The World In Which We Live

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Russian servicemen, dressed in historical uniforms, take part in a military parade rehearsal in front of St. Basil’s Cathedral at Red Square in central Moscow, 6 November 2015.

Russia’s Private Military Contractors:
Cause for Worry?1

by Sergey Sukhankin and Alla Hurska

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Dr. Sergey Sukhankin is a Research Fellow in the Jamestown Foundation, and an Advisor with Gulf State Analytics, both located in Washington, D.C. He also teaches at the MacEwan School of Business in Edmonton. Sergey has consulted with various high-profile bodies and agencies, including the DIA (Washington), CSIS and the DND (Ottawa), and the European Parliament in Brussels.

Alla Hurska is an Associate Fellow with the International Centre for Policy Studies (Kyiv), and an Analyst in the Jamestown Foundation in Washington, and she is pursuing her Masters degree at the University of Alberta in Edmonton. Her areas of interest include Russian and Chinese policies in the Arctic region, non-linear forms of warfare, disinformation, Ukrainian foreign and security policy, and the geopolitics of oil.

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Russian soldiers, on armoured vehicles, patrol a street in Aleppo, Syria, 2 February 2017.

Introduction

Two major geopolitical shifts – the Syrian civil war and the Ukrainian conflict – drew attention of the global academic and policy-related community to the issue of Russia’s private military companies (PMCs) and the so-called Wagner Group, which has become the living symbol of Russia’s covert use of ‘shady’ militarized groups in a powerplay against the west and its allies as well as securing Russia’s geo-economic/strategic interests abroad.

Although they are effective as a tool against weaker opponents, we argue that Russian PMCs should not be viewed as a strategic element in Russia’s military toolkit. Indeed, they are effective only when paired with Russia’s regular armed forces. We contend that PMCs are unlikely to be used against NATO members directly. Nevertheless, Russia will continue employing these forces in zones of instability as a means to engage the West in non-linear and asymmetric fashion.

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Armed men, believed to be Russian servicemen march near a Ukrainian military base in the village of Perevalnoye, outside Simferopol, 5 March 2014.

Russian PMCs throughout History

Russia’s reliance upon non-state actors dates back to the second half of the 16th Century.2 In general, in Tsarist Russia, militarized irregular formations, primarily Cossacks, were employed by the state for various (para)military tasks, including ensuring physical safety of the Russian monarch and, using contemporary parlance, confronting “hybrid threats.”3 Russian irregulars played a visible role in all major regional conflicts waged by the Tsarist regime, frequently acting as proto-special forces that were partly tasked with protection of the Russian national border in the areas populated by the non-Russian peoples. In the course of the Russian Civil War (1917–1922), both sides of the conflict also actively relied upon and collaborated with various forms of irregular formations and armed groups.4

During the Soviet period (1922–1990), the state primarily used irregulars in pursuit of its geopolitical objectives. Specifically, in its confrontation with the western powers in the Third World, that is, Africa, Asia, and Latin America, the Soviets would use “military instructors” – active military5 sent to ‘friendly countries’ to assist local armed forces in training, yet on many occasions directly participating in combat.6 The Soviet state acted as both contractor and provider of these services, whereas pecuniary motives were almost completely overshadowed by ideological calculations.7 However, in the 1980s, this trend experienced a certain transformation: in Libya, the Soviet military instructors and advisors started to be used by the government of Muamar Gaddafi in his adventurous “border wars.”8 Upon the dissolution of the USSR, many of them chose to remain in Libya and serve Gaddafi,9 de-facto becoming the first Russian private military contractors in Africa.

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 dealt a severe blow to state institutions and Russian society. An abrupt and ill-planned transition to a market economy destroyed or badly damaged key governmental structures. Two of the main ‘victims’ were the security services and the armed forces. Chronically underfinanced and occasionally humiliated by the new regime,10 this branch of the Russian state started to lose some of its most qualified cadre to various ‘business’ (de-facto semi-criminal) structures.11 Thus, the roots of Russia’s current PMCs industry should be acknowledged within this historical epoch (1991–2003). However, it would not be adequate to refer to a single source. Instead, we propose to take a look at the following three (intertwined) groups.

ITAR-TASS News Agency/Alamy Stock Photo/BPBDBC

Russian servicemen keep position in the administrative border between Daghestan in Chechnya, 25 May 2000.

The first group consists of ‘volunteers’ who had participated in conflicts throughout the post-communist period in places such as South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Transnistria, Tajikistan, Chechnya, and the Balkans (Bosnia).12 As noted by a distinguished Russian military officer, Igor Girkin/Strelkov, a participant in hostilities in Bosnia himself,13 many “volunteers” were drawn to these “gray zones” for “résumé building”: to later join either Western PMCs or the private security structures.14

A second set of groups comprises ‘private armies’ organized in the 1990s as a result of an expanding Russian criminal web.15 To gain military experience, their members took part in some regional conflicts, including Chechnya, where they fought “on both sides of the barricades.”16 Within this sub-group, special attention should be allocated to Roman Tsepov, the owner of a security firm named “Baltik-Eskort” (1992). The firm – which began as an idea of Viktor Zolotov, the current Director of the National Guard of Russia and a member of the Security Council – was tightly connected to some of Russia’s most powerful organized criminal groups (the Tambov Gang), and rendered security services to the family of (then) St. Petersburg Mayor Anatoly Sobchak, and also for his deputy at the time, Vladimir Putin.17 Later, “private armies” were disbanded with some of its members and leaders being either killed or moved to private security companies (PSCs).

