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Todays's Battlespace

M177 artillery piece

DND photo AR2006-G068-0009 by Master Corporal Yves Gemus

An M177 artillery piece of 2 Royal Canadian Horse Artillery (2 RCHA) at sunset at Forward Operating Base (FOB) Sperwan Gar, Afghanistan, 14 December 2006.

Being Effective in Snake Fighting ~ Lessons for the Canadian Forces in the Effects-Based Operations Era

by Peter J. Williams

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Introduction

When General Rick Hillier took over as Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) in early 2005, he very quickly put into effect the most dramatic transformation the Canadian Forces (CF) has experienced in its history. Central to his vision was the thesis that future conflicts would be characterized more by violence within or around failed states, and against non-state actors (the ‘snakes’), than by wars against such previous opponents as the now-defunct Soviet Union (the ‘bears’).

At the same time, the concept of Effects-Based Operations (EBO) began to emerge.1 Under this doctrine, what was important was the wider (and not necessarily the immediate) outcome or effect of the application of a number of capabilities (kinetic or non-kinetic) against a particular target. Increasingly, these capabilities would not come solely from within the military ‘toolbox,’ but also would bring to bear other elements of national power. Therefore, depending upon the nation employing that power, one could anticipate use of the 3Ds (Defence, Diplomacy, Development), DIME (Defence, Interagency, Multinational, Economic), or, in British parlance, the “Comprehensive Approach.” Within Canada, such a multifaceted method is being increasingly referred to as a “Whole of Government (WoG) approach.”2

Currently, Canada finds itself engaged in a counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign in Afghanistan, having also recently filled a major leadership role while commanding the multinational maritime Combined Task Force 150 (CTF) in the Arabian Sea areas.3 At the operational level, EBO, with a tailored WoG approach, is being applied to each theatre, where there are plenty of ‘snakes’ to be dealt with. Assuming that these are the kinds of interventions in which the CF is likely to find itself engaged for the foreseeable future, what lessons might be learned from our contemporary military experiences to date that can be applied to the Canadian Way of War in future? The aim of this article is to attempt to answer this question.

The Operational Environment

Whether it be the Taliban and their associates in Afghanistan, pirates, human smugglers, and drug traffickers on the high seas, or threats that may act upon our ‘network-centric’ world, the ‘enemy’ we face today do not tend to wear a uniform, nor do they feel in any way obliged to observe the Laws of Armed Conflict. They also possess the ability to blend into the local population after committing an attack. Such are the snakes we increasingly find ourselves fighting today. The trick, then, is how does one become a better countering ‘mongoose’? And further, one must be a mongoose able to act in concert with other arms of government, as well as the full range of International and Non-Governmental Organizations (IOs and NGOs), such as the United Nations, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and so on.

From February to November 2006, I and many Canadian and international colleagues found ourselves in the midst of just such an aforementioned environment in Afghanistan. Early on, we determined that we needed to look at our surroundings in a new and different way. “We” were a Canadian-led formation known as Combined Task Force (CTF) Aegis, and we assumed control of Regional Command [RC] (South) from the US Army’s 173rd Airborne Brigade, also known as Task Force Bayonet. We were responsible for the conduct of operations in the provinces of Kandahar, Helmand, Zabol, and Uruzgan. While Nimroz and Day Kundi were also within the RC(S) Area of Operations (AO), no Coalition forces were permanently stationed in either of the latter two provinces. We reported to Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) 76, a command sub-set of Headquarters 10th US (Mountain) Division stationed at Bagram Air Base. It was only in August, with NATO expansion, that RC(S)/CTF Aegis would become part of the International Security Assistance Force ((ISAF). From our arrival in February, this became a major leadership role for Canadians, who would be leading a multinational formation in combat for the first time in decades.

Prior to deploying, we developed a Campaign Plan, which was designed to take us through our entire nine-month tour, including the transition of forces to NATO. To some extent mirroring the Afghan Compact developed in 2002, the plan had three Lines of Operation (LOOs):

  • Governance;
  • Development: under ISAF this LOO became known as Reconstruction and Development (R&D); and
  • Security.

Within each LOO, there were a series of subordinate effects that we wanted to achieve, as well as ‘metrics,’ that were used to determine the extent of progress along each LOO. This plan was endorsed by Headquarters CJTF-76 prior to deployment to theatre, and only required minimal amendment after deployment, including the transition to a NATO-led mission.

