, “…were from a generation who had never seen their country at peace…. They had no memories of their tribes, their elders, their neighbours nor the complex ethnic mix of peoples that often made up their villages and their homeland.”19 The Taliban root religious beliefs were seen to be incompatible with any sort of compromise. They did, however, maintain the traditional focus on a strong, unifying leader in the person of Mullah Omar. As Rashid notes, “…the obsession of radical Islam is not the creation of institutions, but the character and purity of its leader.”20

Despite the loss of tribal heritage and the elders who had perpetrated it, the Pathan tribal culture intertwines with the radicalism of the Taliban. The success of the Taliban in gaining power over the period 1994-1997 can be seen in a combination of a wide tribal appeal, which “galvanized Pashtun nationalism,” and the driving motivation of “an extreme interpretation of the Sharia or Islamic law.”21 This combination led to the clashes between the Taliban and the international community following the World Trade Centre terrorist attacks in 2001.The Taliban intransigence was “…shaped by a combination of religious extremist views and the special code of Pushtunwali,” which made the Taliban “…willing to sacrifice their political and economic power, indeed their own survival.”22 Such intransigence is still present in the form of the continuing insurgency in southern Afghanistan.

Structure: A Struggle for Power

Despite tribal and Islamic extremist roots, there are also several other structural causes to be considered.  As seen in Figure 1 below, the Pakistani-Afghan border dissects the Pathan tribal area.  The ongoing border dispute serves to inflame Pathan internal power struggles, and it also becomes a source of inter-state conflict.

Figure 1: Map of Afghan tribal distribution

Several commentators stress the importance of the lack of universal recognition for the British colonial Durand Line delineating the Afghani-Pakistani border. Gordon Smith of the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute believes: “…[that] the continuing lack of any resolution of the Durand Line issue is an important factor fuelling instability and insurgent activity in the border regions.”23 The British consulting firm, Middlebrook and Miller, clarifies: “…[that] the key issue is not demarcation itself; it is lack of formal recognition in the eyes of communities that live there that also restricts the provision of government services and security arrangements.”24 That lack of services and order fuels the cycle of instability.

The border issue may also be an indication of underlying power conflicts between Pathan tribes straddling the Durand Line, and governments in Kabul and Islamabad. Although originally intended simply to delimit the extent of British India’s northern influence,25 the border divides the Pathans and thus limits their power. A disputed border allows Afghanistan and Pakistan to exploit internal tribal divisions and to compete for relative influence. The Manley Report outlines some of the destabilizing influences as follows:

The insurgency has continued to benefit from easy resort to safe havens inside Pakistan, where it is refinanced, rearmed and replenished with new recruits, including those from other countries. Pakistan’s own political disarray magnifies the destabilizing threat of the insurgency both to Pakistan and Afghanistan.26

Gordon Smith further notes: “… [that] resolution of the Durand Line should be one among many important factors that would improve relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan and extend ultimate state control over the border areas and tribes.”27 An insurgent victory in southern Afghanistan raises the possibility of a wider ‘Pashtunistan War’ seeking to unite tribes split across international borders.28 Such a war could prompt conflicts in Pakistan’s Northwest Frontier Province, and in disputed Kashmir, involving the nuclear-armed states of India and Pakistan. There is ample historical basis to this possibility. Noting the expansion of the Durrani Kingdom in the 1850s, which included significant areas of present-day Pakistan, including Peshawar, and parts of the North-West Frontier plains, Caroe points out the Afghan claim of 1947: “…[that] in the event of the demission of British authority the whole Pathan country as far as the Indus should revert to Afghan sovereignty.”29 Middlebrook and Miller see powerful Pashtun nationalism as potentially leading: “…[to] the liquidation of both Pakistan and Afghanistan in their modern sense.”30 With the integrity of both nations threatened, the underlying power struggle is obvious. The Pathan people are literally caught in the middle.