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Viktor Zolotov, head of the Russian Federal National Guard Service, makes remarks at the unveiling of a monument to Russian National Guard officers killed in the line of duty at Pobedy Square, Ryazan, Russia, 8 November 2019.

A third group consists indeed of those PSCs. The most well-known players on the Russian market were Antiterror-Orel, Antiterror, Redut-Antiterror.18 Particular attention should be paid to the Moran Security Group (founded in 2011) – a spin-off of the Antiterror PSC. Unlike similar groups, Moran consisted of a “consortium” of smaller companies, and even had a ‘marine’ branch, which owned a number of vessels, Ratibor (ESU2529), Maagen (E5U2139), Anchor 1 (E5U2491) and Deo Juvante (E5U2630). The company offered a much broader set of services than the ‘standard packages,’ with some Russian sources even claiming: “…one of the company’s clients was Bashar al-Assad.”19 In effect, there is every reason to believe that the origins of the Wagner group were somehow related to Moran: not only did it stand behind the Slavonic Corps Limited PMC, but also ties of some of the Moran members – including Alexander Kuznetsov20 – with Wagner have also been proven.

Russia vs. the World: Differences in Practices

As Norwegian research specialists in Russian military and security politics Åse Gilje Østensen and Tor Bukkvoll indicate, the range of services typically provided by the Western private military security companies (PMSCs) consists of “protective security services, military support, and state building services” and “[Western companies] will generally shy away from services that will associate them with mercenaries.”21 Indeed, some tragic occurrences that have happened in the past primarily either resulted from the necessity of self-defence, or were a result of tragic mistakes. One of them was the infamous “Baghdad Massacre” (16 September 2007) that involved Blackwater,22 when members of this PMSC killed seventeen Iraqi civilians in Nisour Square while escorting a U.S. embassy convoy. Of note, Western PMSCs are completely legal.

For their part, Russian PMCs, such as the Wagner Group, were created for diametrically- opposed reasons, and they operate in line with a different logic. Russian PMCs, de-jure non-existent and prohibited by the Russian Penal Code,23 should be viewed as a part of “Active Measures 2.024: (a) a tool of Russia’s covert power politics in strategically important areas; and (b) “power economy” (silovaja ekonomika), “…a state-controlled system of coercion (including a reliance on limited-scale military conflicts, if necessary) aimed at realizing economic goals.” Therefore, one crucial detail should be noted: (il)legal status of Russian PMCs is not a coincidence – it is a reflection of their true purpose. At the same time, acts of violence accompanying activities of Russian PMCs are not coincidental/defensive. As rightfully noted by Jānis Bērziņš, “Russians, PMCs must be understood as mercenaries in the worst sense of the word,” whose main objective is to avoid the direct involvement of Russian armed forces.26

What is the Wagner Group?

Among Russian PMCs, the Wagner Group is the most prominent. Its emergence was by no means spontaneous. The Russian General Staff first entertained the necessity to organize PMCs for various “delicate missions abroad” as early as 2010.27 Yet, it took no concrete steps in this direction. In 2012, Boris Chikin, one of the founders of the Moran PMC, lamented that the global PMC market was being divided between Western players and the lack of opportunities for Russian companies. In effect, a predecessor of the Wagner Group, the Slavonic Corps Limited (2013), was a PMC created by members of the Moran Group and sent to Syria to fight on the side of al-Assad. It was destroyed near al-Sukhnah in eastern Syria.28 Apparently, Slavonic Corps Limited was a ‘trial run’ of a more ambitious and better-organized project. Incidentally, one of its leaders, Dmitry Utkin (a retired lieutenant colonel of the Main Directorate of the Russian General Staff, the GU), would later become a commander of the Wagner Group in Ukraine and Syria, where, playing a key role in capturing Aleppo, he would later be decorated with the Order of Courage during a gala held in the Kremlin.29

ZUMA Press, Inc./Alamy Stock Photo/DWGGG

Aleppo, Syria, during the Syrian civil war, 3 April 2013.

The Ukrainian crisis played a pivotal role in emergence and the rise of the Wagner Group, whose actual emergence dates to May 2014, and the outbreak of armed conflict in the Ukrainian Southeast, where the group would take part in all major engagements (the Battle of Luhansk Airport, the Battle of Debaltseve), subversive/terrorist operations (the Il-76 shoot-down; provocations in the rear of the Ukrainian armed forces; intelligence gathering), and ‘quelling’ of the (pseudo-) Cossacks and local strongmen acting as ‘cleaners’ (chistilshiki).30 While in Ukraine, the group practiced some of the tactics learned earlier in Syria and used by Islamic radicals, which, aside from operations in small and highly maneuvering groups, (commensurate with general principles of non-linear operations that include sabotage, guerrilla/partisan warfare, rapid penetration of the frontline and operations in the enemy’s rear), also included the employment of armoured jeeps/vehicles when attacking the enemy formations.31 The “Ukrainian chapter” of Wagner’s history had a crucial meaning, becoming a training polygon and a form of ‘marketing tool,’ advertising the group and its capabilities to third parties.

