Leadership and Command

Modelling Command from a Balanced Perspective

by Gordon Bennett

Major Gordon Bennett is a Logistics Officer in the Canadian Army. He currently heads the Canadian Army Logistics Centre of Excellence in Borden, Ontario as the Senior Army Logistics Training Advisor. He comes from a business background and holds a Doctorate of Business Administration in Global Business and Leadership. He is also a recent graduate of the Joint Command and Staff Programme at the Canadian Forces College in Toronto, Ontario.

Introduction

Current models of command employed in the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) and taught at the Canadian Forces College form the basis of Canadian command doctrine. The first model taught is referred to as the Pigeau/McCann Model and was developed by renowned Canadian command and leadership researchers Ross PigeauRo and Carol McCann. These researchers focus upon competency, authority, responsibility, and intent. The second model used in the CAF was formulated by the David Alberts and Richard Hayes, who are researchers with significant involvement in the Command and Control Research Program in the US, as well as being known internationally for their work on command. Their model, the Alberts and Hayes Model, describes a Power to the Edge organization founded on agility, focus, and convergence. The third model used in Canadian command doctrine is the Cohen and Gooch Model developed by Eliot Cohen and John Gooch. Cohen is an internationally-esteemed professor and former Counselor of the US Department of State, while Gooch is an Emeritus Professor of History from the University of Leeds. These experts focus on failure to learn, anticipate, and adapt. Students who have been or are attending the Canadian Forces College, as well as academics involved in command research, should well recognize these models, as their principles permeate CAF doctrine. However, upon closer inspection of the models and their applications, there appear to be unanswered questions regarding the holistic nature of command.

Aim

The aim of this article is to provide a holistic command model that better encompasses the nature of command by building upon the existing models. This new model will be termed the ‘Balanced Command Model,’ as it balances four key successful areas of command. It will build upon the work of the existing models, but with three distinct differences. First, the Balanced Command Model will act as a guide for commanders to develop themselves and their subordinates as future commanders. Second, it will look at various factors that affect command, and how those components need to be balanced in order to achieve favorable command results that are neither substandard nor dangerous. Third, the Balanced Command Model will provide a holistic approach to command, rather than looking at a particular or specialized element of command in isolation. This discussion is not designed to detract from those models presently used, but rather, to provide a wider breadth of practical application for contemporary commanders.

Background

To determine how the Balanced Command Model fits into contemporary command theory, it is best to do a quick review of current Canadian command doctrine. The three models currently used in command theory provide an alternate point of view with respect to command for comparison and learning purposes. The intent of this quick review is to familiarize the reader with the basics of the models, and encourage further discussion and study by the reader, since all the models have merit.

The Pigeau McCann Model highlights three key aspects of command: Competency, Responsibility, and Authority, the CAR aspect of their model.¹ These elements are combined to create what these researchers refer to as a Balanced Command Envelope. If authority is high, responsibility is high and competency is high, Pigeau and McCann argue that command will be effective. A dangerous command situation or incompetent command situation develops when these three elements are not aligned.

Competency in this model includes: Physical, intellectual, emotional, and interpersonal components. Authority is both legal and personal and Responsibility includes extrinsic and intrinsic command abilities. The use of responsibility then enables varying levels of mission command and the application of intent without defining an optimal level of mission command.

The Alberts and Hayes Model looks at command as a series of systems.² These systems are comprised of agility, focus, and convergence. Agility in this case refers to flexibility across the spectrum of operations. Focus is the ability of a commander to see the bigger picture and to target efforts on an intended goal using mission command—a tie directly to the Canadian Army’s Advancing with Purpose Strategy.³ The convergence element defines outcomes as a situation develops. In this model, the ideal organization employs command with a high allocation of rights, broad dissemination of information, and unconstrained interaction. These elements are then moulded into a Power to the Edge organization, which seeks to employ decentralized command in order to provide a flexible response to a variety complex situations. This model places a heavy emphasis upon information and decentralized action.

