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Sun Tzu

Cultural Property Protection and the Canadian Armed Forces

by Mark Blondeau

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
In the practical art of war, the best thing of all is to take the enemy's country whole and intact; to shatter and destroy it is not so good.

~ Sun Tzu¹

Introduction

Within treaty law, the *1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict* and its two subsequent *Protocols* serve as the legal linchpin of Cultural Property Protection (CPP): the protection of the physical—tangible—elements of cultural heritage. Cultural property is defined in the convention as:

...movable or immovable property of great importance to the cultural heritage of every people, such as monuments of architecture, art or history, whether religious or secular; archaeological sites; groups of buildings which, as a whole, are of historical or artistic interest; works of art; manuscripts, books and other objects of artistic, historical or archaeological interest; as well as scientific collections and important collections of books or archives or of reproductions of the property defined above.²



NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium.

Canada acceded to the *1954 Hague Convention* on 11 December 1998,³ with the convention coming into force nationally three months later. This convention, borne out of the experiences of the Second World War, and informed by over a century of preceding treaty and LOAC instruments, clearly lays out the ethical foundation, "...that damage to cultural property belonging to any people whatsoever means damage to the cultural heritage of all mankind, since each people makes its contribution to the culture of the world."⁴ This ethical foundation resonates profoundly with a multi-cultural and globally-engaged Canada—it gels squarely with our liberal democratic ideals enshrined in such institutions as the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms* (1982), and the much-vaunted image of the Canadian 'Pearsonian' diplomatic and peacekeeping legacy. It is therefore of no surprise that the identification and de-confliction of Cultural Property (CP) sites as part of our kinetic targeting process—whether formal or *ad hoc*—has been a consistently desired norm, and indeed, an operational imperative. However, there is far more to the *1954 Hague Convention* than purely an admonishment to conduct harm reduction during kinetic operations. There are also other requirements inherent in the clauses of the convention that place additional onuses upon the signatories in both peacetime and conflict. These imperatives also equally introduce new

opportunities for the insightful and creative commander to achieve effects throughout the spectrum of conflict—from the strategic through to the tactical. This article will examine some of the opportunities inherent in CPP; it will then look at recent CPP developments among some of our closest allies in NATO, and conclude by offering a potential model for a cost—and policy—efficient CPP capability to be developed for the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF).

"Any capability that can help achieve Sun Tzu's supreme excellence, or at least move toward it, should be investigated for the potential savings it affords in manpower, national treasure, and long-term diplomatic and economic efforts."

The Strategic Imperatives and Tactical & Operational Advantages of CPP

This article opened with something of a platitude of military doctrine, a quote from Sun Tzu. However, it is useful to return to this quote's basic rhetorical question and ask *Why? Why is it preferable*, indeed absolutely desirable, to "take the enemy's country whole and intact"? Sun Tzu provides the answer to this in the subtext to his axioms: "...supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy's resistance without fighting... Thus, the highest form of generalship is to balk the enemy's plans."⁵ Any capability that can help achieve Sun Tzu's supreme excel-

lence, or at least move toward it, should be investigated for the potential savings it affords in manpower, national treasure, and long-term diplomatic and economic efforts. Traditionally,

the admonishment to mitigate harm during conflict has been the first and foremost consideration for governments and their uniformed services, and *can be* (and *sometimes is*) seen as a form of a restraining element. Even in the world of heritage conservation and CPP, for example, the introduction to UNESCO's *Protection of Cultural Property: Military Manual*, which couches its strategic imperatives in terms of the negative

Directly reflective of Sun Tzu's rhetoric, we find a clear intent to address this imperative in contemporary western military doctrine—for example, the related concepts of Full-Spectrum Operations (FSO), and Joint, Interagency, Multinational and Public (JIMP) enabled forces, both of which envision the integration and coordination of diplomatic, defence, other government agencies, and multinational and commercial resources.⁷ Within Full Spectrum



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Before. Bamiyan Afghanistan, 1998. The large Buddha in the arch was subsequently destroyed by the Taliban.

consequences of not practicing diligent harm reduction strategies,⁶ the avoidance of collateral damage by the (responsible state) actor is made paramount. However, it is the opposite side of the coin—the reality that CPP, when properly executed, is a force multiplier—that really should be in the forefront of the operational planner's mindset.



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After. The same temple after the Buddha statue destruction.