A visit to Headquarters 10th US (Mountain) Division during our pre-deployment phase revealed that we would have to devote more resources and time to campaigning and assessment than we had previously envisaged. Under the command of CJTF-76, we would have to be responsive to a cyclical, monthly assessment process upon which the Commander CJTF 76 would base his decision-making. Thus, it was determined that we would need an assessment capability within the Joint Fires and Effects Cell (JFEC). Luckily, we were able to enlist the services of a Canadian officer with experience in this new field, and, once in theatre, officers were reassigned to the Assessment Cell from other staff sections. This would not only enable us to ‘feed’ the higher assessment processes but would also keep our own commander informed as to the progress of his campaign plan.

CIMIC members hand out school bags to students

DND photo IS2006-1217a by Sergeant Roxanne Clowe

One implied task that emerged was a new approach to an ostensibly fundamental military activity, that of reporting. In order to ensure that we could track campaign plan progress along all the LOOs, we found that reporting mechanisms had to be redesigned to make them more all-encompassing – and not just inclusive of military activities – which constituted the nub of what we had all been trained to report upon previously. As CTF Aegis, we adopted the ‘PMESII’ model:

  • Political: competence and efficacy of the appointed leaders and shuras at provincial/district level. Efficacy of elected bodies and ministerial representatives.
  • Military: enemy organizations and sanctuary/operational areas. Active enemy leaders and combatant cells. Recent enemy action. Presence of enemy facilitators. Popular support for enemy organizations, as opposed to support for the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan [GIRA]. Coalition forces. Capability and readiness of Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). Manning, equipment, training, and operations of ANSF. Ability of ANSF to conduct activities and to influence local areas.
  • Economic: level of drug-related activity, including cultivation, transit, usage, and processing activities. Major drug-related personalities. Impact of drugs upon the social fabric, local government, and security sector reform activities. Activities of bazaars and local markets. Amount of inter-village trade.
  • Social: amount of tribal and factional conflict and disagreement, which degrades security and/or support for the government.
  • Infrastructure: objective infrastructure standards for a district: roads, water, education, medical treatment, agricultural facilities, bazaars, and markets. Number of IO/NGO operations that are present and their activities and economic outlook.
  • Information: by what methods and means are insurgent groups, tribal elders, religious leaders, and elected officials communicating their desires and goals to their constituents? How and how well do these leaders receive information from constituents?

This somewhat-objective information was also combined with a more subjective Commander’s Assessment to produce a comprehensive report. We held on a monthly basis at the regional level a Regional Assessment Board (RAB) to present key trends observed in the previous month. Chaired by the Regional Commander with subordinate Task Force Commanders present, the RAB took the form of an open discussion, which helped inform the regional commander’s decision-making process, and guide how we would prosecute the campaign in future. At both CJTF-76 and HQ ISAF levels, similar fora were also held.

We also used the PMESII model as the basis for reporting from
subordinate task forces. While this did not always enjoy total acceptance or understanding from all units, it did force them to approach the problem we faced in a different, yet common way, rather than reverting to solely reporting on the somewhat limiting Enemy and Friendly aspects of ‘traditional’ Situation Reports (SITREPs).

Chinook makes ammo drop at FOB Sperwan Ghar

DND photo AR2006-G068-0040 by Master Corporal Yves Gemus

Effects-Based Operations

Before deploying to Afghanistan in 2006 as Headquarters [HQ] RC(S), we decided to adopt an Effects-Based Approach to Operations (EBAO), leveraging the Decide, Detect, Deliver, Assess (D3A) methodology inherent in the targeting process, which was already part of our doctrine. Notwithstanding that the US is reviewing the applicability of EBAO,4 the approach we adopted in HQ RC(S) was highly worthwhile for several reasons:

First, we deployed to theatre in early 2006, soon after a Canadian federal election. Within a very short time, we were visited by the newly-elected Prime Minister [PM], whose first question to our commander was: “Are we making a difference?” This speaks directly to the ‘Assess’ aspect of EBAO referred to earlier. In the ‘old days,’ the Assess function was relatively straightforward, and success was easily measured: numbers of serials on the High Payoff Target List (HPTL) destroyed, and, with respect to some missions, (such as in the UN mission in Cyprus), success often meant merely sustaining the status quo. As far as answering the PM’s specific query, while it might have been too early in our deployment to provide a conclusive answer, he was left in little doubt that the CF had embarked upon an endeavour totally different from those previously undertaken,  an endeavour that required a very different approach.