The Cohen and Gooch Model looks at failures.⁴ These include a failure to learn, failure to anticipate, and failure to adapt. Command failures are then analyzed against these three traits from the strategic to the tactical level, to determine how command should have acted in a given situation.

Each of these command models bring unique perspectives with respect to command that can be useful in a variety of circumstances. However, there are still several research questions that these models do not answer. If these models were used exclusively as a doctrinal tool, the following questions would still remain:

What should the CAF be doing to develop future commanders?

Are all elements of command suitability captured in these models?

Is there a larger, more complex system that makes a commander a commander?

How should various command factors be balanced against each other at different command levels?

The Balanced Command Model shown herein answers these questions and highlights a more inclusive approach to command by building on the aforementioned models’ strengths. Using this model will help practitioners develop themselves and their subordinates to be able to command small tactical organizations and progress to commanding the institution.

The Balanced Command Model

The Balanced Command Model determines the elements that create and sustain commanders, and it looks at how those factors grow as commanders progress from low level command billets to commanding the institution.

There are four components to this model. The first is the internally controlled elements noted by the diamonds. The second are the four black arrows illustrating the outward focus of the commander on external stakeholders. The third element is the communication flow and response, which is an internal and external flow coupled with information synthesis and learning. Finally, command is not complete without the fourth element of responsibility. The colored rings move from low-level tactical command to ultimately institutional command at the outside as the commander’s abilities widen over time with training and experience, balanced with the other factors.

The Balanced Command Model is designed to integrate the essential characteristics of effective commanders. As noted by Alberts and Hayes, simplicity in conceptual modelling is important if the model is to be effectively applied.⁵ The Balanced Command Model fulfils this requirement.

The Importance of Balance

The importance of balance in command cannot be overstated, and it is a concept yet to be captured by contemporary command theories. Commanders that exhibit strong traits on one area may not be suitable for command at higher levels due to a lack of balance. An expert tactical commander that lacks personal attributes or the ability to synthesize information in increasingly complex environments will not be a suitable commander.

Asian, particularly Confucian thought with respect to balance has an effect upon the development of this model.⁶ Practitioners who have even a limited background in Asian thought on harmony and balance will find similar themes with this model. Additional reading on Asian leadership using balance is encouraged in order to provide a wider perspective on command balance.

The current methods of selecting commanders through succession planning boards generally imply that balance is sought, and yet, the succession planning methodology arguably does not often formalize, perennially fix, or create in-depth doctrine regarding what characteristics are needed, yet alone against what they should be balanced. Current selection methodologies and criteria can vary from year-to- year, vary between elements, or differ between trades.

In Canada, the PER system looks at some of the personal factors for promotion. The Balanced Command Model can better formalize what elements should be sought for in command positions, which may well differ from those used for promotion. This model can serve as a basis for succession planning when senior staff are selecting commanders, since it formalizes and standardizes what factors create commanders, rather than necessitating annual changing criteria. Creating a balance between the four parts of this model can help better select future commanders.

Alberts and Hayes, in their modelling of command and control, highlight the quality elements of command.⁷ The Balanced Command Model assumes that quality is sought in all aspects of command, whether those are self-directed or externally projected. Quality in the Balanced Command Model is generated by focus upon the commander’s personal abilities and the institution’s inputs, which are designed to develop and refine the commander. The commander’s development and abilities are driven by the individual, but enabled by the institution through orientating potential commanders to what is expected in command, and by providing training and opportunities for commanders and potential commanders to practice. Opportunity creates practical experience. This is seen in the accompanying figure.

Internal Factors

The internal factors form the heart of the model and upon which the other elements must rest. These factors are based upon the internal looking qualities of the individual. Without a strong personal basis, command would simply crumble. Internal characteristics are under the direct influence of the commander and controlled by him or her, but enabled by the institution, which helps mould and develop them. These personal factors include: Ethics and Values, Competence, Personal Attributes, and Direction and Intent.

