Canadian Military Journal [Vol. 22, No. 3, Summer 2022]
Commentary

The brutal, incompetently executed and breathtakingly ill-advised Russian invasion of Ukraine signifies the end of the post-Cold War era that commenced with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. Be it a “paradigm shift”—to cite United Kingdom Foreign Secretary Liz Truss and others—or, in the words of German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, a Zeitenwende—a turning point—the arrival of the post-post-Cold War era, as Roland Paris of the University of Ottawa’s Graduate School of Public and International Affairs noted in a 21 March 2022 Globe and Mail op-ed, has “already upended Europe’s post-1989 security order, and what follows may be even more dangerous than the Cold War.” For Canada, a state typically associated with both a parsimonious approach to defence spending and an uncomfortably sparse interest in matters of national defence and international security, the fallout from the invasion of Ukraine has brought unaccustomed political, media and academic attention to the perceived inadequacy of Canadian defence spending, to the disquietingly glacial pace of defence procurement in Canada, to weaknesses in military readiness, sustainability and recruitment and retention as well as to the most credible procurement and other initiatives for enhancing Canada’s military capabilities in both the near and longer terms. It has also sparked debate on how best to refresh—or potentially replace—Strong, Secure, Engaged (SSE), the Trudeau government’s now five-year-old defence policy blueprint. Although its core tenets and principles arguably remain valid, Jody Thomas, the recently appointed National Security and Intelligence Advisor to the Prime Minister, noted during the March 2022 Ottawa Conference on Defence and Security organized by the CDA Institute and the Conference of Defence Associations that “we’ve been overtaken by events, and there may be a different ordering of things that need to be invested in.”

The geostrategic and other ramifications of the Russian invasion—and their implications for Canada and its NATO allies—are profound. “However the war in Ukraine unfolds,” noted Roland Paris in his Globe and Mail analysis, “NATO–Russia relations will almost certainly remain tense, if not hostile. Sanctions and economic warfare may continue as long as Mr. Putin retains power. Russian troops might never return home from their ‘training exercises’ in Belarus. Their presence threatens Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, all members of NATO. The Western alliance has already begun to rearm and reinforce.” Such trends, according to Paris, “point toward a new kind of Cold War, more perilous than the last. In its original form, the Soviet and Western blocs used various devices to constrain their competition within certain bounds. Armscontrol agreements limited certain weapons and permitted both sides to inspect each other’s compliance. The lines dividing the Soviet and Western blocs were relatively clear. These measures helped prevent the Cold War from becoming ‘hot,’ but most have now faded away.” He goes on to write that, whereas “Russia and NATO were largely disconnected during the Cold War, both sides are now vulnerable to each other’s cyberweapons, heightening the risks of real-world confrontation. Nor can Russia truly be isolated if China continues to serve as its economic lifeline.” Indeed, as former BBC special correspondent Allan Little noted in a March 2022 assessment of the invasion, “much will depend on how China negotiates this new landscape. China and Russia are bonded by their shared antipathy to American power, and their conviction that the greatest threat is from a resurgent, more unified democratic world. China does not want [Vladimir] Putin weakened, or the West strengthened. Yet that is exactly what the effect the war in Ukraine has had.” Similarly, observes Paris, “the good news is that Western democracies have shown remarkable unity in the face of Mr. Putin’s aggression. Now, they must prepare for what could become a long confrontation with Russia in Ukraine and elsewhere, without inadvertently triggering another ‘war to end all wars.’”

Typifying much of the Canadian media reaction to the invasion, and to its potential security and other ramifications for Canada, was Globe and Mail columnist Andrew Coyne. Writing on 19 March 2022, Coyne argued that Russia under Vladimir Putin “has become not merely a source of instability or the occasional outrage, but an existential threat; even if it can be returned to its cage in the short term, it will be the work of decades to contain it. Predictions of Mr. Putin’s imminent demise will, I’m afraid, prove illusory, and whoever succeeds him could in any case be as bad or worse. This is not a short-term crisis, but a long-term one.” Coyne writes that “one consequence of this, clearly, will be a requirement—no longer a request—that Canada improve its contribution to the collective defence of the democracies: an increase in defence spending from its current 1.4 per cent of GDP to at least 2 per cent, and probably beyond that.” The “current crisis has cruelly exposed, if it were not evident already, just how threadbare our military has become….” He writes: “That we need to spend more is self-evident; even more urgently, we need to spend better.” Military procurement, in his view, “has been a national disgrace for decades. Played for politics, corrupted by lobbyists, and caught between competing regional interests, projects have routinely come in years late and billions of dollars over budget. Perhaps we could afford this nonsense in the past. We cannot now.”

Coyne cautioned, though, that “some difficult choices” will be required since “this new demand for [defence] spending” will have to “contend” with the substantial pandemic-related growth in the deficit and the debt, rising levels of inflation, the Trudeau government’s “pet projects—and there are many of them”—the “grim” long-term fiscal prospects of the provinces as “an aging population collides with a sclerotic and overburdened health care system” (thereby necessitating additional fiscal transfers from Ottawa) and, more generally, the global economic uncertainties and damage triggered by the invasion of Ukraine. Indeed, “the only way we will ever be able to afford all of the many new burdens we are piling onto the tax system is if we can generate faster growth—much faster.”