Ukraine accordingly became a springboard for the group towards much more economically lucrative missions in Syria. Still, operations in Ukraine also played an essential role in the transformation of the entity in terms of its composition, primarily reflected in the decreasing quality of its personnel. Between 2014 and 2015, according to various testimonies, the core of the group was indeed predominantly composed of highly skilled professionals with vast ‘hands-on’ experience gained in various regional conflicts. During this period, functions performed by Wagner could be, at some level, compared to tasks vested upon the Russian Special Operations Forces – a flexible, multi-functional force combining qualities of Spetsnaz and the armed forces.32 However, with a swelling in the rank-and-file of the PMC, the entrance requirements and training standards plummeted.33 Between 2016 and 2017, the tasks performed in Syria by the group drifted away from military operations toward forceful seizure (“otzhim” in Russian slang) of oil- and gas-fields/facilities from the anti-al-Assad forces. Further, there is every reason to believe that, at least in part, the group started acting increasingly in concert with pro-Assad forces (uncoordinated, highly diverse and demonstrating not very good war-fighting qualities) and its coordination with the Russian side started to loosen. This transformation increased resentment from the side of Russian neo-conservative nationalists (such as Strelkov), who condemned the Wagner Group and the Russian government for betrayal of Russia’s national interests and of drifting away from Russia’s key mission (creation of the Novorossiya).34 Incidentally, one of such missions co-carried out by Wagner led to a debacle near Deir ez-Zor, where the group suffered its largest losses, due to the results of an aerial strike dealt by US forces.35

Hassan Blal/Alamy Stock Photo/PGGKXP

What remains of the Deir ez-Zor suspension bridge, 11 August 2018.

In discussing the Wagner Group in Syria, one should make two observations. First, a common inaccuracy is that in Syria, “… the Wagner Group is often used as elite infantry.”36 Although this assumption might be somewhat applicable to the “Ukrainian chapter” of the Wagner history, this argument does not apply to its experiences in Syria. Close analysis of operations carried out by Wagner in Syria suggest the group primarily performed the most arduous tasks in areas of maximum risk or danger. Alternatively, it served as an auxiliary force that assisted Russian regular armed forces – the SOF, on the ground, and the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) through coordination and terrain reconnaissance37 – to minimize casualties among Russian regular armed forces akin to Afghanistan and both Chechen wars. Indeed, according to various estimates, the official number of Russian contract soldiers (kontraktniki),38 who were killed in Syria in military engagements was significantly lower than any other party involved. This fact, even though much praised by the Russian military and pro-Kremlin information outlets, failed to attribute some credit to the Russian PMCs that took part in the heaviest battles. Unlike Russian PMCs, elite forces are typically used in high-precision operations – which is clearly visible in the work of the Russian SOF in Syria – and do not typically participate in potentially highly costly frontal attacks.39 The Wagner Group, however, while in Syria, was used as shockwave troops, which normally consists of tasks vested upon elite special forces.

The second aspect is related to the Deir ez-Zor disaster suffered by the Wagner Group in early-2018 in Syria. According to some experts, the defeat of the Wagner Group near Deir ez-Zor might have resulted from an alleged disagreement in 2017 between Russia’s Defense Minister Sergey Shoygu and Yevgeny Prigozhin, the reported sponsor of the Wagner Group. Thus, the inaction of the Russian Defense Ministry that led to the Deir ez-Zor massacre might have been deliberately staged “…to sacrifice the lives of the veterans who work for Wagner, in order to send Prigozhin a message.”40 However, the physical eradication of experienced veterans and, perhaps more importantly, giving the United States a reason to claim victory makes little practical sense, especially in light of Russia’s growing involvement in Libya. In effect, thorough investigations have demonstrated that in this debacle the major losses were suffered by the pro-Assad and pro-Iranian forces. By contrast Wagner occupied a marginal part of the overall advancing forces, and was unlikely to be the leading/coordinating force.41 Following this logic, this means that the Russian MoD ‘punished’ not Wagner per se, but Russia’s regional allies. This argument is not plausible. Most likely, members of the Wagner Group fell prey to a combination of poor coordination and over-confidence that the US side would not use its military-technical capabilities to confront and to repel the attacker.42 Moreover, as argued by the reputable Russian journalist Petr Kozlov, the Syrian debacle may have had a serious impact upon the Russian ruling elite.43 Furthermore, the ‘punishment theory’ may be challenged by post-2018 developments, and by Russia’s increasing involvement in Libya. Specifically, Prigozhin was spotted during negotiations between Shoygu and Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar in November 2018,44 which resulted in the Wagner Group being sent to Libya to support Haftar’s Tripoli offensive, the Operation Flood of Dignity (April 2019).45 Another essential aspect is related to the issue of Russian military advisors (which combined legal advisors and members of the Wagner group) in the Central African Republic (CAR), who were deployed to the country in 2018, as a part of technical-material cooperation between the CAR political regime and the Russian MoD.46 Neither episode could have been performed without the coordination of actions between leadership of the Wagner Group and the Russian MoD.

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A rebel fighter stands on a Russian-made Scud missile that was found in Junine, about 25 km southwest of Tripoli, 3 September 2011. The missile had been directed at the city of Tripoli.