These days, determining success or measuring progress is much more challenging. Indeed, determining exactly what to measure, and then reaching agreement upon this determination within a multinational WoG context, in support of a host-nation (HN) government, is even more challenging. Nevertheless, in order to inform our own public, the local population, IOs/NGOs, and the decision makers in our government, we must be able to articulate our progress. Therefore, with respect to the Afghan theatre, the Government of Canada has established a series of benchmarks covering all aspects of the mission, and which all implicated Government departments, not only DND, must report against regularly.5

Second, the traditional view of targeting was enemy-focused. We soon realized that within RC(S) there was an entire spectrum of stakeholders and powerbrokers we wished to influence, and, therefore, we had to adopt a wider view of those ‘targets’ we wished to engage, particularly those engaged by non-kinetic means. Our numerous high-level visitors provided such opportunities. It was not uncommon for us to receive several general officer level visits in one week. For example, near the end of our tour, in late October 2006, in a single week period, we hosted the following visitors:

  • One  partner nation defence minister and chief of the defence staff (four- star);
  • Two  partner nation ambassadors;
  • D/SACEUR (four-star);
  • One  three-star general;
  • One two-star general; and
  • One one-star general

At that time in the mission, several issues were receiving significant international media and political attention, including national caveats and troop level contributions. By applying the D3A methodology to the aforementioned visitations, we were able to provide the RC(S) perspective on these issues, in the hope of getting them eventually resolved. All this is to say, our traditional view of high-level visits, and how best to ensure that they helped progress our campaign, needed to be reviewed.

Finally, unlike kinetic activities, the results of non-kinetic actions would often take much longer in producing desired outcomes or effects. While having completed the construction of a school is a great thing, its completion, in most cases, is not the desired effect. It is but a result. Until this empty building is staffed by teachers armed with a curriculum, populated by students, and sustained over time, we have not really achieved any effect at all. Therefore, before we start to claim so-called ‘Information Operations victories’ through the erection of bricks and mortar, we must always remember that this is but one part of a longer-term outcome that we are trying to achieve. The concept of a reserve to enable the commander to reinforce a main effort, or to respond to an unexpected event, has particular application in these types of environments. Therefore, the concept of a ‘non-kinetic reserve’ was developed. This consisted, in part, of material that could be distributed to the local population after an event, such as a quantity of radios to enable the GIRA to get their message out.

A final word on EBAO. As mentioned earlier, the future of this concept is being strongly debated within US military circles, and, no doubt, this will have an impact upon our own force development activities. Therefore, while EBAO in no way represents a panacea for all our ills, we should not get too wrapped up in minutiae when victory or success is so much harder to define. That said, Operational Research (OR) staffs can be invaluable in helping us at least depict the degree of progress being made. The CF has deployed OR staff in support of the recent Canadian naval contribution to, and command of,Coalition Task Force 150 (CTF 150), and such staff are also deployed in Afghanistan. In sum, we must be able to explain to a wide range of audiences what it is we are trying to achieve, be able to demonstrate whether we are making progress, and then amend our plans accordingly. If we cannot communicate visible, meaningful, and measurable progress, this will have adverse impacts upon the perceptions of the local population in a deployed area, our own population, and our soldiers, who may return for multiple tours only to find, to use a gunner’s phrase, that they are deploying back into the same ‘spade holes.’

Medical assistant performs first aid on an Afghan soldier

DND photo AR2006-G071-0064 by Master Corporal Yves Gemus

Corporal Killeen, a medical assistant, performs first aid on an Afghan soldier near FOB Sperwan Gar, 13 December 2006.