The renewed political attention to questions of national defence and international peace and security in the immediate post-invasion period was evident in a series of wellpublicized statements and/or speeches by Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance Chrystia Freeland, Minister of Foreign Affairs Melanie Joly and, in particular, Minister of National Defence Anita Anand. The latter’s address to the Ottawa defence conference, for example, stressed that “we are [now] facing the greatest threats to international peace and stability since the end of the Second World War” and a series of “consequences for our multilateral partnerships and for the rules-based international order.” Given Canada’s need for a “strong, healthy and modern military,” the Minister was “pressing to ensure that we as a government are able to step up to support and invest in a well-equipped military that can defend our country and contribute to continental and global security.” “We know from [SSE],” said the Minister in a subsequent Global News interview, “that we will be increasing defence spending by 70 per cent over the nine-year period beginning in 2017. But in the context of the current threat environment, we must ask ourselves, is that enough? Should we be doing more?” In a CBC interview, the Minister reported that “I personally am bringing forward aggressive options which would see [Canada], potentially, exceeding the two per cent [of GDP] level, hitting the two percent level, and below the two per cent level.” More circumspect but potentially instructive was Chrystia Freeland’s early March 2022 comment to reporters in Berlin that she was accompanying the Prime Minister on a fourcountry European tour in part to consult with allies prior to the forthcoming federal budget. “The geopolitical situation has just changed tremendously” and “it’s very important and valuable for me as we finalize the budget to have some firsthand conversations about exactly the changes on the ground. And certainly, defence spending is something we have to look at carefully.” The Prime Minister, although widely reported to have “opened the door” to increased defence spending, was decidedly guarded. He acknowledged that the strategic “context is rapidly changing,” that Canada’s military personnel needed “all the equipment necessary to be able to stand strongly” and that “we will continue to look at what more we can do” but, noted the Canadian Press, he “did not directly respond to a question about whether Canada would finally commit to spending two per cent” of GDP on defence.

A decision by the government of Justin Trudeau to provide significant additional funding for national defence—just how significant and how quickly remains to be seen—at the seven-year mark of his prime ministerial stewardship could in some respects prove reminiscent of Pierre Trudeau’s Defence Structure Review. Unveiled in 1975—coincidentally at the seven-year mark of his prime ministerial tenure—the Defence Structure Review effectively restored NATO to its pre-eminent position in Canadian defence policy, rescued DND and the Canadian Forces from the financial wilderness, and facilitated something of a renaissance for a rather battered and rundown military establishment. The product of a less benign strategic environment and the Soviet Union’s expanding military capabilities, entreaties from allies (with European leverage much enhanced by Canada’s quest for trade diversification) and a variety of other factors (e.g. the perceived regional and industrial benefits of defence procurement), the Defence Structure Review heralded a major, inflation-indexed increase in defence spending and a wide-ranging re-equipment agenda. Some of this new equipment not surprisingly took a considerable amount of time to enter service, but some acquisitions, such as the underbudget CF-18 fighter, arrived, in retrospect, with remarkable dispatch.

Potential analogies between 1975 and 2022 should not be overstated, however. Defence in the 70s, the first and only defence white paper of the Pierre Trudeau era, for example, was obsolete by 1975, while Justin Trudeau’s 2017-vintage SSE defence blueprint remains essentially sound in its core fundamentals—albeit with profound reservations about the slow pace of implementation. Similarly, those who drafted and approved the Defence Structure Review did not have to contend with a pandemic-related assault on the public purse, present-day levels of anxiety over North American and Arctic security, or China’s rise as an economic and military powerhouse, or with the distressing imagery, the angst and the myriad geostrategic dilemmas generated by the invasion of Ukraine.

If the Trudeau government authorizes a prompt (not Germany’s Olaf Scholz-style prompt, admittedly, but something credible) and substantial infusion of additional funding for national defence, difficult but innovative decisions––which will become even more difficult if credible additional funding is not forthcoming––will be required on a host of personnel, procurement, infrastructure and related issues. Some useful insights into current thinking, and by inference into how additional funding could be allocated, were provided by the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS), General Wayne Eyre, in comments to the Ottawa defence conference. In “reconstituting” Canada’s armed forces, noted Eyre, “we’re going to look at three things, three priorities: people, operations and modernization. The people piece has to come first.” Indeed, General Eyre later told a CBC interviewer that his “first and foremost” priority in the event of additional defence spending would be to recruit and retain a stronger and more capable fighting force. “Front and centre,” he informed the Ottawa conference, “is evolving our culture, changing those aspects of our culture that we absolutely have to have in place to win the battle for talent, to be able to attract and retain talent … wherever we may find it in Canadian society because, if we don’t, if we don’t keep pace with the … changing demographics, the changing face of Canada, we are going to be irrelevant. Part of the people priority is getting our numbers back up and to that end, we’re energizing the recruiting system and the personnel production pipeline to be able to get those numbers rapidly back up.” Key, “as well,” he said, is “addressing retention. Even though we’ve got some of the best retention numbers … amongst our Western allies, [we’ve] got to make sure we’re keeping the right people [in] the right occupations [after] investing so much into people.”