Before. Nimrud, Iraq: Human-headed winged bulls guarding the entrance from the central court of the palace into the throne room complex.



After. The winged bulls after their destruction.

Operations, CPP fits particularly well, doctrinally, into Joint Effects Based Targeting, and specifically, Information Operations (InfoOps) Information Related Capabilities (IRCs), where it is perhaps best considered as a subset of Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC),⁸ albeit, a subset that directly impacts upon many different capabilities, areas, and IRCs.



The ruins of the temple of Baalshamin destroyed by ISIS militants in Palmyra, Syria.

The ability to factor CPP into Full Spectrum Operations can provide clear operational advantages, which relate to both IRCs within the juncture of InfoOps with Joint Effects Based Targeting, and/or broader operational requirements & processes, namely:⁹

- Improved Campaign Legitimacy (Strategic Communication);
- Demonstration of Canada's moral leadership and obligation to the communities among which it operates (Strategic Communication);
- Increased Influence and Reputation (Influence Activities);
- Improved Cultural Understanding of a region (Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment—IPOE);
- Prevention of Terrorist Funding¹⁰ (Joint Targeting, directly contributing to stabilization, Force Protection, and domestic/global security);
- Improved Force Protection (through improved Situational Awareness & Increased Influence and Reputation);
- Preservation and Enhancement of Freedom of Manoeuvre (Operational objective, met through the combination of the above CPP benefits);
- Preservation and Protection of CP affords an affected community a swifter return to normality post-conflict (long-term stabilisation efforts).

While the avoidance of wide scale collateral damage has been recognised by leading strategists at the state level since at least the fifth century BC, its antithesis—the deliberate or indif-

ferent destruction of non-military targets—has an *even longer*, and often *tactical*, history. It is a history that very much continues unabated into the 21st Century, as evidenced by the destruction of the Buddhas of Bamiyan by the Taliban in 2001 and the bulldozing of the site of Nimrud and dynamiting of the Temple of Baalshamin in Palmyra by Daesh, both in 2015. In each case, the deliberate destruction of these sites served to underscore the ideological propaganda of the armed groups that undertook the destruction. In many cases, and even more important than the ideological component, such attacks on CP also serve as a direct psychological weapon against an adversarial or occupied group. As an example of the latter, Daesh utilised a policy of CP destruction as a means of Strategic Communication: the demonstration of their power within controlled territory, which resulted in a pattern of CP destruction following either major or perceived setbacks in their campaign. In a similar vein, Doctor Laurie Rush, a US Army CPP expert, notes that Daesh utilised the intermittent (and publicised) destruction of sites in Palmyra as a means to lure in opposition forces before they were sufficiently prepared for victory.¹¹ The active and open prevention of such deliberate targeting of group cultural identity, and attempts to professionally stabilise and assist in reconstruction/recovery of sites when prevention has not been possible, is an inherent and logical element of the concept of ‘winning hearts and minds.’ Those who help to reconstruct a people’s ancestral tomb, place of worship or restore a national treasure can engender trust and foster cooperation that may extend to more sensitive areas, such as de-radicalisation efforts and expanded military situational awareness within the local community. *Standing with*, and *in defence of*, a targeted group is therefore not only ethically sound, but may be tactically sound as well.

Inevitably, conflicts with significant components of identity politics will see a continuation of the deliberate targeting of CP in the years to come. Equally, and directly related, the rise of non-state actors that can directly challenge nation-state militaries has resulted in an increased unholy alliance of organised crime and insurgents—with looting and antiquities trafficking making an appreciable contribution to terrorist and insurgent funding, although not yet at the levels of narcotic and petro-chemical smuggling (and often perpetrated by the same actors).¹² As Yaya J. Fanusie, an Adjunct Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, and Doctor Alexander Joffe, an archaeologist and historian of the Near East note in their 2015 paper, “Monumental Fight: Countering the Islamic State’s Antiquities Trafficking,” Daesh’s involvement in antiquities looting provided revenue streams “...estimated in the tens of millions of dollars or as high as \$100 million annually.”¹³ As an indication of the importance of antiquities smuggling to the finances of Daesh, in late-2014, the jihadist militant and pirate group Abu Sayyaf, which was conducting terrorist attacks in the Philippines, assumed direct responsibility for Daesh’s antiquities—trafficking efforts, at least in part as a compensatory and reliable revenue stream after the success of coalition airstrikes on Daesh oil production and transport infrastructure.¹⁴ Another advantage to terrorist and insurgent groups utilizing antiquities looting as a revenue source, vice higher profile revenue streams such as narcotics or petro-chemical smuggling, or locally invasive tactics such as extortion, kidnapping, seizure of property or taxation, is that it is far less likely to provoke either outside military

