Views and Opinions

Shared Responsibility: Civil-Military Relations in the Humanitarian Space

by Marissa Gibson

Introduction

Militaries are no strangers to providing aid and assistance in conflicts and natural disasters. Equipped with immense logistical capabilities, highly trained staff, government backing and funding, and the ability to operate in insecure environments, they are a logical choice when it comes to assisting a vulnerable population. They are not the only actors in these insecure environments however, and often share the space with a multitude of other actors, including international and local non-government organizations (NGOs), each with their own projects and goals to implement. These actors operate within the ‘humanitarian space,’ a term first coined by former president Rony Brauman of Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF). Brauman spoke of an ‘espace humanitaire’ in which humanitarians should be “…free to evaluate needs, free to monitor the delivery and use of assistance, free to have dialogue with the people.”¹ Despite being coined by one of the most influential NGOs in the world, the humanitarian space is not an exclusive space for humanitarians,’ but is usually occupied by a variety of institutions and actors, such as the military, human rights organizations, development specialists, national governments, and various other organizations.

The increase in military counter-insurgency operations has led to the development of winning the hearts and minds of local population by integrating humanitarian and aid projects into overall strategy in an effort to win over civilians and weaken support for insurgent groups. Military development projects often coincide or clash with the projects of NGOs that have been in the region prior to military intervention, and will likely remain long after troops have been withdrawn.² Aid agencies also attribute military presence as a threat to their security and neutrality. The purpose of this brief policy article is to address the lack cooperation and coordination among military and NGO actors within the humanitarian space – specifically in conflict zones, and to propose a potential policy for the Canadian government that can assist in improving inter-organizational relations with local and international NGOs in conflict zones. A review of the literature has revealed a lack of a new Canadian policy on civil-military relations in the field. Using Queen’s University Professor and Chair of Defence Management Studies Dr. Douglas Bland’s theory of shared responsibility, in conjunction with the distinguished American professor of anthropology Dr. Robert A. Rubinstein’s anthropological perspective, I will discuss its application to civil-military relations in the field and determine the effectiveness of the theory. Shared responsibility understands that both civil and military actors are necessary to create stronger government policies, and in conflict zones, both actors are crucial to building better humanitarian efforts. Lastly, the conclusion reveals that Canada should build upon its current Whole-of-Government approach to facilitate relations with international and local aid agencies that are already in the field.

Policy/Literature Review

Within Canadian policy, there is limited literature on how the military should interact with NGOs in the field, apart from the 2003 Guidelines on Humanitarian Action and Civil-Military Coordination. I have been unable to access these guidelines, but they are said to mirror two main UN guidelines:³ the Oslo Guidelines on The Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets In Disaster Relief (originally published in 1994) and, the Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies (originally published in 2003), better known as the MCDA Guidelines.⁴ As the Oslo Guidelines examines the use of civil and military assets in disaster relief, it is not pertinent to this policy brief. The MCDA Guidelines will be used as a frame of reference to the Canadian guidelines.

It should be noted that the 2003 Canadian guidelines were drafted just as Canada was beginning to engage in Afghanistan, and since then, a number of reports on lessons learned have emerged from the Canadian experience, which could be implemented within a new policy on civil-military interaction. Even the MCDA Guidelines faced their last revision a decade ago. The guidelines stress the importance of coordination between groups, and not cooperation, as cooperation is perceived as blurring the lines between military and civilian actors, thus damaging the impartiality and neutrality of humanitarian organizations. The hope for this policy is to create a framework that improves not only coordination, but also cooperation, as the guideline explains, “…when there is a common goal and agreed strategy, and all parties accept to work together, cooperation may become possible.”⁵

Current literature among the academic community has demonstrated a need for better coordination and cooperation amongst military and humanitarian action, but neither the Canadian military nor major aid organizations have pushed for a change in current practices. Academics agree on one key issue: that civilian agencies view militaries involved in combat, who are also conducting humanitarian operations at the same time, as a risk to both civilians caught in the conflict and the civilian agencies assisting them. The increasing militarization of aid is damaging to the humanitarian principles outlined in the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (UNOHCA) Glossary of Humanitarian Terms, which are composed of humanity, impartiality, and neutrality.⁶ Much of the literature concedes that better practices of communication are required between actors in order to facilitate cooperation, however it is Robert A. Rubinstein who brings the field of anthropology and sociology into the realm of war and security studies in order to examine the relationship, not only between belligerent groups, but also civilian and military organizations who interact together. Rubinstein examines the role of culture in organizations, and how it can create friction among military and civilian groups. His main argument is that by understanding cultural differences, groups can better work together. This unique perspective among the literature will provide the backbone of my policy proposal, in coordination with the theory of shared responsibility.