The CDS characterized operations as a second priority “because as we rebuild, as we reconstitute, and current events are showing this, we absolutely have to keep our eye on readiness and operations. Ensuring that we can continue to deliver overseas and most importantly domestically for when that call comes.” General Eyre observed that there were a number of aspects to the third priority of modernization: “Continuing to push forward the projects that are in [SSE] because we know we’re going to need them. Continuing to focus on the North, including pieces like NORAD modernization because we know we are no longer as secure, no longer as insular here in North America and in Canada as we once were. Continuing to invest in those new domains: space, cyber and how we integrate all those domains with land, air [and] sea to produce that unified integrated effect.”

General Eyre’s attention to home, Arctic and North American defence and NORAD modernization—which would entail considerably more than replacing the North Warning System—dovetails broadly with SSE, the 14 August 2021 Canada–United States Joint Statement on NORAD Modernization, Minister Anand’s Mandate Letter of 16 December 2021 and a growing number of statements and speeches by ministers and officials. It would be a logical recipient of new defence spending, partly because of changing geostrategic, technological and operational realities, partly because of its importance in terms of the broader Canada–United States relationship and partly because of some potentially attractive synergies between Arctic defence and the assertion of Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic—a subject historically close to Canadian hearts if not wallets—and to synergies between the military, quasi-military and non-military roles of Canada’s armed forces (e.g. search and rescue in the Arctic). In procurement terms, logical corollaries to a revitalized northern role would include the replacements for the CF-18, the CC-150 tanker-transport and the Aurora maritime patrol/intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) aircraft. That said, both the Liberals and the opposition parties would do well to recall that the precursor North American Air Defence Modernization (NAADM) accord of 1985 was mishandled by both the government and the opposition and became linked in the minds of many Canadians to the controversial Strategic Defense Initiative and ultimately produced one of the most confused, muddled and frankly embarrassing debates in the convoluted history of Canadian defence policy.

On the broader procurement side of the ledger, a major infusion of additional funding and, at the very least, a comprehensive freshening of SSE, would together necessitate a thorough but not drawn out review of the 348 projects that currently constitute the SSE capital envelope. The review would need to examine a range of factors, including potential capital additions and deletions (although one suspects that there would be precious few of the latter), projects that should be elevated in priority and therefore expedited (if possible) or, conversely, reduced in priority, adjustments in projected quantities and/or capabilities and performance, the prospects for life-extending and upgrading existing weapon systems to meet changing circumstances and requirements, and what is, or is not, feasible given limitations in the ability to manage numerous procurement projects and to actually spend available funds. The latter problem already exists, of course, and has repeatedly figured in the reports of the Office of the Parliamentary Budget Officer. Trade-offs between domestic content and off-the-shelf procurement from foreign suppliers would no doubt also require re-evaluation in some cases. A challenge, not unexpectedly, is that foreign production lines will themselves be busier with domestic and offshore orders following the ramping up of Western defence spending and procurement. Canadian defence academics and others have offered up a range of favoured projects if substantial additional funding is forthcoming. Such lists typically prioritize the successor to the CF-18, the potent but pricey Canadian Surface Combatant, capital projects related to NORAD modernization, multiple projects for the army (usually anchored by air defence and anti-armour requirements) and, potentially, new submarines. Additional strategic airlift—which has the virtue of being relevant to an inherently broad range of defence commitments—appears less frequently on such lists, but Ottawa already has ambitions in this regard, given declarations in Minister Anand’s Mandate Letter of 16 December 2021 and in the Liberal campaign literature from 2021. A harsh defence procurement reality, of course, is that many scheduled projects would be difficult to expedite even if substantial additional funding became available.

In the final analysis, a sound and compelling case—one anchored in Canada’s own national self-interest, in our commitments to our allies and in our oft-stated desire to make enduring and productive contributions to international peace and security—can be advanced for a substantial boost in the defence budget. That said, one must be mindful of the enormous and growing array of competing demands upon the public purse. On some, such as those related to climate change and the environment, we have only scratched the surface. If public support for additional defence expenditures is to be secured and maintained, it is imperative that existing and projected defence dollars be spent—and be seen by the public to be spent—wisely and productively. Longstanding inefficiencies in defence procurement—many, admittedly, more the fault of political tinkering than inefficiencies or deficiencies in stated procurement practices or in the procurement system per se—must be addressed. Bloated civilian and military bureaucracies, and rank structures, also require attention. Nor is the exceptionally serious and deeply troubling problem of sexual misconduct and harassment in the military irrelevant in this context. Such misconduct has already hurt recruiting for the armed forces but, in eroding public support and respect for the armed forces, it also threatens to undermine, at least indirectly, public support for a more credibly funded military establishment.

Professor Martin Shadwick has taught Canadian defence policy at York University for many years. He is a former editor of Canadian Defence Quarterly, and he is the resident defence commentator for the Canadian Military Journal.