disruption or local rebellion. Rather looting can represent a more stable and less resource intensive revenue source which is far more difficult for the West (or other state actors) to strike.¹⁵ Given the grey market nature of the online transfer and sale of antiquities, it is difficult to achieve a precise estimate for overall revenue from antiquities theft and smuggling for any terrorist organisation, whether that be Daesh at its quasi-state organisational height, or other smaller terrorist organisations in Mali,¹⁶ Somalia, or elsewhere. However, applying a Cultural Capital financial model to CP highlights the short-term gains that are typically exploited by adversary forces in the treatment of cultural property as movable assets (looted, trafficked, and sold on the black-or-grey markets), generating immediate revenue,¹⁷ as well as the opposing long-term advantages of not only preventing this revenue stream, but directly protecting cultural property (see the macro-economic example of Egypt, below). As is explicitly noted in *Strong, Secure, Engaged*, “Successfully disrupting terrorist networks requires a multi-faceted approach, including efforts to stop the flow of terrorist financing and counter the communication strategies employed by violent extremists.”¹⁸ Just as with counter-narcotics and petro-chemical smuggling, the countering of the illicit trade in stolen and looted antiquities therefore becomes a distinct line of operation with supporting and complimentary functions in intelligence, CIMIC, post-conflict stabilisation, and international law enforcement; a line of operation that is explicitly required in current Canadian defence policy.

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Anti-government protesters crowd atop an army tank during the Arab Spring Movement demonstrations in Tahrir Square, 29 January 2011, in Cairo.

Within the post-conflict stabilisation phase, the restoration and continued protection of CP remains imperative, demonstrating once again the utility of applying a Cultural Capital financial model to CPP. Just as CP plays a critical part in national, religious, and ethnic identities across the world through its reflection of a collective past, so too does it afford significant potential, renewable, long-term economic opportunities in the post-conflict phase of reconstruction. Prior to 2011, the Egyptian tourism industry reached \$12.5 billion US (2010) in revenue to the country, potentially up to 20% of Egypt's economy.¹⁹ After 2011, and a significant increase in political and security instability coming after the Arab Spring, including Islamist terrorism attacks on tourist sites, this number fell to an average of \$7.77 billion US, with a record low of \$3.80 billion US in 2016,²⁰ a significant loss to the country's GDP. While Egypt is a particularly-spectacular example of the importance of CP to both national revenue and identity, it none-the-less serves to highlight the long-term economic and social benefits of CP to the general community, beyond the ideological, ethical, or abstract benefits.

Looking at CPP as a force capability within the JIMP & Joint Effects Based Targeting paradigms—as opposed to a force restraint from a traditional peer-on-peer manoeuvre warfare conception—opens up tactical and operational level opportunities to effect immediate tactical and long-term strategic influence. As the US Army's Doctor Rush notes, "...military planners should be keenly aware that... entrenched attachment to a community's origins and

ancestors is not a quaint or minority view but is the prevailing frame of reference for a majority of people in the world."²¹ Therefore, factoring CPP into OPLANS has the potential to significantly foster coalition cohesion with regional partners.

CPP Developments in NATO

Recognising both the nuanced requirements in the *1954 Hague Convention*, and the operational opportunities that it brings to both political and military leadership, a number of our key allies—and NATO itself—are actively developing or improving CPP capabilities. At least some of these initiatives are driven by the requirements outlined in Article 7, Paragraph 2 of the *1954 Hague Convention*, which states, "[the signatories shall] undertake to plan or establish in peace-time, within their armed forces, services or specialist personnel whose purpose will be to secure respect for cultural property and to co-operate with the civilian authorities responsible for safeguarding it."²² The US, UK, and NATO itself are taking rapid developmental steps to incorporate CPP into their Influence Activity (IA), Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC), joint targeting and strategic communications efforts, while the Netherlands and Italy (for example) already have mature, deployable capabilities, as do NATO Partners for Peace Austria and Switzerland.