Information Operations

Being able to communicate objectives and progress as outlined above is at the heart of Information Operations (Info Ops). Three aspects on Info Ops merit some further consideration:

Currently, Info Ops does not have its own Military Operational Specialty (MOS), or, to use army parlance, its own ‘cap badge.’ Therefore, how should this capability be owned, managed, or championed within the CF? Similar to Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC), an element of Info Ops, Psychological Operations (PSYOPs) resides largely within the Army Reserve community. In headquarters staffs, Info Ops tends to be its own element within either the J3 (Operations) or J5 (Plans) Branches. Therefore, in addition to the plethora of other advisors with whom a commander has to interact (the development advisor, political/policy advisor, and so on), we now also have the ‘Info Ops Guy.’ Is this how we should approach things, or should Info Ops merely become a more regimented, formalized part of doing business? At the very least, as current operations have demonstrated, we cannot afford to let it reside within a single environment, since it has definite tri-service, generic applications.

We must also determine what role, if any, Public Affairs (PA) plays in the Info Ops domain. Traditionally, the PA community has seen its role as that of informing with the truth, while Info Ops is often viewed in terms of how it may influence. However, if we accept that an effort to influence with the truth is within the boundaries of legitimate military activity, is it not time to reconsider how we can better leverage PA?

Finally, in the complex operational environments we now face, we must ensure we leverage Info Ops to tell the entire story of the campaign, and not just the military or security element. Our Other Government Department (OGD) and IO/NGO colleagues do not always have the resources to reach audiences as wide as we are able to do with CF assets. An example from a previous COIN campaign highlights the importance of getting the full story disseminated.

Television presented special problems. Even more than the telegraph during the Crimean War and the radio during the Second World War, television brought the war into the American home, but in the process television’s unique requirements contributed to a distorted view of the war. The news had to be compressed and visually dramatic. Thus the war that Americans saw was almost exclusively violent, miserable, or controversial: guns firing, men falling, helicopters crashing, buildings toppling, huts burning, refugees fleeing, women wailing. A shot of a single building in ruins could give an impression of an entire town destroyed. The propensity of cameramen at Khe Sahn to pose their commentators before a wrecked C-130 and deliver reports in a tone of voice suggesting doomsday was all too common. Only scant attention was paid to pacification, civic action, medical assistance, the way life went in a generally normal way for most people much of the time.6

One could argue that we face these same challenges 40 years later. We will in all likelihood continue to do so. As part of its national strategy for engagement in Afghanistan, Canada has decided upon three Signature Projects in the developmental realm: irrigation, school construction, and support to polio eradication, as well as a number of initiatives within the governance domain. On the security front, there are a number of benchmarks the CF has been assigned to attain. It is perhaps the last of these that the media will tend to focus upon. By their very nature, security issues tend to be more visually spectacular than stories related to governance and development. And yet, it is only by ensuring that the first two areas get a sufficient airing that we will be able to tell the full story of an overall mission, not only to our own citizens and government, but also to the very people these initiatives are meant to benefit – a local population.

Whole of Government Approach (WoG)

Canada has decided to adopt a WoG approach to the Afghanistan mission. Thus, our ambassador in Kabul is designated the Head of Mission (HoM), and working alongside the Commander of Joint Task Force Afghanistan in Kandahar is the civilian Representative of Canada in Kandahar (RoCK). This leadership cadre in Kandahar represents the tactical face of the WoG approach, and, as the civilian footprint grows, military and civilian staffs are becoming more integrated. With respect to the Canadian led-CTF 150, given the size and scope of the Task Force Commander’s responsibilities (an area several times larger than Afghanistan, and encompassing some of the most globally strategic waterways and littoral regions in the world), attempts were also made to adopt a WoG approach through the provision of a Political Advisor (POLAD) to the commander.

If this approach constitutes the Force Employment (FE) model in an operational theatre, then it makes sense for us to adopt a similar approach in Canada, particularly at the operational planning level. While the CF has Liaison Officers (LOs), and other staffs embedded within the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), this is not reciprocated back to the CF, and our armed forces are the poorer for it. It is only by working alongside our peers in other government departments (OGDs) that we will better understand each other and be able to contribute to mission success. Further, while the CF possesses mature programs for teaching people how to plan, this is not always the case with OGDs, and they may benefit from attendance on some of our courses, and we on theirs. Finally, providing a large footprint in an operational theatre, and coordinating all the force generation activities to get them there, is not something with which all OGDs have much experience.

Campaigning

Despite the proliferation of campaign plans in the CF at unit and higher levels, (largely related to Transformation), this is a relatively new area for the CF in terms of its application to operations.7 In CTF Aegis, we had a campaign plan, which was endorsed by our higher headquarters. When our mission transferred to NATO, we had to ensure that our plan was still ‘nested’ within their own. We currently have a CEFCOM Campaign Plan for Afghanistan, developed with WoG input, and CTF 150’s operations were also conducted in support of a higher campaign plan.