The Wagner Group: Image and Reality

Between 2014 and 2020, the Wagner Group has been spotted operating on three continents. In this regard, one important aspect should be mentioned: the growing discrepancy between the image of the group (primarily created by Russian and Western media, based upon the group’s operations in Ukraine and Syria), and its actual capabilities. This argument gains more relevance in the light of the operations carried out by Wagner in Libya with respect to the Operation Flood of Dignity47 and Mozambique. Specifically, despite the fact that Wagner fighters have been sent to Libya to support Haftar’s offensive against Tripoli,48 its results have fallen short of its declared objective. Furthermore, as reported by both Russian and Turkish sources, the Wagner Group suffered its largest losses in manpower since the Syrian debacle in early-2018.49 These losses have resulted in certain reputational damage. According to available information, following this failure, Russian mercenaries were withdrawn from the frontline zone,50 which might stem from a combination of factors.

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Russia’s President Vladimir Putin shakes hands with Mozabique’s President Filipe Nyusi during a meeting in Moscow, 22 August 2019

Yet another disappointment has befallen the group in the Sub-Saharan Africa, a region of growing importance to the Kremlin’s geo-political/economic calculations.51 Following the meeting between the President of Mozambique Filipe Nyusi and Vladimir Putin in Moscow (22 August 2019) – when the African guest promised “lucrative contracts” and “ample opportunities” for the Russian businesses in the country52 – Russian mercenaries were reportedly deployed in the Cabo Delgado province (northern Mozambique) to help the government in its up-to-date unsuccessful fight against locally-operating Islamic radicals.53 According to both Russian and Western sources54 in pursuit of this contract in Mozambique, Wagner ‘outcompeted’ leading western PMSCs, primarily due to an advantageous pricing policy and to good relations with the local political leadership. However, the initial excitement was soon replaced by the sobering effect made by the first military encounters with the local rebels. Ambushed by the radicals, Wagner reportedly lost several fighters, with up to twenty Mozambique official military also being killed.55 According to some unverified sources, this episode prompted the withdrawal of Russian mercenaries from Cabo Delgado.56 Indeed, these experiences have shown some structural weaknesses showcased by the private military contractors, as well as the fact that this tool, even though effective at the tactical/operative level, is unlikely to gain a strategic role in Russia’s military thinking.57 The main reason behind this assumption boils down to the following: in its actions, the Russian side is delegating PMCs with certain functions – such as military operations that they are not designed to execute, and for which they have no appropriate resources. These functions are typically performed by the regular armed forces, such as the SOF, which is specifically designed for such tasks.

Beyond Wagner: Russian Irregulars and the Western Alliance

Reflecting upon the range of challenges faced by NATO due to Russia’s use of PMCs, one essential aspect should be recognized: as the most well-known and notorious entity of its kind, the Wagner Group is neither the root of the problem nor the main peril. As it was convincingly demonstrated in Deir ez-Zor, Libya58 and Mozambique,59 the actual military capabilities of the Wagner Group depend upon various conditions. One of them is the close cooperation with Russia’s regular armed forces, which secured its success in both Ukraine and Syria. Therefore, from a strictly military perspective, Russian PMCs should not be viewed as a supreme threat, yet those forces could act as ‘spoilers,’ distracting/disrupting actions of NATO/Western powers in zones of instability.

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Another shot of armed men, believed to be Russian servicemen, marching outside a Ukrainian military base outside the Crimean city of Simferopol, 10 March 2014.

Arguably, however, a much more serious peril emanates from ‘irregulars,’ –a broad array of forces that including PMCs, Cossacks, the Night Wolves,60 members of various military-patriotic organizations/societies, and ‘hacktivists,’–that could be used to provoke and destabilize situations. The main challenge stemming from activities of this group was, perhaps, best showcased during Russia’s annexation of Crimea. Success of this operation in many ways was inseparable from actions of the irregulars that performed all the “groundwork,”61 by preparing the ‘turf’ for the “little green men”62 – regular armed forces, such as the SOF and the Spetsnaz.63 Some elements of the ‘Crimean scenario’ could consist of exercises by Russia in other venues or theatres. One such potential areas is the Balkans, where Russia has been using covert operations since the early-1990s through proxy forces, and/or Latvia and Lithuania. Incidentally, during the Zapad-2017 strategic military exercises (14–20 September), Moscow used both local forces and the Don Army Cossacks as an auxiliary force64 on the territory of Kaliningrad oblast, which co-hosted the event. Even though this risk does exist and should not be neglected, it appears highly unlikely that Moscow would use the ‘Crimean scenario’ in or against countries that hold NATO membership. After all, the current operative theatre of Russian PMCs/irregular forces is either confined by the ‘borders’ of the post-Soviet area, or it extends to places classified as “gray zones.” This, however, does not mean that the risk should be excluded completely: Russia is likely to continue testing NATO and its allies through a string of provocations as a means to tackle cohesion of the alliance and the resolve of its members.

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Russian military vehicles on the move during the Zapad-2017 war games near the village of Volka, Belarus, 19 September 2017.