Approaches

This article has outlined the culture and structural power struggles unique to the Pathan peoples, and, consequently, the Taliban-led insurgency in southern Afghanistan and the Pakistani tribal areas. Possible strategies for the Afghan Government and the international community, catering to these specifics, will now be presented. The current problem is one of physical combat for control of territory and a conflict of ideologies. This leads to a focus upon the employment of force and coercion as well as an appeal to the Pathan tribal culture. Strategies from the realist school of thought, which deal with power and are often seen as most applicable to security studies, will be employed. These will be adapted to the cultural context in order to deal with the tribal and religious character of the Pathans.

A realist perspective focuses upon the struggle for state survival amidst an anarchical international system. Realism assumes a state-centric perspective, assuming that all states’ aims are similar (power to ensure survival being the aim), but that capabilities may be markedly different (in terms of relative strengths). The structure is one of international anarchy, where a state must rely on self-help for survival, and no one enforces an international order. Although the Taliban do not compose a state, the power struggles and the relative anarchy of the tribal culture are seen as roughly comparable. The realist school of thought advocates peace through a balance of power. Columbia University’s Kenneth Waltz declares: “…[that] peace is maintained by a delicate balance of internal and external restraints.”31 Peace would be obtained, then, by creating a more favourable balance of power, whether through application of force, threatening force and rewarding cooperation through diplomacy, or creating alliances to balance one’s opponent. Cultural considerations would modify these policy options.

a. The Role of Power

The Manley Report clearly describes the power struggle in Afghanistan. From the military perspective: “ISAF [International Security Assistance Force] forces report significant successes in their strategy of ‘clear, hold and develop,’” while the Taliban seek to “…unsettle the population, shake popular confidence in the safety that can be provided by the government, and discourage the populations of ISAF countries enough to cause the withdrawal of their forces from the fight.”32 In this context, the threat and use of military force is an essential component.  Force may be used to frustrate those Taliban actively threatening the population and ISAF forces, killing or capturing them, and weakening the movement. Equally as important, force serves to thwart wider Taliban interests, and opens the door to negotiations. Professor Emeritus of Johns Hopkins University William Zartman, in his study on the feasibility of negotiations with extremists, concludes: “…[that] a generic lesson from similar cases is that it is first necessary to check the violence and show it to be inoperative, so that the movement in part or whole turns to politics and renounces its violent option.”33 Other writers agree on the explicit link between force and the prospect of negotiations, stating that extremists “…need to be convinced that they can, in fact, achieve their goals through negotiation and that they will never achieve them through continued violence, because of impenetrable barriers or overwhelming force”34 (emphasis in original). ISAF and the Afghan National Army continue to employ force in this manner against the insurgency.

Osama bin Laden

REUTERS⁄Reuters TV⁄RTR1RV9S

Osama bin Laden

 

b. Force and Diplomacy

In a realist view, diplomacy can be distilled into the mutual recognition of power imperatives, which are ultimately backed by military force. The emphasis is upon demonstrating power relationships. Foreign policy and international relations scholar Robert Art of Brandeis University notes: “…[that] because compellence [SP] can entail both threats and actual use of force, compellence has not necessarily failed if the threats are carried out.”35 Shah Tarzi examines the concept of coercive diplomacy, studying US diplomatic efforts from 1998 to 2001 that were established with the Taliban through Pakistani intermediaries. Specific efforts were made to convince the Taliban government to renounce terrorism, and, in the days ‘post 9/11,’ to give up Osama bin Laden. Negotiations of this sort relied upon the threat of force, where “…carrots are to be offered after use of force is threatened.”36 The ensuing military intervention in Afghanistan demonstrated the failure of these negotiations in 2001, but the marked change in the balance of power since then may hold some grounds for optimism. A much weaker Taliban may be more willing to negotiate. However, Tarzi cautions:

[that] assuming rational behaviour on the part of the target state or groups is inherently a questionable proposition, thereby limiting the utility of coercive policy. Specifically, when dealing with terrorist groups or failed states in which the leadership has a radically different and highly destructive messianic religious and cultural referent, the notion of rational behaviour itself becomes a culture-bound frame of reference.37

Zartman also recognizes the difficulties in obtaining a negotiated settlement among the almost irreconcilable clash of interests present in the Afghani conflict. He makes the distinction between nationalist armed conflicts, such as those in Kosovo or Northern Ireland, and conflicts with religious extremists such as the Taliban leaders:

It is hard to find exact parallels. Nationalist movements against a dominating enemy, as in Kosovo, Macedonia, Palestine, and Ulster, provide somewhat similar cases, but the goals were finite and ultimately negotiable. Other instances of religious, ethnic, or other ideological movements seen in Algeria (1990–1996), Rwanda (1990–1994), and Colombia (1980–), involve attempts at total destruction of the enemy for non-negotiable goals; the movement was crushed, co-opted and marginalized in Algeria, but the other two instances provide few lessons for negotiability.38

Diplomacy, then, even in the context of power relationships, must be focused on national, or, in this case, Pathan tribal interests, while avoiding a negotiation on ideologies as unprofitable. Dr. Bertram Spector of the Center for Negotiation Analysis gives some guidance for negotiation of this sort, relying upon secrecy, third parties, or the media. He notes: “History has shown that tough negotiating with terrorists has a chance of being productive if appropriate opportunities are found where the state has ample capacity to back out gracefully or secretively and escape capitulation and charges of appeasement if the attempt fails.”39

c. Internal Balance of Power

Power may be maintained by balancing, by forming alliances equal or superior in strength to challengers, and by dividing opposing alliances. In an analysis of previous campaigns against extremists, it is noted: “…[that] the historic response is a two-handed policy of reward and repression, by…  providing payoffs for moderation and encouraging splits in the rebellion, while…  containing the spoiler wing, controlling its occasions for spoiling, and increasing the disincentives for continued violence.”40 This method was used by both the British and by Pakistani political agents in order to keep the Pathan tribes fractured and amenable. American social commentator Stanley Kurtz describes the employment of this policy in what is now the Pakistani province of Waziristan:  “[T]he British ignored tribal feuding when the stakes were small. Yet if one tribe seemed at risk of gaining a permanent upper hand, the Brits intervened to keep opponents more-or-less equally at each other's throats.”41 Changes in tribal strengths required changes in alliances.

This option worked somewhat successfully in maintaining a minimal level of violence, but produced no long-term solutions. The same instability faced by British India and then the Pakistanis is still present today. Appealing to internal divisions may, however, be a means of separating tribalism and extremist Islam.  Should it be possible to identify moderate tribal groups within the Taliban, military and economic support may succeed in weakening the core Islamic extremists. However, short term gains may come at a price to the international community’s goals for Afghanistan.  Kurtz makes the point: “…[that] learning to play the tribal game is very different from establishing a genuine democracy, which would mean transcending the game itself.”42

d. Regional Balance of Power

Wider international interests will also require the use of power balancing. Gordon Smith points out that because of the wider tribal ties, the “…destruction of the Taliban movement – were it even possible – at this point basically translates into the destruction of Pakistani influence in Afghanistan.”43 This creates a Pakistani interest in prolonging the insurgency, even at the expense of its internal stability.  Afghanistan in turn, by continuing its dispute of the Durand Line, also seeks influence to offset Pakistan. Afghanistan currently benefits the most from international assistance, armed force and foreign aid. As such, diplomatic pressure should be able to induce Afghanistan to recognize the Durand Line and to negotiate outstanding grievances.  Under US pressure, a reciprocal Pakistani move could see a reduction in support and sanctuary to the Taliban. An offer to involve moderate Taliban in the Afghan government would avoid excluding Pakistani influence. Such an offer was previously made in 2001 prior to the Bonn Agreement, and, under much changed circumstances, it could be revisited.44

e. Undermining a Culture of Violence

Culture can help to define case-specific approaches to a conflict that may complement the power-based considerations provided above. The Pathan culture I have described is composed of both tribalism and religion. Both elements can be adhered to strongly or weakly. The Taliban movement is based upon a tribalism weakened by years of war, and on a core of Islamic extremism.