The theory of shared responsibility, proposed by Douglas L. Bland in 1999, relies upon the understanding that civilian leadership maintains civil control over some aspects of the military, while military leadership retains control over others. The theory rests upon two assumptions: first, that “civil control” infers sole responsibility and legitimacy of the military to civilians outside of the military/defence establishment; and second, civil control is a fluid process that reacts to changing ideas, values, circumstances, issues, and personalities, and to the stresses of war.⁷ Bland’s theory is meant to be applied at the national level between senior civilian officials and senior military officers. However, for the purposes of this brief, I will apply it at the local level between military and civilian agencies in conflict zones.

Analysis

Shared responsibility acknowledges that there are circumstances in which military input is required at the decision-making level, and vice-versa. At the local level of conflict this means that shared responsibility crosses organizational boundaries and that both the military and civilian agencies can benefit from input from one another. The understanding is that both actors play complementary roles when providing humanitarian assistance and development aid, and sharing responsibility ensures a higher chance of success in project implementation. The MCDA Guidelines acknowledge that a working relationship between militaries and civilian groups can be beneficial. Nonetheless, they concede that interaction between the two should remain absolutely minimal in order to enforce the image of NGO neutrality and impartiality. The maintenance of neutrality and impartiality are of significant importance to NGOs because they provide a means of security in order for agencies to operate in insecure environments – if they are lost, the NGO can become a target for belligerents.

The theory of shared responsibility challenges the notion of NGO impartiality and neutrality by creating a platform in which militaries and NGOs work side-by-side. Applying the theory of shared responsibility requires civilian and military groups to come together to discuss solutions to humanitarian problems. Bland states: “…civil authorities are responsible and accountable for some aspects of control and military leaders are responsible and accountable for others.”⁸ In the context of complex emergencies, the theory makes the assumption that there are aspects of humanitarian development in which civilian expertise outweighs the military, and others where military expertise outweighs civilian knowledge. To put it succinctly, there are times when one group should defer to the other in order to create the best chance of success for the implementation of humanitarian aid.

Despite the desire of NGOs to remain outside the sphere of political and military influence, humanitarian space is inherently influenced by politics and military action. Rather than being distinct from politics, humanitarian space is inherently political, as argued by Collinson:

Humanitarian space can be derived from a recognition that most of the important aspects of humanitarian space are determined by the interplay of interests among a variety of political, military, economic and other actors, organizations and institutions(including legal institutions), in addition to humanitarian agencies and affected population.⁹

Determining the nature of humanitarian space is only one of the challenges faced by humanitarian actors in their interaction with military agents. In applying the theory of shared responsibility to militaries and aid agencies in the field, a variety of difficulties are encountered. Militaries and NGOs may share overlapping goals, but each function independently of the other, with an overarching end goal that may not be applicable to both parties. Organizational and structural differences can also create friction. These challenges and others will be discussed further in the next section.

Discussion

In order to determine if Bland’s theory of shared responsibility is viable in the context of local coordination between military and humanitarian actors, it must be assessed against current challenges faced in the field. Bland’s theory “…provides an instrument for organizing and managing civil-military relations… in the context of their history, culture, and politics while allowing the harmonization of these arrangements with those in other like-minded states.”¹⁰ There are two key hurdles that cause problems between civilian and military actors in conflict areas. The first conflict between military and aid agencies in insecure environments is the belief that militaries threaten the neutrality and impartiality of civilian organizations and their employees. The second, and most problematic issue is the overlap, implementation, and purpose of military and humanitarian aid projects.