For this purpose, Moscow is already actively using irregulars – primarily, the Night Wolves, Cossacks, various military-patriotic organizations, as well as ‘hacktivists,’ – to infiltrate, provoke, destabilize and stir up things in other regions/countries/places. Out of a large number of known examples, one must recall the role of Cossacks and PMC members, covered up by the Russian MFA, the Russian Orthodox Church and the Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs, in radicalizing the Serbian youth, which came to be known as the “Zlatibor affair” – an event that caused huge resonance in the country and required the personal involvement of Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić. The incident revealed strong ties between the Russian MFA, Cossacks, the Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs and members of some PMCs that had fought in the Donbass.65 Currently, with respect to the Balkans, Russia’s attention is diverted to Bosnia, Montenegro (where Russian agents already tried to carry out a military coup in 2016), and Serbia, which had refused to introduce any anti-Russian sanctions as a result of the unlawful annexation of Crimea. It is highly possible that even NATO/EU membership of the above-mentioned countries would not fully stop Moscow from using covert methods.

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NATO and EU flags waving on a blue-sky background.

The second concern is premised upon developments in Russia’s westernmost region, the Kaliningrad oblast. Specifically, Kaliningrad-based Cossacks are actively establishing ties, primarily via joint para-military exercises, with The Slavic Union (Braterstwo Słowian) and The Movement for the Sovereignty of the Polish People (Ruch Suwerennośći Narodu Polskiego) – pro-Russian and anti-NATO -Ukrainian platforms.66 The direct impact of these ties should not be overrated, and yet, the collateral damage is unpredictable and might become more pronounced in the future.

The third concern relates to the Arctic region, an area of Russia’s strategic interests and massive expectations.67 As the noted French historian, sociologist, and political scientist Marlene Laruelle opines, the Arctic occupies a special place in Russia’s economic, geopolitical and ideological calculations.68 Following the Ukrainian Crisis, Russia began intensifying its efforts towards (re)militarization of the region. Russia’s strategy is on many levels commensurate with an idea brought forth by a renowned Russian military expert, Vladislav Shuryghin “[I]n the Arctic region, you do not fight wars with armies and divisions.”69 Indeed, a closer look at Russia’s manoeuvres/exercises in the region show high role of small and highly maneuvering formations – elements that are presumably seen by Russia as the main operative force in case of a limited-scale escalation in the region. Aside from military-related aspects, Russia’s actions in the region generate interest for yet another reason: by using a mix between facts and provocations and information operations.70

Conclusion

The emergence of Russian PMCs on the Ukrainian Southeast in 2014 and their subsequent (re)appearance in Syria (2015) created a huge wave of interest toward this phenomenon among Russian and international experts, scholars, journalists, and policy makers. The initial veneer of the omnipotence and invincibility of Russian private military contractors was challenged in 2018 (Syria) and 2019 (Libya and Mozambique). Based upon these examples, it would be adequate to presume that the actual military potential demonstrated by Russian PMCs do not allow to classify this tool as a strategic element within the Russian toolkit. And yet, its importance/capabilities should not be downplayed – under certain circumstances and against specific enemies/adversaries this tool could and will be very useful. That said, we believe that the main danger to the Western alliance and, in particular, its partners, emanates from ‘irregulars’ that could be employed in various (both military and non-military) missions, acting – in the case of a potential limited-scale military escalation or preceding events – as an auxiliary forces, which was demonstrated during the annexation of Crimea.

Therefore, we argue that in the short-to-mid-term prospect, main areas of employment of Russian irregular forces (including PMCs) will extend to the following three main areas. First, actual (para)military operations will likely be performed by Russian PMCs in resource-endowed and politically unstable countries in the Middle East, the Maghreb, the Sub-Saharan Africa and (potentially) South and Central America (Venezuela and Nicaragua) as well as countries of the post-Soviet space. The employment of these forces in/against EU/NATO member-states should not be expected in a short- and mid-term prospect. Second, provocations and ‘ground testing’ as a means to test the resolve of the Western alliance – an element whose spread will extend beyond the above-mentioned area, including the Balkans, the Arctic region, and the European Union. While the actual impact of these actions should not be overstated – since Russia is unlikely to use offensive potential of irregulars (including PMCs) against EU and NATO members – the Western alliance must be cautious, since some provocations (especially with respect to the Balkans and the three Baltic States) might take place. Third, information-psychological operations as an integral part of the war of the new generation (Network-centric warfare) – an element that was demonstrated during the Crimean operation.71 That said, to understand better and perhaps even re-consider their role, potential areas of employment of Russian irregular formations (including PMCs) and their coordination with Russian regular armed forces, it would be valuable to thoroughly analyze the history of the Ukrainian crisis, paying special attention to the interim between January 2014 and February 2015.

One final aspect should be highlighted. Dr. Christopher R. Spearin of the Canadian Forces College argues that one way to curtail the activities of Russian PMCs is for the United States to place them “…in a normatively defensive context in which utilization is transparent.”72 This scenario, as confirmed by Anthony Pfaff and Edward Mienie of the US Army War College,73 looks at the problem of Russian PMCs from a Western perspective. Based upon the analysis of operative principles employed by Russian PMCs, whose functions and de-facto activities drastically differ from Western PMSCs, legal measures are unlikely to have any impact upon Russian PMCs and other semi-state actors. Although activities of irregulars could be, to some and very limited extent, confronted by legal measures, PMCs could only be targeted by military measures. By inflicting substantial damage on these mercenary formations in ‘gray zones,’ two main results could be achieved. For one, the recruiting mechanism could be disrupted because the number of qualified recruits is likely to subside dramatically. For another, and most importantly, defeats of mercenaries could well repel third parties from hiring them in the future.