Each of these efforts has a direct historical precedence in the Allied Monuments, Fine Arts and Archives Section(s) (MFAA) of the Second World War (the 'Monuments Men'), as well as its partner organisation, the Art Looting Investigation Unit (ALIU). This multi-national program was formed under the Civil Affairs and Military Government Sections of the Allied armies in 1943, and continued in operation throughout Europe, North Africa and Japan until 1946. The experiences of the MFAA during and immediately after the Second World War directly led to the drafting and signing of the *1954 Hague Convention*; however, while the majority of the personnel from the thirteen nations represented in the original MFAA came from the USA and the UK respectively, these two nations did not ratify the Convention until this century.²³

The United States ratified the *1954 Hague Convention* on 13 March 2009, but had begun efforts to incorporate

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An American soldier of the US Army Monuments, Fine Arts, and Archives (MFAA) Section seen with the 'Crown of Charlemagne,' found in a cave in Siegen, Germany, near the end of the European war.

CPP training and activities by 2003, after the inadequacies of then US CPP policy and TTPs became apparent in the occupation of Iraq. These activities have been championed by Doctor Laurie Rush, whose work with the 10th Mountain Division out of Fort Drum, New York, has been at the training and doctrine development vanguard for the US military, as well as Major (ret'd) Corinne Wegener—the first serving U.S. cultural property officer since the Second World War.²⁴ Within Fort Drum, Doctor Rush leads the Cultural Resources Branch (CRB), and has been a key figure in the US Combatant Command Cultural Action Group, now renamed to the Military Cultural Heritage Action Group (MilCHAG), along with the Smithsonian Cultural Rescue Initiative (of which Ms. Wegener is the director). The Fort Drum CRB and 10th Mountain Division's G9 Branch

(Civil-Military Cooperation) have developed a close working relationship, one that has incorporated realistic CPP into pre-deployment field training for the division before deployments.²⁵ The success of these efforts have led to increased opportunities to further develop and update US military doctrine regarding

CPP, which is currently limited to Graphic Training Aid 41-01-002, *Civil Affairs Arts, Monuments, and Archives Guide*,²⁶ and regulatory guidance which falls within the DoD Environmental portfolio, while concurrently developing an internationalised consensus on CPP best practices among the Allies and relevant NGOs.

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ROTC cadets learn cultural property protection, military history, and more from Fort Drum internships.

DVIDS/courtesy photo by Kent Boike, 10th Mountain Division and Fort Drum Museum/4603128

Over the past year, the US has accelerated its development of CPP capability, with the development of a CPP specialty (38G/6V, Cultural Property Protection Officers) that will see reservists with a specialist civilian background in Cultural Property assigned to units across US Army Civil Affairs & Psychological Operations Command (USACAPOC). The inaugural five-day CPP Training will be held in conjunction with the Smithsonian Institute in March 2020, with future iteration of the course being of longer duration. It is intended to host not only US Army Civil Affairs (CA) Cultural Property Protection Officers, but also officers with similar civilian backgrounds from the USN, the USMC and the USAF, as well as allied forces. The end strategic intent of the program is to ensure CPP is integrated into both US joint and allied combined forces.²⁷ The current US model represents a logical progression from the previous one that looked to employing CA officers with relevant civilian academic backgrounds. In 2018, the US had three serving CA officers who were designated as CPP specialists, ranging in rank from captain to lieutenant-colonel, but without formal military CPP training and career specialist recognition.²⁸

The US is also looking to further incorporate CPP training into Combat Arms team (brigade and division) training. Both the Smithsonian Cultural Rescue Initiative and the US National Committee of the Blue Shield have provided CPP training to US emergency responders and deploying military personnel respectively, as well as providing deployed mission-specific training aides.²⁹ The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) holds a second key component of the US CPP initiative, which is its expanding cultural properties inventories. These inventories *can*, and *are*, then used to not only feed into the non-lethal target lists, but also to “...offer tremendous insight into cross cultural values and landscape features of great significance.”³⁰

The United Kingdom ratified the *1954 Hague Convention* and both of its additional protocols on 12 September 2017. Due to a confluence of fortune at the time of the ratification, the



Statue: *Capitoline Triad*, II-III Century AD, taken in 1992 during illegal excavations in Livigno, Italy, then rescued in 1994 by the *Carabinieri* Command for the Protection of the Cultural Heritage.