Ethics and values are influenced by society, culture, the rule of law, and institutional norms but are internally controlled by the commander. A commander may choose to hold ethics and values at, above, or below the expected norms. Holding ethics below the expected norms will result in a dangerous command situation, even if all other elements in the model are superior. Balance is therefore required. Without a foundation of ethics and values, responsibility cannot be issued from a higher commander without potentially having negative consequences and dangerous command decisions. General Giáp of Vietnam held a significant level of Communist values and enforced those values on others. While the West may not agree with his values and the existing organizational norms, his superiors did so, resulting in them giving Giáp significant responsibility and authority.

Competence derives from training, experience, and innate skill. These elements balance with the personal attributes of an ability to learn, and help form a response to information flows, which will be discussed later. Without competence, the outward reaching elements of leadership, authority, delegation, and use of specialists with responsibility cannot function. As with the other core factors, competence limits the level of command a commander can exercise effectively.

Personal attributes include: Emotional intelligence, self-mastery, foresight, humility in command, fairness, empathy, social intelligence, learning habits, intelligence, and looking the part that is expected of him/her by the home culture and organization. A complete discussion of these elements can be found in other literature and it is too extensive for this article. Therefore, this list will only be briefly mentioned herein.

Direction and intent are noted in the model as being key elements to the personal nature of the commander. The level of intent communicated by the commander may vary from commander to commander. Intent includes how much implicit intent the commander expects to be understood, and how much explicit intent is required, and the balancing act between the two. Mission command will be based upon how the implicit and explicit intents are given and received, hence the direction component.⁸ Commanders that leverage personal factors in communicating intent, forming a culture of shared understanding, will have an easier time implementing mission command. US Army doctrine on intent and direction states, “…it is the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of Unified Land Operations.”⁹ Direction is required for delegation, leadership, and the use of specialists, and it is predicated upon the ability to collect and respond to information using the other personal factors to filter and react to the changing nature of a given situation.

The internal factors need to be balanced in order to create an effective command situation. If a commander has high competence but low ethics, for example, that commander could create a dangerous command situation in that actions taken by that commander are not aligned with societal or institutional culture, resulting in disrepute for the organization and possible operational level failure even if there are tactical wins. Commanders that employed torture in the Battle of Algiers fell into this category. Rommel’s actions in North Africa were initially successful due to tactical competence in the short term. He was heralded by Hitler due to his personal attributes and former successes using tactical competence. However, his ‘rock star’ image was not balanced with the use of specialists, and his misuse of authority to pursue the Allies against direction and advice from higher authority ensued. The unbalance between personal attributes internal to Rommel, championed by Hitler himself, and external elements with respect to the use of specialists and authority led to a command failure.¹⁰

Likewise, if a commander cannot express clear direction or intent, his/her subordinates will be paralyzed to act unless under their own auspices, in spite of having a technically- competent commander with strong personal attributes. A failure to provide a clear intent will result in subordinates either taking action into their own hands at the risk of not understanding the higher-level situation, or a paralysation of the organization.

A balance within the personal attributes category is needed to avoid internal conflict with subordinates. Arrogance in command, or an inability to employ emotional intelligence or interpersonal skills will create unnecessary friction, a lack of trust between commanders and subordinates, a distain and subsequent lack of support for the commander, or through following the commander’s direction to the ‘letter of the law,’ but no further.

This balance between the four internal personal factors is essential for command success. Failing to recognize a balanced approach with internal factors will result in one of several potential problems, including: A dangerous command situation, inaction when action is needed, action by subordinates without benefit of a ‘big picture view,’ disregard for orders, or even mutiny.

Additionally, the internal factors need to be balanced against the other three elements of the model. For example, the ‘rock star’ status of a commander can be a benefit for propaganda or messaging purposes if balanced with the other three elements of the model. If it is not balanced, the commander and chain of command may face significant problems in the future with errors in judgement at the operational level or a situation that creates a rogue or dangerous command situation, somewhat represented by the Rommel example.