Soldiers and Remote Weapon System (RWS) on the RG-31 Armoured Patrol Vehicle (APV)

DND photo IS2006-1197 by Sergeant Roxanne Clowe

Will this nesting always be easy to achieve? Of course not. Nations, by nature, have national interests, which may differ, however slightly, from coalition or alliance plans. Certainly, one must do all one can to ensure that national campaign plans exist within any higher intent (be that one’s own government, or coalition/alliance superiors). However, it must be realized that operational-level campaign plans are part of an enduing engagement over a protracted period, and, like any plan, they are subject to periodic review. Campaign plans must be able to survive the six-month rotations the CF has become accustomed to executing over time, while recognizing that each new in-theatre commander will bring a fresh perspective to a given issue.

This raises another point about campaigning. Campaign plans, once produced, must not merely become static documents residing in filing cabinets. Campaigns include several Lines of Operation (LOOs) and Decisive Points (DPs), along with decisions associated with those DPs. Over time, a Main Effort should be designated in order to demonstrate how military effort can be focused over time to meet objectives. These considerations are also underpinned by an assessment framework, which enables future operations to be planned, to progress, to be reported, and, finally, to generate decisions in their wake. Staffs must therefore be mindful of the fact that campaign plans are living, dynamic documents, and not something that will happen automatically by rote once produced. Campaigns need to be managed, assessed, reviewed, and adjusted over time.

Indigenous Capacity Building

A new role for the CF and for others in the WoG team has been that of building local capacity in operational theatres. In Afghanistan, the CF has played a major role in training and mentoring the Afghan National Army. CF expertise has been further extended to developing the necessary contract management skills within the local Afghan community by deploying requisite expertise in the Contract Management Organization (CMO). Indeed, other members of the WoG team are also linked with their Afghan counterparts in similar roles.

There is a ‘flip side’ to this, of course, and that is the role that the indigenous forces have in mentoring members of the CF.  We would likely reap great benefit from having Afghan input into the training of our Info Ops and PA personnel at home, as well as our efforts in Counter-Improvised Explosive Device (C-IED) capability. In short, we must do all we can to learn from each other while battling a common foe. While there are challenges to be overcome in doing so, the fact that we have now fought alongside our Afghan comrades for a considerable length of time should count for something. As an interim measure, better leveraging the Afghan diaspora in Canada may represent a start on what may be categorized as ‘reverse-capacity building.’

Old Wine in New Bottles?

As we analyze the contemporary operational environment, we must remain mindful of the lessons of the past, and the role of Canada’s military in the past. Lessons from the maritime domain are particularly applicable. Some 65 years ago, our forebears were engaged in combating what was arguably a form of high seas piracy, as the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) was given the “most thankless task”8 of providing escort against a formidable German U-Boat fleet to merchant shipping convoys in the North Atlantic during the Second World War. Indeed, by the end of the war, the RCN, by then the world’s third-largest navy, had carved out for itself a major role in this regard.

Today, we face a similar threat – one which has gained recent attention off Somalia where modern-day pirates recently pulled off one of the most spectacular acts of piracy in history, namely, the hijacking a Saudi tanker with $100 million worth of crude oil on board.9 Piracy in the region has also resulted in Canada diverting HMCS Ville de Québec from other duties in order to escort vessels loaded with food and humanitarian relief for the UN World Food Program.

Perhaps a return to a signature role that Canada has accomplished in the past – that of convoy escort – warrants exploration. Amidst a time of so-called global economic uncertainty, and in areas of the world so closely associated with energy reserves, the water of the region currently threatened by pirates may represent, for some, an area of greater national interest than other parts of the world wherein the CF is currently engaged. Indeed, as one writer to a major national newspaper has commented:

What happened to the concept of convoys? They worked in the Second World War as protection against far more dangerous predators. Wouldn’t this be more effective than trying to patrol vast areas of ocean? Obviously, convoys would be costly and very inconvenient for individual ships. But so is losing a tanker worth $100 million. Maybe insurers could help by reducing rates for ships that traveled in escorted convoys.10

Should the CF ever be further involved in such a role, it may be useful to apply a tenet of EBO to the problem. During the Second World War, the measure of success for “the most thankless task” was safe and timely arrival of a given convoy. Sunken U-Boats alone would not sustain the springboard to victory that was Britain. Of course, one must also be able to address the root causes of such threats, and, while efforts are applied on other fronts, focused application of certain covert CF capabilities may be able to make a significant contribution to combating piracy.