UK was availed of both a dedicated reserve staff officer with extensive professional civilian interest in the area of cultural property protection and art theft within its Army HQ Directorate of Capability Development, as well as a Secretary of State for Defence with an academic background in Classics and Archaeology. Having these personalities in place at the right time undoubtedly assisted in the rapid development of a UK Defence CPP capability, with the UK's CPP unit activated in early-2019, less than two years after the UK's ratification of the *1954 Hague Convention*. The UK CPP unit will be a tri-service unit, but is hosted within the Army's 77th Brigade for support, and will consist of 15 part-time reserve specialist CPP officers (some recruited from within existing service lines, and some recruited from civilian life), and potentially, one civilian information manager.³¹ The first CPP qualification (the CPP 'Special to Arm' course) for the CPPU officers—all will be commissioned officers ranging from captain to lieutenant-colonel in rank—was delivered in 2019 to both UK and allied students.

As noted above, there are other extant—and more mature—CPP organisations within NATO; most notably, the Italian *Carabinieri* Command for the Protection of Cultural Heritage created in 1969.³² In addition, NATO itself is looking to develop a potential CPP Centre of Excellence, and has been developing doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) through experimentation led by its Allied Command Transformation's (ACT) Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre in Lisbon.³³

A Possible Structure for CPP in the CAF

While Canada acceded to the *1954 Hague Convention* on 11 December 1998, no significant movement towards the establishment of CPP-specialised capabilities has occurred in the subsequent two decades. However, the precedents set by our closest allies, the USA and the UK in this area, provide an achievable roadmap for the CAF. As with all formalised capabilities, a clear policy that underpins the implementation requirements must first be developed. Unlike the recent experience of the UK, the most challenging part of the development of a Canadian CPP capability already occurred twenty years ago, embodied in our accession to the *1954 Hague Convention*. Now, all that remains is to transform the legal requirements (particularly those under Article 7(2) of the Convention), into an actionable framework of policy with the required organisational changes and training to make it happen. Such a policy will need to reiterate the requirements for CPP as outlined in International law, and then define the roles and responsibilities with respect to CPP within both a CAF and Whole of Government context, with a particular noting of the interface with IA, CIMIC, and especially, the targeting process. A clear collaborative relationship between DND/CAF and other relevant Government departments will have to be defined: with CBSA, RCMP, Heritage Canada (DHC) and Global Affairs Canada (GAC) all having clear roles to play in CPP. The document will also need to establish the roles and employment of military CPP

specialists in both peace and wartime, noting both permanent staff functions and temporary deployed roles. Finally, such a policy will need to define the levels of both *generalist* training (CPP awareness training, general and mission-specific) and *specialist* training envisioned (for CIMIC CPP specialists, as well as others).

A viable and sustainable CPP capability that not only addresses the treaty requirements of the *1954 Hague Convention*, but also has the ability to add significant operational capability can be achieved for the CAF with a relatively-small resource budget. An example of such a construct, which can be realistically seen as a hybridization of the US and UK models tailored to the CAF organisation, is presented below. While the UK has been able to create a specialised Defence CPP Unit resident within the new 77th Brigade, Canada's even more modest resources—and geographically dispersed realities—recommend an adapted model—an adapted model which in this area harkens to the US model of CPP specialists by civilian qualifications embedded in the CA community. In this proposed model, CPP specialists (number to be yet decided) would be dispersed throughout the CAF in a two-tier structure. Tier 1 would consist of Primary Reservists within CIMIC lines falling directly under the Influence Activities Task Force (IATF) of the Canadian Combat Support Brigade. This first tier would be the group from which Rotation 0 and Rotation 1 deployments of CPP specialist officers would be drawn; of note, they would also be envisioned to be fully qualified CIMIC operators. Tier 2 would be identified and trained personnel, both Regular and Primary Reserve, who would receive the CPP specialist qualification, but would then return to their home units and career progressions. This tier would be earmarked for follow-on (out of trade) deployments during sustained operations, as an operational reserve for the Tier 1 cadre. In both cases, the prerequisites and CPP specialist training would be identical. CPP specialists would be commissioned officers³⁴ with a relevant academic background in archaeology, anthropology, history, or history in art or museum/heritage studies & conservation (likely at the graduate degree level), who would also then go on to complete a specialist course in CPP with a unique four letter competency code. Although both are still in their initial pilot course stages, the UK's CPP 'Special to Arm' course and the US Army CPP Training being run in conjunction with the Smithsonian Institute provide excellent templates for a future CAF training program. Of note, there is the potential to course load initial CAF CPP specialists onto either the UK or US courses for initial cadre qualification, and to facilitate the development of an eventual CAF CPP course in a 'train the trainer' paradigm³⁵—with the Peace Support Training Centre (PSTC) in Kingston being the most logical training establishment to host an eventual Canadian CPP course. Having the CPP centre of training in Kingston also brings significant synergies with our US partners, given the geographic proximity of Garrison Kingston to Fort Drum in upstate New York.