Learning and Adaptation and the Role of Information

Learning and adaptation is the bridge between the information, communication, and the personal factors of the commander. Information flows are a two-way street, with the commander emitting information and information being collected from external and internal sources. As new information is collected, the commander must assimilate that information by either decoding or acting upon it, or by discarding it. To either decode the meaning of the information or reject it requires personal factors, such as competence, which can be amplified through experience. Once decoded, the commander must learn the significance of that information, adapt his/her actions accordingly, and then communicate a response through direction and intent.

The process of collecting information, learning and adapting, and responding bares a semblance to the US Observation, Orientation, Decision, and Action (OODA) Loop decision making methodology when looking at tactical level situations. However, at the strategic level, or when looking at procurement or long-term planning, speed in decision making is not paramount as much as is making sense of information and learning for long-term adaptation. The requirement for speed at a particular level differs from the OODA loop system, but a practitioner can easily nestle the OODA loop system within the model as it pertains to command. Further validation between the model’s components and the OODA loop system is an area for further investigation, but it is beyond the scope of this article. General Giáp, it could be argued, used both a short-term decision making cycle similar to the OODA Loop cycle, while at the same time using a longer decision-making cycle as he built his forces. He learned how the Japanese and French were operating and responded quickly, using OODA Loop methodologies. However, he concurrently sought to forge legitimacy in conjunction with Ho Chi Minh over the long term, initially with the OSS and the Chinese. His tactical actions against the Japanese and French were similar to following an OODA Loop cycle while his long-term planning as a commander at the operational and strategic levels bears a greater semblance to the long-term view in this model, in that force build up and strategic wins took much longer than tactical actions, and they required greater patience and persistence. This example serves as an excellent case of learning and adaptation with direction and intent balanced with personal attributes.

Learning is fed by information and communication, with behavior being adapted accordingly. Professional development and training are designed to improve personal factors, including competence, ethics, communication, and personal attributes.

Learning and adaptation to the information available is critical. An unbalanced commander fails to be able to collect, synthesize, and adapt to a given situation, based upon the information available. Even if the commander exhibits internal factors in a balanced fashion, a lack of ability to filter and respond to information and its flows internally and externally and balancing what is vital, key, and unimportant results again in several problematic outcomes. The first outcome is a dangerous command situation as the commander is unable or unwilling to accept and analyze internal or external information. A dangerous command situation also ensues if the commander refuses to learn and adapt.¹¹ Adaptation runs counter to the ‘same as last year’ mentality. Adaptation in this case is similar to the Cohen and Gooch model.

The second outcome sees the commander becoming overloaded with information, and being unable to filter and synthesize it, he/she moves into a paralytic decision state or formulates decisions based upon only one manageable piece of data. Information overload could also cause panic in an inexperienced commander which could be leveraged by the opposing force.¹² Decision paralysis or requesting continual clarification from a higher headquarters to ‘RFI or assume away’ the problem can also arise. Information overload is now becoming a significant issue with improvements in technology resulting in information filtering problems or delays waiting for better information.¹³ The commander’s ability to manage information flows and synthesize it is becoming increasingly difficult, but it is necessary. This problem is being researched by other writers, and therefore, it will not be discussed in detail here.

The third risk with information is that of overcomplicating the situation. The ability to look at a complex situation, break it down into component parts, attack each part, and reassemble the situation with an adapted overarching response, and then to communicate that response is challenging, and it runs on the opposite end of the spectrum of analytical paralysis or filtering issues. The interaction between the commander’s ability to collect and process information and to provide an educated and adapted response is the subject of a research paper in itself, as there are a plethora of means to do this, coupled with insufficient space herein to provide specifics on the ‘how’ and accompanying caveats.¹⁴

Examples of commanders successfully balancing information with learning and adaptation include successful insurgent commanders such as General Giáp, the British in Malaya in the 1950s, the intelligence misinformation campaign against the Germans in preparation for D-Day, and General Schwarzkopf during Operation Desert Storm.