Militaries are unique in their ability to operate in dangerous regions, providing not only their own security but also assisting the population at the same time. The Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) in Afghanistan were able to function in areas of the country where tenuous security conditions made it nearly impossible for aid groups and other humanitarian organizations to establish a presence.¹¹ This ability has been criticized by the aid community of damaging their neutrality and impartiality in the conflict, and increasing the risk of being targeted by belligerents who now perceive them as working alongside military actors. This perception is understandable from the perspective of aid agencies, and is a hurdle that may be nearly impossible to resolve using the theory of shared responsibility. It would require a shift in opinion by the aid community that the humanitarian space is no longer neutral territory, but one that is shared by myriad actors. “The key challenge for humanitarian organisations is how to engage and influence all the key actors involved so as to promote a more humanised politics and more effective humanitarian action.”¹² Militaries will continue to provide assistance in conflict zones as a way to win the hearts-and-minds of the population, and it would be best for aid agencies to capitalize on the strengths provided by militaries in order to improve and increase the reach and impact of their aid. The reality however, is that a more robust means of protecting civilians while simultaneously establishing and enforcing humanitarian space is ideal, neither the capacity nor the will exists within the international community.¹³

In counter-insurgency operations, the development and implementation of aid projects by the military is seen as a crucial facet in the fight to win over local support and undermine the legitimacy of insurgent forces. Militaries in these situations are often considered to have a tendency to focus on short-term, non-participatory, and decisive action. According to Dr. Volker Franke of the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, “…the military typically favours conditions where it can go in, provide technical assistance or logistics support, and then get out quickly.”¹⁴ Military personnel also often lack the expertise and experience required to implement humanitarian projects, and favour projects that create rapid and tangible results that are neither sustainable nor supported by the population. NGOs, on the other hand, have usually been operating in the area long before military intervention, and have built networks among relevant local actors within the population. They are invested in long-term projects that are built in conjunction with the needs of the supported population, and will likely remain long after the military has departed the region. It is within this context that the theory of shared responsibility can provide a solution.

Civil and military actors have their own strengths and weaknesses, and when functioning in an integrated and cooperative relationship, they can build upon each other’s strength and minimize weaknesses. Militaries have immense logistical capabilities and the capacity to operate in insecure environments. NGOs tend to hold a deeper understanding of the needs of the population, and the expertise needed to implement effective and relevant projects that can be sustained by the population being supported. This is not to say that full integration is required on all joint projects, as it is understood that the military has its own strategic goals to accomplish (and aid projects are only a portion of the overall strategy), and NGOs are subject to the project demands of their donors, but rather that cooperation and coordination should be a priority where there is the potential to implement projects together.

Shared responsibility understands the different contexts of military and civilian history, culture and politics, and works to harmonize them. Its strength lies in creating a platform for shared understanding that can facilitate better relations between civil agencies and the military in order for them to work together. Militaries can provide protection and logistical support to aid agencies, whereas NGOs can provide ideas for more appropriate projects that will be sustainable, rather than short-term projects with minimal benefit to the population. In applying the theory to conflict level relationships, there is undoubtedly difficulty in bringing together separate entities with different mandates and objectives. In order to do so, the work of Robert A. Rubinstein should be considered.

Rubinstein is an anthropologist who applies his craft to conflict resolution, peacekeeping, and international security, and provides a unique perspective among the literature of civil-military relations. He states: “International security work is conducted by a community, the social and cultural dynamics of which affect the decisions taken by its members.”¹⁵ He elaborates further in a 2003 article, “Cross-Cultural Considerations in Complex Peace Operations,” in which he discusses the cultural differences between military and civilian actors. He presents culture as a model for understanding military and humanitarian participants in peace operations and suggestions to improve interaction amongst actors. Within the framework of shared responsibility, Rubinstein’s work provides a platform for improving understanding between actors. Using five common frameworks of cultural models, each with two opposing styles, the reader can clearly decipher which style military and humanitarian actors prefer, and how these styles impact their own decision making processes.

In order for the theory of shared responsibility to succeed in its application, the first hurdle of defining humanitarian space must be addressed. Unless aid agencies are willing to accept that humanitarian space is no longer a neutral and independent sphere, but rather, an entity that is influenced by the actors within and outside of it, including their political natures, it will be nearly impossible for fluid coordination and communication amongst militaries and NGOs. Despite this, shared responsibility can still improve current standards of civil-military cooperation by fostering greater understanding for the roles played by the military and humanitarian agencies, and the benefits that can be gained from a stronger working relationship.