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While during routine operations the majority of CPP qualified officers would either be on Class A part-time employment within CIMIC designated positions (Tier 1), or employed in entirely different functions across the CAF (Tier 2), there would be some requirement for limited full-time CPP specialist support, both in a force planning and employment role, and in a force development, management, and generation role. These two distinct groupings of responsibilities would almost certainly be best managed by two distinct individuals, either Class B employed CPP senior officers, or civilian equivalents, located within two distinct organisations. The first position would be most logically located within CJOC Headquarters, and would be tasked with:

- Being an integral functional authority within the Joint Operational Effects section;
- Advising the Joint Targeting Intelligence Centre on CPP considerations;

- Writing, managing and championing a CPP appendix to the CIMIC Annex to (all/most) Operational Orders. For example, if there is a CIMIC Annex, then there should likely be either a CPP appendix, or at least a devoted paragraph;
- Contributing as required, to background/cultural intelligence documents and the intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (IPOE) process produced by Canadian Joint Operations Command's Joint Intelligence Centre;
- Acting as the Commander CJOC's overall CPP Advisor.

The second full-time CPP staff officer position would be created either in the Inter-Agency Task Force (IATF), or potentially in the notional Joint Force Commander's staff, to carry out the following (force development, management and generation) staff functions:

- Managing the CPP specialist training, within the reserve CIMIC units and with PSTC and/or allies, including the management of a dedicated CPP training budget;
- Acting as a lead instructor for PSTC on the CPP specialist course;
- Managing the Class A Tier 1 CPP specialist staff list, including deployment cycles, and further (academic/specialisation) credential lists;
- Managing the overall Tier 2 dispersed CPP specialist qualified list;
- Managing the academic outreach partners list of contacts, and acting as the information manager and communications node for the wider CAF CPP community;
- Acting as a backstop and liaison officer for the CJOC HQ CPP Staff Officer/Advisor.


One further area for an important Canadian contribution to an Allied CPP effort is afforded by the DIA's cultural property inventories, and leverages our unique 'Five Eyes' intelligence sharing and collaborative relationship. In this area, Canadian Forces Intelligence Group *broadly*, and its subordinate unit the Canadian Forces Joint Imagery Centre *specifically*, would be able to contribute meaningfully to a shared CPP inventory. When combined with the use of Commercial Satellite Imagery (CSI) and a collaborative relationship with academic partners, as envisioned in *Strong, Secure, Engaged*, this would provide a significant complementary CPP capability to that envisioned above for the IATF CIMIC units, as well as the efforts of our closest allies and partners.

The model described above has the policy advantage of directly supporting or enacting four of *Strong, Secure, Engaged*'s key initiatives, namely:

- Initiative 72: Establish a Canadian Armed Forces targeting capability to better leverage intelligence capabilities to support military operations;
- Initiative 73: Increase investment in academic outreach to \$4.5 million per year in a revamped and expanded defence engagement program, including: collaborative networks of experts; a new scholarship program for Masters and Post-Doctoral fellows; and an expansion of the existing expert briefing series and engagement grant program;
- Initiative 76: Enhance existing roles assigned to Reserve Force units and formations, including: Information Operations (including Influence Activities); [and] Combat Support and Combat Service Support;
- Initiative 77: Employ the Reserve Force to deliver select expeditionary missions in a primary role such as Canadian Armed Forces capacity building.³⁶

Conclusion

The CAF does not currently possess a CPP capability as envisioned by the *1954 Hague Convention* to which we are party, and that we tacitly recognised in 1999's Joint Doctrine on *Civil-Military Cooperation in Peace, Emergencies, Crisis and War*. In addition, the force multiplier effects that CPP can bring to both military and political leadership in terms of strategic communications, influence activities, coalition building, cultural intelligence (and hence situational awareness and force protection), as well as post-conflict reconstruction, are significant. It is an undeniable and inherent information related capabilities within the effects-based Joint Targeting Enterprise that is a cornerstone of current Canadian Defence Policy and several of the initiatives in *Strong, Secure, Engaged* are either *directly supportive of* or *indicate the requirement to* create a specialised, even if modest, CPP capability in the CAF.