Responsibility and Levels of Command

Responsibility in a command situation is required. Without responsibility within the bounds established at a particular level of command, the commander could become a dangerous commander. A lack of responsibility is essentially a ‘blank cheque’ written by a state. Responsibility increases over time as the commander, from a junior level, demonstrates the personal factors necessary to progress and the ability to synthesize externally oriented factors and outward influences.

Command development begins at a low level, a platoon or equivalent unit for officers. As that commander’s experiences and training develop, he/she is granted increasingly-higher levels of responsibility exemplified by the Pentagon to use an American analogy, pushing on the concentric circles of command levels. The core personal factors grow as well but are still founded in the individual. As the commander grows in level of command so does his/her level of responsibility. However, in order to train new commanders, levels of responsibility must occasionally reach into the next level of command. There are two reasons for this. First, as commanders are replaced in the battlespace for a variety of reasons, the next level commander down must be ready to assume those responsibilities. Examples in garrison include the Executive Officer replacing the Commanding Officer during periods of absence, or officers being given responsibility over unique projects that push their limits. In the battlefield, it could mean replacement due to casualties in the chain of command. Informally, commander development occurs in Western militaries when acting commanders are assigned a temporary post or lead special projects.

In order for commanders to prepare future commanders, junior commanders are required to step up into the next level of command and demonstrate competencies of a higher-level commander. Future commander development comes with responsibilities that exceed the current level of command. Therefore, responsibility does not align directly with a level of command, but it stretches outward past current responsibilities. This stretching of responsibilities is a formative opportunity for a junior commander, and an evaluation opportunity for the current commander of a subordinate.

While history teaches of a few noteworthy junior commanders being highly successful, this is arguably not the norm. Giving too much responsibility to a commander without a balanced ability to employ outward elements, synthesize information flows, or demonstrate a balanced level of internal factors suitable to the level of command will result in a dangerous or incompetent commander. Will a commander that is too junior learn? Probably, and likely quickly, but this shortcut risks coming at a great cost in blood and treasure when balance is not both initially present and suitable for the level of command.

Outward Elements of Command Success

The four influences of Authority, Delegation, Leadership, and Power, and the Use of Specialists are categorized as outward influences, due to their nature in affecting external entities. The effects and use of these elements widen as the commander is promoted into higher roles of responsibility. A Chief of the Defence Staff or elemental commander will have a wider breadth of functions to draw upon than a tactical level platoon commander. Junior commanders are granted little authority to act since they are still in development and have a narrow tactical scope to their employment. Commanders at the elemental level have significantly more authority to act. Therefore, it is reasonable to illustrate the widening of authority as levels of command increase.

Leadership and power is required by a commander. Ideally, transformational leadership is employed.¹⁵ Leading starts with leading people and progresses to leading the institution. Power can be both informal and formal.¹⁶ Positional power of a commander is also necessary. Positional power is one reason why militaries have change of command parades—to demonstrate tangibly who is in the command position. However, the ability of a commander to use other forms of power creates a more balanced commander in that he/she is able to adapt to the power situation using leadership and power methods—again an emphasis upon balance.

As commanders progress to increased responsibility, they are required to increase their use of specialists. The commander of a joint command will rely significantly more upon legal advice, policy advice, assistance from other government departments, contractors, and others than will a company commander. Rommel failed logistically in North Africa. Part of his failure was the result of ignoring logistics advice from higher authorities against stretching the lines of communication.

In similar form to relying upon specialists, the use of delegation by commanders is required. A commander cannot command without subordinates and higher numbers of subordinates requires the use of delegation through the personal factor of direction and intent, resulting in mission command. A commander that is unable to delegate will burnout or be ineffective. Delegation requires follow-up, and this comes with delegated authority and responsibility.¹⁷

Finally, authority needs to be balanced with the use of delegation, power, and specialists. Without authority, specialists will be reluctant to act. Without authority, the commander cannot effectively order subordinates or delegate tasks, as there is no mechanism other than personal power to follow-up with tasks given or to ensure maintenance of discipline and task completion. Formal authority delegated from higher is the legal means to execute command.