Islamic extremism is seen to limit a cultural appeal. As Zartman forcefully states, Islamic radicalism is: “…part of a deeper cultural nature that feels offended and threatened by the intangible invasion of the modernized and ostensibly homogenizing West, and the physical invasion of corporations, armies, universities, even clothing, and support for local impious regimes….  In its present form, there is nothing to negotiate about, for or with.”45 It is this form of intractable conflict that Samuel Huntington had in mind when he famously declared: “…[that] the great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural.”46 In this case, Huntington simply advocates non-involvement:  “For the relevant future, there will be no universal civilization, but instead a world of different civilizations, each of which will have to learn to coexist with the others.”47 Dealing with a clash of cultures by disengagement is not seen as a victorious option in Afghanistan. However, it is worthwhile to note that engagement does not necessarily lead to any sort of mutual ‘agreement to disagree.’ A cultural analysis suggests that there exist irreconcilable differences in ideology between the international community and the Taliban.

ANA forces hold a suspected Taliban

DND photo IS2007-0667 by Master Corporal Robert Bottrill

ANA forces hold a suspected Taliban member while patrolling the area around a newly established checkpoint in the Zhari District of Afghanistan, 20 November 2007.

There is much more hope in an appeal to tribal sensitivities, especially in acknowledging the Pushtunwali code of hospitality and retributive justice. First, strengthening the remaining Pathan elders who administer the code may serve to undercut the extremism of the younger Taliban raised in the Pakistani refugee camps.  Efforts to incorporate a national Afghan code of justice with traditional tribal practices will be helpful in this regard. The Afghan Human Development Report 2007 advocates such a “hybrid model of Afghan justice,” where “traditional justice institutions will cooperate with and work alongside the state justice institutions.”48 Second, ISAF military operations could be structured to reduce a Pathan justification for retribution. A Globe and Mail article from 24 March 2008 suggests that Taliban ranks contain “an unusual concentration of first-hand experience with bombing deaths” and that “NATO soldiers have repeatedly witnessed the Taliban forcing civilians into dangerous situations in hopes of getting them killed by foreign troops, thus evoking the wrath of the village.”49 Greater restraint on the use of air power and long-range targeting would entail the increased employment of soldiers on the ground. While that would result in an elevated risk to ISAF troops, such a risk may have an extremely valuable role in breaking the cycle of violence. Additionally, as Pushtunwali places the burden of retribution upon the immediate family relations, selective targeting of individuals may prove detrimental in the longer term. With adequate evidence, mass arrests and detention of entire male family groupings may be better at disrupting the insurgency and preventing revenge. Greater use of Afghan troops in the fight against the insurgency would also require careful scrutiny to avoid ‘friendly’ perpetration of tribal retribution. Such strategies may help to undermine the current violent Pathan culture, while supporting its positive aspects and social order.

Conclusion

Herein, it has been demonstrated that the Pathan culture is one of intermixed tribalism and Islam. The Taliban represent a version of weakened tribalism and extreme Islam, but even weakened tribalism is a significant influence in a centuries-old culture. Additionally, structural issues, such as the Afghan-Pakistan border dispute, reinforce the Taliban-led insurgency. Force will be needed to combat the violence of the insurgents. Military means need to be supplemented by diplomacy, coercive if need be, and a deliberate policy of creating favourable tribal and Afghan-Pakistani balances of power to address underlying structural issues. Inter-tribal alliances should be fostered in order to fracture the Taliban, while the Durand Line issue must be resolved at the state level. Complementing these classic realist strategies, counter-insurgency operations should support desirable aspects of the Pushtunwali code, while seeking to break the cycle of vicious retribution. Justice reform should strengthen tribal elders. Military operations need to recognize the value of a presence on the ground as superior to long-range targeting. Taken together, such policies will help in the international effort, described by James Dobbins the former US special envoy to Afghanistan, “…to redirect the competition for wealth and power, which takes place within any society, from violent into peaceful channels.”50

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Major Keith Cameron, an experienced combat engineer, has completed three tours of duty, most recently as Commanding Officer of the 24th Field Squadron in Kabul, Afghanistan, as part of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in 2003-2004. Currently completing a Masters in Political Science with the University of Western Ontario, he is the Executive Assistant to the Canadian Military Representative at NATO Headquarters, Brussels.