Notes

  1. “This Working Paper was funded by the Defence and Security Foresight Group which receives funding from the Mobilizing Insights in Defence and Security (MINDS) program designed to facilitate collaboration and mobilize knowledge between the Department of National Defence, the Canadian Armed Forces, and academia and other experts on defence and security issues. Through its Targeted Engagement Grants, collaborative networks, scholarships, and expert briefings, MINDS works and collaborates with key partners to strengthen the foundation of evidence-based defence policy making. These partnerships drive innovation by encouraging new analyses of emerging global events, opportunities, and crises, while supporting a stronger defence and security dialogue with Canadians.”
  2. The most well known examples include the Livonian War (1558 – 1583), the Time of Troubles (1598 – 1613) and the colonization of Siberia (1580 – late-1600s).
  3. Valery Gerasimov, “Po opytu Sirii: Gibridnaya voyna trebuyet vysokotekhnologichnogo oruzhiya i nauchnogo obosnovaniya”. Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kurier, no. 9, 2016, at: https://vpk-news.ru/articles/29579; See also:  Frank Hoffman, “Hybrid Warfare and Challenges,” Joint Forces Quarterly, no. 52, 2009, at: www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a516871.pdf; Vladimir Rauta (2019): Towards a typology of non-state actors in ‘hybrid warfare’: proxy, auxiliary, surrogate and affiliated forces, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, DOI: 10.1080/09557571.2019.1656600.
  4. “Irregulyarnye voyska v Rossiyskoy imperii,” Mvd.prav-ussr.su, Accessed 2 February 2019, at: http://mvd.prav-ussr.su/иррегулярные-войска-в-российской-имп/.
  5. Igor Eliseev and Aleksey Tikhonov, “V teni piramid,” in Rossiyskaya Gazeta, №5300 (221), 30 September 2010, at: https://rg.ru/2010/09/30/taina.html.
  6. Sergey Sukhankin, “The Russian State’s Use of Irregular Forces and Private Military Groups: From Ivan the Terrible to the Soviet Period,” in War by Other Means, The Jamestown Foundation, 12 April 2019, at: https://jamestown.org/program/the-russian-states-use-of-irregular-forces-and-private-military-groups-from-ivan-the-terrible-to-the-soviet-period/.
  7. Lavrenov S.Y. Sovietskii Soyuz w lokalnikh voinah I konfliktakh. Artel, Moscow, 2003.
  8. “Border wars” were a series of conflicts between Libya and its neighbors, including Chad, Niger and Egypt that took place in the 1970s–1980s. For more information, also see: V.Voronov, A.Artemyev, Sovetskaya shkola Kaddafi: Kak I chemu nauchili armiyu Muammara Kaddafi sovetskie voyennye,  SUP Media Gazeta.Ru: Internet-izdaniya, 2011,  at: https://www.gazeta.ru/politics/theme/2011/03/31/3571009.shtml
  9. Vladimir Voronov and Aleksandr Artemyev, “Sovetskaya shkola Kaddafi,” Gazeta.ru, 31 March 2011,  at: https://www.gazeta.ru/politics/theme/2011/03/31/3571009.shtml.
  10. Aleksandra Turchaninova, “Veteran ‘Alfy’: Eltsyn nas nenavidel ilyubil…, ” available at: https://histrf.ru/biblioteka/b/vietieran-alfy-ieltsin-nas-i-nienavidiel-i-liubil.
  11. NCnews. “Sovershenno Dokumentalnoye Rassledovanije  sekretno-Spetssluzhby oligarhov.” Youtube.com, Projekt Sovershenno Sekretno, 10 February 2013, at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EUZorQLtIGU. See also Mark Galeotti. The Vory: Russia's Super Mafia (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2018).
  12. Sergey Sukhankin, “From ‘Volunteers’ to Quasi-PMCs: Retracing the Footprints of Russian Irregulars in the Yugoslav Wars and Post-Soviet Conflicts,” in War by Other Means, The Jamestown Foundation, 25 June 2019, at: https://jamestown.org/program/from-volunteers-to-quasi-pmcs-retracing-the-footprints-of-russian-irregulars-in-the-yugoslav-wars-and-post-soviet-conflicts/.
  13. Igor Strelkov, “Kontrudar,” Zavtra.ru, 6 January 1998, at: http://zavtra.ru/blogs/1998-01-0751.
  14. Mark Galeotti, “Gangster’s paradise: how organised crime took over Russia,” in The Guardian, 23 March 2018, at: https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/mar/23/how-organised-crime-took-over-russia-vory-super-mafia.
  15. “Kratkaya istoriya chastnoy ochrany RF,” Nastrussia.ru, 2 June 2012, at:  http://www.nastrussia.ru/russia/blogpost/126-kratkaya-istoriya-rossijskoj-chastnoj-okhrany?start=1.
  16. NCnews. “Sovershenno sekretno-Spetssluzhby oligarhov.” Youtube.com, 10 February 2013, at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EUZorQLtIGU.
  17. Charles Gurin, “ROMAN TSEPOV, R.I.P.,” The Jamestown Foundation, Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 1 Issue: 93, 27 September 2004, at: https://jamestown.org/program/roman-tsepov-r-i-p/.