The Royal 22e Regiment (R 22e R) provide security overwatch in their LAV III

DND photo AR2006-S002-0043 by Captain Edward Stewart

Conclusion

If one accepts that future conflicts will be along the lines of the overseas operations we are currently conducting, the implications for the CF are substantial. The good news is that we are well on the way to becoming proficient ‘mongooses’: our units at the tactical level have established a reputation for operational excellence that is second-to-none, and we are acknowledged as such by our Allies. Staffs are working in areas heretofore somewhat unfamiliar to the CF, such as Campaign Assessment and the mentoring/training of indigenous forces. Senior commanders are gaining experience at the higher tactical/lower operational levels in a multinational COIN environment. Still, in order to be able to take on the Black Mambas, Kraits and Taipans of the world, there are further improvements that should be considered. To that end, it is recommended that:

  • the CF engage our OGD partners with a view to having them embed Liaison Officers in our operational-level headquarters in order to better facilitate WoG planning and the conduct of operations and campaigns;
  • OGDs be engaged to send personnel on appropriate CF training courses, with a view to building capacity for future operations, and developing a more expeditionary mindset;
  • our staff training courses teach officers the process of campaign management, and not merely campaign plan production;
  • the CF make efforts to incorporate Afghan capacity into our force generation and force development activities in Canada;
  • the CF explore institution of convoys, as well as the use of submarines and Special Operations Forces (SOF), in regions affected by piracy as part of the military effort in combating high seas crime;
  • our Info Ops/Public Affairs agencies, in consultation with our WoG partners, develop expertise to promote those activities in the governance and developmental realms, in order to ensure that the full story of WoG missions is told; and
  • capabilities such as Info Ops, Civil Military Cooperation, and so on, be generated from across the CF as recognition of their applicability to operations other than ‘land-centric’ operations.

CMJ Logo

Colonel P. J. Williams, an artillery officer, is currently Director Plans Western Hemisphere on the Strategic Joint Staff. From February to November 2006, he was the Chief, Joint Fires and Effects Cell in HQ Regional Command (South), Kandahar, Afghanistan, serving in Operation Enduring Freedom and with NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Brigadier-General D.A. Fraser, former Commander, Regional Command (South)/Coalition Task Force (CTF) Aegis in the preparation of this article.

Notes

  1. Recently, the US military has decided to review its approach to EBO.
  2. The author first became aware of this term, used widely within antipodean circles, while a student on the Australian Command and Staff Course in 2002.
  3. Canada’s lead of CTF 150 ran from late Spring until Autumn 2008
  4. In a Memorandum dated 14 August 2008, General J.N. Mattis, USMC, Commander US Joint Forces Command, notes: “EBO has been misapplied and overextended to the point where it actually hinders rather than helps joint operations.” He goes on to say that a return to time-honoured principles and terminology is required, while retaining those aspects of effects-based thinking that are useful.
  5. See www.afghanistan.gc.ca for details of benchmarks covering the Governance, Development, and Security Lines of Operation (LOOs).
  6. General (ret’d) William C. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1976), pp. 510-511.
  7. See “Tactics Without Strategy: Why the Canadian Forces Do Not Campaign,” by Colonel J.H. Vance, in The Operational Art-Canadian Perspectives. Context and Concepts, Allan English, Daniel Gosselin, Howard Coombs and Laurence M. Hickey (eds.), (Kingston, ON: The Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2005), pp. 271-292, for further discussion on this subject.
  8. W.A.B. Douglas and Jűrgen Rohwer, “The Most Thankless Task Revisited,” in RCN in Retrospect 1910-1968, by James A. Boutilier (ed), (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press), 1982), p. 187.
  9. See  http://www.cbc.ca/cp/world/081122/w112237A.html 
  10. Brain Henderson , “At Sea on Controlling Piracy,” in The Globe and Mail, Letters to the Editor, 22 November 2008, p. A-22

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