Personal authority in this model is not applied here, as it is implied by competence and personal attributes, and is not the sole purview of a commander, but can be attributed to anyone in the organization. A Private that is highly competent in his/her trade and possesses high personal attributes can have personal authority as an expert in a particular field, but that does not make that member a commander. Personal authority in a similar fashion to the Private will enhance the commander’s formal authority, but personal authority is not exclusive to the commander, as is formal legal authority.

Caveats

This model comes with several caveats. First, there is the influence of national and military cultures. Some cultures do not delegate as much as Western mission command-oriented militaries. These cultures will see narrower levels of authority and responsibility in decision making. Additionally, leadership and power taught in some nations will not be transformational- based leadership. The debate over which style of leadership fits which cultural context is outside the scope of this article, but should be considered before applying this model across all nations and cultures.

The size of some militaries and their national roles may see less reliance upon the use of specialists, as some specialist functions seen in Canada and the United States may be performed by other government departments or simply may not exist in other nations (i.e., Psychological operations, civilian military co-operation, and so on).

Ethics in this model is not debated as to what is ethical and what is not. Ethical norms will vary from nation to nation, and in some nations, they may be discounted significantly. However, it could be argued that every nation and military has a set of values. Communist nations have significantly different values than the West, which has significantly different values from some African countries or Asian cultural norms. However, military leaders in all of these situations are expected to follow or exceed their organizational values. Will one set of values win out over another, creating a stronger force when contact is made between two groups of opposing values? Perhaps, but that is not needed for the model, and it is a topic for further exploration. As for Western militaries, the current ethics taught will satisfy this factor. For all militaries, humane treatment of others should form at least a foundational base for command.

Pigeau and McCann highlight physical competency as part of their CAR model. This has been discounted with the Balanced Command Model as physical ability is expected by all soldiers and is not exclusive to commanders. Additionally, physical aspects in appearance are also limited since cultural physical norms differ between nations and cultures. A tall, ‘washboard-warrior’ image may be well accepted in some cultures whereas a ‘well fed’ commander may be seen as materially successful in another culture. Fitting the expected norm is part of the model, as it contributes to personal credibility, but there is no one physical appearance that covers all situations and cultures.

The Balanced Command Model should not be considered a holistic method to determine who future commanders will be. It should form the basis for the criteria against which to judge potential commanders, but it should also encompass information collection systems, such as 360 degree feedback.

Language profile is intentionally omitted from the model. The reason for this is that language skills are job, not command, specific. Additionally, many nations, including Canada’s allies, have commanders that speak only one language and still possess excellent commanders. Some allied commanders speak three-or-more languages and are excellent commanders. Language profile does not a commander make. Multilingual skills will add to job and situation specific skills. Using a second language profile as a command pre-requisite would assume that allied commanders that are unilingual are somehow inferior to Canadian commanders in a Western context. This is simply not the case. Multilinguistic ability is a tool for a position, not a command forming criteria.

Some commanders will learn and grow faster than others, thus age should not be a factor in commander selection. Commanders can come with experience from outside their trade, outside their element, and potentially, even from outside the military.¹⁸ Experience outside the norms of succession planning can bring diversity to an organization and result in organizational success. Selection should be based upon the ability of the commander to have mastered balance between and within the four elements of the Balanced Command Model rather than exclusively assessing abilities based upon time in rank, or experience in one elemental stream or trade.

Command Development

The Balanced Command Model serves as a command development tool for practitioners. By breaking down the components of successful command into component parts, commanders can more easily visualize what elements need development in their subordinates and themselves in preparation for future positions. Although the model does not provide a step-by-step means to detail how to develop subordinates into future commanders, it provides the appropriate categories for development. A step-by-step outline is simply too exhaustive for this study, but could assist future research in a more profound setting.

Conclusion

The Balanced Command Model overcomes existing problems with contemporary command models, and it clarifies understanding of command skills. It creates a foundation that can form doctrine, be used for succession planning, demonstrate developmental areas, and aid in mentoring future commanders.