  18. Sergey Sukhankin, “From ‘Volunteers’ to Quasi-PMCs: Retracing the Footprints of Russian Irregulars in the Yugoslav Wars and Post-Soviet Conflicts,” War by Other Means, The Jamestown Foundation, 25 June 2019, at:  https://jamestown.org/program/from-volunteers-to-quasi-pmcs-retracing-the-footprints-of-russian-irregulars-in-the-yugoslav-wars-and-post-soviet-conflicts/.
  19. Sergey Lyutykh, “Umru za Rodinu. Dorogo,” Lenta.ru, February 1, 2018, https://lenta.ru/articles/2018/02/01/chvk/.
  20. Denis Korotkov, “Brodyaga, Sedoy, Wagner i Ratibor okruzhyli prezidenta,” Fontanka.ru, 21 August 2017, at: https://www.fontanka.ru/2017/08/18/103/.
  21. Åse Gilje Østensen and Tor Bukkvoll, “Russian Use of Private Military and Security Companies - the implications for European and Norwegian Security.” FFI Rapport no. 18/01300, CMI - Chr. Michelsen Institute, 2018,  at: https://www.cmi.no/publications/6637-russian-use-of-private-military-and-security.
  22. Phil Stewart, “U.S. troops in Iraq will need immunity: U.S. chief,” Reuters, 2 August 2011, at:  https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-usa/u-s-troops-in-iraq-will-need-immunity-u-s-chief-idUSTRE7711PX20110802
  23. Sergey Sukhankin. “’A black cat in the dark room’: Russian Quasi-Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) – ‘Non-existent,’ but Deadly and Useful,” in Canadian Military Journal, Vol. 19, No. 4, Autumn 2019.
  24. Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan. The New Nobility: The Restoration of Russia’s Security State and Enduring Legacy of the KGB (New York: Public Affairs, 2010).
  25. Aleksandr Ageev, “Silovaya ekonomika I smena mirovogo gegemona,” Strategicheskie prioritety, No. 2 (6) (2015), pp. 27–48.  
  26. Jānis Bērziņš. The Russian Way of Warfare (pp. 17–21), in: Current Russian Military Affairs. Assessing and Countering Russian Strategy, Operational Planning, and Modernization. SSI, Current Russian Military Affairs, Conference Executive Summaries. John R. Deni, (ed.), July 2018.
  27. Irina Malkova, Anton Bayev, “Chastnaya armiya dlya presidenta: istoriya samogo delikatnogo porucheniya Yevgeniya Prigozhyna,” in The Bell, 29 January 2019, at: https://thebell.io/41889-2/.
  28. Sergey Sukhankin, “Russian PMCs in the Syrian Civil War: From Slavonic Corps to Wagner Group and Beyond,”  in War by Other Means, The Jamestown Foundation, 18 December 2019, at: https://jamestown.org/program/russian-pmcs-in-the-syrian-civil-war-from-slavonic-corps-to-wagner-group-and-beyond/.
  29. “Utkin Dmitrij Valerevich,” in Myrotvorets, 16 December 2016, at: https://myrotvorets.center/criminal/utkin-dmitrij-valerevich/.
  30. Sergey Sukhankin, “Unleashing the PMCs and Irregulars in Ukraine: Crimea and Donbas” in War by Other Means, The Jamestown Foundation, 3 September 2019, at: https://jamestown.org/program/unleashing-the-pmcs-and-irregulars-in-ukraine-crimea-and-donbas/.  
  31. “Intervyu rossiyskikh naemnikov Botvinyevykh: ‘Wagnera’ na Donbasse trenirovali nashy kadrovye voyennye iz ‘Vympela.’ Ryadovoy ‘Wagnera’ poluchal 180 tysyach rubley,” Censor.net.ua, 18 May  2018, at: https://censor.net.ua/resonance/3066311/intervyu_rossiyiskih_naemnikov_botvinevyh_
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  32. Sergey Sukhankin, “Russian Special Operations Forces: Image Versus Substance,” in Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 16 Issue: 43, The Jamestown Foundation, 27 March 2019, at: https://jamestown.org/program/russian-special-operations-forces-image-versus-substance/.
  33. Denis Korotkov, “Oni srazhalis za Palmiru,” in Fontanka.ru, 29 March  2016, at: https://www.fontanka.ru/2016/03/28/171/.
  34. Igor Strelkov (Girkin), “’Chastniki’ Chast 1-4,”in  Vbloknot.com, 14 July 2018, at: https://vbloknot.com/18446-igor-strelkov-chastniki.html
  35. While the accurate number is unknown, the most realistic number of Russian mercenaries killed should be seen closer to twenty men. For more information see: Christoph Reuter, “The Truth About the Russian Deaths in Syria,” in Spiegel.de, 2 March 2018, at: https://www.spiegel.de/international/world/american-fury-the-truth-about-the-russian-deaths-in-syria-a-1196074.html.
  36. Gostev, A., and R. Coalson, “Russia’s Paramilitary Mercenaries Emerge from the Shadows.” RFE/RL.org, 16 December  2016, at: https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-paramilitary-mercenaries-emerge-from-the-shadows-syria-ukraine/28180321.html.
  37. Sergey Sukhankin, “Russian PMCs in the Syrian Civil War: From Slavonic Corps to Wagner Group and Beyond,”  in War by Other Means, The Jamestown Foundation, 18 December 2019, at: https://jamestown.org/program/russian-pmcs-in-the-syrian-civil-war-from-slavonic-corps-to-wagner-group-and-beyond/  