Notes

  1. Olaf Caroe, The Pathans: 550 BC – AD 1957 (London: Macmillan, 1964), p. 397.
  2. John Manley et al., Independent Panel on Canada’s Future Role in Afghanistan (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Services, 2008), at http://independent-panel-independant.ca/pdf/Afghan_Report_web_e.pdf , accessed 17 January 2008, p. 10.
  3. Caroe, p. 11.
  4. Ibid., p. 205.
  5. Ibid., p. 347.
  6. Graeme Smith, “Facing the Enemy,” in The Globe and Mail, 22 March 2008, p. A16.
  7. Stanley Kurtz, “Tribes of Terror,” in Claremont Institute, 27 December 2007, at http://www.claremont.org/publications/crb/id.1507/article_detail.asp , accessed 5 March 2008.
  8. Ibid.
  9. Louis Dupree, Afghanistan (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 1973), p. 340.
  10. Caroe, p. 258.
  11. Dupree, p. 476.
  12. Ibid., p. 191.
  13. Caroe, pp. 305-306.
  14. Ibid., pp.90, 113.
  15. Dupree, p. 250.
  16. Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000), p. 85.
  17. Caroe, p. 198.
  18. Rashid, p. 23.
  19. Ibid., p. 32.
  20. Ibid., p. 86.
  21. Ibid., p. 2.
  22. Shah M. Tarzi, “Coercive Diplomacy and an ‘Irrational’ Regime,” in International Studies 42, No. 1 (2005), p. 40.
  23. Gordon Smith, Canada in Afghanistan: Is It Working? (Calgary: Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute, 2007), at http://www.cdfai.org/currentpublications.htm, accessed 17 January 2008, p. 5.
  24. Peter J. Middlebrook and Sharon M. Miller, “All Along the Watch Tower: Bringing Peace to the Afghan-Pakistan Border,” in Foreign Policy Futures (New York: Middlebrook & Miller, 10 October 2006), at http://www.middlebrook-miller.com/html_pages/publications.html, accessed 26 February 2008, p. 5.
  25. Caroe, pp. 381-383.
  26. Manley et al., p. 12.
  27. Smith, p. 5.
  28. Ibid., p. 23.
  29. Caroe, p. 436.
  30. Middlebrook and Miller, p. 8.
  31. Kenneth Waltz, “Structural Realism after the Cold War,” in International Security 25, No.1 (2000), p.13.
  32. Manley et al., p.13.
  33. William Zartman, “Negotiating internal, ethnic and identity conflicts in a globalized world,” in International Negotiation 11 (2006), p. 268.
  34. Bertram Spector, “Negotiating With Villains Revisited: Research Note,” in International Negotiation 8 (2004), p. 618.
  35. Robert Art, “Coercive Diplomacy,” in Power and Principle in Statecraft and the Consequences of Anarchy,  Robert Art and Robert Jervis (eds.) (New York: Pearson, 2007), p. 164.
  36. Tarzi, p. 31.
  37. Ibid., p. 40.
  38. Zartman, p. 265.
  39. Spector, p. 617.
  40. Zartman, p. 268.
  41. Kurtz.
  42. Ibid.
  43. Smith, p. 13.
  44. See “Ex-Afghan King Said to Agree To Role in Kabul for Taliban,” in The New York Times, 19 October, 2001, and “US and Pakistan Share Afghan Goal,” in BBC News, 16 October 2001. The Taliban ultimately refused to be included at the time.
  45. Zartman, p. 270
  46. Samuel Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?” in Foreign Affairs 72, No. 3 (1993), p. 22.
  47. Huntington, p. 49.
  48. Ali Wardak, Daud Saba, and Halima Kazem, Afghanistan Human Development Report 2007 (Islamabad: Army Press, 2007), at http://www.undp.org.af/Publications/KeyDocuments/nhdr07_complete.pdf, accessed 26 February 2008), p. 4.
  49. Graeme Smith, “Air Strikes and Drug Eradication,” in The Globe and Mail, 24 March 2008.
  50. James Dobbins et al., The Beginners Guide to Nation Building (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2007), p. xxiii.

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