Conclusion

The civil-military relationship in the field is already complex, and can be exacerbated by the conflict around it. Cooperation between civilian and military actors is made difficult by civilian perception that military involvement increases risk against agencies and their employees, and damages their protective image of neutrality and impartiality. Project implementation by militaries, while occasionally successful, is more often than not beset by failure due to the development of quick impact projects that look good for the media but have no use to the population meant to benefit from it. These issues are hampered by the unclear definition humanitarian space, which is no longer the sole territory of humanitarian actors, but is now host to militaries, local and international government agencies, non-government agencies and international bodies, such as the United Nations.

An ideal policy created by the Government of Canada would involve the amalgamation of the theory of shared responsibility into its discussion. The Whole-of-Government (WoG) approach currently embraced by Canada is certainly a start, but only pertains to inter-agency cooperation among the Department of National Defence, and the two former Departments, Canadian International Development Agency and the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, now rebranded together as Global Affairs Canada, as well as other key departments. A more embracing policy is necessary in order to facilitate better cooperation with non-government agencies – particularly those that have significant influence within the aid community, ICRC or MSF, for example. The remaining question is twofold: Is Canada willing to take the steps to open up improved dialogue within the aid community and to create a new policy, based upon the lessons learned from the civil-military experience in Afghanistan? And is the aid community willing to embrace the changing nature of humanitarian space? This second question can only be answered if the aid community (and their donors) find cooperation with the military to be in their best interests, and will benefit not only the organization, but also the population they are supporting.

Second Lieutenant Marissa Gibson is a reservist with the Princess of Wales’ Own Regiment in Kingston, Ontario. She has a Bachelor of Social Studies in Conflict Studies and Human Rights from the University of Ottawa, and a Master of Arts in War Studies from the Royal Military College of Canada.

Notes

1. Vicky Tennant, Bernie Doyle and Raouf Mazou, “Safeguarding Humanitarian Space: A Review of Key Challenges for UNHCR,” UNHCR Policy Development and Evaluation Service (2010), p. 3.
2. Myriame Bollen et al, “Are PRTs Supposed to Compete with Terrorists?”, in Small Wars and Insurgencies 17, no. 4 (2006), p. 444.
3. “Aid in the Crosshairs: Civil-Military Relations in Afghanistan,” in Canadian Council for International Co-Operation (2007), p. 7, at: http://archive.ccic.ca/_files/en/what_we_do/003_apwg_2009-04_brief_note_civil_military_afghanistan.pdf.
4. These guidelines have been revised since the original dates of publication. The Oslo Guidelines in 2007, and the MCDA Guidelines in 2006. I am unsure as to how they differ in comparison to Canada’s 2003 guidelines and will thus have to postulate on similarities.
5. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Civil-Military Guidelines and Reference for Complex Emergencies (New York: United Nations, 2008), p.12.
6. Rupen Das, “Humanitarian Space in Unconventional Warfare,” in Helping Hands and Loaded Arms: Navigating the Military and Humanitarian Space, Sarah Jane Meharg (ed.) (Cornwallis Park, NS: The Canadian Peacekeeping Press, 2007), p. 40.
7. Douglas L. Bland, “A Unified Theory of Civil-Military Relations,” in Armed Forces and Society 26, no. 1 (1999), p. 10.
8. Bland, p. 9
9. Sarah Collinson and Samir Elhawary, “Humanitarian Space: A Review of Trends and Issues,” in Overseas Development Institute (2012), p. 4.
10. Bland, p. 10.
11. Mick Ryan, “The Military and Reconstruction Operations,” in Parameters 37, no. 4 (2007), p. 59.
12. Collinson and Elhawary, p. 4.
13. Das, p. 52.
14. Volker Franke, “The Peacebuilding Dilemma: Civil-Military Cooperation in Stability Operations,” in International Journal of Peace Studies 11, no. 2 (2006), p. 14.
15. Robert A. Rubinstein, “Anthropology and International Security,” in The Social Dynamics of Peace and Security: Culture in International Security, Robert A. Rubinstein and Mary LeCron Foster (eds.), (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988), p. 28.