  38. Sarah Fainberg. Russian Spetsnaz, Contractors and Volunteers in the Syrian Conflict. No. 105, Ifri, December 2017, at:https://www.ifri.org/en/publications/notes-de-lifri/russieneivisions/russian-spetsnaz-contractors-and-volunteers-syrian
  39. Examples of Budyonnovsk and other follies committed by Russian armed forces during the First Chechen War should be attributed to the general state of disarray in the Russian army. For more information see: Yuri Demin. Bitva za Budennovsk. Spetsnaz Rossii. 31 May 2015, at: http://www.specnaz.ru/articles/224/8/2249.htm
  40. Kimberly Marten, “Russia’s use of semi-state security forces: the case of the Wagner Group,” in Post-Soviet Affairs, 35:3, 2019, 181-204, DOI: 10.1080/1060586X.2019.1591142; Kimberly Marten, “The Puzzle of Russian Behavior in Deir Al-Zour.” in War on the Rocks, at: in https://warontherocks.com/2018/07/the-puzzle-of-russian-behavior-in-deir-al-zour/
  41. Sergey Sukhankin, “Russian PMCs in the Syrian Civil War: From Slavonic Corps to Wagner Group and Beyond,” in War by Other Means, The Jamestown Foundation, 18 December 2019, at: https://jamestown.org/program/russian-pmcs-in-the-syrian-civil-war-from-slavonic-corps-to-wagner-group-and-beyond/.
  42. Christoph Reuter, “The Truth about the Russian Deaths in Syria,” in Spiegel.de, 2 March 2018, at: https://www.spiegel.de/international/world/american-fury-the-truth-about-the-russian-deaths-in-syria-a-1196074.html.
  43. Petr Kozlov, “Putin zamenil rabochie poezdki na vstrechu s generalami. Vozmozhno iz-za Sirii,” BBC.com, 13 February 2018, at: https://www.bbc.com/russian/news-43051143.
  44. Irek Murtazin, “Na etoy kukhne chto-to gotovitsya,” in Novaya Gazeta, 9 November 2018, at: https://novayagazeta.ru/articles/2018/11/09/78517-na-etoy-kuhne-chto-to-gotovitsya.
  45. Samer Al-Atrush, “Libya’s Prime Minister Says Russia Mercenaries Will Drag Out War,” in Bloomberg, 14 November  2019, at: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-11-14/libya-s-prime-minister-says-russia-mercenaries-will-drag-out-war.
  46. Sergey Sukhankin, “Russia’s hired guns in Africa,” ECFR.eu, 12 November 2018,  at: https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_russias_hired_guns_in_africa.
  47. “Khalifa Haftar, Libya’s strongest warlord, makes a push for Tripoli,” in The Economist,  5 April 2019, at: https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2019/04/05/khalifa-haftar-libyas-strongest-warlord-makes-a-push-for-tripoli.
  48. Samer Al-Atrush and Stepan Kravchenko, “Putin-Linked Mercenaries Are Fighting on Libya’s Front Lines,” in Bloomberg, 25 September 2019, at: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-09-25/-putin-s-chef-deploys-mercenaries-to-libya-in-latest-adventure.
  49. Liliya Yapparova, “Oni sami tolkom ne znali, kuda edut,” in Meduza.io, 2 October 2019, at: https://meduza.io/feature/2019/10/02/oni-sami-tolkom-ne-znali-kuda-edut.
  50. “Boytsy ChVK Wagnera pokinuli liniyu fronta v Livii,”  in Lenta.ru, 11 January 2020, at: https://lenta.ru/news/2020/01/11/gone/.
  51. Sergey Sukhankin, “The ‘Hybrid’ Role of Russian Mercenaries, PMCs and Irregulars in Moscow’s Scramble for Africa,” War by Other Means, The Jamestown Foundation, 10 January 2020, at: https://jamestown.org/program/the-hybrid-role-of-russian-mercenaries-pmcs-and-irregulars-in-moscows-scramble-for-africa/. James Sladden, Becca Wasser, Ben Connable, Sarah Grand-Clement. Russian Strategy in the Middle East. RAND Corporation, 2017, at: https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE236.html
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  53. Sergey Sukhankin, “Russia Prepares a Foothold in Mozambique: Risks and Opportunities,” in Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 16 Issue: 142, The Jamestown Foundation, 15 October  2019, at: https://jamestown.org/program/russia-prepares-a-foothold-in-mozambique-risks-and-opportunities/.
  54. Pjotr Sauer, “In Push for Africa, Russia's Wagner Mercenaries Are 'Out of Their Depth' in Mozambique,” in The Moscow Times, 19 November 2019, at: https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2019/11/19/in-push-for-africa-russias-wagner-mercenaries-are-out-of-their-depth-in-mozambique-a68220.
  55. “Insurgentes Emboscam e Matam 20 Membros das FDS e cinco russos,” in Carta de Mocambique, 29 October  2019, at: https://cartamz.com/index.php/politica/item/3469-insurgentes-emboscam-e-matam-20-membros-das-fds-e-cinco-russos.
  56. “Nayemniki ChVK ‘Wagner’ otstupili iz Kabo-Delgado,” in Infonavigator.com, 25 November 2019, at: https://infonavigator.com.ua/gibridnyj-front/najomniki-chvk-vagner-otstupili-iz-kabo-delgado/.
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