Government of Canada

Developments in the armed forces of our closest allies indicate that such a capability can be developed economically, while both joint experimentation and operational lessons learned in NATO have demonstrated the positive force multiplier effects of CPP in expeditionary, peace support operations, and peacetime engagement activities. Further, the experiences of our closest Allies have indicated that CPP is likely best situated within CIMIC/Civil Affairs constructs, but with clear lines of operation that intersect with Strategic Communications, Influence Activities, Targeting, and Defence Intelligence. Canada has a unique opportunity to systematically develop a CPP capability in a *more efficient way than*, and *building directly upon*, the recent experience of our closest allies in the US and UK. In so doing, the CAF can provide a potentially high impact niche capability that does not require significant new resources. While there are multiple means of delivering an active CPP capability to the CAF, the model proposed herein is one possible solution that attempts to balance the ability to deliver clear operational effects, with the economic and personnel exigencies of an expanding and modernising force structure.

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NOTES

- 1 Lionel Giles, (trans.), *Sun Tzu on the Art of War*, (Leicester: Allandale Online Publishing, 2000), p. 8, at: https://sites.ualberta.ca/~enoch/Readings/The_Art_Of_War.pdf
- 2 *Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict with Regulations for the Execution of the Convention 1954*, (hereafter *1954 Hague Convention*), Article 1(a), at: http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php?URL_ID=13637&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html
- 3 UNESCO, *1954 Hague Convention*, List of State Parties, at: <http://www.unesco.org/erila/convention.asp?KO=13637&language=E&order=alpha>.
- 4 UNESCO, *Hague Convention 1954*, Preamble.
- 5 Giles, p. 8.
- 6 Roger O'Keefe, Camille Peron, Tofiq Musayev, and Gianluca Ferrari, *Protection of Cultural Protection: Military Manual* (UNESCO, 2016), pp. 1-2.
- 7 See Walter A. Dorn and Michael Varey, "The Rise and Demise of the 'Three Block War,'" in *Canadian Military Journal*, Vol. 10, No. 1, 2009.
- 8 Indeed, CAF CIMIC doctrine does already recognize the specific subset of CPP within CIMIC. See B-GG-005-004/AF-023, *Civil-Military Cooperation in Peace, Emergencies, Crisis And War*, (Ottawa: DND, January 1999), particularly p. 2-12, p. 2A-3, & p. 5B-4. However, beyond an acknowledgement of the requirements under the *1954 Hague Convention*, and the need to include arts, monuments and archives considerations in CIMIC Operational Estimates and Cooperation Area Assessments, no prescriptive avenue towards achieving this niche specialist capacity has been addressed.
- 9 Adapted from UK Army Director General Capability policy paper, *Delivering a Cultural Property Protection Capability*, 30 July 2015; para 12, pp. 10-11.
- 10 See UN Security Council Meeting 24 March 2017, Record of Discussion, at: <https://www.un.org/press/en/2017/sc12764.doc.htm> accessed: 30 November 2018.
- 11 Email Doctor Laurie Rush to Lieutenant-Commander Mark Blondeau, 11 December 2018.
- 12 As an indication of the importance of antiquities smuggling to the finances of Daesh, in late-2014, Abu Sayaf assumed direct responsibility for Daesh's antiquities –trafficking division, at least in part as a compensatory and reliable revenue stream after the success of coalition airstrikes on Daesh oil production and transport infrastructure. See Hannah D. Willett, "Ill-Gotten Gains: A Response to the Islamic State's Profits from the Illicit Antiquities Market," in *Arizona Law Review* (Vol. 58, 2016), pp. 831-865.
- 13 Yaya J. Fanusie and Alexander Joffe, "Monumental Fight: Countering the Islamic State's Antiquities Trafficking," Center on Sanctions & Illicit Finance, Foundation for Defense of Democracies, November 2015, p. 5.
- 14 Patrick Blanin, "Islamic State's Financing: Sources, Methods and Utilization," in *Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses*, Vol. 9, Issue 5, May 2017., pp. 16-17.