This article has put forward four key areas that merge to form the model. These components centered are around four personal factors developed within the scope of responsibility of the member. The outward-looking elements of specialists, leadership and power, authority, and delegation project outward from this base. Contributing to this are commanders who capitalize upon information and communication flows, synthesize this information, and form an adapted response.

Adoption of the Balanced Command Model will aid existing leaders to mentor and evaluate potential commanders, while helping future commanders prosecute self-development. The need for balance in command will help prevent poor commanders from taking command, based upon expertise in select areas at the exclusion of other factors. Using the Balanced Command Model as a tool for succession planning and command appointments will help standardize the process for command selection taking out the guess work or potential biases that could exist from year-to-year between individuals and between trades. Standardization of command selection is provided by this model.

This article has sought to fill the voids left by current doctrinal command models by providing a command methodology that is balanced, and one which can be immediately applied to command development. While there exists more work to be done in generating specifics in the model, this writer believes the discussion has contributed to the body of command knowledge with an aim to being relevant and practical.

Notes

1. Ross Pigeau and Carol McCann. “Re-conceptualizing Command and Control,” in Canadian Military Journal, Vol. 3, No. 1, 2002, pp. 53-63.
2. David S. Alberts and Richard E. Hayes. “Power to the Edge: Command and Control in the Information Age,” in Information Age Transformation Series, Chapter 8 – Agility (pp. 123-159), Chapter 9 – Power and the Edge (pp. 165-177), and Chapter 12 – The Power of “Power to the Edge” Organizations (pp. 213-221).
3. Advancing with Purpose: The Canadian Army Strategy, 3^rd Edition, p. 9.
4. Eliot A. Cohen and John Gooch. Military Misfortunes: the Anatomy of Failure in War. (New York: Free Press, 1990.)
5. David S. Alberts and Richard E. Hayes, Understanding Command and Control. Command and Control Research Program, at: http://www.dodccrp.org/files/Alberts_UC2.pdf.
6. Chris Rowley and David O. Ulrich (Eds.) in their book, Leadership in the Asia Pacific: A Global Research Perspective (London: Routledge, 2014), describe Asian command and the role of balance.
7. Alberts and Hayes.
8. Designing Canada’s Army of Tomorrow, p. 48.
9. US Army ADP 6.0., at: http://usacac.army.mil/sites/default/files/misc/doctrine/CDG/adp6_0.html.
10. Specialists in this case would include logistics commanders at a bare minimum. Rommel’s failure to use and understand logistics operations was a great contributing factor to his failure in theatre.
11. Many command situations during the First World War could be attributed to this problem. The result was massive, unnecessary casualties.
12. Looking at panic and experience in this perspective could aid in attacking less formalized and experienced commanders and soldiers including in insurgent type settings. Intentional information overload, or the perspective of an overwhelming force, as viewed during Operation Desert Storm arguably helped the allied forces quickly displace Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Many historical battles talk about being routed by overwhelming force, the sight of opposing forces, or information. The principle is the same whether it is sight or information, and it lends itself well to information operations.
13. Thom Shanker and Matt Richtel. “In New Military, Data Overload Can Be Deadly,” in New York Times, at: http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/17/technology/17brain.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
14. An interesting read and effective way of looking at this is Livingood’s Inter-Agency paper entitled: Systems Theory and Military Leadership. (February 2014). No.12W, at: http://cdm16040.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/p16040coll1/id/55.
15. A-PA-005-000/AP-003 Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Doctrine.
16. For further information, Northhouse provides an excellent overview of power and leadership in his book: Leadership: Theory and Practice. 7^th Edition. ISBN: 978-1-4833-1753-3.
17. The term ‘authority’ is used here, as higher authority may not be a military commander. Civilian ‘commanders’ work in certain organizations, such as the UN and the MFO.
18. General Sir Arthur Currie serves as an example of an outstanding commander that came with militia and civilian experience, not full-time active duty experience.