- 15 Fanusie and Joffe, p. 6.
- 16 As an example of the growing awareness of Cultural Property looting and trafficking as a source of terrorist revenue, in 2013 the mandate of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), explicitly noted the link between illicit trafficking in cultural objects and the financing of terrorism. UN Security Council Meeting 24 March 2017, Record of Discussion, at: <https://www.un.org/press/en/2017/sc12764.doc.htm>. Accessed: 30 November 2018.
- 17 Email Lieutenant-Colonel Andrew Duncan to Lieutenant-Commander Mark Blondeau, 26 November 2018.
- 18 *Strong, Secure, Engaged: Canada's Defence Policy*; (Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, as represented by the Minister of National Defence, 2017), p. 53.
- 19 Konstantinos Tomazos, ; "Egypt's tourism industry and the Arab Spring," in: *Tourism and Political Change*. Goodfellow, Woodatton, Oxford (2017), at: https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/58369/1/Tomazos_TPC_2017_Egypt_s_tourism_industry_and_the_arab_spring.pdf
- 20 Trading Economics, "Egypt Tourism Revenues: 2010-2018," at: <https://tradingeconomics.com/egypt/tourism-revenues>. Accessed: 26 September 2018.
- 21 Laurie Rush, "Partner of Choice: Cultural Property Protection in Military Engagement," in *Military Review* (Nov-Dec 2018), p. 104.
- 22 *1954 Hague Convention*, Article 7(2).
- 23 For more details on the history of the MFAA, see the website <http://www.monumentsmen.com/> maintained by Robert M. Edsel. While Canada was not specifically represented in the original MFAA, one of the two MFAA casualties, Maj Ronald Balfour, was killed while attached to the Canadian First Army as a CPP advisor.
- 24 See Laurie Rush, "Cultural Property Protection as a Force Multiplier in Stability Operations," in *Military Review* (March-April 2012), pp. 36-43.
- 25 See Kristoffer T Mills and Laurie Rush, "Integration of Cultural Property Protection into a Decisive Action Training Exercise," in *Military Review*, (November-December 2017).
- 26 Graphic Training Aid 41-01-002, *Civil Affairs Arts, Monuments, and Archives Guide*, (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, October 2015). Accessed 19 November 2018, at: http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/army/gta41-01-002_arts_monuments_and_archives.pdf
- 27 Email Colonel Scott Dejesse to Lieutenant-Commander Mark Blondeau, 4 December 2019, and telecom Colonel Scott Dejesse with Lieutenant-Commander Mark Blondeau, 6 December 2019.
- 28 Email Doctor Laurie Rush to Lieutenant-Commander Mark Blondeau, 19 November 2018.
- 29 <https://culturalrescue.si.edu/hentf/training/> and <https://www.uscbs.org/military-training.html>, Accessed: 20 November 2018.
- 30 Email Doctor Laurie Rush to Lieutenant-Commander Mark Blondeau, 11 December 2018.
- 31 Emails Lieutenant-Colonel Tim Purbrick to Lieutenant-Commander Mark Blondeau, 24 August 2018 & 2 October 2018. While the initial troop to task study (Defence Planning Assumptions, Reserve Mobilization Ratios and Harmony Guidelines) suggested a necessary force of 40- to 50 CPP specialists, this number was not seen to be achievable in the UK's current manning and budgetary restraints.
- 32 See Laurie Rush and Luisa Benedettini Millington, *The Carabinieri Command for the Protection of Cultural Property: Saving the World's Heritage*, (Newcastle University: The Boydell Press, 2015).
- 33 See <https://www.cimic-coe.org/products/conceptual-design/cimic-innovation/advanced-cultural-competence-aac/the-protection-of-cultural-heritage/>, and http://www.jallc.nato.int/products/docs/factsheet_cpp.pdf.
- 34 Numerous after- action reports dating back to the Second World War have indicated that this job requires commissioned rank in order to have "...traction with a battlegroup commander engaged with combat ops therefore all officer, minimum rank [Captain]". Email Lieutenant Colonel Tim Purbrick to Lieutenant-Commander Mark Blondeau, 24 August 2018.
- 35 Email Lieutenant-Colonel Tim Purbrick to Lieutenant-Commander Mark Blondeau, 2 October 2018.
- 36 See *Strong, Secure, Engaged*; pp. 66-69.